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In this chapter, I explore competition among students and parents in a North Korean elementary school. Despite the perception that competition is discouraged in socialist countries like North Korea, it is prevalent as a means to motivate citizens to increase productivity. During my childhood in North Korea, competing with friends was commonplace. Teachers encouraged competition as a method to motivate students to study hard. While capitalist societies openly embrace competition, in North Korea, it exists in a visible but unspoken form. People are encouraged to compete to "praise the Great leaders" rather than for personal goals. The norms and meaning of competition tend to vary depending on the context, as illustrated by my childhood experiences. I highlight competition in three areas: (a) competition in classes through publicized performance scores, (b) competition among students to meet material quotas (e.g., papers, apricot stones, copper, etc.) through "mini assignments," and (c) competition for student leadership positions among parents through bribery.
Since the North Korean Famine in the mid-1990s, survivors have turned to cross-border activities for sustenance, evolving into commercial activities in black markets known as jangmadang. With the collapse of the socialist Public Distribution System, the majority of North Koreans now rely on these black markets to earn money and meet their basic needs. However, such commercial activities for personal gain are illegal in the country, symbolizing the emergence of North Korea’s hidden market economy. This hidden economy is characterized by various types of “shadowy private enterprises (SPEs),” ranging from entities officially registered as state-owned enterprises but run by private individuals to home-based enterprises. These SPEs sustain their operations and evade punishment by bribing bureaucrats. However, systematic corruption poses threats to the survival, safety, and well-being of marginalized groups who struggle to pay bribes, exacerbating inequality between privileged and unprivileged segments of society. Consequently, the hidden economy engenders various forms of competition, spanning from market competition to an invisible competition for safety and wellbeing.
Returnee executives have been found to be able to predict a variety of strategic actions effectively; however, less attention has been given to how these executives influence nonmarket strategic actions, especially bribery. We integrate upper echelons theory and institutional theory to examine whether and when returnee executives influence enterprise bribery. We argue that returnee executives may develop moral relativism, which makes them more likely to view bribery as an ethical means of competition. This, in turn, increases the extent to which enterprises engage in bribery. In addition, we argue that anticorruption initiatives (formal institutions) and Confucian culture (informal institutions) moderate the above relationships. The empirical discussion of data from 2,241 nonstate-owned listed companies in China confirms most of the above theoretical speculations. This study helps us recognize the dark side of returnee executives in emerging economies.
This paper concentrates on informal practices, which refer to transactions occurring outside formal institutions and regulations. Bribery fits this definition as it involves the exchange of money or favours outside legal channels to gain an advantage or influence decisions. We analyse bribery in five sectors (education, judiciary, medical, police, and permit) between 2003 and 2013 using the Global Corruption Barometer survey. Multinomial logistic and logit regressions verify that in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), people bribe the authorities more than in the rest of the world, while the magnitude depends on the model. The results are robust with fixed effects and propensity score matching regressions. This paper proposes that higher bribing rates in the MENA region can be explained by informal practices such as wasta, hamula, and combina—the channels that undergird transactions. The article concludes with policy implications to alleviate the impacts of bribery in the MENA region.
How do bribes and lobbying distort judgment? In our experiment, referees are tasked with judging a worker’s performance, and awarding a bonus to workers who score above a certain threshold. We find that bribes and lobbying are both distortionary, but in different ways. Whereas lobbying increases the number of workers receiving a bonus, bribes weaken the relationship between performance and success, with bonuses mostly being awarded to workers who bribe. We discuss implications for anti-corruption interventions.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that intermediaries are ubiquitous in corrupt activities; however, empirical evidence on their role as facilitators of corrupt transactions is scarce. This paper asks whether intermediaries facilitate corruption by reducing the moral or psychological costs of possible bribers and bribees. We designed bribery lab experiment that simulates petty corruption transactions between private citizens and public officials. The experimental data confirm that intermediaries lower the moral costs of citizens and officials and, thus, increase corruption. Our results have implications with respect to possible anti-corruption policies targeting the legitimacy of the use of intermediaries for the provision of government services.
This paper studies how social ties interact with bribery and corruption. In the laboratory, subjects are in triads where two ‘performers’ individually complete an objective real-effort task and an evaluator designates one of them as the winner of a monetary prize. In one treatment dimension, we vary whether performers can bribe the evaluator—where any bribe made is non-refundable, irrespective of the evaluator’s decision. A second treatment dimension varies the induced social ties between the evaluator and the performers. The experimental evidence suggests that both bribes and social ties may corrupt evaluators’ decisions. Bribes decrease the importance of performance in the decision. The effect of social ties is asymmetric. While performers’ bribes vary only little with their ties to the evaluator, evaluators exhibit favoritism based on social ties when bribes are not possible. This ‘social-tie-based’ corruption is, however, replaced by bribe-based corruption when bribes are possible. We argue that these results have concrete consequences for possible anti-corruption policies.
