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The longest chapter of the book is dedicated to Kant’s core argument against Constant. Kant’s essay contains three formulations of the same idea: that lying, or a right to lie, would undermine the possibility of contracts, and of the duties and rights that contracts generate. Kant is convinced that this would be disastrous for humankind. That is why he claims, against Constant, that lying – not an unconditional duty of truthfulness – would be the downfall of society. The chapter discusses the enigmatic notion of a ‘source’ of right or rights (which should not, it is argued, be equated with the social or original contract); and it subjects two slightly different reconstructions of the core argument to philosophical scrutiny, concluding that both are untenable. It seems that, in 1797, Kant revived Michaelis’s argument, which he had appropriated and then abandoned earlier in his philosophical development. This negative result does not, however, lessen Kant’s absolutism because the ethical duty of truthfulness is still in place.
The chapter explores the application of restraint of trade, a common law notion, to professional tennis, particularly as pertains to relations between agents and players. The chapter goes on to show the regulation of restraint of trade in the English common law and then applies its findings to sport law more generally. It goes on to identify restraints arising from national federations and state regulation, as well as those emerging from contractual relations between players and agents. The chapter then proceeds to apply the concept to professional tennis, particularly in respect of agency agreements with a focus on the Zverev case before the courts of England. The chapter also ponders whether restrictions in national team selections as well as bans imposed by transnational tennis stakeholders have the same or similar effect as the aforementioned restraints.
This volume introduces the legal philosopher Adolf Reinach and his contributions to speech act theory, as well as his analysis of basic legal concepts and their relationship to positive law. Reinach's thorough analysis has recently garnered growing interest in private law theory, yet his 'phenomenological realist' philosophical approach is not in line with contemporary mainstream approaches. The essays in this volume resuscitate and interrogate Reinach's unique account of the foundations of private law, situating him in contemporary private law theory and broader philosophical currents. The work also makes Reinach's methods more accessible to those unfamiliar with early phenomenology. Together these contributions prove that while Reinach's perspective on private law shares similarities and points of departure with trends in today's legal theory, many of his insights remain singular and illuminating in their own right. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Psychology and law, by their nature, are deeply entwined. Both are about human behavior – understanding it, modifying it, regulating it. Psychology’s research engagement with legal topics enjoys a long history, but until recently has been largely limited to clinical assessment (e.g., capacity, insanity) and police and trial evidence and procedures (e.g., eyewitnesses, jury instructions). The traditional canon of “Psychology & Law” research gained prominence when DNA evidence revealed that many wrongful convictions involved problems foreseen by psychologists. Also, the emergence of “Behavioral Law & Economics” likely provided more legitimacy to law’s engagement with empirical psychology topics and methods, spurring “Law & Psychology” teaching and research in law schools. The expanded range of research can be found across the US law curriculum as illustrated in four main first-year courses – Criminal Law, Torts, Contracts, and Property – and two commonly taken or required courses – Evidence and Professional Responsibility. The current experimental jurisprudence boom has added to the topics and methods used in this research and amplifies the existing trend in which psychology engages more closely with the content and values of law.
Part I of this article reviews major differences in definitions of the transaction concept by leading authors and some of the difficulties involved in its usage. Part II takes steps towards a new approach, starting with the legal notion of a contract. This identifies a narrower and more specific type of transaction, empowered by both legal forces and non-legal or cultural norms or rules. The sharper and more specific concept of contracting cost is derived. Contracting costs are the costs of obtaining, formulating, negotiating, and administering legal contracts. They do not include the costs of the work and other inputs required to fulfil a specific contractual agreement. Legal contracts are historically specific phenomena, applying only to modern societies with developed legal institutions. By making the analysis more specific, we emphasise factors of greater relevance in modern market economies. In addition to legal sanctions, the law engenders other forms of motivation based on what is perceived to be legitimate legal authority.
A contract is an important tool for organizations to obtain and sell resources, and its value is typically measured by the benefit acquired through the exchange. Viewing a contract only through this instrumental lens, however, leaves significant value unrealized. A contract is not just a tool for acquisition, but also a mechanism for governance, an instrument of coordination, and a relational lever to build trust and familiarity over time. The chapter identifies how organizations can use their legal knowledge of contracts to generate a collaborative advantage for both parties. The chapter will first explore how a contract can be a source of cocreated collaborative advantage. It will then show that contracting parties build trust by going through three levels of trust in order to have a trust-based relational contract from which significant value can be harvested. Finally, the chapter will examine how firms can preserve contractual value when trusting relationships are either limited or absent.
