This article explores how the new generation of legalistic autocrats consolidates power—not by committing mass human rights violations as a way of consolidating power as authoritarians of the twentieth century did, but instead by attacking checks and balances so that democratic institutions are weakened. Judges at transnational courts, faced with evidence of these attacks, are developing a jurisprudence through which they transform the vindication of individual rights into requirements that states maintain democratic structures. While it is not clear if this jurisprudence prevents backsliding, it may become useful as new democrats attempt to restore constitutional institutions using these decisions as guidelines for democratic reform. In doing so, new democrats would be giving meaning to the rule of law writ large.

A major challenge for contemporary legal constitutionalism is a crisis of public ethics that manifests in the lack of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance towards the judiciary. To showcase the importance of these norms in the relationship among co-equal branches of government, I focus on three cases, one where these norms have been present—South Africa—one where they have been absent—Mexico—and one case in between—United States. Until this crisis is addressed, the authority of apex courts will continue to be under threat. The Article suggests that a starting point to address the public ethics deficit may lie in shifting comparative constitutional law scholarly attention to the political sphere.

This article examines the connections between existing democratic deficits in law and contemporary democratic backsliding processes. To undermine the democratic process, present-day autocrats employ various legal strategies, including enacting new legal institutions (such as constitutional amendments or key statutory reforms) or manipulating existing ones. Focusing on a legal legacy of military rule in Turkey, the Specially Authorized Courts, this study argues that in consolidating power, autocrats also capitalize on pre-existing authoritarian zones within legal systems. In Turkey’s case, the AKP government has leveraged the exceptional procedures of Specially Authorized Courts to silence adversaries while simultaneously framing its reforms to the structure of these courts and the trials held at these courts as efforts to democratize the country and eradicate authoritarian legacies. As a result, the AKP masked its repressive actions behind a narrative of democratization in the early stages of Turkey’s democratic regression. Overall, the article presents both the coercive and legitimating uses of pre-existing “zones of authoritarianism” in law in contemporary processes of democratic backsliding. In doing this, it highlights how aspiring autocrats exploit the histories embedded in legal institutions to obscure their repressive actions.

Current scholarship conceives of courts as victims or targets of populist authoritarians. But can empowered courts facilitate democratic backsliding? This article develops a new framework for understanding the approaches judiciaries take when tackling political corruption and argues that when judges attempt to replace ‘corrupted’ elected branches as the primary representative institution, their actions and rhetoric can enable populist authoritarians to seize power, raising the risk of democratic backsliding. I combine jurisprudence, newspaper archives and interviews to trace the process through which Pakistan’s Supreme Court, committed to playing a representation-replacement role, enabled the military-backed populist Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf to come to power in 2018, and use its powers to reverse Pakistan’s democratic transition. I also probe the political impact of anti-corruption jurisprudence in more established democracies. In doing so, I introduce a typology for understanding approaches courts take when combating corruption, and highlight the threat to democracy that can emerge from judiciaries.

As Catholic churches played a tremendous role in the third wave of democratization, it is crucial to examine their role in the current trends of autocratization. Given the potential for democratic backsliding resulting from elections, I study the official stances of national Catholic churches toward electoral manipulation in 59 cases across different regions, post-Third Wave. I find that 32% of the Catholic churches resisted electoral manipulation, while 34% called for peace, and 34% took no stance. I argue that beyond religious market dynamics, historical context also shapes Catholic churches’ cost-benefit calculations. Using logistic and multinomial regression models, I contend that Catholic churches resist electoral manipulation when government favoritism toward Catholicism is too low, even when they control a considerable proportion of the population. Additionally, the historical pro-democratizing role of Catholic churches positively influences their decision to resist electoral manipulation, particularly for those facing high competition in the religious market.

When do citizens vote against autocratizing incumbents? A growing body of literature addresses this question, yielding mixed results. I argue that an important component is how visible autocratization is to the average citizen. I conceptualize “visibility of autocratization” and posit that it is essential for understanding when citizens vote out incumbents attempting to entrench their power. I test the relationship between visible autocratization and incumbent re-election in the universe of competitive African elections since 1990. I show that voters punish autocratizing incumbents by voting them out, but they only do so when autocratization is visible. Additional analysis of Afrobarometer data in four countries experiencing autocratization shows that citizens’ perception of autocratization is systematically related to preference for opposition candidates, even after controlling for partisanship and economic performance, and irrespective of levels of partisan animosity. This study contributes both theoretically and empirically to understandings of political behavior under autocratization.

This Article analyzes the role played by international actors, indigenous peoples, and independent lawyers as guardians of democracy in a context where democratic backsliding, abusive judicial review, and institutional takeover has taken place. Using the Guatemalan 2023 electoral process as a case study, this Article sheds new light on authoritarian constitutional practices, evidenced through the judgments of the Guatemalan Constitutional Court and activities of its Criminal Prosecutor’s Office. This Article also considers how foreign governments, international organizations, indigenous peoples, and independent lawyers came to play a guardianship role in the face of the decline of core institutions of constitutional democracy. Techniques such as transnational sanctions, judicial challenges, diplomatic “shaming,” and protest movements were successful in upholding constitutional democracy by discouraging attempts by the courts and government officials to derail the transition of power and annul the electoral results. This Article analyzes how and why these techniques had an impact in the Guatemalan context and extracts lessons and insights, both positive and negative, for dealing with abusive constitutional practices in theory and in practice.

