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We present and test a model of reciprocity in which people are more likely to repay good treatment to the extent they judge it as motivated by true caring rather than tactical self-interest. The model’s key contributions stem from how it handles ambiguously motivated behavior. It allows people to maintain divergent hypotheses: They can view behavior as driven by caring, self-interest, or a mix thereof. In contrast, previous analyses resolve rather than maintain ambiguity. They treat caring and self-interest as mutually exclusive hypotheses, and require that people commit to one and dismiss the other. By more realistically handling ambiguity, our model yields three benefits. First, it accommodates intuitive patterns of play that existing analyses do not and which we experimentally corroborate. These patterns reflect intermediate inclinations to reciprocate ambiguously motivated positive behavior. Second, it challenges conventional interpretations of long-studied phenomena, including unraveling in finitely iterated prisoners’ dilemmas, substantial offers in ultimatum games, and gift exchange. Third, it highlights how diversity in perceptions – the same action can appear generous to one person and miserly to another – is empirically consequential. Under conventional interpretations and without accounting for diverse perceptions, the aforementioned phenomena have been viewed as inconsistent with a taste for repaying good treatment. Our model shows that they are entirely consistent with a nuanced form of this taste: a desire to repay good treatment that seems to largely reflect genuine caring.
This chapter examines the specificities at work at the international level and their implications for the issue of legitimacy, concentrating on the contemporary context. These specificities have to be understood in relation to the notion and experience of the international community. There are five distinctive features that characterize the international level in connection with the sense of international community. Although the interactions of these characteristics make the international system what it is, this chapter addresses them individually to identify clearly their nature and respective significance for international legitimacy. These features include the ambiguity of the international community; the national bent of international life; cultural diversity and disparity of development; the hegemonic and yet fragmented and contested conception and exercise of power; and the extent to which actors (states and individuals, in particular) have the possibility of ownership—that is, of being represented and of participating at the international level, including in terms of consent.
Some people act despite knowing their actions are wrong. Others know and do the right thing. This paper focuses on people who rightly believe that gaining specific knowledge would be enough to motivate moral action but remain strategically ignorant due to self-interest. This paper argues that such individuals have a moral obligation to acquire the salient knowledge given the following applies: first, such individuals are aware of the morally efficacious knowledge; and second, the efficacious knowledge is accessible to them. Then, we examine similarities and differences between morally mandatory knowledge and culpable ignorance. Finally, morally mandatory knowledge shows that ignorance can result from deficient moral character.
Chapter 4 outlines and tests our argument about the consequences of IO withdrawal for exiting states. We argue that there should be negative reputational and cooperative consequences for withdrawing states because IOs operate as hand-tying, credible commitment devices. International actors might regard withdrawal as backing out of a commitment and a signal that decouples the state from a self-chosen “in-group.” Thus, international actors – such as market analysts and other states – may reduce their trust that a withdrawing state will follow through on other commitments. As evidence, we document that withdrawal is associated with worsened perceptions of political risk and investor confidence. We document how the negative reputational consequences vary based on states’ and IOs’ preexisting reputations. We also show that withdrawal reduces the chance of being elected to the UNSC as a non-permanent member and makes states less likely to sign future treaties with the exiting state. We expect the material consequences of withdrawal to be limited due to strategic selection, substitution, and potential gains. We test these arguments on economic IOs because they represent more than half of all IOs and they can be evaluated consistently. We find that withdrawing states on average suffer limited material consequences.
This chapter focuses on digital collaboration when learning an additional language (L2), a specific type of learner–learner interaction. In CALL contexts, collaboration has almost exclusively been researched in connection with writing, which will be the focus of this chapter. The chapter first provides a definition of collaboration versus cooperation and then a literature review of digital collaboration, mainly in writing contexts. We conclude with a list of strategies for promoting collaboration and suggestions for future collaboration contexts and research.
Describe how children think and behave differently in groups; explain the roles of collaboration, self-identity, and categorisation in creating and sustaining groups; understand how group differences can be reduced via intergroup contact, cooperation, and empathy.
The current strategic environment can be characterised as a return to great power competition, centred on the Indo-Pacific region, within an environment of post-pandemic climate change. The ’region is in the midst of the most consequential strategic realignment since the Second World War’, and the confluence of these characteristics has resulted in a major step-change for Australia’s strategic policy and has significantly increased expectations of the Australian Defence Force. For the ADF, the force generation and force employment requirements to effectively shape, deter and respond within a ’competitive and contested’ region increase the demand signal on the force. For the Australian Army, accelerated warfare requires land forces ’to be ready to do more tasks, fight at all ranges, and enable the joint force in every domain’.
The exponential growth of cross-border data flows and fragmented national and regional data protection standards have intensified regulatory challenges in global trade. The effects of regulatory divergence are amplified by a lack of transparency, potentially masking discriminatory practices. Article VII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) offers a framework for recognition agreements to bridge these gaps but is not utilized in practice. This paper examines the interplay between GATS Article VII and the EU data adequacy decisions – currently the most comprehensive bilateral framework for assessing compatibility between data protection regimes among other WTO members. It argues that data adequacy frameworks qualify as recognition agreements/arrangements under GATS, offering potential to reduce the trade effects of differences in data protection laws globally while safeguarding regulatory autonomy. A roadmap for leveraging Article VII to advance international alignment is developed to help realize the dual goals of enhancing global cooperation and strengthening privacy protection.