In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact that competing for funds has on the risk-taking behavior of laboratory portfolio managers compensated through an option-like scheme according to which the manager receives (most of) the compensation only for returns in excess of pre-specified strike price. We find that such a competitive environment and contractual arrangement lead, both in theory and in the lab, to inefficient risk taking behavior on the part of portfolio managers. We then study various policy interventions, obtained by manipulating various aspects of the competitive environment and the contractual arrangement, e.g., the Transparency of the contracts offered, the Risk Sharing component in the contract linking portfolio managers to investors, etc. While all these interventions would induce portfolio managers, at equilibrium, to efficiently invest funds in safe assets, we find that, in the lab, Transparency is most effective in incentivising managers to do so. Finally, we document a behavioral “Other People’s Money” effect in the lab, where portfolio managers tend to invest the funds of their investors in a more risky manner than their Own Money, even when it is not in either the investors’ or the managers’ interest to do so.
We investigate contract negotiations in the presence of externalities and asymmetric information in a controlled laboratory experiment. In our setup, it is commonly known that it is always ex post efficient for player A to implement a project that has a positive external effect on player B. However, player A has private information about whether or not it is in player A’s self-interest to implement the project even when no agreement with player B is reached. Theoretically, an ex post efficient agreement can always be reached if the externality is large, whereas this is not the case if the externality is small. We vary the size of the externality and the bargaining process. The experimental results are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions. However, even when the externality is large, the players fail to achieve ex post efficiency in a substantial fraction of the observations. This finding holds in ultimatum-game bargaining as well as in unstructured bargaining with free-form communication.
We conducted a series of field experiments to investigate the ability of experimentally measured risk preferences to predict the contractual choices of workers in the real labour market. In a first set of experiments we twice measured workers’ risk preferences using the lottery approach of Holt and Laury (Am Econ Rev 92(5):1644–165, 2002). These workers subsequently participated in a contract-choice experiment, making 12 decisions. For each decision, the worker chose between his/her regular piece-rate contract and a particular fixed wage contract, each distinguished by the level of the fixed wage. One of the twelve decisions was then chosen at random and the worker was paid according to his/her choice for that decision over a period of two working days. We estimate the effect of risk preferences on contractual choices, controlling for measurement error and worker ability. Risk preferences effectively predict contract choices—risk-averse workers are more likely to select fixed-wage contracts. High-ability workers prefer piece-rates.
This chapter brings together the research findings and answers the main research question, namely how the legal framework can contribute to a achieving a fair(er) balance between the interests of musicians and their main corporate partners. It summarises the potential bottom-up initiatives, as well as the possible regulatory action identified throughout the book.
This book focuses on music industry contracts and the contractual dynamics between composing and/or performing musicians and their primary partners in the digitised music industry, namely music publishers and record companies, taking account of the ubiquitous nature of music streaming. It focuses on the question of how the legal framework intervenes and should intervene in such contracts, both in theory and in practice. Its objective is to contribute to a level playing field that counteracts the imbalance in bargaining power between musicians and their corporate partners in a proportionate way. The book draws upon an analysis of copyright contract law at the European Union and national level, as well as relevant principles of general contract law, competition law and related applicable rules that curb business-to-business contract terms and trade practices characterised as unreasonable. The book studies the applicable legal framework in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.This title is part of the Flip it Open Programme and may also be available Open Access. Check our website Cambridge Core for details.
This chapter delves into the question of the impact of extraterritorial and secondary sanctions on private contractual relations. It opens with a discussion of the characterisation of extraterritorial and secondary sanctions as potential legal or factual impediments to the performance of contractual obligations. A detailed analysis of the case law follows, bringing to the fore some degree of reluctance on the part of judicial authorities to allow operators to suspend the performance of their contractual obligations or to terminate contractual relations on account of their exposure to extraterritorial or secondary sanctions, at least in the absence of sanctions or force majeure contractual clauses. The chapter also explores the potential tension between such sanctions, on the one hand, and measures – commonly referred to as blocking statutes – enacted by states or by the EU to thwart their effects, on the other hand. A discussion, in this respect, of the relevant case law reveals a quest for a balance between policy objectives and economic soundness and shows the existence of incongruent views on the compatibility of sanctions clauses with blocking statutes.
Sanctions are intrinsically complex. Implementation of sanctions regulations often entails navigating an extremely dynamic environment consisting of numerous restrictions and prohibitions, difficulties in interpretation, inconsistent measures adopted by imposing jurisdictions and countermeasures. This has been evident following the sanctions against Russia, often described as unprecedented in scale. The more frequent resort to sanctions further means that an increasing number of international contractual relationships are affected. Financial institutions operating globally are particularly impacted. This is exacerbated by the use of secondary sanctions which remain a controversial foreign policy tool and even subject to countermeasures, for example, blocking statutes. Consequently, financial institutions and other economic operators with an international presence, torn between two conflicting regimes, face an unsolvable legal dilemma. This uncertainty extends to the termination of contracts involving persons or activities subject to secondary sanctions. Although in most cases international (financial) contracts contain sanctions clauses (often under force majeure provisions), it remains unclear whether these can be relied on, especially where the institution’s own jurisdiction opposes secondary sanctions. This chapter presents in more detail what are the practical challenges in sanctions implementation. It focuses on financial institutions and provide recommendations on how such challenges could be addressed.
