Increasing senior leadership diversity and decentralizing decision-making have become imperatives for many organizations, supported by a growing normative literature. However, mixed empirical evidence suggests that these may hinder the decision-making processes required to deliver value to firms and their stakeholders. We argue that diversity and decentralization should instead be viewed as means of organizing towards these ends, and theorize the conditions under which they may harm performance – specifically, the nature of the knowledge problems faced by leaders. Analyzing a 19-year panel of 922 U.S. firms, we find that diversity and decentralization are associated with stronger financial and market performance in uncertain environments but become liabilities under ambiguity, where speed and strategic clarity are critical and homogeneous, centralized leadership is more effective. Stakeholder outcomes are similarly affected, particularly employee wellbeing and ethical political activity. These findings challenge normative claims, with implications for theory, proscriptions, and practice.

Ambiguity, in the decision-theoretic sense, means that agents are unable to identify unique probabilities for some events that they care about. Ambiguity characterizes many real-life situations, but many important questions surrounding it are still open. Descriptively, we know that people typically perceive and are sensitive to ambiguity in certain kinds of situations. Intuitively, this is well justified. Normatively, however, many think that ambiguous beliefs and ambiguity sensitivity are irrational. This raises questions such as: Why are people sensitive to ambiguity? Does it lead to inferior decisions, in particular given people’s usual decision environments? An interesting clue is that there are many examples of social contexts in which ambiguity benefits everyone involved. Hence, we investigate the possibility that ambiguity sensitivity is ‘ecologically rational’ or adaptive in a multi-agent, strategic setting. We explore the viability of ambiguity sensitive behaviour using evolutionary simulations. Our results indicate that ambiguity sensitivity can be adaptive in strategic contexts, and is especially beneficial when agents have to coordinate.

This study investigates the integration of literal completions of idiomatic multiword expressions (MWEs) into two linguistic contexts: one promoting a literal interpretation and the other a figurative one, requiring reinterpretation to align with figurative bias. Sixteen Italian idioms were distributed in two groups by their Potential Idiomatic Ambiguity (PIA) score, an index of literal plausibility, decomposability and transparency. Using experimental dialogues, the study tested whether high-PIA idioms receive higher acceptability ratings across both contexts than low-PIA idioms. Eighty-four Italian-speaking participants rated idiom literal completions within literal and figurative contexts. Results show that literal completions of high-PIA idioms integrate better across contexts, while those of low-PIA idioms receive lower ratings and have longer combined reading and rating times. This supports hybrid models of idiom processing, emphasizing the role of idiomatic features and context in balancing figurative and compositional interpretations. This study also marks an initial effort to experimentally trace systematicity within idiomatic wordplay, challenging the idea that it lacks relevance for linguistic research while outlining limitations and directions for future work.

Sentences with a plural subject receive a distributive reading if the predicate refers to the atomic members, or a collective one if it relates to the whole group. Previous accounts suggest that the distributive representation includes an additional semantic operator, and comprehension experiments show that adults interpret an ambiguous sentence as collective. However, children accept distributive readings more frequently, questioning their presumed greater difficulty. The current study investigates these interpretations in a novel way through a production study, where Italian adults and preschoolers described distributive and collective pictures. Adults produced more distributive expressions, in line with semantic theories and psycholinguistic findings. Preschoolers, however, showed limited sensitivity to the need for disambiguating markers, showing in particular that knowledge of distributive quantifiers is not fully acquired by the age of five, at least in the production domain. We discuss our results at the intersection of language acquisition, semantic theories, and cognitive development.

This article offers a hermeneutical account of ambiguity using Luke and Acts as an extended case study. After discussing the difficulties in identifying purposeful ambiguity in biblical texts, verbal ambiguity is distinguished from ambiguity beyond the sentence level, such as ambiguities of plot or character. Instead of approaching ambiguity primarily as a failure of language or a problem to be solved, this article offers a framework for thinking about ambiguity as an invitation to read a text from multiple angles. The discussion is illustrated throughout with a series of examples taken from Luke and Acts. I close with reflections on how this approach to ambiguity is helpful when reading scripture against different cultural contexts and in the study of New Testament Christology.