A realistic utopia is a utopia that respects basic constraints imposed by the Human Condition. This chapter explains why some kinds of political manipulation are not bad or wrong at all, and would accordingly remain operative in a realistic political utopia. The legitimacy of manipulation is first demonstrated with respect to five categories of the non-deliberative dimensions of political life: mobilizing, participation, negotiation, ruling, and ensuring stability. It is then demonstrated with respect to political deliberation itself. All of this applies to manipulation’s function in the two faces of democratic politics: cooperation and competition. The need for the “social lubrication” functions of manipulation is especially acute in politics, given the intractability of the coordination challenges on a society-wide scale. Specifically, manipulation is, at certain junctions, a necessary tool for overcoming motivational obstacles to the flow of political information in a way conducive to rational persuasion. In such ways manipulation is integral to the very idea of a functioning democracy.
Social interactions frequently take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma as driven predominantly by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides a causal test of the importance of social preferences in such contexts. In a series of pre-registered experiments, we show that high levels of cooperation can be sustained when prosocial individuals interact in segregated groups. By comparing their behavior with that of mixed and selfish groups, we highlight the conditions under which other-regarding motivations matter in repeated interactions.
Past research has documented ingroup favoritism, the tendency to cooperate more with ingroup members than outgroup members, in a wide range of intergroup contexts, and extensively discussed conditions under which ingroup favoritism emerges. However, previous studies have predominantly focused on a simplistic intergroup context, for instance, where group boundaries are static, and one group membership is present. To fill the gap, we leveraged data from professional volleyball players and investigated the influence of (1) varying levels of intergroup conflict salience, (2) past and present group memberships, and (3) national team membership on intergroup cooperation. Contrary to our hypotheses and the social identity perspective, we found that conflict salience and former ingroup membership did not influence intergroup cooperation. Additionally, we found that the more national team players there are in the ingroup, the more cooperative those who play for the national team are with ingroup members, leading to increased ingroup favoritism.
What was the social experience of work in the ancient world? In this study, Elizabeth Murphy approaches the topic through the lens offered by a particular set of workers, the potters and ceramicists in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire. Her research exploits the rich and growing dataset of workshops and production evidence from the Roman East and raises awareness of the unique features of this particular craft in this region over several centuries. Highlighting the multi-faceted working experience of professionals through a theoretically-informed framework, Murphy reconstructs the complex lives of people in the past, and demonstrates the importance of studying work and labor as central topics in social and cultural histories. Her research draws from the fields of archaeology, social history and anthropology, and applies current social theories --- communities of practice, technological choices, chaîne opératoire, cultural hybridity, taskscapes – to interpret and offer new insights into the archaeological remains of workshops and ceramics.
Recently, there has been a Renaissance for multi-level selection models to explain the persistence of unselfish behavior in social dilemmas, in which assortative/correlated matching plays an important role. In the current study of a multi-round prisoners’ dilemma experiment, we introduce two correlated matching procedures that match subjects with similar action histories together. We discover significant treatment effects, compared to the control procedure of random matching. Particularly with the weighted history matching procedure we find bifurcations regarding group outcomes. Some groups converge to the all-defection equilibrium even more pronouncedly than the control groups do, while other groups generate much higher rate of cooperation, which is also associated with higher relative reward for a typical cooperative action. All in all, the data show that cooperation does have a much better chance to persist in a correlated/assortative-matching environment, as predicted in the literature.
We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, groups with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.
We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.
We explore if fairness and inequality motivations affect cooperation in indefinitely repeated games. Each round, we randomly divided experimental participants into donor–recipient pairs. Donors could make a gift to recipients, and ex-ante earnings are highest when all donors give. Roles were randomly reassigned every period, which induced inequality in ex-post earnings. Theoretically, income-maximizing players do not have to condition on this inequality because it is payoff-irrelevant. Empirically, payoff-irrelevant inequality affected participants’ ability to coordinate on efficient play: donors conditioned gifts on their own past roles and, with inequalities made visible, discriminated against those who were better off.
This study investigates the mechanisms driving the effectiveness of free-form communication in promoting cooperation within a sequential social dilemma game. We hypothesize that the self-constructing nature of free-form communication enhances the sincerity of messages and increases the disutility of dishonoring promises. Our experimental results demonstrate that free-form messages outperform both restricted promises and treatments where subjects select and use previously constructed free-form messages. Interestingly, we find that selected free-form messages and restricted promises achieve similar levels of cooperation. We observe that free-form messages with higher sincerity increase the likelihood of high-price and high-quality choices, thereby promoting cooperation. These messages frequently include promises and honesty, while threats do not promote cooperation. Our findings emphasize the crucial role of the self-constructed nature of free-form messages in promoting cooperation, exceeding the impact of message content compared to restricted communication protocols.
We propose a novel experimental method that disentangles strategically- and non-strategically-motivated behavior. We apply it to an indefinitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma game to observe simultaneously how the same individual behaves in situations with future interaction and in situations with no future interaction, while controlling for expectations. This method allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the observed pattern of cooperation in experiments with repeated interaction, including the so-called endgame effect. Our results indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic.
Previous research has suggested that communication and especially promises increase cooperation in laboratory experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping. The goal of this paper was to examine messages under a double-blind payoff procedure to test the alternative explanation that promise keeping is due to external influence and reputational concerns. Employing a 2 × 2 design, we find no evidence that communication increases the overall level of cooperation in our experiments with double-blind payoff procedures. However, we also find no evidence that communication impacts cooperation in our experiments with single-blind payoff procedures. Further, the payoff procedure does not appear to impact aggregate cooperation.
Some peer punishment technologies may bias experimental results in unwanted ways. A critical parameter to consider in the design is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which measures the income reduction for the targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it could confound the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.