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The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, described by Chancellor Olaf Scholz as a Zeitenwende (turning point) triggered a fundamental rethinking of German foreign, security, and defence policy. This article conceptualises the invasion as a temporal shock to Germany’s ontological security. Building on the ‘temporal turn’ in International Relations, we argue that the war not only violated Ukraine’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, but it also disrupted a broader sense of chronological continuity in European security, long defined by reduced defence spending and the assumption that interstate war was obsolete. Where previous studies have focused on the interrelationship of ontological security and temporality built around the concepts of biographical continuity, collective memory, and mnemonical security, this paper focuses instead on narrative disruption and the retiming of national security and identity via the perception of external shocks. We contend that the Zeitenwende narrative challenged historical concepts of German ontological security, such as Ostpolitik and Wandel durch Handel, that were deeply embedded in a strategic culture of military reticence by calling for the revitalisation of German military power. Yet this retiming remains constrained by incremental policy implementation and historical associations with Germany’s militaristic past, creating ongoing ontological insecurity about Germany’s role in European security.
This chapter briefly summarizes the central argument of the book: states do not tie hands to make commitments to go to war more credible. It shows how the argument sheds light on the causes of war, that the risks of crises inadvertently escalating to war are much lower than many fear, suggesting a complete reassessment of crisis stability. It also discusses how states communicate with each other, if they do not tie hands. Next, it applies the argument to the Ukraine War, demonstrating how the insight that states do not tie hands helps explain several aspects of the Ukraine War, including why the war has not escalated, Ukraine is not a NATO member, the US withdrew advisors from Ukraine just prior to the war, and others. Last, the chapter considers this puzzle: If these tying hands ideas first developed by Thomas Schelling lack even anecdotal empirical support, why have they endured in scholarly and policy discussions for decades? Why do any ideas endure, past the point when the weight of evidence suggested they should be discarded?
Watanave Hidenori and his team at the University of Tokyo use social media, satellite images and other digital resources to research and map wars and natural disasters, partly as a way of rebooting and preserving their memory. In addition to the 1923 quake, the team has produced digital archives of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings, and the 2011 Tohoku (Great East Japan) tsunami, and they currently track war damage in Ukraine, following Russia's invasion in 2022. Questions by Tristan Grunow, Laura Hein, and David McNeill. Questions were posed in English, to which Watanave responded in Japanese. Answers have been translated from Japanese, and can be found after the English interview.
China's international position is quite strong: it has leverage over Russia, which is increasingly dependent on China for economic and military aid; and it is in a strong bargaining position with the European Union, which relies on Chinese trade and investment. These circumstances might not seem conducive to improvement in China-U.S. relations, especially since many longstanding issues, such as on Taiwan and trade, remain unresolved. But progress in some areas, notably military-to-military talks, have (as Chinese officials see it) “stabilized” relations. This article argues that if the U.S. develops a China policy that emphasizes finding common ground rather than, as at present, devising ways to contain and deter China, some elements of China's foreign policy might change and serious tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea islands could be calmed. Furthermore, it addresses incentives–in particular, U.S. acceptance of the Chinese principle of partnership, not rivalry– to wean
Commonsense morality suggests that an unjustly invaded democracy may conscript its own citizens and bar them from emigrating when such a policy is necessary to sustain resistance to the invader. What does this assumption regarding ‘internal conscription’ entail for ‘external conscription’ – for foreign countries who might close their borders to many citizens of the invaded democracy, to push them to fight? Could it have been morally appropriate for Ukraine’s neighbours, for instance, to close their borders to (many) Ukrainians at the onset of the Russian assault on Kyiv, with the aim of sustaining Ukraine’s resistance to Putin’s invasion? I take up such questions by examining the seeming discrepancy between internal and external conscription. I argue that, notwithstanding its surface appeal, a categorical divide between the two kinds of conscription is unwarranted. At the level of fundamental moral principles, the two stand and fall together.
