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Globally, prejudicial attitudes toward women persist. By taking anti-discriminatory stances, value-oriented organizations – e.g., political parties and religious denominations – can tap into group identities to shape their members’ attitudes. We know much less about the role of organizations that are not inherently value-oriented – such as sports teams – in accomplishing the same. Yet, as various campaigns by sports teams worldwide indicate, this is precisely what non-value-oriented organizations increasingly attempt to do. Can football team fandom be leveraged to promote gender-egalitarian attitudes? We address this question with data from a national survey in Brazil and a survey experiment conducted in partnership with a major Brazilian football club. We find that while football team identity is salient and may be leveraged to change displayed social attitudes, the Club’s anti-sexism campaign inadvertently increased men’s expressed prejudice toward women in football – although it may have also improved institutional trust among women.
Norm contestation has become an established research programme in International Relations. However, scholars have yet to scrutinise the form and effect of radical contestation. I argue that radical contestation is a disruptive form of contestation, distinguished by (1) the extensive scope that attacks a specific norm and wider normative order, institutions, and actors sympathetic to the norm, and (2) high emotional intensity in animating contestation. To bring these features of radical contestation together, I use insights from the study of emotions and backlash movements to advance a new ‘emotional backlash’ framework and explain the construction, mobilisation, and outcome of radical contestation. I subsequently apply this framework to analyse the emotional backlash against Rohingya refugees during Covid-19. Cultivated by resentment, the emotional backlash against the Rohingya contests refugee protection norms and extends to radically challenge human rights advocates, United Nations agencies, and the larger humanitarian and cosmopolitan principles. In doing so, backlash supporters aim to restore a society without refugees and their sympathisers, and instead to promote racism as a ‘normal’ organising principle. By capturing radical contestation, this contribution steers norms scholarship towards a new research terrain and highlights the implications that the backlash has for the international refugee regime.
Chapter 6 situates the case studies of activism in Argentina and South Africa in global trends in LGBT rights and distills some general lessons from the research. It explores the implications of the book’s arguments for understanding LGBT activism in two additional national contexts that differ drastically in terms of LGBT legal inclusion: the Netherlands and Russia. The Dutch case illustrates additional applications of the book’s theory and the Russian case points to the limits of this study in underscoring contingency of identity deployment on the ability to express identity in public and to meet collectively in public and private spaces. The chapter then tackles the contemporary challenge of backlash against LGBT rights gains and considers how an intersectional approach to identity strategizing clarifies the stakes of some lesbians’ participation in anti-transgender mobilization. The chapter concludes with a reflection on directions for future research, including how the book’s framework can help scholars understand identity strategizing by movements in other national contexts.
Why do states exit IOs? How often does IO exit happen? And what are the consequences of IO exit for leaving states? Despite recent attention to individual cases and the importance of membership in IOs, little is known about state exit from IOs across states, organizations, and time. Chapter 1 outlines the common logic of IO exit that links withdrawal and suspension: States often use IO exit as a strategy to negotiate institutional change when mechanisms of voice have failed. We summarize our empirical contributions that rely on a new dataset of IO exit across 198 states and 534 IOs from 1913 to 2022. We show that exit is infrequent, intermittent, and often temporary rather than terminal. Factors related to bargaining help predict IO exit, and exit generates negative reputational and cooperative consequences for leaving states. Nonetheless, IO exit is often an imperfect tool in achieving institutional change. Overall, we correct the view of IO exit as recently increasing. We also show that alternative arguments are not correct: IO exit is not widely occurring because of a backlash against globalization, nationalism/populism, IO authority, or legal rules. Moreover, exit is not inconsequential. We end with a roadmap for each chapter.
