This chapter discusses the promise and the pitfalls of conducting social psychological research on mock jurors. The tremendous potential of this methodology to shed light on the psychology of jury decision-making is only beginning to be tapped. We use two recent experiments on the psychology of character assessments as case studies to explore some of the necessary tradeoffs in this methodological design, and to showcase the importance of understanding the psychological underpinnings of our legal doctrines. However, future research must present more diverse stimuli that better reflect the racial and gender composition of parties in real trials. Recognizing how hard it can be to replicate complex psychological processes experimentally, we argue that in some cases we should switch the burden of proof – that is, near-universal psychological processes should be presumed to also occur in the courtroom.

This chapter discusses the provisions of the Act that address character evidence. The term ‘character evidence’ is not defined in the legislation, so that some recourse to the common law is required. However, Part 3.8 of the Act provides a simple mechanism allowing evidence of character to be adduced in criminal proceedings, as follows:

• Exclusionary rules that would prevent a defendant from adducing evidence of good character (the hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility rules) do not apply; and

• If the defendant adduces evidence of good character (whether by giving evidence or through the testimony of another witness) then the prosecution, or another defendant, can respond with evidence of bad character (because the same exclusionary rules also do not apply).