A remedy is specific when the plaintiff seeks to get the court to coerce the defendant into doing (or not doing) a particular thing. The word ‘coercion’ is used advisedly. The court orders the defendant to do (or not to do) the particular thing, and if the defendant refuses to comply, the court may use measures such as imprisonment, sequestration and fines to encourage compliance with its order. The two most important examples of specific relief in Australia are the decree of specific performance and the injunction. This chapter will consider specific performance, and the next chapter will consider injunctions. Specific performance relates to ordering the defendant to comply with the terms of a contract, but injunctions may be ordered across private law and beyond. Specific performance is exclusively equitable, and generally operates in relation to a common law cause of action; namely, breach of contract.
Catamorphisms are functions that are recursively defined on list and trees and, in general, on algebraic data types (ADTs), and are often used to compute suitable abstractions of programs that manipulate ADTs. Examples of catamorphisms include functions that compute size of lists, orderedness of lists, and height of trees. It is well known that program properties specified through catamorphisms can be proved by showing the satisfiability of suitable sets of constrained Horn clauses (CHCs). We address the problem of checking the satisfiability of those sets of CHCs, and we propose a method for transforming sets of CHCs into equisatisfiable sets where catamorphisms are no longer present. As a consequence, clauses with catamorphisms can be handled without extending the satisfiability algorithms used by existing CHC solvers. Through an experimental evaluation on a nontrivial benchmark consisting of many list and tree processing algorithms expressed as sets of CHCs, we show that our technique is indeed effective and significantly enhances the performance of state-of-the-art CHC solvers.
This chapter argues that, even if emerging economies actively promote hybrid procedures and workouts and create a simplified insolvency framework for micro- and small enterprises (MSEs), ordinary insolvency proceedings will still play a significant role in the economy. On the one hand, they will serve as the primary mechanism for the reallocation of assets of nonviable medium and large enterprises (MLEs). On the other hand, formal reorganization procedures can still be relevant for viable MLEs unable to complete a workout or hybrid procedure due to several factors, including the lack of trust in the debtor’s management team or the need to use some provisions exclusively available in formal insolvency proceedings. Therefore, emerging economies should make sure to improve the efficiency of their ordinary insolvency proceedings. Nonetheless, they cannot adopt the type of complex procedure heavily supervised by courts existing in countries with strong institutional environments. Instead, they need to implement a procedure that should not require significant court involvement. This chapter explains how this goal can be achieved while making the procedure more attractive to debtors and creditors.
Academic defenders of sweatshops argue that disregarding labour rights will result in increased welfare in the developing nations where transnational corporations (TNCs) operate. They argue that TNCs should ignore local labour laws in the best interests of the poor. In this article we criticise this ‘ignore the law’ position regarding sweatshops on three separate grounds. First, it fails to acknowledge the demands for businesses to respect the rule of law as part of the development process. Second, it utilises an inadequate account of voluntary contractual bargaining which overlooks how employment practises operate in sectors prone to utilising sweatshop labour, leading to coercive employment conditions incompatible with human dignity and free choice. Third, it fails to adequately account for labour law and international labour standards, which embody a strong moral conception of dignity at work and observance of fundamental human rights in protecting workers against abuse through the resulting legal duties placed on states and corporate actors. We conclude that poverty reduction requires the support of both private and public actors. Advocating the side-stepping of labour laws distracts from the important work of institution building necessary to protect workers and facilitate economic growth consistent with decent work, sustainable development, fairness and human dignity as embodied in international labour standards.
Derek Parfit’s view of personal identity raises questions about whether advance decisions refusing life-saving treatment should be honored in cases where a patient loses psychological continuity; it implies that these advance decisions would not be self-determining at all. However, rather than accepting that an unknown metaphysical ‘further fact’ underpins agential unity, one can accept Parfit’s view but offer a different account of what it implies morally. Part II of this article argues that contractual obligations provide a moral basis for honoring advance decisions refusing life-saving and/or life-sustaining medical treatment; advance decisions have similarities to contracts, such as life insurance policies and will-contracts, that come into effect when the psychological discontinuity is through death.
Legal technologies using AI-augmented algorithms to translate the purpose of a law into a specific legal directive can be used to produce self-driving contracts, that is, a contract which instead of relying on a human referee to fill gaps, update, or reform the provisions of the contract, uses data-driven predictive algorithms to do so instead. Self-driving contracts are not simply science fiction; not only are self-driving contracts possible, they are in fact already with us.