In recent times, several international courts (ICs) have faced resistance from their member states. A recurring narrative used to justify states’ backlash against ICs has been that ICs are increasingly overreaching and essentially interfering with states’ sovereignty. This article explores what backlash over sovereignty actually entails, highlighting a diverse set of political agendas and strategies. The article first develops an analytical matrix of three forms of sovereignty politics – by design, as a shield and as reprisal – to capture different aspects of sovereignty politics. This framework is then used in an empirical analysis of four African states that, within a four-year time-period, all withdrew their declarations granting direct access to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Court) for NGOs and individuals from those states. In all cases, sovereignty was claimed as the reason for withdrawal but as we demonstrate, the cases vary. Overall, we find that resistance against the African Court does not necessarily emerge from a challenge to a principled concept of sovereignty, but from sitting governments’ narratives of what human rights ought to be, who ought to invoke them, and when. In other words, sovereignty arguments work mainly to safeguard member states from the authority of the African Court where state practices collide with international commitments to human rights. This takes on a distinct rhetorical framing that utilizes and evokes a set of different meanings of sovereignty, for example that the Court is outside its delegated competences or the issue is inside a vague notion of internal affairs. By using these legal-rhetorical strategies, member states seek to avoid having to address directly the challenges being brought against them at the IC.
The most enduring stereotypes about feminists is that they are manhaters. Interestingly, few empirical studies have examined this stereotype for its veracity. Chapter 4 critically examines the stereotype that feminists dislike men and that feminism is a movement against men. Social psychological research on women’s attitudes toward men is examined and finds that anti-feminists actually feel more hostility toward men than do feminists. The function and implication of the manhating feminist myth is critically examined in this chapter. The feminist manhater myth persists in order to undermine the feminist movement and to drive a wedge between traditional and non-traditional women. Related strategies to make feminism unpalatable, such as lesbian-baiting, are also critically examined. Chapter 4 ends with strategies to reduce the impact of the manhater stereotype and to foster gender equality. The empirical work measuring the effects of women/gender studies classes on students is presented, and teaching children about gender discrimination are some strategies presented.
Chapter 1 addresses the false belief that prejudice and discrimination are individual in nature and not systemic or institutional. Many people believe that racism, sexism, or homophobia comprise an individual’s negative feelings toward marginalized groups – a person has hate in their heart and discriminates against the relevant target. It is certainly the case that people can hate members of certain groups and that hate can manifest in discrimination. However, inequality is also refleted in insitutions. It is systemic and structural. That is, inequality is reflected in laws, policies, and practices, and is baked into insititutions such as health care, the criminal legal system, marriage, education, the military, and so on. Chapter 1 describes the key terms associated with systemic inequality, and describes the process by which systemic inequality is established and maintained. The chapter concludes with strategies to reduce systemic and structural inequality.
The Conclusion describes the stakes of ignoring the impact of bigotry. In particular, the ways in which bigotry impacts the lives of those who benefit from it are a focus.
The social and political contexts in many countries are affected by dangerous trends and forces of populism. Populist hostility is most observable in connection with issues of immigration, where it functions as a pretext for scrapping legal protections in increasingly hostile immigration laws. What is particularly insidious about these developments is the claim, articulated by some theorists, that the popular resentment and backlash against immigrants and refugees are justified. That populists are hostile towards immigrants and human rights laws, the claim seems to go, is the fault of the legal norms and institutions that allow in the immigrants and protect them. This article challenges those approaches and argues that legal constraints on popular biases towards immigrants are necessary and need to be defended against popular moralism. It is also argued that although community values are important, they should not be considered as trumps against the rights of immigrants and refugees.
Benign Bigotry delves into the multifaceted landscape of prejudice, spanning academic and scientific research, popular culture, and contemporary politics. At its core lies the concept of subtle prejudice-a pervasive, often unconscious bias in race, gender, and sexuality. Through meticulous analysis and the author's own experience serving eight years on the Police Oversight Board, this book exposes seven seemingly harmless cultural myths that perpetuate inequality. It also confronts prejudices against women and LGBTQ+ individuals, offering concrete strategies to dismantle entrenched beliefs. Designed as a textbook for undergraduate and graduate classes, yet accessible to the educated lay reader, each chapter caters to those interested in psychology, sociology, business, and education. With a valuable new chapter on systemic inequality, updated real-life examples, and engaging with the exploration of empirical research on discrimination and prejudice emerging since 2009, this second edition is not to be missed.
