The conclusion summarises the book and reflects on what is at stake in reconceptualising the transformation of European banking as extroverted financialisation. It contemplates recent financial endeavours to ‘improve’ our global financial architecture and finds most somewhat lacking in their ability to introduce a global financial system that serves social rather than financial ends. In fact, missing the implications of EF, some of these endeavours have the potential to worsen, rather than improve, the threats of credit crunches and crises. Alternatively, we might be better off to consider more radical solutions that tackle the very nature of USD debt creation and the financial architecture itself.

Why have European banks embarked on a radical transformation in which they became deeply dependent on US financial markets, a relationship they are ill-equipped to manage and less likely to overcome? This chapter introduces and summarises the book. It outlines the debates about the Americanisation of global finance and presents the concept of extroverted financialisation to help explain US-led financialisation outside the US.

In the early 2010s, banks in the Global North began ending or denying correspondent banking relationships with banks in the Global South, a trend known as “de-risking.” Banks culling these relationships blamed overzealous anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulation in the Global North and insufficient AML/CFT systems in the Global South. De-risking resulted in some developing countries and territories seeing their access to the global financial infrastructure severely restricted, slowing the movement of money and raising costs, including for remittances. This is an undesirable outcome for the targeted jurisdictions, but also for policymakers in the Global North who, for a variety of reasons, want North–South banking relationships to continue. Despite patchy evidence that de-banking was linked to AML, the banking industry leveraged the threat of de-risking and the claim of its tie to AML in order to successfully push back against AML regulation, a first for the AML regime. The case shows the infrastructural power of banks in global financial governance and highlights how state power can be challenged where financial flows are concerned. Local reactions to the episode provide hints about strategies that might loosen the colonial ties that still bind the global financial infrastructure together.

For many postcolonies, a national currency—like a constitution, flag, or passport—was a necessary accompaniment to independence. Money and credit were more than potent symbols of decolonization; they were means of constituting a new political order. This Introduction argues that the monetary regimes established in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania aimed to remake their independent societies, turning savings, loans, and other financial instruments into the infrastructure of citizenship and statecraft. These instruments tried to create a “government of value” in which personal interest and collective advance were aligned through mechanisms that were simultaneously ethical and economic, cultural and political. They did so because colonial subjects experienced empire as not only political domination but also a constraint on economic liberties. Yet, the ensuing decolonization was at best partial, not least because the value of national currencies depended on the accumulation of foreign money. Moreover, the independent political economy of East Africa created new inequalities and divisions. Struggles over money, credit, and commodities would animate a series of struggles between bankers and bureaucrats, farmers and smugglers in the coming decades. By detailing the notion of the “moneychanger state,” this chapter provides the conceptual frameworks to understand these conflicts in new ways.

Beginning in the late colonial period, banking and money became a central interface between the state and its subjects, with Ugandans demanding greater access to credit. In the years after independence, the government responded to expectations of commercial liberty by using savings and loans to turn colonial subjects into credible citizens—dutiful producers of export value whose personal “banking habit” would serve the nation as a whole. Whether through the Bank of Uganda’s national currency or the Uganda Commercial Bank’s vans circling the countryside, economic citizenship tried to sidestep the nation’s lack of affective solidarities by weaving together monetary ties. For many, this was welcome, but simultaneously, these financial interdependencies limited exchange across territorial borders. As a result, some people—among them, Asians, migrants, and residents of the border regions—were cast as suspicious subverters of the nation-state. Rather than a question of merely inclusion or exclusion, this chapter shows that postcolonial citizenship worked through “enforced membership,” as national currency imposed inclusion within the state’s monopoly on valuation, sometimes with violent implications (as in the case of the 1972 expulsion of Ugandan Asians).

In 1967, Tanzania nationalized many foreign companies as part of the Arusha Declaration’s effort to create socialism and self-reliance. Among the most important were the dominant British banks that shaped investment and exported capital. Building on transcripts, private diaries, correspondence from Barclays Bank, as well as other sources, this chapter analyses how politically independent Tanzania endeavored to remake finance. Economic self-determination depended, in part, on the negotiations between Barclays and Tanzania over how much compensation government would pay for the 1967 expropriation. At stake was not merely a final price; instead, the struggle for economic sovereignty depended on the ability to determine the accounting protocols through which price would be calculated and even to define the bundle of different assets that would be subject to valuation. It was on these technicalities that postcolonial statecraft depended, meaning formulas and figures were imbued with political importance and ethical significance. Yet, ultimately, Tanzania found its authority to govern value was stymied by the enduring inequalities of the global capitalist order.

