Industrial concentration has increased in recent years with large companies consolidating their dominant positions. Concentrated markets are thought to benefit large firms as they earn elevated profits and gain political influence. Antitrust law is the main policy tool to reduce concentration. Calls to strengthen antitrust have come from the political left and the right, yet we know little about public support for such policies. We test how economic, moral, and democratic concerns influence support for antitrust. We find that the public does not respond to the consumer price benefits of antitrust but is moved by arguments invoking concerns for fairness and the importance of maintaining democratic institutions. We find that Republicans and Democrats often respond in divergent ways, with Republicans being less supportive of antitrust when informed that it could punish successful companies, whereas Democrats are more concerned about using antitrust to curb corporate influence. The findings accord with a general concern on the left for limiting business influence in politics and a concern on the right for maintaining business growth.

This article applies the lessons from the prior theory of responsive regulation in criminology to EU competition law and extends these lessons to argue in favour of an enhanced form of responsive competition law. First, it finds that EU competition law enforcement is already responsive in the traditional sense as it takes the reactions of undertakings into account when deciding which instrument to apply, in accordance with the enforcement pyramid developed by Braithwaite. An enforcement pyramid for EU competition law is presented. The objectives of competition law are found to be broad, and its key norms are open, facilitating responsiveness. This also allows competition law to develop to meet new societal demands, such as the need to control market power in the digital realm and to combat climate change. Next, the article examines the role of responsive and accountable behaviour by undertakings in competition law. First, it is found that in line with new forms of regulation concerning non-financial reporting, greenwashing, data protection, digital markets and services, and artificial intelligence, the special responsibility of dominant undertakings in competition law increasingly demands a pro-active approach to compliance. This also involves considering the interests of third parties and framing private governance in accordance with fundamental rights and legal principles. An enhanced degree of responsiveness of dominant undertakings results. Second, additional space is being created within competition law to accommodate undertakings that behave in a socially responsible manner, notably regarding sustainability. This is examined in relation to the issue of a fair share for consumers, and private enforcement by means of compliance agreements. After discussing potential objections to responsiveness in terms of democratic legitimacy, legal certainty, and redistribution of wealth, the article concludes that the developments sketched above indeed point towards the reinforcement of the responsive nature of competition law.

This paper tests the insiders’ dilemma hypothesis in a laboratory experiment. The insiders’ dilemma means that a profitable merger does not occur, because it is even more profitable for each firm to unilaterally stand as an outsider (Stigler, 1950; Kamien and Zang, 1990, 1993). The experimental data provides support for the insiders’ dilemma, and thereby for endogenous rather than exogenous merger theory. More surprisingly, our data suggests that fairness (or relative performance) considerations also make profitable mergers difficult. Mergers that should occur in equilibrium do not, since they require an unequal split of surplus.

Antitrust policy aims to reduce market concentration and increase competition among firms. Contemporary antitrust is sensitive to both domestic and international considerations. Internationally, the market is dominated by the largest firms, raising questions about the competitiveness of domestic firms and the application of antitrust against foreign firms. Domestically, public support for antitrust is needed for continued enforcement. This paper examines how international markets shape public support for antitrust in the United States. Using media analysis, we find that antitrust is increasingly in the news, and that international competition is referenced in antitrust debates. We theorize that support for antitrust is shaped by concerns for the competitiveness of domestic firms, relative to foreign competition, and that these concerns vary based on individuals’ levels of nationalism. We test our theory using a survey experiment and find that individuals are especially concerned with being placed at a disadvantage relative to foreign competitors. Interestingly, we find that using antitrust laws against foreign firms yields divergent reactions—highly nationalistic Americans increase their support for strong antitrust laws, while those with low levels of nationalism decrease support. The paper highlights the importance of global competition in shaping preferences for domestic regulation.

Although citizens value competitive markets and support small businesses, we observe substantial variation in market concentration. Why do politicians abstain from taking action to reduce concentration? We propose an often overlooked political benefit to concentrated markets: When concentration increases, competition is less pronounced and firms earn larger profits. These profits can be taxed for government revenue or used to reward business-friendly politicians. We expect politicians to impose more lenient competition policies toward firms that provide larger sources of revenue. Moreover, this relationship should be especially strong under authoritarian political institutions, where politicians only weakly value the free market and consumer outcomes and where institutional commitments to unbiased policies are weak. We derive our theoretical claims from a formal model. We draw on both cross-country evidence and evidence from Turkey at the firm and industry level to evaluate our claims. We find that as political institutions become less representative, firms that make higher tax payments tend to control more assets, operate in more concentrated industries, and engage in higher value M&As. Our study points to the weak provision of competition policies as a source of rent-seeking.

This essay celebrates the BU Health Law Program upon its 70th anniversary, offering reflections on the founders of the program, Fran Miller, George Annas, and Wendy Mariner (“FGW,” endearingly), and their contributions to the field.

Current faculty offer reflections, including: Several speak to scholarly research, including Elizabeth McCuskey on health care finance, Aziza Ahmed on human rights, Dionne Lomax on antitrust, Christopher Robertson on trust, and Kathy Zeiler on the marketplace. Other contributors speak to the student experience, with Dianne McCarthy on mentorship, Laura Stephens on demanding excellence, Michael Ulrich on teaching, and Larry Vernaglia on merging law and public health. On FGW’s broader impacts, Nicole Huberfeld speaks to the translation of research to reach new audiences, and Kevin Outterson writes about FGW’s pivotal roles in establishing the health law field and the institutions that now define it.

Together these pieces testify to the astounding contributions of these scholar-teacher-leaders across many domains and dimensions of health law. While their contributions are countless and immeasurable, these reflections offer a start.

For the past decade, U.S. communications policymakers have been debating the need for net-neutrality regulation of “dominant” communications carrier platforms. One of the reasons advanced for regulating these carriers derives from a fear that carriers could reduce competition in the production and distribution of video media through their ownership of media companies, but is there any evidence supporting the notion that vertically integrated communications companies have successfully used such a strategy? This paper provides evidence from the financial markets that carrier integration into video production has not redounded to the benefit of these companies’ stockholders. In fact, this integration appears to reduce the value that investors place on such carriers, a result that suggests that the difficulties in managing a large, vertically integrated media and communications company more than offset any benefits (if any) that may derive from anticompetitive behavior induced by vertical integration.

Competition policy in the EU and UK is in the process of a significant reconfiguration. Its key postulates, methodologies, and normative goals are being subject to intense discussion and revision. The emergence of sui generis ‘new competition tools’ in the area of digital markets—EU Digital Markets Act and UK Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers (bill)—epitomises this trend. The purpose of this Article is to attempt to provide legal theoretical foundations for the new subfield of competition law and policy by systematising and conceptualising these trends into the framework of socio-legal scholarship.