States frequently use leadership decapitation in their domestic and cross-border counter-insurgency/terrorism operations, yet the literature is far from having a consensus regarding its effects. I argue that literature focuses on the military implications of decapitation (its implications for the organisation’s operational capabilities/ability to generate violence) at the expense of its implications for negotiations between insurgents and the state. Second, I argue that leadership arrest and killing are analytically distinct categories of leadership decapitation that can trigger different processes and outcomes and that an arrested leader’s possible role from the prison should be considered in the analysis since leadership arrest alters the leader’s incentives, resulting in a new bargaining game between the leader, the state, and the organisation. I empirically illustrate these arguments using the arrest of the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Abdullah Öcalan as a theory-building case study. In the case study, I show that Abdullah Öcalan’s arrest was productive for terminating the conflict in the short run, whereas it was counter-productive in the medium and long run. These findings suggest that the literature may benefit from tracing the process closely, considering the dynamic nature of conflicts and the impact of decapitation on bargaining processes, without limiting the temporal scope of inquiry.

How do counterterrorism policies enable terrorist groups to thrive and survive? This article examines the relationship and how counterterrorism policies and political structures impact terrorist group success. While studies of terrorism have tended to separate the two phenomena, there is considerable complexity in the interactions between violent action and coercive state response. To demonstrate the complexity of these interactions, this article examines the persistence of three transnational terrorist groups from 1989 to 2022 – the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and the Hizbul Mujahideen – that operate in the Kashmir region despite India’s coercive counterterrorism policies. While existing research emphasises macro-level factors in transnational terrorism, this article, based on original qualitative data, demonstrates the critical importance of granular, localised opportunities for terrorist groups to carry on. We show how these structures interact with civilian perceptions of state legitimacy and security to create nuanced patterns of support. In doing so, we challenge simplistic explanations of terrorist recruitment and resilience. The article dispels existing misconceptions about the efficacy of coercive counterterrorism to end militant groups and further suggests that softer, non-coercive approaches might not necessarily generate public sympathy. In fact, select counterterrorism policies might inadvertently legitimise violence by extremist groups to their constituency and increase sympathy in the process.

This paper develops the notion of ‘Platform Security’ to analyse the type of security power that seeks to work through facilitation and decentralised connection. The paper draws an analogy between the metaphor and model of the platform economy and contemporary security practices. It analyses the imaginaries and infrastructures of the platform economy and shows how these are present in the work of transnational security authorities. Like online platforms, contemporary security practitioners seek to connect local players in a manner that is data-driven and decentred. Like digital platforms, security organisations like FATF and Europol seem to understand themselves as utilities or services, whose primary aim is to ‘transmit communication and information data’ that they have not themselves produced or commissioned (Van Dijck 2013: 6). Analysing platform security through this lens, allows the development critical purchase on this mode of security power and raise critical questions about the organisation of responsibility and protections.

Long viewed as an example of effective multilateralism, UN peace operations are facing mounting challenges. Transformations in the landscape of conflict are outpacing their ability to respond. Rising expectations of peacekeeping have led to disenchantment with what they can deliver, while dis- and misinformation tactics undermine the efforts of the UN to make and build peace. As UN peace operations risk becoming another casualty of intensifying international tensions, great power rivalry, and the erosion of the rules and norms that govern international cooperation, we consider the future of UN peace operations. In the debate between a “pragmatic” and an “adaptive” approach to peacekeeping, we argue that a fundamental question is the ability of both alternatives to address three recurring issues that have shaped the effectiveness and legitimacy of peace operations: the mismatch between ambitious mandates and limited resources; the gap between the protection of civilians objective and its implementation in practice; and growing difficulties in honoring the principles of impartiality. We argue that policymakers and researchers should not lose sight of the fact that peacekeeping's legitimacy depends on its adherence to some version of host-state consent and some kind of restriction on when and how force is used. The expectation of civilian populations that the UN stands for protection also means that the UN must continue to safeguard some key norms associated with peacekeeping.

This article serves as the introduction to a Special Issue of the European Journal of International Security titled ‘What the War on Terror Leaves Behind’. In it, we seek to contextualise and summarise the diverse contributions of this collection, which is animated by four overarching questions: (i) More than 20 years after the attacks of 11 September 2001, is the War on Terror now, finally, over? (ii) What, if any, legacies remain from the post-9/11 way of thinking and doing counterterrorism? (iii) What is the significance of the War on Terror’s legacies or absence thereof? and, (iv) How do the War on Terror’s impacts and effects sit within other historical contexts and (dis)continuities? The article begins with a brief overview of some of the conceptual and political ambiguities of the War on Terror itself, before situating the issue in relation to issues of continuity and change anticipated by the four questions above. A second section then explores the urgency of these questions for academic debate, and in the ‘real world’ of international security as experienced by states, communities, and other subjects. A third section then summarises the argument and contributions of the articles in the issue –highlighting the lack of agreement on key issues within these debates.

This article critically examines the major shortcomings in multi-country security investments in East Africa during the war on terror. It argues that these investments have not only failed to adequately recognise African contexts but also falls short of recognising the agency of local communities in counterterrorism efforts. Drawing on critical terrorism and security studies, as well as excerpts from interviews with practitioners in Kenya, the article identifies gaps in the prevailing approach that treats Africa as a unitary entity and critiques the notion of universality of knowledge ingrained in these interventions. By taking a decolonial perspective, the article challenges some prevailing constructions about Africa, linked to the war on terror, as the source of this notion of universality of knowledge. By highlighting the connection of counterterrorism strategies to coloniality and the systemic exclusion of subaltern voices, the discussion suggests that a more contextually informed approach is a precursor to envisioning Africa positioned beyond the war on terror.