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This chapter examines the Supreme Court’s practice, over approximately a century and a half, in developing and applying the “substantive due process” doctrine. The animating premise of that doctrine is that the Due Process Clause confers judicially enforceable protections against substantively unfair infringements of certain “unenumerated” yet fundamental or important rights. After the Court’s embarrassed climb down during the 1930s from a line of decisions enforcing rights to freedom of contract, the Court reembraced the Due Process Clause as a source of “unenumerated” rights in Roe v. Wade (1973) and, later, in decisions protecting rights to engage in private acts of sexual intimacy and extending the unenumerated right to marry to same-sex couples. Although the current Court overturned Roe in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022), the majority opinion avoided a strictly originalist approach by embracing precedents holding that the Due Process Clause protects some fundamental substantive rights that are grounded in “tradition.” The chapter explores the conservative justices’ reasons for adopting that position. It also considers whether substantive due process decisions invalidating prohibitions against sodomy and laws defining marriage as necessarily involving one man and one woman can survive under the rationale of Dobbs.
Recently, the role of abortion access in the workplace and the field of I-O psychology has been highlighted, but little published research explicitly tackles the impacts of abortion care from an organizational psychology perspective. We examine the potential impacts of further restrictions on abortion access within the context of people’s relationships with employment and workplaces. We focus our discussion on three significant mechanisms that may further restrict access to abortion depending on the degree to which they are enforced or enacted: restriction of abortion medication and equipment shipping, limiting federal funding for organizations that facilitate abortion access, and fetal personhood laws. Further restriction of abortion access may create significant challenges for organizational decision makers, employees, and healthcare workers. Together, these changes to the experience of work necessitate shifts in research and practice within the field of I-O psychology. I-O researchers and practitioners must work together to facilitate organizational functioning and employee well-being through these changes by becoming and staying informed about organizational benefit policies and reproductive care-related practices and their impact on employees, employee career trajectories and distress related to unwanted pregnancy, and moral injury and other challenges faced by healthcare workers.
This chapter examines five key issues concerning the definition of a ‘victim’ in homicide law. First, protection should extend to all living humans, regardless of individual characteristics, although future considerations may necessitate specialised norms for animals and AI. Secondly, grading or sentencing based on victim characteristics (age, gender, occupation) is unjustified. Thirdly, homicide law should apply only to born individuals, with cases involving foetuses injured by third parties potentially prosecuted under ‘foeticide’. Fourthly, homicide law should focus on killing ‘others’, not ‘self’. Suicide should not be criminalised, although assisting or inciting suicide may be prosecuted in certain circumstances. Fifthly, determining when a victim is ‘already dead’ and beyond homicide law’s scope should use criteria consistent with defining the beginning of life (irreversible cessation of brain stem function or circulatory and respiratory function). These points aim to clarify the scope and application of homicide law, addressing complex issues surrounding victim status, foetal rights, suicide and the definition of death in legal contexts.
Pronatalist policies are on the rise in many countries. These have stemmed from several motivators, including economic concerns, nationalism, and promotion of traditional family values. As global fertility rates have fallen, many countries have instilled pronatalist policies to encourage people to have more children. In other countries, including the United States, religious traditionalism and nationalist forces have fueled pronatalist policies as a counter to improved female empowerment and global immigration. No matter the stated motivation, government-sanctioned pronatalism overtly leads to reproductive coercion or covertly results in limited reproductive autonomy as collateral damage. Herein, we review global examples of prior and current pronatalist policies, outlining the motivators for their promotion within each case. We demonstrate how these policies are not only ineffective, but are dangerous to the health and well-being of women and other populations and are in direct conflict with modern reproductive goals, reproductive justice, and decades of efforts towards achieving gender parity.
During pregnancy, colonization by genital mycoplasmas may be associated with adverse outcomes. This study was conducted to investigate the prevalence of four species of Mollicutes (Mycoplasma hominis, Mycoplasma genitalium, Ureaplasma parvum, and Ureaplasma urealyticum) in pregnant women receiving high-risk prenatal care and to evaluate possible associated factors. Data collection included the application of a questionnaire and the collection of cervical swabs from pregnant women. Species identification was performed by real-time PCR. The overall prevalence of Mollicutes was 60.97%. 55.9% of pregnant women were colonized by Ureaplasma spp., and 19.51% by Mycoplasma spp. The prevalence rates by species were 48.78% for U. parvum, 11.59% for U. urealyticum, 18.9% for M. hominis, and 1.22% for M. genitalium. Age, 12 years of schooling or more, age at first sexual intercourse up to 14 years, third trimester of pregnancy, having undergone infertility treatment, presence of STI, and groin lymph nodes were associated with a higher prevalence of microorganisms. The results presented are of utmost importance for understanding the prevalence of these microorganisms, the characteristics of colonized pregnant women, and planning screening strategies and interventions that minimize the negative impacts of these infections.
