The popes of the first decretal age addressed uncertainties about baptism, but left long loose ends for popes of the second decretal age to tie up.

Chapter 2 theorizes the relationship between culture and politics in a manner that explains the Turkish case and can also be applied more generally. I begin by discussing scholarly approaches to the role of culture in contentious politics before offering my conceptual framework for furthering these approaches. How does culture matter in the creation of oppositional identities and political mobilization? Most often, scholars have answered this question by emphasizing structural conditions, movement frames, or personal narratives. Instead, I focus on dispositions. I draw from practice theory to rethink issues of consent and social movement resistance, and I draw from the concept of "practice" to study the processes through which powerful actors cultivate symbolic oppositions within individuals in the form of dispositions. But the implications of this process for movement mobilization have been undervalued. The chapter makes the case that shared dispositions between mobilizing agents and their constituencies produce collective practices among otherwise dispersed individuals and secure consent on the alternative cosmology. While laying the groundwork to establish specific dispositions may take quite some time, once this groundwork has been completed, mobilizing agents can more easily convince people to "hear" insurrectionary messages as well as act on them.

Clinicians navigating the legislation when working with young people and their families in the United Kingdom (UK) may need to use several relevant frameworks of legislation at the same time. This may appear complex in practice. Clinicians need to consider how a young person’s development across multiple domains, for example, cognitive, emotional, moral, social and so on, can have an impact upon their decision-making. Clinicians who work with children and young people often also work with parents or their local authority statutory equivalents, as well as other statutory and non-statutory agencies, to help find the best outcomes for children and young people (CYP). This requires good knowledge of legal frameworks, competence in working within complex multi-agency systems and being able to understand and work with different perspectives around an issue.This chapter specifically discusses aspects of the law in relation to children and adolescents (all those under 18 years) including the Human Rights Framework, Mental Capacity Act 2005, Children Act 1989 (amended 2004), Mental Health Act (amended 2007), and Criminal Justice Act (2003) within England and Wales. We have not addressed the differences in legislation in Northern Ireland or Scotland but have commented on distinct issues where relevant.

The Conclusion discusses the unsuccessful attempt by James VI and I’s government to create the “Imperial Crowne” of “Great Brittaine” out of the kingdoms of Scotland and England in 1604–08. It examines union treatises by Thomas Craig, John Hayward, and David Hume of Godscroft that struggled to reconcile sovereignty discourse’s stress on historical narrative, legalistic precedent, and jurisdictional independence with a proposed merger of equals. Indeed, in the Atlantic Archipelago only the combination of crises that resulted in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms created the circumstances for revolutionary political thought about sovereignty that dispensed with arguments from a historical sequence of precedents. In this way, the conclusion reflects on the enduring effects that conceiving sovereignty in terms of the recognition of superiority had on premodern writers despite a long series of attempts in England and Scotland to envisage political relations differently.

This chapter covers the problems with current norms in the participants we recruit for psychology experiments, and how to solve some of these problems by taking a Big Data approach. Specifically, many psychology experiments use very restricted and similar samples – such as American college students. However, this sample differs greatly from the global adult population, in many ways described here. The chapter then discusses how we can move toward more representative groups using Big Data, while also highlighting caveats that we will never be able to make a perfect sample, and sometimes we may want to intentionally restrict the people we recruit. The chapter finishes with a look at the big ethical questions surrounding participant recruitment, and discussion on imbalances in the demographics of psychology researchers themselves.

Hume criticized the idea that all legitimate government rests on consent of any sort, tacit or express. He did not deny that some governments originated that way, or that it was an admirable way. But he thought it absurd to claim that legitimate government authority is contingent upon each subject’s consent. To say that it is so is contrary to common opinion and, moreover, simply shifts the question to that of the bindingness of promises. That bindingness must rest on the idea of necessity, and so it is needlessly indirect to appeal to promises when government can be justified directly by its necessity to prosperous and secure society. Hume, however, also made a positive contribution to the social contract tradition. He described how a convention, or common practice, can coordinate expectations and behavior without the need for any express agreement or contract. Later theorists make use of Humean convention in order to connect the idea of hypothetical consent to the actual circumstances of life. In short, government is legitimate where there is a convention of conformance to a social contract that would, hypothetically, be approved by clear-minded individuals.

This chapter explores how international law and its legitimacy could be improved and made more aligned with the demands of justice. It focuses on two types of requirements. First, there are the principles and accompanying procedures on the basis of which actors ask their agency (and their rights) to be recognized by international law and its culture of legitimacy. These principles are consent, justification, accountability, consistency, representation and participation, and non-abuse of power. Second, there are the topics around which this quest for the recognition of agency (and rights) takes place. They are better universality of international law, human rights as a benchmark of the legitimacy of sovereignty, compliance/enforcement/accountability, and human rights supported by public goods. These two kinds of requirements have been at the center of the efforts to make international law more inclusive as well as more legitimate, and they need to be taken more seriously in the future.

Political legitimacy entails a process of evaluation and eventually of judgment concerning whether or not, and to what extent, the exercise of political power (institutions, leadership, policies, and results) meets the conditions required by legitimacy. Despite the importance of the contribution of law to legitimacy, legitimacy cannot be purely and simply identified with and reduced to law. This is, in part, the case because law functions as an expression and vector of two other components of political legitimacy: values and consent. As such, this chapter is organized into three parts. First, I examine the meaning of values and consent and of their relationship in general. Second, I refer to the challenges that can be associated with values and consent. Third, I show how values and consent, provided that they are not the captives of these challenges, can operate as sources and criteria of evaluation and judgment of political legitimacy.

Recent empirical work demonstrates that some instances of material deception are perceived by ordinary people as consent-defeating, whereas other instances are not. One hypothesized account of these divergent lay intuitions draws on the notion of “essence”: Roughly speaking, lies that pertain to the “core” or “nature” of a consented-to act are perceived as precluding consent, whereas lies that pertain to features that are “nonessential” or “collateral” to the act are perceived as compatible with consent. To assess this hypothesized account, an independent measure of “essence” – one that does not rely with problematic circularity on notions of consent – is needed. This chapter draws on an emerging cognitive science literature that deploys linguistic probes to investigate how people intuitively represent human action. Here, we will consider two such probes, the “by” test and the “basically doing” test, and observe that whereas the former predicts judgments of consent, the latter does not.

What makes a constitution legitimate? Models grounded in consent, right procedure, or necessary and sufficient justice conditions capture powerful intuitions, but face equally powerful problems: These models generate paradoxes and infinite regress, and their static character ignores legitimacy’s dynamism. Moreover, debates around constitutional interpretation – originalism, living tree, or common good oriented - demonstrate the permanent space between a (constitutional) rule and its application. These debates leave mysterious how legitimacy, once in a constitution, ever gets out. But these issues resolve if we understand legitimacy as something functional, not substantive. Like a currency, I suggest, it can be drawn from diverse (normative and symbolic) sources, banked (in constitutions), and later withdrawn and spent (on political endeavours). This model honours normative intuitions, while escaping puzzles and paradoxes. Moreover, since a constitution’s legitimacy ‘holdings’ can fluctuate with political skill and circumstance, this model capture’s legitimacy’s dynamism. Such a functional model bridges the empirical and normative study of legitimacy, and it may deepen empirical understanding of normativity’s role in regime stability and constitutional change.