Chapter 6 details and tests our theory of IO exit by applying it to the predictors of IO suspensions. IO member states use suspension to punish states that have violated IO commitments and to incentivize domestic institutional change. We argue that suspension is not an automatic punishment for violations but instead is influenced by factors related to bargaining and institutional constraints: Violator states that are more powerful, have material resources, and have alliance relationships with regional powers are less likely to be suspended while IOs. Empirically, we analyze 101 IO suspensions from 1939 to 2022 across all IOs and states, and then focus our multivariate analyses on suspensions for political backsliding. This is because we show that most suspensions occur for human rights violations and incursions on democracy commitments (like coups d’état); and narrowing the scope allows us to control for the kinds of violations that prompt suspension. Our quantitative analysis shows that IO membership suspension is imposed against some but not all violators – and that this is partly because powerful states are able to insulate themselves from IO pressures, avoiding punishment for violations that less powerful states get suspended for. IO institutional constraints including their democratic density also affect the likelihood of suspension for political backsliding. Suspension can act as a multilateral diplomatic sanction but power and politics matter.

Chapter 3 outlines and tests our theory of IO exit by applying it to the predictors of IO withdrawal. We argue that many dissatisfied states use the process of withdrawal to broker deals for institutional change in the IO. Many withdrawals are driven by preference divergence from other member states or declining power. Using our IO Exit dataset, we analyze 387 IO withdrawals from 1913 to 2022 across 534 IOs and 198 states. In categorizing the reasons for state withdrawals, we show that two-thirds of IO withdrawals are motivated by the desire to negotiate change rather than by issues that reflect populism, nationalism, or capitulation toward international cooperation. States also use the threat of withdrawal, which supports the notion that exit is a negotiating process with multiple steps rather than a final or singular act. Withdrawal is usually not permanent; half of the time, states return to the IOs they left. States also likely consider costs a priori and avoid withdrawal if the costs are projected to be too high. This prevents many withdrawals from happening in the first place. We do not find consistent support for alternative arguments that backlash against globalization, encroachment from authoritative IOs, nationalism/populism, or legal rules are robust drivers of withdrawal.

The chapter spells out the homeostatic model of how the soul is involved in perception introduced in Chapter 6, while addressing two main challenges for it. First, I argue that while the physiological details are not easy to tease out, there is no principal reason against Aristotle’s extension of the model from touch to other sense modalities. More importantly, I argue that we can understand the role of the perceptive soul as an extension of the model developed for the nutritive soul in An. 2.4 and based on Aristotle’s art analogy (from Phys. 2 and elsewhere). The upshot is that the basic perceptual acts are underlaid by bodily processes non-cognitively controlled by the soul. But while homeostasis is the aim of nutrition, in perception it only becomes a means for achieving something else, namely discrimination. The chapter closes by showing how the interpretation developed in this book pays off when it comes to understanding Aristotle’s two notoriously difficult concluding accounts: the account of perception as a reception of forms without the matter in An. 2.12 and the summarizing account of the cognitive soul in An. 3.8.

The Conclusion sums up the main results of the study and their philosophical relevance. It focuses on the notion of complete passive activities; Aristotle’s integration of causal, qualitative, and relational features of perception; his dynamic account of perception, which defies the standard dichotomy between materialism and spiritualism; the central dilemma for Aristotle’s endeavour to explain perception, as well as the prospects of the homeostatic solution; and finally the promise of the present study to also provide the groundwork for a better understanding of Aristotle’s account of intellectual cognition.

The Introduction articulates the central question about the nature of perception and sets it within the explanatory project of Aristotle’s De Anima. What makes Aristotle’s account attractive, I argue, is that it strives to accommodate causal, qualitative, and relational features of perception. A central insight of Aristotle’s account is captured under the notion of perception as a complete passive activity, but that notion has, since late antiquity, appeared paradoxical to readers of De Anima and was, thus, systematically disregarded. The Introduction analyses the historical and philosophical reasons for this disregard. It further articulates the key dilemma pertaining to Aristotle’s view of the role played in perception by the soul: it should be the primary cause of an essentially passive and receptive activity, but it should itself remain unmoved and impassive; how can that be? Although this question has received relatively little attention among recent scholars, it is argued to be more crucial than the much-discussed issue of what happens in the perceiver’s sense organs. The final section of the Introduction outlines the argument of the entire book.

