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In a groundbreaking new study, acclaimed scholar of global capitalism William I. Robinson presents a bold, original, and timely 'big picture' analysis of the unprecedented global crisis. Robinson synthesizes the different economic, social, political, military, and ecological dimensions of the crisis, applying his theory of global capitalism to elucidate these multidimensional and interconnected aspects. Addressing urgent issues such as economic stagnation, runaway financial speculation, unprecedented social inequalities, political conflict, expanding wars, and the threat to the biosphere, he illustrates how these different dimensions relate to one another and stem from the underlying contradictions of a global system spiralling out of control. This is a significant theoretical contribution to the study of globalization and capitalist crisis, in which Robinson concludes that the conditions for global capitalist renewal are becoming exhausted.
We live in a time of significant global risk. Some research has focused on understanding systemic sources of this risk, while other research has focused on possible worst-case outcomes. In this article, we bring together these two areas of research and provide a simple conceptual framework that shows how emergent features of the global system contribute to the risk of global catastrophe.
Technical summary
Humanity faces a complex and dangerous global risk landscape, and many different terms and concepts have been used to make sense of it. One broad strand of research characterises how risk emerges within the complex global system, using concepts like systemic risk, Anthropocene risk, synchronous failure, negative social tipping points, and polycrisis. Another focuses on possible worst-case outcomes, using concepts like global catastrophic risk (GCR), existential risk, and extinction risk. Despite their clear relevance to each other, connections between these two strands remain limited. Here, we provide a simple conceptual framework that synthesises these research strands and shows how emergent properties of the global system contribute to the risk of global catastrophic outcomes. In particular, we show that much of GCR stems from the interaction of hazards and vulnerabilities that arise endogenously within the global system, and how ‘systems thinking’ and complex adaptive systems theory can help illuminate this. We also highlight some unique challenges that systemic sources of GCR pose for risk assessment and mitigation, discuss insights for policy, and outline potential paths forward.
Social media summary
The global system is generating global catastrophic risk.
23rd November 2011 was the first anniversary of the artillery exchange between the two Koreas around the island of Yeonpyeong off the west coast of Korea. The artillery battle in 2010 was the first such since the Korean War armistice and brought the peninsula to a state of heightened tension. With the Lee Myungbak administration mulling an invasion of the North in the event of a collapse of the DPRK, a local conflict could easily explode into war. The last year has seen a lopsided arms race with South Korea dramatically increasing its military capabilities on a scale the North cannot match. The South Korean military are under American ‘wartime’ control, and since for technical reasons as well they cannot engage in war without US support, the Americans would be automatically involved in any war. A US-ROK invasion of the DPRK would almost certainly force China to intervene, as it did in 1950. A second Sino-US war would have calamitous, consequences.
Silver coinage developed accompanied by locally produced silver. Gold was introduced in the late first century bce. Both were reformed by Nero, and the system eventually collapsed.
This chapter examines Shelley’s images of the collapse of human civilizations and the colonization of their ruins by a darkly resurgent nature. In particular, it places Shelley’s fascination with civilizational collapse and natural overgrowth in the context of recent conceptions of “rewilding.” It argues that “rewilding” as currently conceived by its leading advocates remains an irreducibly human project, whereas Shelleyan overgrowth conceives of a resurgent nature that both occludes and darkly perpetuates the ruins of humanity. A number of key moments in Shelley’s work are central here: his description in his preface to Prometheus Unbound of the situation of the composition of that poem; a fragment of 1818, “Flourishing vine, whose kindling clusters glow”; and the description in Adonais of “Desolation’s bones.” Through close readings of these episodes, the chapter shows that Shelleyan overgrowth represents what we may call a “dark rewilding” – which is for us, as it was for Shelley, a future that human civilization increasingly appears to anticipate. Shelley anticipates many of the conceptual and ethical complexities of today’s rewilding, articulating instead a more ambivalent, less obviously hopeful conception of overgrowth as the eerie perpetuation of the ruins of a disappeared humanity.
