This chapter seeks to strengthen the account of the Principle of Multispecies Legality offered in the previous chapter by responding to potential queries and concerns around the proposal’s structure, scope, and feasibility. The outlined concerns are as follows: that the PML is an attempt to redefine legal personhood; that a focus on interests is too inclusive, in that in opening the doors of legal inclusion to a relatively wide range of beings and entities it would put undesirable constraints on human activity; that a focus on interests is too limited in that it doesn’t capture the full scope of animals’ capabilities; that the PML will result in the equal treatment of humans and all other animals; that we shouldn’t base a being’s worth on their possession of a particular characteristic; and that the PML will be too unfeasible to implement.

Chapter 2 explores an important premise which underlies this critique of the law: it examines the idea that disfigurement inequality is a problem which merits a legal response – namely the granting of protective rights under the Act. It concludes that, despite some uncomfortable distinctions, there is a compelling case for a legal response in this area. The nature of law’s current response is then laid out. Relevant parts of the international legal framework – including EU law, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’) and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) applying the European Convention on Human Rights – are explained by reference to the models of disability which implicitly inform them.

Chapter 3 probes the meaning of the word ‘equality’. It outlines a multidimensional, substantive conception of equality, as adopted by the UN Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. But it notes the Act’s lack of engagement with some aspects of this ideal. The Act’s scope is both more limited and more individualised than this substantive concept might demand. Making sense of what law might intend to contribute to meeting equality ideals is difficult but necessary, as it can provide a benchmark against which to evaluate the law. With this in mind, this chapter proposes five potential objectives, which are guided by the Act’s scope. These range from changing attitudes and shaping perceived social norms through to influencing behaviours or compensating victims of negative treatment. These potential objectives are used as a framework for assessment of law’s contribution throughout the rest of the book.

In his Doctrine of Right, Kant claims that freedom is the only innate right. The Feyerabend Lectures, in contrast, contains a list of many innate rights. I compare Kant’s conception of innate right with Achenwall’s as well as those of Heineccius, Meier, and Hutcheson. Although in Feyerabend Kant lists various innate rights (plural), they roughly correspond to the “authorizations” that Kant develops in the Doctrine of Right from the single innate right of freedom, and even in Feyerabend they are linked to freedom. Not only did Kant have a different basis for right in freedom, his explanation of what the others call innate rights in terms of freedom better explains their importance.

Throughout this book, you have been challenged to look at the role the Arts play in society and in education. Various methodologies have been suggested and each specific Arts area has been broken down for you. The tools are now in place for you to organise Arts learning and teaching in your classroom. You also have reflective tools to apply to the learning and teaching you undertake. In this final chapter, we challenge you to imagine your Arts-rich classroom. What do you want the Arts to look like and how do you want your students to engage in them? These decisions will reflect your vision and rationale for teaching the Arts and your many experiences in working with the Arts as you have progressed through this book. These decisions are best made by the person who decides the ‘what’ and ‘how’ for their students every day: you.

This chapter introduces the book’s motivation: to understand how activists use identity to manage the apparent contradiction between the promises of legal inclusion and persistent forms of marginalization. The chapter illustrates the importance of the issue through discussion of the activism of two lesbian groups – Free Gender in Cape Town, South Africa, and La Fulana in Buenos Aires, Argentina – that form the focus on the book. Both organizations strategize sexual identity in tandem with other racial, class, and gender identities, albeit in different ways. The chapter presents the conceptual background of the book, which adopts a historical approach to understanding LGBT inclusion into citizenship and explains the relevance of intersectionality to contemporary LGBT organizing. The chapter previews the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1 that accounts for key differences in how the two organizations strategically use multiple identities. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the methodological aspects of the research and presents the plan for the rest of the book.

This chapter focuses on digital collaboration when learning an additional language (L2), a specific type of learner–learner interaction. In CALL contexts, collaboration has almost exclusively been researched in connection with writing, which will be the focus of this chapter. The chapter first provides a definition of collaboration versus cooperation and then a literature review of digital collaboration, mainly in writing contexts. We conclude with a list of strategies for promoting collaboration and suggestions for future collaboration contexts and research.