The growing focus on the agency of norm violators has led to new insights on various rhetorical strategies that states accused of norm violation deploy. However, few studies have simultaneously examined both specific rhetorical devices that enable norm evasion and their social psychological underpinnings. Building on International Relations (IR) research on norm evasion and social psychological research on in-group wrongdoings, this paper conceptualises states’ rhetoric of norm evasion as a social psychological coping strategy: aimed at protecting in-group esteem. Empirically, the paper offers a systematic analysis of Japan’s rhetoric of norm evasion regarding its colonial and wartime past, as well as its social psychological underpinnings. Five rhetorical strategies of norm evasion are identified: (1) claiming legality, (2) claiming the inapplicability of relevant treaties, (3) claiming the inapplicability of relevant norms, (4) equivocating, and (5) citing non-disparagement pledges. These strategies, as well as the psychological disengagement they enable, have culminated in the promotion of non-remembrance, or behavioural manifestations of norm regress.
In recent years, anti-refugee hate crimes have soared across Europe. We know this violence has spread fear among refugees, but we know less about its effects on the non-refugee population. This is an oversight, as research suggests political violence often has effects on the broader population. Those effects can range from increased solidarity with the targets of the violence to reduced pro-social behavior and less support for the targets of the violence. In this research note, we examine the effects of exposure to anti-refugee hate crimes in Germany. Our results suggest no direct effect of exposure to anti-refugee hate crimes on support for refugees. These results have several implications for our understanding of political divides over refugees in Europe.
Advocates of gender quotas emphasize their transformative potential for women’s political participation. Yet evidence on the symbolic effects of quotas remains inconclusive, with some studies uncovering significant backlash after implementation. Although elite resistance to quotas has been posited as an explanation, the underlying mechanisms generating negative effects remain underexplored. This study proposes the utilization of “moral panic” by elites as a mechanism of resistance. By leveraging their media influence and employing conservative moral rhetoric, elites engineer moral panic, framing women’s political engagement as detrimental to social order and gender hierarchies. Such panic aims to incite public opposition and rationalize elite resistance to progressive changes. Notably, this tactic is more prevalent in countries with reserved-seat quotas, where elites possess limited control over electoral outcomes. Using an original dataset encompassing politician names and genders, I analyze over 150,000 news articles from 2000 to 2021 across 10 sub-Saharan African countries. The findings indicate that quota-induced gains in women’s representation are followed by significant increases in conservative ethical language in news coverage of women politicians, particularly in countries with reserved-seat quotas. These findings bear important implications for gender equality in politics and shed light on the dynamics of backlash after quota implementation.
Chapter 9 reveals that the circular patterns of norm renegotiation manifest at the national level in India’s broader women’s movement. It describes the history of this movement and then use ACLED data on all women-led protest events in India from 2016 to 2021 to illustrate the breadth of women’s collective mobilization and the range of demands raised. Women most often come together to protest more explicitly gendered issues, such as gender-based violence. However, many women-led protests focus on other demands, including improved government accountability and service delivery. The nature of women’s demand-making suggests possibilities for both gender equality and improved governance with their political inclusion. Finally, it documents broader patterns of resistance to women’s collective action at the national scale, documenting a range of explicit instances of violent backlash and summarizing the rise of the men’s rights movement in India. This provides further evidence of male coercion and suggests conditions under which women’s collective action can succeed.
Chapter 8 demonstrates that such effects can be augmented by stimulating solidarity among women with a focus on gender consciousness-raising, but that such actions generate backlash. It tests the importance of social solidarity in stimulating women’s collective action by exploiting arbitrary variation in the delivery of a gender consciousness-raising program to SHGs. It shows that women are more likely to undertake collective action after identifying shared experiences of deprivation and forming a bond based on their gender identity. This collective action is also more likely to be aimed at women’s strategic interests – their interests rooted in their patriarchal suppression – and therefore garner more resistance from men in the community, including through increased experiences of (public) violence and harassment. It shows that women navigate this resistance through their collective strength and solidarity.