Why do citizens fail to punish political candidates who violate democratic standards at the ballot box? Building on recent debates about heterogeneous democratic attitudes among citizens, we probe how divergent understandings of democracy shape citizens’ ability to recognize democratic transgressions as such and, in turn, affect vote choice. We leverage a novel approach to estimate the behavioural consequences of such individual-level understandings of democracy via a candidate choice conjoint experiment in Poland, a democracy where elections remained competitive despite an extended episode of backsliding. Consistent with our argument, we find that respondents who adhere less strongly to liberal democratic norms tolerate democratic violations more readily. Conversely, voters with a stronger liberal understanding of democracy are more likely to punish non-liberal candidates, including co-partisan ones. Our study identifies political culture, particularly the lack of attitudinal consolidation around liberal democracy, as a missing variable in explaining continued voter support for authoritarian-leaning leaders.

Although Prime Minister Abe Shinzo repeatedly touted Japan's values-oriented foreign policy in Asia there was little substance to this agenda. Like other nations, Tokyo downplays human rights and democratic values in favor of maintaining trade ties and securing geo-strategic advantage. It is thus a values-free diplomacy of pragmatism and expediency, dealing with regional governments as they are, not as one might wish them to be. Japan is certainly not unique in this regard, but Abe invites scrutiny of the government's record due to his rhetorical grandstanding. Colonial and wartime legacies have made it problematic for Japan to lecture and pressure regional governments on their political systems and practices. Moreover, the escalating rivalry with China for regional influence reinforces Tokyo's hesitation to promote democratic reforms for fear that it will lose clout by driving governments into Beijing's unconditional embrace.

Democratic backsliding, the slow erosion of institutions, processes, and norms, has become more pronounced in many nations. Most scholars point to the role of parties, leaders, and institutional changes, along with the pursuit of voters through what Daniel Ziblatt has characterized as alliances with more extremist party surrogate organizations. Although insightful, the institutionalist literature offers little reflection about the growing role of social technologies in organizing and mobilizing extremist networks in ways that present many challenges to traditional party gatekeeping, institutional integrity, and other democratic principles. We present a more integrated framework that explains how digitally networked publics interact with more traditional party surrogates and electoral processes to bring once-scattered extremist factions into conservative parties. When increasingly reactionary parties gain power, they may push both institutions and communication processes in illiberal directions. We develop a model of communication as networked organization to explain how Donald Trump and the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement rapidly transformed the Republican Party in the United States, and we point to parallel developments in other nations.

In authoritarian regimes, governments regularly use overt and heavy-handed visual propaganda to effectively signal regime strength and deter protests. Can democratic leaders also use this so-called hard propaganda to project strength, or does this kind of authoritarian-style messaging potentially backfire because of societal norms for leaders’ behavior? Focusing on a rare instance in which outright visual hard propaganda was used in a democratic setting, we study how US citizens perceived its use by the Trump administration during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests. In a preregistered online survey fielded from June 12 until June 16, 2020, we exposed participants from both sides of the political spectrum to randomized pairs of real-world propaganda images. This allowed us to explore how partisanship influenced perceptions of hard propaganda during the height of the protests. Our findings reveal that, compared to standard political messaging, hard propaganda can communicate greater strength to both government supporters and opponents in a democracy. Yet, in contrast to autocratic settings, it fostered opposition among Trump opponents. Trump supporters, however, did not find such propaganda any more or less appropriate than standard political communication, consistent with an increased acceptance of authoritarian practices within polarized democracies.

This is a case study of Guatemala’s judicial system, initially designed to be a pluralist model in 1984. However, it is now captured by political entrepreneurs who are undermining liberal democracy. The research warns about similar risks in other young democracies and explains the pitfalls of judicial councils and capturable courts. Although judiciaries are now seen as safeguards against authoritarianism, this study demonstrates how they can be subverted. Unlike authoritarian populists who weaken judicial institutions through popular support, this case shows how entrepreneurs rely on intimidation and capture. Using data of the growth of lawyers, I propose the entrepreneurs outnumbered the elites committed to democracy and captured the nomination process in favor of uncommitted elites leading to democratic backsliding.

How does the mass public form attitudes on electoral rules and reforms? Existing research on this question reveals a trade-off between principles, such as fairness, and partisan self-interest. I use two survey experiments on state legislative redistricting to explore how voters weigh principles against partisan self-interest when forming opinions on electoral reforms. First, I ask whether the public’s partisan self-interest motivation stems more from individual representation considerations or broader partisan power considerations. I find that both considerations provide a powerful enough incentive to activate partisan self-interest regarding preferences for state legislative district maps. Unexpectedly, the two considerations have quite similar effects on public support for redistricting reforms. Second, I explore the principles versus partisan self-interest trade-off through the lens of loss aversion, a concept developed in behavioral economics. In line with expectations, I find that preventing loss provides a more powerful incentive for Americans to violate democratic principles than achieving partisan gain. In sum, this research sheds light on voters’ decision between principles and partisan self-interest in the formation of opinion on electoral reform.