This chapter claims that in the new millennium, religious conservatives succeed in their struggles to control women’s bodies and to turn their private prejudices into public policy through the misappropriation of human rights and by gaining unwarranted religious exemptions. By allegedly demanding the protection of their own rights to religious liberty, conscientious objection, equality, and multicultural accommodations, religious conservatives are reversing the progress in women’s rights and using liberal rights and concepts as a weapon against women. The chapter argues that, contrary to popular belief, the separation between religion and the state cannot protect women’s rights against the religious conservative attack. It compares the religious conservative attack on women’s rights in the USA, where religion is separated from the state, to the religious conservative attack on women’s rights in Israel, where there is no separation between religion and the state, and shows that despite the very different religion–state relations, the religious conservative attack in the USA and Israel is similar in both method and success.

Without significant changes in labor law, the 100-year life will almost certainly be defined by deep inequities. Working-class people, and workers of color in particular, are least likely to enjoy extended life spans. And if they do live longer, they are unlikely to enjoy a leisurely retirement in which they decide how they spend their extra years. Instead, they will face more toil and precarity. This chapter imagines a different future. It asks: What would the 100-year life look like if working people had a greater hand in shaping it? What would a legal regime look like that gave working people power to affect decisions about how work is structured and how resources are distributed in the era of the 100-year life? How might we reimagine labor law for a more just and equitable 100-year life?

A pragmatic approach to international human rights law involves discussing its premises, principles like human dignity, liberty, equality, and solidarity, and structural principles such as democracy, pluralism, and the rule of law. The chapter also examines the conditions, matters, and actors involved in the discussion. It explores how these principles are applied in practice and the challenges faced in their implementation. The chapter emphasizes the importance of a pragmatic approach that considers the practical realities of applying human rights principles in different contexts. It also discusses the role of various actors, including states, international organizations, and civil society, in promoting and protecting human rights.

Natural rights can justify legal rights to control and dispose of those resources exclusively – that is, rights of ownership. Ownership is justified on moral grounds when it seems likely in practice to help people acquire and use resources more effectively than alternate regimes would – especially, a system in which resources were open for everyone’s access and use and people enjoyed them with usufructs. This chapter studies four core or paradigm cases in which ownership facilitates use enough to be legitimate. One (associated with Aristotle) stresses ownership’s tendency to reduce disputes over property; another (associated with St. Thomas Aquinas) focuses on how ownership encourages careful management of resources; a third (Locke) focuses on how ownership incentivizes people labor and productivity; and the last (James Madison and other American founders) focuses on ownership’s securing privacy and autonomy for owners’ own preferred uses. This chapter considers egalitarian critiques of ownership, especially by Jeremy Waldron, Joseph Singer, G.A. Cohen, Liam Murphy, and Thomas Nagel. To define ownership, this chapter relies on conceptual work by A.M. Honore and J.E. Penner.

This book introduces a normative theory of property. Property laws and social norms are justified by whether and how well they secure natural rights. The natural rights are justified by run-of-the-mill principles of natural law, which evaluate human action by whether it helps people survive or flourish rationally. The book studies how natural rights legitimate property law in general and in specific doctrines. It also studies the main topics in property law and policy – ownership, public commons, the appropriate design of property rights, rights less sweeping than rights of ownership, property torts, regulatory takings, and eminent domain. The book studies in particular the phenomenon of practical reasoning, the sphere of moral reasoning that converts fundamental moral goals into specific laws and policies to enforce in practice. A theory of natural rights contributes importantly to normative theory beyond the theories most respected today – egalitarian or progressive theories, law and economics, and approaches the book calls pragmatic.

Constitutions are, above all, a compact among equals: they represent a contract that aims to include everyone, on an equal footing. This fact is explicitly reflected in a majority of constitutions, which appear openly committed to a principle of legal equality. The problem is that, from its very origins, this egalitarian constitutional ideal encountered enormous difficulties that prevented it from becoming ae reality in practice. Almost every area covered by the equality principle - whether we refer to the rights of racial, sexual or ethnic minorities, or to the workers’ rights – was transformed into a space for legal and political dispute. This chapter explores a few of those “disputed territories”, including conflicts around social rights; gender inequality; and indigenous rights. In this way, this text pays attention to the continuous, unfinished battle between the constitutional ideal of equality and a political practice systematically oriented to defy it.

Many of our pressing questions about price personalization concern its current practice and potential regulations. We could be tempted to move directly to those hard questions because many – but not all – consumers, scholars, and regulators already believe with some confidence that price personalization harms consumers or treats them unfairly. In this chapter, I pause to unpack intuitions about harm and unfairness and consider systematically what the normative problems with price personalization might be so that our understanding can inform what we look for in existing practice and what we aim to achieve with new regulations.