The author assesses the role of consent in processes of binding dispute resolution before international courts and tribunals. He seeks to demonstrate that ‘consent’ has a particular role in binding dispute resolution. This particular role derives from the special nature of binding dispute resolution processes. They are intrusive and characterized by their uncertain outcome: the implications of State consent to the dispute resolution process crucially depend on decisions of an independent entity, namely an international court or tribunal. Because this is so, States insist on the need for consent, as a precondition of any binding dispute resolution process. At the same time, once consent has been given, control shifts to the competent international court or tribunal. Moreover, by virtue of their decision-making authority, many international courts and tribunals have managed to assert at least a persuasive influence over proper construction of the legal rules at stake, extending beyond the cases immediately pending before them. The chapter traces these peculiarities and examines how the tension between State and courts’ authority plays out in particular disputes.
As scholars and activists seek to define and promote greater corporate political responsibility (CPR), they will benefit from understanding practitioner perspectives and how executives are responding to rising scrutiny of their political influences, reputational risk and pressure from employees, customers and investors to get involved in civic, political, and societal issues. This chapter draws on firsthand conversations with practitioners, including executives in government affairs; sustainability; senior leadership; and diversity, equity and inclusion, during the launch of a university-based CPR initiative. I summarize practitioner motivations, interests, barriers and challenges related to engaging in conversations about CPR, as well as committing or acting to improve CPR. Following the summary, I present implications for further research and several possible paths forward, including leveraging practitioners’ value on accountability, sustaining external calls for transparency, strengthening awareness of systems, and reframing CPR as part of a larger dialogue around society’s “social contract.”
The conclusion identifies the key turning points in the Court’s jurisprudence in light of the established theoretical framework and presents several key findings that further the debate on judicial politics and on the backlash. The main takeaway is that international courts may not always attempt to expand their power. On the contrary, concern for institutional survival or public image may compel them to under-utilize their power. Courts will follow forbearing or selectively forbearing policies to prevent or mitigate political pushback or backlash. They will reserve audacity or selective audacity for moments when they feel safe from political repercussions. Drawing upon my analysis of the Court over five decades, I call for historicizing the current instances of backlash against international courts and liberal institutions. At least in the context of the European Court, an important lesson is that the backlash is not unique to today’s political climate. The Court has seen different episodes of backlash and, as a result, it has forged a resilience strategy to fend off or pre-empt backlash. Such strategies can also be traced in other courts and institutions with delegated authority.
This chapter discusses the current trends at the reformed Court against the backdrop of recent reform initiatives, as well as the general atmosphere of widespread negative feedback and backlash since the 2010s. To do so, it relies on the results of the content analysis carried out on the case law between 1967 and 2016, a close reading of some of the recent landmark judgments, and the insights gathered from elite interviews conducted with current and former judges. This assessment shows the extent to which the reformed Court resorts to selective forbearance. I find that the reformed Court, challenged by widespread negative feedback, selectively pays heed to member states’ concerns. That is, it continues a progressive line of reasoning when it comes to certain core obligations, such as the obligation to refrain from using excessive force while policing or the provision of legal protection and remedy. Yet, it adopts a more forbearing attitude towards certain other obligations, such as the obligation to uphold the non-refoulement principle, the provision of sufficient medical care in detention centers, or the provision of acceptable detention conditions to (irregular) migrants or asylum seekers.
Chapter 5 turns to an examination of the ties between working-class representatives and constituents, by taking an in-depth look at the relationship between labor unions, political parties, and workers in Argentina and Mexico. We show that the evolution of unions and parties throughout history lead to working-class deputies in Argentina having stronger ties to workers and a better track record of policy representation than working-class deputies in Mexico. Then we leverage an original dataset of working-class representation over time and across states in Argentina and Mexico to show empirically that whereas increases in working-class representation in Argentina are associated with citizens evaluating their representative institutions more positively, the increased presence of working-class legislators in Mexico leads to backlash and more negative evaluations of legislatures and political parties.