This book provides a first-hand account of the founding, ascent, and dissolution of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), a tech community bank founded in 1982 with US$5 million that became the nation's 13th largest bank and tech industry's lender and bank. In this pathbreaking work, which challenges conventional understanding of risky tech lending by showing how an independent community bank became the go-to bank for the tech industry in the United States, Xuan-Thao Nguyen includes interviews with key players, ranging from the original founders and early employees to the current CEO of SVB. Chapters explore how the relationship between the venture capital (VC) industry and SVB transformed the way commercial banks comply with banking regulators while lending and nurturing young tech clients. The book demonstrates why the relationships between investors, start-ups, bankers, lenders, experts, lawyers, regulators, and community leaders are key ingredients for ongoing innovation in the tech industry. The book concludes with the sobering dissection of SVB's sudden death by $142 billion cuts inflicted by tech bros, social media, and the Federal Reserve Bank's successive interest rate hikes to squash the overheated economy.
Between c. 300 BC and AD 350, the Meroitic kingdom dominated the Middle Nile Valley; following its breakdown, it was replaced by a series of smaller successor polities. Explanation for this change centres on socio-political and economic instability. Here, the authors investigate the role of climate and environment using stable carbon and oxygen isotope analyses of human and faunal dental enamel from 13 cemeteries. The results show increasing δ18O values towards the end of the Meroitic kingdom and in the post-Meroitic period, combined with less negative δ13C values. These trends suggest a shift towards more arid conditions associated with changes in agricultural practices and land use that may have contributed to the kingdom's dissolution.
Crises, defined as a period of acute stress on social systems of all kinds, are a recurrent feature of history. As such, they are best approached and understood from a comparative historical perspective. We can distinguish between those caused or precipitated by an exogenous shock and those that derive from an endogenous process that culminates in the crisis. Crises can be of short or long duration and range from local to global. The most severe are ones that lead to a civilizational collapse or radical simplification process. Historically, severe crises have been localized to specific parts of the planet, even when several occur simultaneously because of global natural phenomena, but in the modern world we have truly global crises. Evidence suggests that such a global crisis is imminent or has already commenced. This raises practical and normative pressing issues.
Sensemaking is widely seen as one of the most crucial processes in crisis response operations. Frontline responders need an adequate understanding of a crisis situation to implement the appropriate actions. Gaining a better grasp of the situation requires acquiring more cues and avoiding premature commitment to a particular frame of reference. Ideally, operational members need to engage in adaptive sensemaking to achieve a perfect understanding of the crisis. Yet, crises are defined by uncertainty, which hinders a full understanding of the situation. The pursuit of a perfect understanding may also impede a rich awareness of the context and create blind spots. Thus, responders need to embrace some degree of uncertainty in their sensemaking as well, even though this is counterintuitive and demanding. The dilemma for responders is that they need to balance gaining a better understanding with embracing uncertainty. Frontline responders may deal with this sensemaking dilemma by pursuing a plausible understanding. A plausible understanding matches the demands of the situation and helps responders take bold action, but is also treated with an attitude of ambivalence, doubt, and modesty.
Climate change is often cited in the ‘collapse’ of complex societies and linked to agricultural resilience or lack thereof. In this article, the authors consider how demand affected agricultural strategies as farmers navigated the transformations of the Late Harappan phase (c. 1900–1700 BC) of the Indus tradition. Through the modelling of monocropping/multicropping, low/high yield crops, and supply-driven versus flexible production, various economic, environmental and social demands are explored with reference to the choices of farmers and how these decisions differed regionally, and how they impacted the wider Late Harappan de-urbanisation process. The authors’ archaeobotanical perspective on the Indus contributes to wider understanding of how urban societies and their agricultural bases change over time.
To tilt the scales in favour of a faster energy transition, significant efforts to decarbonise the economy are required. This means flipping the political and economic systems that are failing to deliver deep decarbonisation and replacing them with ones built on compassion and justice. Through a cascade of regime transitions in the energy sector, mass mobilisation, and support politics, these reforms are achievable.
The archaeology of the pre-contact Andes provides an ideal study of human responses to climate change given the region's extreme climatic variability, excellent archaeological preservation, and robust paleoclimate records. We evaluate the effects of climate change on the frequency of interpersonal violence in the south-central Andes from ca. 1.5–0.5 ka (AD 470–1540) by comparing incidents of skeletal trauma observed among 2753 crania from 58 sites to rates of ice accumulation at the Quelccaya Glacier. We find that, in the highlands, the odds of identifying inter-personal violence increase on average by a multiplicative factor of 2.4 (1.8–3.2; 95% C.I.) for every 10-centimeter decrease in annual ice accumulation. Our statistical analysis does not detect a relationship between ice accumulation and interpersonal violence rates among coastal or mid-elevation populations. This disparity likely resulted from variable economic and sociopolitical strategies at different elevations. The failure of rain-fed agriculture during periods of drought and concomitant dissolution of organizing polities likely predisposed highland populations to socioeconomic stress and violent competition for limited resources. Conversely, diversity among lowland and midland economies may have buffered against the effect of drought.
