Perhaps the most debated question in Arnauld scholarship is whether Arnauld follows René Descartes in holding that God freely creates the eternal truths (the creation doctrine). In this chapter, I offer the first systematic treatment of this issue in Arnauld’s early texts from the 1640s. I begin by distinguishing between two versions of the creation doctrine: the metaphysical and the epistemic. According to the former, God in fact freely creates the eternal truths, while according to the latter we do not know whether God creates the eternal truths, and we should not say that God did not create the eternal truths. I then trace Arnauld’s view through the early texts. I argue that in his earliest texts Arnauld does not hold either version of the doctrine, but likely holds a version of voluntarism in line with his early nominalism and I also compare his early view with Ockham’s. I then argue that in the later texts from the 1640s Arnauld’s view changes and by 1648 he likely held the epistemic creation doctrine.

In this chapter I continue my treatment of Arnauld’s account of the creation doctrine. Building on the distinction in Chapter 10 between the metaphysical and the epistemic versions of the doctrine, I argue that Arnauld holds the epistemic creation doctrine in these later texts. I begin by offering my prima facie case for this interpretation based on his method and epistemic commitments outlined in Chapters 2 and 8. I then consider several arguments that Arnauld is committed to the metaphysical version of the creation doctrine on account of his treatments of divine freedom and divine simplicity. I show that Arnauld has the means to block any commitment to the metaphysical version of the doctrine from either of these other positions. I also consider why Arnauld remains silent on the matter of the creation doctrine and offer an account that explains his silence and shows it to be an intentional choice. All told, I conclude that Arnauld holds the epistemic creation doctrine.