Decisions to trust in strategic situations involve ambiguity (unknown probabilities). Despite many theoretical studies on ambiguity in game theory, empirical studies have lagged behind due to a lack of measurement methods, where separating ambiguity attitudes from beliefs is crucial. Baillon et al. (Econometrica, 2018b) introduced a method that allows for such a separation for individual choice. We extend this method to strategic situations and apply it to the trust game, providing new insights. People’s ambiguity attitudes and beliefs both matter for their trust decisions. People who are more ambiguity averse decide to trust less, and people with more optimistic beliefs about others’ trustworthiness decide to trust more. However, people who are more a-insensitive (insufficient discrimination between different likelihood levels) are less likely to act upon their beliefs. Our measurement of beliefs, free from contamination by ambiguity attitudes, shows that traditional introspective trust survey measures capture trust in the commonly accepted sense of belief in trustworthiness of others. Further, trustworthy people also decide to trust more due to their beliefs that others are similar to themselves. This paper shows that applications of ambiguity theories to game theory can bring useful new empirical insights.

Other-regarding preferences or decision errors are the main explanations put forward to justify contributions exceeding the non-cooperative optimum in VCM games. An alternative rationale relies on ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion increases the perceived marginal benefit of own contributions, which in equilibrium will exceed the Nash level. We present a series of experiments testing this hypothesis. To control for other-regarding preferences, we run a two-player game in which a human player plays with a virtual agent. Players are assigned either to a risky setting (known probabilities of opponent's choices) or to an ambiguity setting (probabilities of opponent's contribution are vague). Results show that ambiguity affects contributions. However, attitude to ambiguity appears to be affected by the location of the aggregate Nash optimum inside the decision space.

Empirical studies of ambiguity aversion mostly use artificial events such as Ellsberg urns to control for unknown probability beliefs. The present study measures ambiguity attitudes using real-world events in a large sample of investors. We elicit ambiguity aversion and perceived ambiguity for a familiar company stock, a local stock index, a foreign stock index, and Bitcoin. Measurement reliability is higher than for artificial sources in previous studies. Ambiguity aversion is highly correlated for different assets, while perceived ambiguity varies more between assets. Further, we show that ambiguity attitudes are related to actual investment choices.

In an experiment with more than 500 participants we study how past experience of uncertainty (imperfect knowledge of the state space) affects risk preferences. Participants in our experiment choose between a sure outcome and a lottery in 32 periods. All treatments are exactly identical in periods 17–32 but differ in periods 1–16. In the early periods of the risk treatment there is perfect information about the lottery; in the ambiguity Treatment participants perfectly know the outcome space but not the associated probabilities; in the unawareness treatment participants have imperfect knowledge about both outcomes and probabilities. We observe strong treatment effects on behavior in periods 17–32. In particular, participants who have been exposed to an environment with very imperfect knowledge of the state space subsequently choose lotteries with high (low) variance less (more) often compared to other participants. Estimating individual risk attitudes from choices in periods 17–32 we find that the distribution of risk attitude parameters across our treatments can be ranked in terms of first order stochastic dominance. Our results show how exposure to environments with different degrees of uncertainty can affect individuals’ subsequent risk-taking behavior.

Healthcare technologies are often appraised under considerable ambiguity over the size of incremental benefits and costs, and thus how decision-makers combine unclear information to make recommendations is of considerable public interest. This paper provides a conceptual foundation for such decision-making under ambiguity, formalizing and differentiating the decision problems of a representative policy-maker reviewing the results from an economic evaluation. A primary result is that presenting information to regulators in an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio or cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) format instead of a net monetary benefit or cost–benefit analysis (CBA) framework may induce errors in decision-making when there exists ambiguity in incremental benefits and decision-makers use well-known decision rules to combine information. Ambiguity in incremental costs or the value of the cost-effectiveness threshold does not distort decision-making under these rules. In reasonable contexts, I show that the CEA framing may result in the approval of fewer technologies relative to CBA framing. I interpret these results as predictions on how the presentation of information from economic evaluations to regulators may frame and distort recommendations. All the results extend to non-healthcare contexts.