Many readers have seen Piers Plowman as a poem of crisis, a poem that fractures under the weight of its own ambivalence. I argue here that the demonic ambiguity of debt offers a plausible explanation of the conflicting impulses at work in this text. For Langland, monetary exchange, along with the careful accounting practices it demands, as long as it is conducted honestly and fairly, serves as a metaphor of penitential exchange, not paradoxically, not in spite of its corrupting power, but because it is conducive to balance and order, to the practice of virtue and the ethical habits of self-regulation required for true and effective penance. On the other hand, for Langland, the unpayable and infinitely reproducible nature of debt, manifest precisely in the ascesis instituted by grace, produces a troubling limitlessness. The ascesis of debt is, in this way, self-undermining. The debt that cannot be repaid correlates to needs that cannot be measured, and thus to desires that cannot be checked and boundaries that cannot be known.
Details the investigation of the Ukraine scandal by the House of Representatives, the decision to impeach Trump, and the debates over the nature and scope of the articles of impeachment.
The article aims to provide a comprehensive theoretical and practical analysis of the issues in the legal regulation of corruption prevention, study the state of the fight against corruption and the legalization of proceeds of corruption-related crimes under martial law, determine new corruption risks during a war, and suggest recommendations for their minimization. The authors of this article established the main problems that cause the emergence and spread of corruption in society and ways to overcome this phenomenon. The study’s results established that independent anti-corruption agencies and authorized law enforcement agencies have continued preventive and law enforcement activities even under war conditions, their purpose being to ensure the normal State functioning, the country’s defence capacity, and society’s security. In law-making and law enforcement activities, this research work can help to improve international relations between Ukraine and foreign countries in the context of the development of bilateral relations regarding the provision of assistance to Ukraine for post-war recovery, the attraction of investment, the fight against corruption, and possible accession to the European Union.
Though the Islamic waqf is defunct, the Middle East now features modern organizations known also as waqfs. The modern waqf is essentially a philanthropic or charitable corporation. It is self-governing and has a perpetual existence. Along with other autonomous nongovernmental organizations known under different names, the modern waqf provides the institutional basis for a vigorous civil society. Yet across the Middle East civil society remains weak. This is due to two factors, both legacies of the Islamic waqf. First, a century is a short time to develop the civic skills that the Islamic waqf left uncultivated for a millennium. The region is still learning how to build politically effective NGOs. And second, the anemic civic life engendered by the Islamic waqf provided fertile ground for the repressive regimes of modern times. The region’s autocracies try systematically to keep civil society politically weak. From the standpoint of liberalization, a hopeful sign is that the region’s current NGOs, unless captured by the state, are serving as founts of civic education. Promoting a culture of bargaining and compromise, they are teaching how to communicate ideas and form coalitions.
Bribery for access to public goods and services remains a widespread and seemingly innocuous practice which disproportionately targets the poor and helps keep them poor. Furthermore, its aggregate effects erode the legitimacy of government institutions and their capacity to fairly administer public goods and services as well as protection under the law. Drawing on original evidence using social norms methodology, this research tests underlying beliefs and expectations which sustain persistent forms of bribery and draws attention to the presence of pluralistic ignorance and consequent collective action problems. With examples focused on bribery in traffic law enforcement, healthcare, and education—three critical areas where bribery is often identified as an entrenched practice—this article contributes new evidence of: (a) the presence of pluralistic ignorance, a common social comparison error, surrounding bribery behavior; (b) differing social evaluations of bribe-solicitation; and finally, (c) how this context might exacerbate collective action problems. This empirical case study of Nigeria shows that even though more people are likely to be directly affected by bribery during routine interactions with public officials and institutions and many believe this practice is wrong, most people incorrectly believe that others in their community tolerate or even accept bribery behavior.
Discusses the origins of the Armstrongs and Vickers firms and their shifts into armament production. In trying to make domestic sales Armstrongs and Vickers encountered three main challenges in dealing with the British Government. First, the primacy of laissez-faire ideology within the Government, especially in the Treasury and the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service. Second, the class prejudices of the southern elite dominating the British Government. The governing elite’s distain for trade made it difficult for armament firms to get any help, though the Admiralty and sometimes the War Office needed their products and so dealt with them. Third, departments such as the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service were disinclined to deal with trade, preferring to focus on high politics. In response, Armstrongs and Vickers developed strategies for the domestic and international markets: building and maintaining relationships with British elites, including through exchanging personnel with the government and supplying intelligence; building and maintaining relationships with foreign elites, including using agents for diplomacy, and bribes to facilitate sales; excluding competitors from the domestic market; if exclusion failed, then cooperating and colluding with other armament firms; diversifying when sales were scarce; providing finance to secure international sales; and innovating to generate sales.
