Climate change, partly driven by rising emissions, has damaging and often irreversible impacts on entire economies. In this context, production processes play a crucial role, as they affect the level of pollution, causing environmental degradation, and affecting human health. Sustainable production methods and stricter environmental regulations can help mitigate these effects. However, their effectiveness depends on many factors as, for instance, the attitude towards greenery by firms and their convenience in breaking the rules. In the present work, we propose a dynamic framework to describe how and in which measure the production processes influence the environmental quality, considering the presence of non-compliant firms and the attitude toward greenery. We obtain a 3D piecewise-smooth dynamical system describing the evolution of the fraction of polluting firms, the monitoring level by the State, and the environmental quality over time. By analyzing the effects on environmental quality of the environmental regulation enforcement for different greenery propensities, we show that: (1) if the propensity for greenery is high, the system will converge towards a good equilibrium, that is, with high environmental quality and absence of dishonest companies; (2) if the propensity for greenery is at an intermediate level, the system may converge towards good or bad equilibria; (3) if the propensity for greenery is low, further internal attractors may emerge.

We explored how the perspective through which individuals view their actions influences their ethicality, comparing a narrow perspective that allows for evaluation of each choice in isolation, to a broad perspective that promotes an aggregate view of one’s choices. To examine unethical behavior we employed a computerized variation of a trivia game that challenges the player’s integrity because, rather than choosing the correct answer, players indicate whether the correct highlighted answer is the answer they had in mind. In Experiment 1 perspective was modified through the choice procedure: broad perspective evoked by an aggregate decision regarding the upcoming test items and narrow perspective evoked by a segregated decision regarding each upcoming test item. In Experiment 2 perspective was evoked through differential priming. Across both experiments, when given a monetary incentive to succeed, the adoption of a narrow perspective increased cheating, as evidenced by overall higher reported success rates.

Current theories of dishonest behavior suggest that both individual profits and the availability of justifications drive cheating. Although some evidence hints that cheating behavior is most prevalent when both self-profit and social justifications are present, the relative impact of each of these factors is insufficiently understood. This study provides a fine-grained analysis of the trade-off between self-profit versus social justifiability. In a non-student online sample, we assessed dishonest behavior in a coin-tossing task, involving six conditions which systematically varied both self-profit and social justifiability (in terms of social welfare), such that a decrease in the former was associated with the exact same increase in the latter. Results showed that self-profit outweighed social justifiability, but that there was also an effect of social justifications.

People experience fair and unfair treatment daily, and at times may react by breaking ethical rules and lying. Here, we assess the extent to which individuals engage in dishonest behavior aimed at helping or harming others after they experience (un)fair treatment. Across three financially incentivized experiments, recipients in a dictator game received a fair or unfair amount and then could, by means of dishonesty, inflate or deflate their counterparts’ pay. Results show that dishonest helping is a common and robust behavior. Individuals lie to help others after fair, unfair, and no prior treatment. Dishonest harming, however, is less prevalent. Only after unfair treatment, some, but not all, individuals engage in dishonest harming. Dishonest harming was associated with high levels of anger and disappointment, and low levels of gratitude. Interestingly, the source of (un)fairness, whether it is intentional or not, did not attenuate peoples’ behavior, suggesting that dishonest reactions to (un)fairness were driven by the mere (un)fair treatment, and not by a motivation to reciprocate an (un)fair counterpart.

Corruption is a global problem. Despite the importance of this theme, a shortage of theoretical models in both psychology and related areas that favor its understanding and investigation is noted. Due to this scarcity of theoretical models, in addition to the need to systematize studies on the topic, this theoretical article aims to describe the Analytical Model of Corruption (AMC) as an interdisciplinary and multilevel proposal aimed at corruption analysis. To achieve this goal, the concept of corruption was analyzed using related phenomena as reference. Similarities and differences in corruption have been identified with dishonest behavior and unethical behavior. Subsequently, theoretical models on corruption identified in the literature were presented, and their main characteristics and limitations were pointed out. After describing the models, the AMC was presented and its advantages over the previous models were discussed. Finally, it was concluded that the AMC could be configured as a theoretical model that guides interdisciplinary studies on corruption, allowing for a more complete analysis compared to previous theoretical models identified in the literature.