In this chapter we address the question of whether or not language acquisition is largely implicit in nature. After reviewing key constructs (e.g., explicit and implicit knowledge, explicit and implicit processing/learning, intentional and unintentional learning), we discuss the major positions currently under scrutiny in the field: (1) Explicit learning is necessary; (2) explicit learning is beneficial; (3) explicit learning does little to nothing (i.e., acquisition is largely if not exclusively implicit in nature). A key issue in this chapter is how one defines “language” and how one construes “input processing.” We will review how definitions of these constructs color the researcher’s perspective on the issues.

Highlighting the lack of opportunities to use and practise language that is often typical of the foreign language classroom, a lesson is described where learners had opportunity to consolidate learning and develop fluency in using language they had previously covered in class. Drawing on Ortega (2007), the principles of optimal practice are described and examples from the classroom show how ‘optimal practice’ may have consolidated language learning, but also led to new learning. Perspectives from both the teacher and students are included. The importance of incorporating opportunities for practice in the language classroom is discussed and, here, as elsewhere in the book, Nation’s four strands (Nation, 2007) are presented as a way of integrating balance into a classroom language programme.

What role is played by habitual behaviors in sport skill? To answer this question we examine and contrast two different views on habit: the intellectualist and the enactivist. Intellectualism, which can be traced back to William James’ mechanist account of habits as reflex-like automatic dispositions, claims that deliberation and explicit goal-representation are necessary to make behavior intelligent and flexible because habits alone do not have this capacity. Enactivism, on the contrary, claims that habits are both necessary for and constitutive of the development of sports skills because they can be inherently intelligent and flexible. After reviewing behavioral and neuro-cognitive evidence in favour of each view, we offer an anti-intellectualist argument to support the enactivist view: habitual behaviors are legitimate sources of prereflective motivation and bodily know-how. Accordingly, skillful action control is not constrained but disclosed by habit formation. Automatism then is not a drawback for strategic control and improvisation but their pragmatic foundation.

To allow identification of stimuli, sensory input is initially held briefly in sensory memory. It is then held in a short-term store (STS), where it can receive the additional processing required to form a permanent memory. The existence of separate short- and long-term stores is supported by research on amnesia, demonstrating that brain damage can affect one but not the other. Forgetting in STS may be caused by decay, and by interference from other memories. STS can hold information retrieved from long-term memory when required for activities such as reading; to reflect this, it is now called working memory. Baddeley proposed that working memory has 3 components: the phonological loop, visuo-spatial sketch pad, and central executive. Consolidation theory suggests that the formation of a permanent memory requires time for the strengthening of synaptic connections; there also appears to be a consolidation process that can occur over years. We cannot attend to all the stimuli that seek entry into working memory; change blindness provides a striking example. Some theories suggest that selection occurs early in processing, others that attention can be allocated flexibly after stimuli have been identified. With practice, processing can become automatic, so that stimuli no longer require attention.

In this chapter we address the question of whether or not language acquisition is largely implicit in nature. After reviewing key constructs (e.g., explicit and implicit knowledge, explicit and implicit processing/learning, intentional and unintentional learning), we discuss the major positions currently under scrutiny in the field: (1) explicit learning is necessary; (2) explicit learning is beneficial; (3) explicit learning does little to nothing (i.e., acquisition is largely if not exclusively implicit in nature). A key issue in this chapter is how one defines “language” and how one construes “input processing.” We will review how definitions of these constructs color the researcher’s perspective on the issues.

All aspects of linguistic knowledge are ultimately based on speakers’ experience with lexical expressions, but of course, knowledge of language, notably, grammar, exceeds their memory of particular lexical tokens. It is a standard assumption of the usage-based approach that grammar involves a taxonomic network of constructions ranging from prefabricated strings of lexical expressions to highly abstract schemas. Chapter 4 describes the taxonomic organization of constructions and their development in L1 acquisition and language change. It includes a detailed discussion of current research on statistical grammar learning in infancy, the acquisition of constructions during the preschool years and two case studies on the rise of constructional schemas in language history.

There is general consensus among usage-based researchers that the development of linguistic structure is driven by domain-general processes, but these processes are not always explained in light of psychological research on cognition. Chapter 3 provides a systematic overview of the various cognitive processes that are involved in language use and explains, in general terms, how grammar, usage and cognition are related. It is argued that language use involves a unconscious decision-making process that is determined by cognitive factors from three general domains: (1) social cognition (e.g., joint attention, common ground), (2) conceptualization (e.g., figure-ground, metaphor) and (3) memory-related processes (e.g., automatization, priming). The various processes can reinforce each other but can also be in competition. Of particular importance is the competition between other-oriented processes of social cognition and self-oriented processes of memory and activation spreading. One general advantage of the network approach is that it provides a natural explanation for the effects of frequency on usage and development.

All linguistic elements, e.g., words, phrases and clauses, occur in sequential order. The sequential arrangement of linguistic elements is motivated by conceptual and pragmatic factors, but the strength of sequential relations is primarily determined by automatization or chunking. Since automatization is a gradual process driven by frequency of occurrence, sequential relations vary on a continuum. Moreover, since language unfolds in time, sequential relations have an inherent forward orientation, which is reflected in the fact that listeners are able to “predict” upcoming elements in the unfolding speech stream. Chapter 5 considers the effect of automatization and chunking on the development of linguistic structure and the cognitive organization of grammar. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is concerned with research on lexical prefabs and the organization of morphological network models, and the second part considers sequential aspects of constructional schemas and the gradience of constituency.

Chapter 2 provides a background on the use of network models in different scientific disciplines and introduces the general architecture of the grammar network. The proposed network model has two levels of analysis: a lower level, at which linguistic signs, notably constructions, are defined by three different types of associations, or relations: (1) symbolic relations connecting form and meaning, (2) sequential relations connecting linguistic elements in sequence and (3) taxonomic relations connecting linguistic patterns at different levels of abstraction. Together the three relations define the basic units of speech, i.e., lexemes and constructions. Every unit constitutes a (local) network shaped by language use, but these networks also serve as nodes of a higher-level network that involves three other types of relations: (4) lexical relations connecting lexemes with similar or contrastive forms and meanings, (5) constructional relations connecting constructions at the same level of abstraction and (6) and filler-slot relations connecting particular lexemes with constructional schemas.