This chapter explains the various mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, chiefly arising out of violations of the rules of the ITF, ATP and WTA. It focuses on ITF mechanisms, starting with internal processes and on-site quasi adjudicatory mechanisms. It then goes on to examine the ITF’s Internal Adjudication Panel, especially its first-instance, appellate and supervisory function, followed by the Independent Tribunal, which is an arbitral body. It proceeds to look at the various types of powers and functions conferred on the Tribunal and the jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) arising out of appeals against the Independent Tribunal. The chapter examines briefly the very narrow ATP and WTA dispute resolution mechanisms and the role of national courts in dealing with contractual tennis disputes.

This chapter turns to the relationship between the courts and the executive branch of government. The executive branch is ordinarily the most powerful branch of government, and when courts act to hold the executive to account, they are often at risk. The charged relationship between courts and the executive arises not only from the political tension that is generated by holding a powerful executive to account, but also from the different structural and functional characteristics of the executive and the judiciary. The chapter analyses these characteristics, noting that courts must act fairly and independently deciding the disputes that come before them and the executive must act to protect the state and its inhabitants and govern effectively. The chapter then illustrates the dynamic relationship between the courts and the executive by exploring three difficult contexts for that relationship: illiberalism and authoritarianism, emergencies and crises, and corruption by members of the executive branch.

Chapter 9 draws on the evidence outlined earlier in the book to evaluate a range of possible legal interventions. Structured according to the five potential equality objectives outlined earlier, the measures include steps to increase the visibility of people with disfigurements in daily life, methods of motivating employers to become appearance-inclusive and changes to influential institutions outside the employment context. They also include a range of legislative reforms to replace the severe disfigurement provision with a better remedial mechanism, such as the creation of a new protected characteristic of disfigurement or the reformulation of the definition of disability.

This chapter considers the role courts play in protecting fundamental rights. It addresses three questions. What role do domestic courts play in the protection of rights in different constitutional settings? In examining key elements of constitutional design, the chapter show how there are significant variations in how courts protect rights across the world. Secondly, what role should courts play in the adjudication of rights? Here it is argued that courts in their ordinary work, applying legislation and the common law, do and must protect rights. With regard to the more contested question whether courts should protect rights under a constitutional bill of rights, the chapter argues that the case for such a role for courts is at its strongest in certain circumstances but that it cannot be claimed that in all circumstances courts should be conferred with this power. Finally, the chapter considers the current debates in the United Kingdom concerning a possible repeal of the Human Rights Act, and withdrawal from the European Convention of Human Rights, and expresses dismay at the prospect of the repeal of the Human Rights Act, given how elegantly that Act combines protection for rights by UK courts with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.

Courts are institutions within the broad body politic of their society, which comprises not only the branches and institutions of the state, but also political parties, the media, civil society and the legal profession. The role that courts play in modern bodies politic has expanded significantly since the Second World War, mainly as a result of the practice of writing constitutions. These constitutions have often been adopted at a time of transitions, such as decolonisation, following a war or a period of autocratic rule or civil war and have accordingly often been accompanied by uncertainty and fragility. Responding to the expanded role of courts with a general normative claim that the expanded role of courts is democratically inappropriate without a careful consideration of the circumstances in which the role of courts has been expanded is unsatisfactory and in a world in which democratic backsliding is largely characterised by an expansion in executive power is probably also unwise.

As this book’s “negative cases,” Chapter 7 unpacks why legal mobilization related to tobacco product liability and the recovery of healthcare costs for treating smokers has had so little impact on legal frameworks and jurisprudence. The chapter highlights the persistence of the Tobacco Business Law in sustaining the tobacco industry’s political power, the role of transnational networks among tobacco companies in resisting stronger regulations, domestic Japanese and Korean judges’ narrow interpretations of standing rules and causation, and the weaknesses of support structures for sustained legal mobilization and advocacy.