What counts as knowledge, expertise, and theory? How are knowledge hierarchies connected to emotional and hierarchies of subjects? How does the division between emotion and reason shape our experiences? The Element addresses these questions by exploring the Greek feminist birth control movement (1974–1986), focusing on the production and circulation of knowledge, termed as affective epistemologies of antimilima (talking back). This concept reinterprets women's lived and embodied knowledge, emerging at the intersection of academia and social movements, as a form of resistance against established expertise. By drawing on feminist theorists like Donna Haraway and Sara Ahmed, the Element critically examines the relationship between scientific and experiential knowledge. This analysis reconfigures the interplay between rationality and emotion, providing a critique to the binary model of thought and suggesting new avenues for democratic knowledge, society, and citizenship. Historical tracing of these theories offers a counter-narrative to contemporary anti-gender, anti-intellectual, and far-right politics.
Whereas other chapters in this volume integrate gender perspectives, this chapter argues that gender is a key lens for understanding Jewish experiences in the Holocaust. Across Europe, in Jewish communities vastly different in terms of size and religious mores, gender roles and gender ideals affected access to information, escape trajectories, and survival strategies.
In this chapter of Complex Ethics Consultations: Cases that Haunt Us, the author explores the misunderstandings that can arise when there are no good options but a decision must be made. Zaner discusses the complex emotions faced by a pregnant woman carrying a fetus at 22 weeks gestational age and neural tube defect. She is referred to the maternal-fetal unit. She faced a decision about whether to terminate the pregnancy based on uncertain information and a two-week deadline to make a decision. The author reflects on the ethical dimensions so many parents face when either decision is irreversible and information is tenuous, but a treatment decision must still be made.
This chapter argues that the flaws in liberal theory and practice that religious conservatives and right-wing populists use to attack women’s rights are also used to undermine liberal democracy. It claims that due to the embeddedness of patriarchy in liberal theory and practice, liberals have chosen to disregard the feminist critique of the liberal public–private distinction and of the refusal to intervene in the nonpolitical sphere. As a result, prejudices that liberals have allowed to flourish in the private sphere serve as the basis for a successful right-wing religio-populist attack on the liberal state itself. Using the example of the USA, the chapter discusses the capture of the American Supreme Court by the populist and religiously conservative Republican Party led by President Trump. It analyzes two major abortion decisions issued by the captured Supreme Court – Whole Women’s Health and Dobbs – and shows how these decisions thoroughly undermine the liberal rights regime, transfer the control over women’s bodies and their rights to Christian religious hands, and are part of a wholesale Christian nationalist attack on American liberal democracy.
The early 1970s was a tumultuous time for abortion law and policy in North Dakota where the defeat of an abortion liberalization initiative in 1972 was quickly followed by Roe v. Wade in 1973. The resulting political and cultural circumstances strongly favored the North Dakota Right to Life Association, which saw much of its agenda passed by the legislature with overwhelming bipartisan support. This study uses a political culture perspective to examine the development of North Dakota abortion law and policy in the years after Roe. It illustrates how the state legislature, interest groups, the bureaucracy, and the courts reacted to a series of disruptions in abortion policy. The resulting policies made abortion a continuing source of tension within North Dakota politics.
In 2015 the UK government abolished means-tested child-related social security payments to households for third or subsequent children born from April 2017 (the ‘two-child limit’). From 2017 to 2021 there was a sustained increase in the number of abortions annually in England, following a previously flat trend. Using abortion-level microdata from the Department for Health and Social Care, we analysed whether this increase was primarily among women with two or more existing children in more deprived areas, consistent with being a response to the two-child limit. Descriptive analysis and interrupted time series modelling showed that the increase in numbers of abortions over time was not associated with having more children or living in more deprived areas. Instead, from 2017 onwards the previously declining trend among people with no or one previous births reversed. The pattern of change at area level was nearly identical across deciles of the Index of Multiple Deprivation. The cumulative impoverishing effects of austerity may affect abortion decision-making in England generally, but the two-child limit specifically is not associated with the change that followed its introduction. The primary drivers of recent increases in abortions may be non-material, such as uncertainty about the future beyond immediate financial considerations.
Private employers and their health insurers have come to occupy a central role in access to reproductive care for the majority of Americans through a complex legal infrastructure that effectuates employers’ choices in their employee benefit plans. While some aspects of state insurance law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and anti-discrimination laws encourage employers to cover reproductive care, this web of laws is very porous and predominantly supports employers’ choices. Sometimes, this validation of employer choices expands access to reproductive care services, as in the case of Walmart extending its benefits to cover abortion-related travel expenses in the wake of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health. But employers who wish to restrict access to reproductive care also find their preferences validated by law, as illustrated in Hobby Lobby’s successful bid to refuse coverage for certain contraceptive drugs, despite the ACA’s mandate to cover them. The additional deregulation that employers’ “self-insured” plans enjoy under ERISA preemption, combined with the prevalence of these plans, amplifies these effects. In essence, the availability of funding for reproductive care for the majority of Americans of reproductive age is left to the promises enshrined in employers’ health benefit plans and the incentives that these entities pursue in designing their plans. This chapter untangles the legal web that gives private sector employers this gatekeeper role, and explores the implications of our reliance on employers for individuals’ reproductive freedom.