Amid Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, the human rights community has understandably focused its attention on human rights violations committed by the Russian state. This has, however, left the human rights implications of the martial law Ukraine has put in place for civilians largely unexamined. This essay highlights the ways Ukraine's travel restriction on “battle-aged” civilian men has harmed three overlapping groups—civilian men, the families of the men (including women and children), and trans and nonbinary individuals—and shows that the restriction runs counter to important principles in international human rights and humanitarian law. It then considers the ethical dilemmas faced by the international human rights community in addressing such harms, and the political psychology of rights advocacy that may explain the tendency to underplay this particular set of human rights issues. Nonetheless, the essay ultimately argues that advocates should hold actors—including and perhaps especially those with which they may sympathize—accountable to the human rights standards to which they have pledged.
The securitization of Russian-speakers has been central to nation-building in Estonia and Latvia since they regained their independence in 1991. Securitization at the levels of discourse and policy varies over time as a result of historical legacies, Russia’s kin state activism, and the minority protection requirements of European institutions. This article introduces a typology that links discursive frames with policies to map securitizing trends in Estonia and Latvia after the Soviet collapse: securitizing exclusion — less accommodating policies are justified by presenting the minority as a threat to the state or core nation; securitizing inclusion — more accommodating policies are justified to “win over” the minority in order to decrease the threat; and desecuritizing inclusion — more accommodating policies are justified on grounds of fairness or appropriateness without reference to security. The utility of the typology is demonstrated by analyzing frames in the public broadcast media and recent policy developments in Estonia and Latvia immediately following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The analysis points to increasing convergence across countries in favor of securitizing exclusion. The analysis points to increasing convergence across countries in favor of securitizing exclusion. We conclude by evaluating these trends in light of minority mobilization and recent data on support for the active defense of the state among Russian-speakers and titulars.
This article examines how the war in Ukraine has had an impact upon the enlargement of the European Union (EU) and transnational cooperation in Europe. It explains how, in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the EU has relaunched its enlargement process (notably, by opening accession negotiations with Ukraine), promoted the establishment of a new European Political Community and deepened its ties with other regional organisations, like the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the United Kingdom. It is argued that the return of large-scale warfare to the European continent for the first time since the end of World War II has contributed to reaffirming the role of the EU as a beacon of liberty, peace, security and prosperity, and highlighted the dynamism of the European integration project. Nevertheless, a number of challenges lie ahead, especially regarding enlargement, including both the candidates’ preparation and the EU's own readiness. The article therefore proceeds to map the debate about EU reform, the ongoing stalemate and the open questions concerning the future of Europe in order to illustrate fully the impact of the war in Ukraine on the enlargement project.
Chapter 5 analyzes the evolving security structures in East Asia since the end of World War II. What counts as security for the countries in the region and beyond, and the policy choices made accordingly, have made East Asian security the way it is today. Evolution shapes every component of international security, specifically the nation, the nature of politics, and epistemology. Conventional security theories such as the security dilemma and alliance apply to East Asia partly because Western practice and theory have become parts of East Asian practice and theoretical thinking. At the same time, East Asia had a much longer history, and was not a blank canvas for outside influence. The mixture of the old and new explains why East Asian security concepts and practices seem partly familiar and partly strange, which is characteristic of East Asian international relations.
What are the legacies of the war on terror? This paper seeks to answer this question through an analysis of vernacular uses of terrorism discourse in political commentary on the Ukraine war. The paper describes how the set of tropes, ideas, and recurrent metaphors that constituted the historical backbone of narratives about terrorism before and after 9/11 is now being mobilised in the context of interstate conflict. Instead of rejecting such deployments of terrorism as lay misappropriations of an otherwise-objective concept, we argue that they evidence the aesthetic force of terrorism discourse in organising our ethical relationship to different experiences of (in)human suffering. The paper advances the concept of terrorism as an aesthetic signifier, to provide two contributions to terrorism studies. First, we argue that narrative approaches to the study of political violence in IR can only move forward if they bypass the field’s traditional framing of terrorism – which we dub the (il)legitimacy trap – and push the boundaries of critique beyond the idea of terrorism as unacceptable violence. Second, we contend that IR scholars must situate the signifiers orbiting the discourse on terror within wider racialised aesthetic regimes dictating the visibility and invisibility of collective suffering. With these two moves, we hope to bring more attention to the question of victimisation in terrorism studies, a field historically focused on perpetrators and the conditions of perpetration of violence.