While the international law frameworks regulating the relations between States are relatively well developed, the role of international law at a municipal level is equally important. This can be illustrated in various ways. This chapter assesses the role of international law in municipal law; this includes a review of theoretical perspectives as reflected in the so-called monism-dualism debate, and a consideration of how the 'transformation' and 'incorporation' approaches have been dealt with by the courts. The chapter then examines the relationship between Australian law and international law, starting with an assessment of Australia's international personality; this is followed by a review of treaty-making in Australia, and the position taken by Australian courts on some of these matters. We then consider the impact of customary international law upon the common law, with particular reference to Australia. Following is a discussion of the relationship between treaties and municipal law, taking account of basic principles, implementation of treaties and the role of the courts. The chapter concludes with a review of constitutional and legislative options.

In line with the more civilian and less military role of consuls in the 1st century BCE, a number of consulars renounced any potential military glory through a provincial command and preferred to remain in Rome during and after their consulships. In contrast to what had happened throughout the 2nd century, consulars rarely filled their cursus honorum with regular offices. One of the usual tasks of consulars was to intervene in court, not only for their potential skills as orators but above all for the authority that their consular status conferred on them. Consulars acted as advocates, never as prosecutors. Some consulars, such as Cicero and Hortensius, were true specialists before the courts. Speaking at a popular assembly (contio) was always another way of gaining public visibility. For the period 81–50, we have evidence of a greater number of consulars taking part in assemblies than in earlier periods. However, since consulars as privati were not entitled to convene an assembly, their speeches to the people were always unusual. The Senate remained the great dialectical battleground for consulars. Priority to speak in the Senate always belonged to consulars.

Entrenchment is a constitutional tool that renders legal change more difficult. This chapter examines the forms entrenchment can take, and the reasons for and against entrenchment. It argues that entrenchment can, on occasion, help resolve constitutional problems by requiring law-making institutions to depart from the normal way in which they effect legal change. Entrenchment rules are at their most attractive where there is a connection between the reason for entrenchment – the reason why the normal rules of legal change are problematic in a particular area of law – the type of entrenchment rule adopted, and the area of law entrenched.

Despite being nearly universally recognised as a virtue, judicial independence has been challenged in almost all parts of the world. Some commentators even consider it to be so open to differing interpretations as to be a useless concept, that should be unpacked to its smaller components to be studied meaningfully. We are less cynical about the idea. According to our theory, judicial independence exists where powerful actors are unable or unwilling to inappropriately interfere with the workings of the judiciary. Judicial independence is thus a relational concept and always results from the interplay between the capacity and willingness of powerful actors to inappropriately interfere with the judiciary, and the capacity and willingness of judicial actors and their allies to withstand such actions. We distinguish three levels of judicial independence: de jure institutional independence, de facto institutional independence, and decisional independence. Courts are thus independent when powerful actors do not consistently impose their preferences in disputes they have a stake in, either by capturing the courts through formal changes of laws governing the judiciary, through rigging these laws in their favour, or by skewing judicial decision-making. By contrast, a dependent judiciary is the one that is captured, rigged, or skewed.

The narratives of judges and lawyers in interviews give a behind-the-scenes glimpse into the beliefs and dilemmas underlying judicial settlement-promoting decisions in court. In this chapter we describe findings from our interviews with judges and lawyers. What is their view of the judicial role in the pursuit of settlement? What is their view of ADR? What is their perspective on the interplay between justice and efficiency? Which theories of legal justice do they develop? Findings are described on the background of the comparison between legal cultures.

Regardless of the intellectual coherence of hierocratic theory and the pope’s formal status as head of the universal Catholic Church and lynchpin of its central administration, the practical reality of papal monarchy had to reconcile that curial centralism with the logistical impossibility of exercising and enforcing direct control over all of Catholic Europe. Configured by local variables and interests, the integration of regional churches and polities within the papal network rested insecurely on a delicate balance combining delegation of authority, administrative decentralization, and local acquiescence. Incomplete subjection left space for local agency to exploit the perceived benefits of papal authority and obstruct its unwelcome intrusions. Using England as a case study, this chapter considers various manifestation of those complex ties (the activities of papal emissaries, and responses to and exploitation of the legal, fiscal, and dispensatory claims and structures), emphasizing the bottom-up perspective on medieval papal monarchy.