This chapter concerns a 2005 Malaysian court case in which the plaintiff defaulted on home-purchasing loan and then claimed he could obtain favourable repayment terms if he switched his borrower from Affin (Islamic) Bank to a regular commercial bank. According to the local regulatory framework, all commercial transactions, including those of Islamic banks, fall under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The government issued a specific law - namely the Islamic Banking Act 1983, later enhanced as the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 - to regulate the Islamic banking and financial industry. As Malaysia practises a dual banking system, whereby Islamic banking products are offered side by side with the conventional ones, the case presents interesting comparison between the two banking products.

By and large, the relationship between a bank and its customers is contractual and governed by the usual contract rules. Such a relationship is also regulated by various statutes. Still, it is a contract in a specialised market with a long history and, consequently, it has acquired a large raft of terms implied by custom and usage. These may, of course, always be ousted by express terms, but clear and unequivocal words are required for the effect.

The Epilogue takes the story into the late 2000s, as another major economic crisis hit hard. It considers the cultural memory of how the 1930s touched Britain and other parts of the world. By the early twenty-first century, memories of the inter-war past had largely evaporated from popular party politics, but they retained a force in cementing both the self-identity and the entitlements of those people born in the first half of the twentieth century.

In this chapter, signs of basic services will be given, such as getting hydrated (and duly performing ‘bodily function’), getting connected and having access to funds.

This chapter describes the key changes in terms of money, credit and banking in the 1000 to 1500 period within the various kingdoms. It highlights how after a period of late monetization, each Christian kingdom transitioned to centralized models that were well-articulated with their European counterparts while keeping important distinctive traits. Nevertheless, the demand for means of payment on behalf of kings, merchants and other agents stimulated the development of credit. The need for credit spanned the entire Peninsula and the urban/rural divide. Thus, all countries saw the emergence of lively credit markets for (mostly private) borrowers, buttressed by functioning courts and regulations. These markets involved both specialists and non-specialists, but it was only in the Crown of Aragon where financial agents transitioned to institutionalized banks.

This chapter describes the development of the Tokugawa economy, illustrating how its patterns and shifts were experienced by producers and consumers in a particular place and time. In outlining the framing features of the Tokugawa economic world, we draw attention to how the proportion occupied by manufacturing industries and distribution mechanisms increased steadily in tandem with expansion of the economy’s overall volume. Diverse factors accompanied and further spurred these trends: urbanization (in cities and country towns), greater social mobility, expanding trade and communication networks, rising income, the labor of women as producers for the market, and a popular consciousness increasingly oriented toward ordinary consumption. This economic development can be described in either positive or negative terms. Economic historians in recent decades have pointed more to the positive aspects that raised the standard of living for many, whereas many social historians note the groups who lost out in the commercialization process, such as low-ranking samurai and landless commoners. Evidence can be given for both perspectives, underlining the complexity of what we call economy.

Despite the benefits that banks could get from implementing distributed ledger technologies (DLTs), few banks have focused on making full use of it. According to operational experience, DLTs – which are blockchain based in this case – are frequently employed at the level of cryptocurrencies but are seldom used when it comes to banking applications. This chapter aims to provide an overview of the current state of the academic literature on implementing DLT in the banking sector. By providing a comprehensive overview of DLT adoption in the banking sector, this study can contribute to the development of a better understanding of DLT and its potential to transform the banking industry.

The metaverse is a rapidly evolving concept in the business world, representing an inclusive dimension of innovative elements such as technologies, marketplaces, and social interactions. The financial industry is paying close attention to this concept, since it offers limitless potential for virtual customer interactions. Banks are increasingly utilising technology to offer their services and are therefore interested in exploring the metaverse as a natural evolution of their industry to build closer relationships with their customers. However, the added value for banks needs to be carefully evaluated, and the lack of clear regulation could cause hesitation. Additionally, the metaverse could amplify potential risks of cybercrime in the financial and banking sectors. This chapter explores banks’ approaches to the metaverse as a new way to exploit the potential of distributed ledger technologies and presents a summary framework on the development opportunities (and related hazards), for financial intermediaries.