Edited by
Anne Peters, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and Public International Law, Heidelberg,Christian Marxsen, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
This chapter espouses a hybrid approach to the Security Council’s mechanisms for maintaining international peace, looking at the interactions between politics and law. It examines how politics among great powers affect the Security Council. It describes the effect of the changing landscape of power politics on its workings both historically and in the present. The chapter investigates how the Security Council deals with novel threats, and it discusses the contributions a more powerful China may make to the Security Council and to international peace. It reflects on the Security Council’s trajectory by revisiting universal and regional approaches to the maintenance of peace. Three core arguments are presented: (i) while more legal regulations need to be explored to reduce the negative impact of power politics, any legal design must have due regard for power politics; (ii) while a universal approach should be maintained, regional arrangements should play a bigger part in the maintenance of international peace; and (iii) a more powerful China can both enable and disable the Security Council.
This study delves into the progression of nuclear war risk perceptions during the initial 6 months of the Ukraine war. It particularly investigated the influence of Italian media coverage changes and the affective tone of war representation. Utilizing a mixed-methods approach, two separate yet interconnected studies were conducted. The first study employed web scraping and keyword selection techniques to assess emotional language and quantify war-related content in the headlines of Italian online newspapers from March to July 2022. Results demonstrated a linear decrease in war-related news and an emotional shift, with a significant decrease in fear and an increase in joy noted between March and May. The second study examined nuclear war risk perceptions at an individual level, surveying a panel of 397 Italians at three distinct points during the same time frame. The findings revealed a similarity between the media’s affective tone and individuals’ affective risk perceptions. Analytic risk perception, in contrast, showed a linear decrease that matched the decline in war-related news volume. The study found preexisting individual differences, among women and older participants, to be significant determinants in shaping risk perception evolution. These groups exhibited higher initial risk perceptions and more resistance to change as the scenario unfolded. This research contributes to the existing body of work that underscores the media’s role in influencing risk perceptions by illuminating the relationship between media representation of the Ukraine war and individual-level affective risk perception. Furthermore, it highlights individual differences as significant moderators of risk perception change during a crisis.
Political technology works. It can create total systems of control. It can give malign actors the edge in political competition. It can create fake political subjects and entire virtual political geometries. It can grow support for fringe and minority politics. And it can be used to reverse lever outsider political takeovers by creating artificial rivals to traditional political structures and then drive them mainstream.
Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine has sent shock waves around the world. Russia has violated the most fundamental rule of international law and most people intuitively feel that the war in Ukraine has changed the entire landscape of international society. Given what is clearly a turning point, it is difficult to assume that global constitutionalism founded on ‘human rights, the rule of law and democracy’, called ‘the constitutional trinity’, will not undergo any changes. Can global constitutionalism survive such a difficult moment? This is a fundamental question that global constitutionalists must address. This article answers this question in the affirmative. First, despite its gross violations of international law, Russia is not necessarily attempting to withdraw from the current framework of international law. The existing individual-centred elements in international law, which are the central pillar of global constitutionalism, will not be replaced by any alternatives. Second, even if the existing framework of international law remains viable, there is an undeniable risk that the polarization of international law accelerated by the ongoing war will negatively affect global constitutionalism. Such polarization may hollow out the constitutional trinity in international law. However, global constitutionalism will continue to function as the principal cognitive framework for international society because the exercise of individuals’ rights embedded in international law will incessantly provide energy for global constitutionalism. This article concludes that insofar as international law keeps its individual elements, global constitutionalism will be able to retain its normative power under the present predicament in the world.
This essay aims to advance the general discussion of hypocrisy in moral and political philosophy as well as normative policy debates regarding democratic sanctions against autocracies that often trigger charges of hypocrisy. In the process of making sense of these charges, I articulate and tackle three general puzzles regarding hypocrisy complaints. The first—the inaction puzzle—asks why a charge of hypocrisy should have any effect on the moral assessment of an agent’s actions, as distinct from the agent’s character or attitudes. The second—the ambivalence puzzle—asks why we often react to hypocrisy charges with seemingly paradoxical ambivalence, recognizing such charges for the transparent deflections they often are, but also granting their normative force. The third—the preemption puzzle—asks why hypocrisy charges do not entirely lose their force when their targets openly concede that they too have suffered from the same flaws that they highlight in others. I argue that sustained reflection on each of these puzzles can enrich—and be enriched by—normative analysis of democratic sanctions.