In light of the conclusions reached in the previous chapters and the knowledge gained through the fragments, the author addresses the issue of Ephorus’ universality. He tries to understand which reasons led Polybius to mention Ephorus as his only predecessor; and he sets Ephorus’ universality in the context of the historiographical thought of the fourth century BC, to better appreciate its novelty.

Multilevel multicomponent complex adaptive systems are not reducible to the sum of the causal effects of independent variables. Causal inference, which has a privileged place in contemporary IR (and many other social sciences) cannot address systems effects, which arise from interdependent elements and operations (not the impact of independent variables on dependent variables). Systems effects explanations explain why by showing how. They identify mechanisms and processes of causation. They thus are able to establish causal efficacy; that is, show how processes produce – actually cause – outcomes (rather than merely identify some elements that are part of an unspecified causal process). Such an understanding leads us away from a “laws and theories” conception of science, which remains popular in Physics and Chemistry, towards a “models and mechanisms” understanding, which predominates in the life sciences (which, on their face, seem a much better model for the social sciences).

Chapter 10 tackles the controversial issue of high local government debt. It first examines sources of local government debt and clarifies that most of China’s local government debt is set apart from the government budget. It then estimates the size of China’s local government debt over time, scrutinizes the reasons for the fast debt accumulation, and evaluates the immediate impacts and potential problems of high local government debt. In this latter part, the size of government debt in each region is also estimated and the large disparities in government debt among regions are exposed. It shows that local government debt is rather high in some regions. It also shows that the size of local government assets is substantial. Thus, although high, China's local government debt is still manageable It finally discusses the measures China has taken to curb local government debt and offers suggestions for additional fiscal reforms needed for curtailing local government debt.

The global human population has increased hugely since the mid-nineteenth century and stands at almost 8 billion at the time of writing. This trend is mirrored in Britain, especially in England, with a total UK population of almost 68 million in 2020. Predictions imply that global increases will slow down, perhaps peaking at around 10 billion by 2100. Three factors contribute to changes in population size. In Britain, the reproductive rate has been below the replacement level of around 2.1 children per couple for several decades. The ongoing increase in human numbers has been dictated primarily by the other two factors. Longevity has increased steadily; people are living longer. However, the most significant driver by far in recent decades has been the high level of net immigration into Britain. Wildlife declines are statistically related to human population density across Western Europe at least with respect to two well-studied taxonomic groups, amphibians and birds.

The concluding chapter highlights the salient features of Etruscan spatial organisation. The study has identified distinctive and varied trajectories between city territories and identified different types of frontiers between them. Questions are also posed and answers proposed as to why nucleation took place. Broad comparisons are also made with examples of state formation outside Etruria. Further work is merited to get properly to grips with the rural settlement patterns, specifically the comparative use of the extensive field surveys which have been practised in Central Italy. A further challenge is to write one book which brings the cultural riches of the Etruscans together with their lived landscape, building on previous attempts by the current author with Nigel Spivey and Graeme Barker with Tom Rasmussen. This is work for the future.

Carers are a valuable resource for a patient who is suffering from a severe eating disorder. The treating team does need to respect confidentiality but also acknowledge the risks that a carer may need to be aware of when looking after a relative with an eating disorder.

People often create counterfactual alternatives to reality about how things could have been different “if only …” The creation of alternatives has widespread effects in daily mental life: It enables people to explain the past, to prepare for the future, and to experience emotions such as regret and guilt. In this chapter I consider the profound impact of the counterfactual imagination on everyday thought by focusing on its impact on moral judgments such as blame and responsibility. Insights from the study of imagination and morality shed light on the mechanisms underlying the counterfactual imagination: simulation processes that construct an alternative to reality by mutating aspects of the mental representation of reality. The relationship between the imagination and morality is two-way: On the one hand, counterfactuals affect moral judgments because people rely on them to identify causes of an outcome and to probe a person’s intentions and knowledge. On the other hand, moral thoughts affect the imagination because moral norms provide important “fault lines,” “junctures” in the mental representation of reality that affect the accessibility of imagined alternatives. The two-way relationship corroborates the idea that the imagination depends on cognitive processes shared with reasoning.

Potential causes of the current crisis are catalogued and examined. They may include globalization, technological change, breakdown of class compromise, immigration, authorization of prejudices by some insurgent politicians, or something else?