The modern papacy emerged from the clash with the values of Enlightenment and the pope’s loss of temporal power. In a way, popes established themselves as a renovated source of moral authority on bioethics. This chapter aims to trace the history of papal pronouncements on contraception and abortion. It examines the historical roots of Christian sexual ethics from antiquity. It focuses on the early modern origin of the questions concerning the beginning of life and on the modern idea of immediate ensoulment. It shows how modern medical knowledge and eugenics contributed to a new view of reproduction as separate from sexuality, which called into question the traditional sense of marriage and gender roles. In this context, in which anti-modernism certainly played a role, popes condemned birth control, abortion, and women’s emancipation, revealing a huge hiatus between the experience of laity and the inflexible authority of the Catholic Church.
The papacy played a central role in the development of Roman Catholic teaching about bioethics. Pope Pius XI’s Casti connubii (1930) condemned contraception, sterilization, and abortion. Papal teaching was broadly accepted by Catholics before the 1960s. Widespread dissent in the Church greatly increased after the publication of Pope Paul VI’s Humanae vitae (1968). The first successful IVF procedure in 1978 raised new bioethical issues relating to the status of human embryos outside the womb.
The Catholic hierarchy was more successful in lobbying politicians to enact restrictive laws, or obstruct liberal reforms, than in persuading the laity to accept its teaching on birth control and assisted human reproduction. A rift emerged between mainstream Catholic culture and the institutional Church. The Church is now circumscribed in meeting the challenges presented by complex ethical issues, such as surrogacy and assisted dying, because of the papacy’s inflexible stance on these matters.
Chapter 6 employs Welby’s Meaning Triad to investigate whether the boundary for the beginning of girlhood should be clearly identified in the international legal framework. It studies the definitions of child under international law and in the English language to assess whether they establish a beginning point for girlhood. It conducts two case studies concerning, respectively, the practice of prenatal sex selection and the right of young and adolescent girls to a safe abortion, to illustrate the significance for girl children of the current boundary for the beginning of girlhood under international law. It studies the sense, meaning and significance of provisions in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and refers to their respective travaux préparatoires.
The Supreme Court of the United States’ (SCOTUS) decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization removed the federal right to an abortion, thereby entrusting the states to decide the fate of women’s reproductive health care policies. The outcome activated pro-choice and pro-life groups in efforts to secure favorable policies in states. One tool that groups have utilized to gain support for their position involves selective framing of women’s reproductive policies, including careful selection of wording employed in popular referenda. Using a survey experiment, this study investigates how word/phrase choice influences support for women’s reproductive policies. Two general findings stand out. First, word/phrase choices significantly impact aggregate levels of support for policies. Second, predictor variables exhibit non-static relationships with support across statements. For example, some gender gaps were evident in support for general statements and pro-choice-leaning statements but absent for specific statements and pro-life-framed statements. These findings hold implications for elections on reproductive health policies.
The United Kingdom was the first country to legalize the refusal to provide health care in the name of “conscientious objection”, allowing doctors to refuse to provide abortions based on personal or religious beliefs.
A historical review into the origins and motivation behind the “conscientious objection” clause in the 1967 Abortion Act found that Parliamentarians and the medical profession wanted to preserve doctors’ authority over patients, protect objecting doctors from liability, and appease religious anti-abortion beliefs.
These factors point to an unprincipled basis for the introduction of “conscientious objection” into healthcare, which ultimately came at the expense of patients’ rights and health. The “conscience clause” also represented a negation of basic ethical directives in medical practice including patient autonomy and physicians’ fiduciary duty to patients. The term “conscientious objection”— borrowed from the military but misapplied to healthcare — helped mask the practice as a moral “right” of doctors, even while it disregarded patients’ health and dignity.
Refusing to provide treatment on the basis of “conscience” is harmful and discriminatory, and should be phased out gradually using disincentives and other measures to encourage objectors to choose other fields.
In response to “Origin of ‘Conscientious Objection’ in Health Care: How Care Denials Became Enshrined into Law Because of Abortion,” in which Christian Fiala, Joyce Arthur, and Amelia Martzke trace the origins of “conscientious objection” (CO) policy, this commentary looks at the implications of their arguments for large religious health systems where CO disingenuously constrains care. Within such health institutions, the constraints on standard obstetric care reflect the conscience of bishops who write religious policy, not the beliefs of providers who must implement them, or the patients subject to them.
We take a deep dive into the sponsorship and cosponsorship activity of Republicans in the US House of Representatives from 1993–2014 to examine how ideology and gender influence the policy priorities of Republican legislators on issues associated with women, as well as on the party-owned issue of tax policy. We expect that Republican women are cross-pressured since assumptions about their policy expertise as women conflict with the policy reputation of the Republican Party. As a result, Republican women’s policy choices are impacted by their ideology in a way that is different from their male counterparts. Moreover, our analysis of which members’ bills move through the legislative process demonstrates that beyond their own policy preferences, women are strategic party actors. Thus, women are only more likely to see action on their women-focused and anti-abortion proposals, the two areas that define the partisan divide over women’s place in society.