Over the century considered here there were two overriding problems for Armstrongs and Vickers in doing business with the Ottoman Empire. First, the Empire’s constant indebtedness; they always needed loans to buy weaponry and had a habit of falling behind in payments. Second, the British Government followed its own diktats and would annoy the Ottoman rulers. Therefore Armstrongs– and later Vickers– despite pursuing independent policies, were often disadvantaged by being seen as British firms, showing the limitations of the firms’ independent diplomacy and marketing. Armstrongs through its alliance with Ansaldo– accidentally– discovered a route around the problem of guilt by association, and for a short time profited handsomely from that strategy. Having battled with Germany to secure plum contracts, on the eve of the Great War the British Government thwarted Turkey by commandeering the Sultan Osman I and the Reshadieh dreadnoughts built by Armstrongs and Vickers. This affected relations with Turkey until she joined the Allies in World War Two, after which she got British Export Credits. Postwar Turkey was granted American military aid, closing the market to Vickers-Armstrongs.
British armament firms operating in Latin America and elsewhere got very little help from their home government; they were on their own. They were also operating in very changeable political conditions, with many states in the region experiencing regular internal power shifts, including naval revolts and coups. There was also a lot of interstate rivalry, presenting many sales opportunities. The inhibitor to making arms sales was Latin American indebtedness. States needed loans to buy weapons but also often defaulted on them. Bribery was also a necessary lubricant of trade in the region. The Latin American market was therefore an exhilarating mix of risk and reward for Armstrongs and Vickers. Sales began in the 1880s with a controversy over the Chilean Esmeralda when war broke out with Peru. The British Government detained the ship, though Armstrongs had broken no rules. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru all became important Armstrongs’ and Vickers’ customers until the Great War saw the firms focus on British needs, ceding the market to America. There were few British armament sales in the interwar years. After the Second World War Vickers-Armstrongs and the British Government worked together on arms sales, ignoring the “Gentleman’s Agreement” with America.
Adaptation by
Adrian Evans, Monash University, Victoria,Richard Wu, The University of Hong Kong,Shenjian Xu, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing
The common types of poor lawyering include bribery, receiving private fees, forgery, theft of clients’ money and obtaining property by deception, all with themes of greed and laziness. But there are also failures of lawyers’ regulation not just of lawyers’ character, with little discipline of the largest law firms involved in corporate scandals. Choosing a ‘good’ law firm is therefore important for all law students’ futures, and it is important to ask firms about many issues, including their attitude to pro bono work and whether they have a written policy on handling ethical issues. More fundamentally, if the public interest in ‘good’ lawyering is to be supported across Greater China, then better legal ethics education is central to change and social stability. This chapter examines key procedural rules about investigating lawyer misconduct in each of the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and provides the different definitions of what is misconduct, lists of penalties, details of complaints processes, reviews and appeals. Finally, we set out a table of key ethical rules affecting legal professional conduct in each of the Pthree jurisdictions, including those related to fees and costs.
The emergence of multijurisdictional anti-bribery actions presents a substantial challenge to multinational corporations (MNCs). Multiple sovereigns have the jurisdiction to pursue criminal enforcement action against the same entity for the same underlying bribery. The existing legal framework is not sufficient for addressing this global challenge. The difference between theories of double jeopardy and judicial practices across sovereigns complicates multinationals’ strategic designs of their compliance programmes. A global settlement regime would help in efficiently using precious judicial resources and incentivize MNCs to self-disclose in furtherance of their cooperation.
A robust global legal regime holds business firms accountable for engaging in corruption. This chapter explicates that regime. This chapter also puts forth a business case for not engaging in corruption. Corruption imposes real costs on businesses, and degrades the quantity and quality of relationships into which they might enter. The chapter concludes with a discussion of measures that all businesses should take to mitigate the likelihood that persons associated with them will engage in corruption. Before discussing any of these topics, however, this chapter first discusses the definition of corruption and describes the harms corruption inflicts.
How can we make sure that states do not only sign international anti-corruption conventions, but also comply with them once the ink has dried? Peer review among states offers one answer to this question. This article develops a theoretical framework to study the different processes and mechanisms through which peer reviews can contribute to state compliance. It focuses on three processes: transparency, pressure, and learning. The article subsequently applies this framework to the OECD Working Group on Bribery (WGB) in order to identify how far participants in this peer review perceive the WGB as capable of organising these processes, and to what extent they consider these processes relevant for promoting state compliance. Data come from an online survey (74 observations) and 17 in-depth interviews. The findings reveal that this peer review exercise is perceived as effective in creating transparency about state behaviour, mobilising pressure, and stimulating learning. However, the extent to which these processes can promote compliance is more limited. For these processes to work, political will is crucial.
Compared to universal jurisdiction, active nationality jurisdiction remains one of the least understood and written about forms of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. This article seeks to offer a normative account of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by states over their nationals for crimes committed abroad such as sexual offences against minors, bribery of foreign public officials, or medical “circumvention” tourism. It highlights all of the reasons that militate against such assertions of jurisdiction as a matter of policy and law. It goes on to argue that the assertion of criminal jurisdiction over nationals for crimes committed abroad must be understood beyond its permissibility under international law as a modality that manifests the interests of the state of nationality, the territorial (host) state on occasion, the relevant individuals, and, increasingly, the international community.