Chapter 2 considers the extinction crisis, eco-collapse, ecocide, and their consequences for humanity as well as global solutions and what individuals can do.
This chapter provides a survey of the close of the Late Bronze Age and the rise of Iron Age towns, and delivers an updated synthesis of existing evidence and arguments for climatic shifts across the eastern Mediterranean from the twelfth to fourth centuries BCE. Kearns then undertakes an island-wide comparative analysis of ruralization and urbanization apparent in survey records by the mid-first millennium BCE. Focusing on legacy and recent survey data, the chapter argues for oscillations in sedentism across the island as communities experienced environmental changes and cultivated new weathering practices, and situates the re-emergence of social differentiation in the relationships between households and land and new spaces for public gathering at tombs and shrines.
The notion of collapse and its importance in geotechnical engineering is introduced. The two main approaches are explained: (i) stress fields that fulfil the Mohr–Coulomb limit condition (together with slip line analysis as an application of the method of characteristics) and (ii) analysis of collapse mechanisms consisting of rigid blocks. The harmonisation of codes and the problematic definition of safety on the basis of probability theory are discussed.
Can we regain our humanness? Considering the massive loss of the natural world, the impending effects of climate change, staggering inequality, and the power of the elite, it may be impossible to avoid a dystopian future. Nevertheless, many scenarios for the future are possible, including a prolonged or sudden collapse, a new optimist paradise, or a decentralized golden age of barbarism. I argue that a plausible future is a return to a hunting and gathering way of life as the coming climate instability and the exhaustion of accessible fossil fuels make agriculture impossible. If there is cause for optimism, it lies in our deep evolutionary past. Selfishness and exploitation are no more a part of human nature than cooperation and caring about others and the natural world. If we are to avoid a dystopian future, we need a collective political movement to challenge the ultrasocial status quo and its defenders. Individual action is not enough.
In this book, Catherine E. Pratt explores how oil and wine became increasingly entangled in Greek culture, from the Late Bronze Age to the Archaic period. Using ceramic, architectural, and archaeobotanical data, she argues that Bronze Age exchange practices initiated a strong network of dependency between oil and wine production, and the people who produced, exchanged, and used them. After the palatial collapse, these prehistoric connections intensified during the Iron Age and evolved into the large-scale industries of the Classical period. Pratt argues that oil and wine in pre-Classical Greece should be considered 'cultural commodities', products that become indispensable for proper social and economic exchanges well beyond economic advantage. Offering a detailed diachronic account of the changing roles of surplus oil and wine in the economies of pre-classical Greek societies, her book contributes to a broader understanding of the complex interconnections between agriculture, commerce, and culture in the ancient Mediterranean.
Chapter 6 discusses the effects of disasters. It distinguishes between effects in the immediate aftermath of the disaster – mortality and demographic recovery; land loss and capital destruction; economic crisis; and blame, scapegoating, and social unrest – and longer-term structural consequences – societal collapse; economic reconstruction; long-term demographic change; reconstruction, reform, and social changes; and redistribution of resources. This chapter argues that disasters, even similar ones, did not always produce homogeneous outcomes. Furthermore, rather than being totally damaging or even controversially regarded as a ‘force for good’, the effects of disasters are best assessed by making a basic distinction between the aggregate level and the distributive level: disasters could be instrumentalized to benefit a certain segment of a given population over others.
This contribution argues that the concept of protean power opens a space to think about the limits of control and knowledge about catastrophic possibilities such as nuclear war. To do so, it offers the first distinctive definition of nuclear luck, which has long been acknowledged by policy and military leaders but remains unaccounted for in scholarship. It further shows that the nuclear realm is defined by two key unknowables. However, it argues that protean power perpetuates a survivability bias which has characterized scholarship so far, before suggesting ways to overcome that bias and modify scholarly ethos to acknowledge such catastrophic possibilities.