This chapter summarizes the MOUDD theory of phenomenal consciousness, and responds to dualist arguments based on bats, zombies, color inverts, and Mary in her black-and-white room.

Paranormal explanations of NDEs generally refer to the dualistic view of the world. These explanations are built upon the belief or derived from the credo that NDEs can be explained through paranormal concepts.

Unlike many other forms of ‘heresy’, Manichaeism is not a polemical construct but an independent and organised church within the Christian tradition originating in Mesopotamia and Iran in the third century CE. It had its own heresiology against other communities such as the western Catholic-Orthodox church, identifying key points of difference and deviance from the ‘faithful and true Christianity’ of Manichaean doctrine and practice.

Even by the standards of medieval heresy, the history of the Bogomils is notable for a lack of sources. This chapter bases its analysis on the long account of Kosmas Presbyter of Pop Bogomil and his followers in tenth-century Bulgaria. Understanding this helps illuminate less informative references and points to a persistent dualist tradition in the Balkans and Byzantium, well capable of exporting organisation and doctrine.

Were ‘the Cathars’ a medieval reality, an actual religious dissidence entertained by an organised group of people, or are they a mere figment of medieval churchmen and modern historians? In the last two decades, a fierce scholarly controversy has developed around this question. The present chapter introduces the reader to both sides of the argument.

The distinction between international and domestic law plays an essential function in the establishment of international law as an autonomous order. During the lifespan of the League, this distinction was contested by scholars and judges in increasingly sophisticated ways. This process culminated in the debate between monists and dualists. However, the formal conceptual foundations of this debate meant that it failed to take account of the way that bureaucrats, officials and experts at the League adopted equally sophisticated normative strategies as part of the ‘experiment of international administration’. Such strategies, which lay at the heart of attempts to promote the ‘well-being and development’ of peoples subject to mandatory rule and foster co-operation across social and economic fields, creatively transformed conventional understandings of the relationship between international law and domestic law. This chapter juxtaposes these simultaneous, countervailing trends of formalisation and deformalisation in international law and administration to offer fresh insight into the crucial formative period in the history of the distinction between international law and municipal law.

This chapter begins by sketching the standard belief-desire model of action and action-explanation employed by most philosophers, while also noting some variations. Of necessity, given the immense literature on the topic, this is presented at a high level of generality, abstracting over many local disagreements. The model and its variations provide the main set of foils for the scientifically grounded accounts to be discussed in later chapters, which are then briefly previewed. The remaining sections of the chapter go on to explain and quickly motivate three major assumptions that are taken for granted throughout the remainder of the book (and also by many philosophers and almost all cognitive scientists, it should be said): realism, physicalism, and representationalism.

This chapter highlights two distinct perspectives – international and domestic – on the judicial application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention). The international perspective is framed by reference to article 4 of the Convention and the maximalist approach taken by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The domestic perspective is conceptualised by reference to the direct and indirect application of the Convention as permitted by the reception rules in monist, dualist, and hybrid legal systems. The chapter argues that the international and domestic perspectives on the judicial application of the Convention differ on account of the different institutional positions of the bodies that control them (the Committee vs the domestic courts). The maximalist international position promoted by the Committee is often unavailable to the domestic courts, although it may be a potential inspiration to them. Canvassing these distinct perspectives provides the context for a better understanding of the limitations in the domestic courts’ engagement with the Convention, detailed in the subsequent chapters.

Kemp refuses to distinguish philosophical dualism from the sociological analytical dualism of the M/M approach where two entities can be interdependent but are not inseperable. This makes him a Central Conflationist

This chapter critically reviews dualism, as developed by Heinrich Triepel, and monism, mainly formulated by Hans Kelsen. It argues that these theories can no longer comprehensively explain the relationship between international and EU or EU and national law and that, due to their emergence almost a century ago, these theories must be understood in their historical context. Historically, dualism was progress as the separation of international and national law helped international law become independent. Thus, dualism liberated international law from being understood as “external State law,” and was even referred to as a “cleansing thunderstorm” by the monist Alfred Verdross. The main characteristic of monism is the assumption of a single unified legal system. Kelsenian monism must face the criticism of having a highly fictitious understanding of the world: nothing less than the “unity of the legal world order” is proclaimed. To depict the most important assumptions of Kelsenian monism, this chapter looks into the Kelsenian adherence to neo-Kantian epistemology, and shows that this understanding refers to a very specific philosophical position, which has been rightly criticized by many philosophers.

This chapter holds that the CJEU follows two diametrically diverging doctrines regarding the relationship between international and EU, as well as EU and Member State law. From a theoretical perspective this is inconceivable. One and the same organization cannot follow two different approaches. However, from a pragmatic perspective, this chapter acknowledges that this Janus face of the CJEU is quite understandable. Autonomy understood as monism, on the one hand, is an expression of legal unity, which is absolutely necessary for the EU to safeguard its integration process. On the other hand, autonomy expressed as dualism helps to secure the stability of this integration process by separating the EU legal order from far-reaching international influences. However, at the same time, autonomy cannot provide for an adequate replacement of monism and dualism.