In recent years, Western governments have invoked the values of universal human rights to justify large-scale military operations. Critical theorists have often responded that these campaigns serve not to promote peace, stability, or prosperity, but to entrench Western economic and political power, often in ways that have been devastating for local populations. However, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine casts doubt on whether assumptions about Western dominance will continue to furnish adequate accounts of global armed conflict. Critical theorists base many of their views on what is sometimes called ‘memory politics’, meaning that they cite histories of Western militarism, colonialism, racism and economic exploitation as backdrops to current policies. In this article it is argued that they will only be able to explain a conflict like the Ukraine war with credibility by incorporating into their memory politics the left’s own histories of supporting autocratic regimes.
The global governance regime for space is grounded in six decades of co-operation between the Soviet Union and then Russia on the one hand, and the United States and its allies on the other.
But continued co-operation is not guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, some elements of international space co-operation broke down immediately. Other elements, such as the International Space Station, notably continued. More worrying, perhaps, is the heavy reliance of Russian and Ukrainian forces on satellites, including, in the case of Ukraine, satellites owned and operated by private companies. This raises challenging issues of international law, including whether these private satellites are legal targets. It also raises the question of how far Russia might go in this regard. What if it decided to target SpaceX’s Starlink mega-constellation?
Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022 was the end of the Arctic cooperation between states and others as we knew it, despite the fact that Russia’s illegal actions are not occurring in the Arctic region. Russia’s attack on Ukraine caused pronounced security fears and responses, particularly from the European and North American countries, including the other Arctic states. This naturally affected Arctic cooperation because it is precisely in the Arctic region that Russia is such a vastly central actor. For example, the region’s pre-eminent inter-governmental forum, the Arctic Council, is struggling to continue its activities in full, as the seven western Arctic states paused participating in meetings held in and activities involving Russia. On the other hand, the first in-person meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) fisheries agreement in late November 2022 successfully adopted its COP Rules of Procedure by consensus, including Russia. The purpose of this article is to investigate how adversely Arctic international cooperation in inter-governmental forums and treaties has suffered due to the Ukraine war, utilising a qualitative research methodology to collect internal and sensitive information from key informants. In particular, the article aims to find an answer to the following question: In which types of Arctic inter-governmental structures have the states been able to continue the cooperation and for what reasons? The hypothesis that will be tested in this article is whether treaty-based cooperation has fared better than cooperation founded on soft law. This article will flesh out the current state of Arctic cooperative frameworks and actual cooperative activities under them, analysing three soft law-based cooperative frameworks, including the Arctic Council and several treaty-based cooperative frameworks, such as the CAO fisheries agreement and Arctic Science Cooperation Agreement. This article is based on the facts as of 22 February 2023.
The wish from 24 February 2022 onwards to help Ukraine defend against Russian aggression has led to the provision of unprecedented lethal European Union (EU) military assistance. As the ‘taboo’ of supplying lethal assistance into non-EU conflicts is swept aside, what is the role of international arms control law? The legal requirements of the EU Common Position on arms exports and the Arms Trade Treaty compel EU Member States to assess various short- and long-term risks associated with arms exports. But it is unclear how arms control norms are being taken into account by the EU Council in its rapidly evolving role as a peacemaker.
The standards that are being used to shape EU decision-making on Ukraine matter both for their precedent-setting as reflecting the trajectory of EU normative power, as well as on the long-term blowbacks of proliferation on illicit arms trafficking. While from the EU Council, there has been limited public articulation of these risks, greater consideration thereof would serve as a reminder of the reality of post-conflict arms proliferation, ie. illicit arms trafficking of weapons leached from the conflict, and their subsequent misuse by undesirable actors. Geostrategic precedent is being set, with implications that extend far beyond Ukraine, including to other conflicts where the EU is already intervening. The EU’s delivering of massive lethal military assistance alters also the reflexive perception of its institutions.
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