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This chapter scrutinises the framework within which Kant decides to conduct his argument against Constant. Constant argues that the would-be murderer has forfeited his right to be told the truth. Kant argues that the duty to be truthful does not depend on that kind of right; that Constant fails to distinguish between truth and truthfulness with sufficient care; and that one should distinguish the question of whether lying is permissible (licence to lie) in emergencies from the question of whether lying is ever morally required (obligation to lie). In the 1797 essay, Kant addresses the second question through the first. If there is never a licence to lie, there can be no obligation to do so.
‘Truth’ refers to reality – what is, was, will be, and should be – and its aspects, in the context of representations thereof. A true something is the real thing, and a true proposition, belief, hypothesis, exemplar, and so forth is a successful representation of truth in the first sense. The virtue of truthfulness is the judicious love of truth in both senses. From love of reality and correct representations of it, the truthful person tends to tell others the truth as she sees it, but is not fanatical about telling it, because virtues like justice, compassion, and gentleness, which themselves are a kind of truth, can enjoin the withholding or even distortion of truths. Truths can be horrible, and it can take courage and humility to admit them.
This chapter explores the connection between Heidegger’s existentialism and fundamental ontology. Specifically, and contra John Haugeland who argues that existentialism is a key feature of fundamental ontology insofar as taking responsibility for our existence entails getting the being of entities right, this chapter argues that taking responsibility for our existence explicitly exhibits the temporal horizon that is fundamental for all our purpose activities and our understanding of entities, generally.
Chapter 7 examines the Fourth Way, which argues from the gradations of being, truth, goodness, and other perfections found in things, to a first cause utmost in being and perfection. After a translation and the premises are given, the chapter explains what assigning a gradation of these terms involves for Aquinas. There is discussion of a key implication of the Five Ways that God is “subsistent being itself,” that God’s essence is God’s existence. Next, there is a discussion of the premise that there is a maximum in every genus which is the cause of all other things in that genus. Thus, there is a maximum in being, truth, and goodness which causes these in all other things. This is God. A closing section discusses the doctrine of continuous creation in Aquinas, that God sustains all else in existence at every moment. There is a look at the contemporary debate over the need for a God to do this, which is termed divine conservation versus existential inertia.
We have most of the technology we need to combat the climate crisis - and most people want to see more action. But after three decades of climate COPs, we are accelerating into a polycrisis of climate, food security, biodiversity, pollution, inequality, and more. What, exactly, has been holding us back? Mike Berners-Lee looks at the challenge from new angles. He stands further back to gain perspective; he digs deeper under the surface to see the root causes; he joins up every element of the challenge; and he learns lessons from our failures of the past. He spells out why, if humanity is to thrive in the future, the most critical step is to raise standards of honesty in our politics, our media, and our businesses. Anyone asking 'what can each of us do right now to help?' will find inspiration in this practical and important book.
This chapter assesses what role businesses need to play in the transisiton to a sustainable future. It details the corporate attempts to debunk climate science and the ever-sophisticated art of greenwash. By exploring examples of both, the reader is enabled to think more critically about the role of business in society. It also looks at corruption and cover-ups and how neither have a place in an Anthropocene-fit business or industry. Finally, it gives examples of companies who are showing an ethical and sustainable way forward for the future.
The core of the Polycrisis, along with the thinking skills and personal development needed to thrive in the Anthropocene are discussed in clear terms, laying the foundation for the next chapter.
This chapter looks at the history of dishonesty in politics and why we must now do better. It gives the reader five criteria by which to assess a politician’s honesty, along with suggestions of what MPs can expect from us in return. Mike then explores the motives for voting and what democratic and parliamentary reforms would better serve humanity in the future, including an assessment of Citizens’ Juries.
This exposé of some very unreliable media highlights the need for all of us to be critically assessing our media sources, in order to be well-informed on the key issues of our day. Scrutinising press behaviour, for example phone hacking, and the role of think tanks, the chapter ends with useful criteria by which to assess the credibility of an information source and what each of us can do to improve standards of truth in media.
An exploration of truth, honesty and trust. This chapter exposes deceit in its many forms, specifically calling out bullshit and explainig why truth is so important, at all stages of a politician’s career. It also looks at the role psychopaths play in society and how best to curb their influence.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, numerous Western missionaries were involved in debating the existence of God in various religious texts and practices in ancient China. Drawing on both the rising philological scholarship in Europe and their own field experience in China, the Western missionaries examined the idea of God, the Thearch, and Heaven as the Supreme Being in the spiritual life and ritual activities of the Chinese people. From the Christian perspective, they attempted to identify the original belief in one God in ancient China in order to convert their Chinese audience. Furthermore, they addressed the issue of monotheism in the broader Asian context by suggesting the universal monotheistic degeneration from Persia to China across Asia continent.
Kierkegaard's lifelong fascination with the figure of Socrates has many aspects, but prominent among them is his admiration for the way Socrates was devoted to his divinely ordained mission as a philosopher. To have such a destiny, revealed through what one loves and is passionate about as well as through a feeling of vocation, is a necessary condition of leading a meaningful life, according to Kierkegaard. Examining what Kierkegaard has to say about the meaning of life requires looking at his conception of 'subjective truth,' as well as how he understands the ancient ideal of 'amor fati,' a notion that Nietzsche would subsequently take up, but that Kierkegaard understands in a manner that is distinctly his own, and that he sought to put into practice in his own existence. Our life is a work of art, but we are not the artist.
Fiction writers in the nineteenth century engaged an evolving assemblage of understandings and conflicts concerning their stories and their relationship with politics. Early decades were characterized by suspicions about the value of fiction and its potential for disrupting the demands of nation-building. With industrialization and mass culture came a new appreciation for literary fiction as vehicle for both consensus-building and sociopolitical change. Through it all, most writers and readers, while employing a variety of modalities and aiming at different political targets, maintained the conviction that fiction, when in the hands of a truth-teller, could convey the “truth” of “great principles” and thus do political work. To demonstrate these nineteenth-century understandings of the intersections of fiction and politics, this chapter examines fiction across the century in three different periods consistent with the history of the book and print culture: the first running roughly from 1800 to the late 1830s, after the nation’s birth but before the age of mass culture; from 1840 to the late 1870s, the age of the industrial book; and from 1880 to century’s end, the early days of modernism, new conceptions of language, and the autonomous work of art.
This Element explores the relationship between monotheism and relativism. Over the last two decades, emerging relativist theories have been extensively developed and debated within the fields of philosophy. How does monotheistic theology relate to relativism, especially to relativism about truth? Given that truth relativism contends that beliefs and propositions are invariably only relatively true, it appears to conflict with traditional monotheism, which asserts the absolute truth of God's existence. This book examines the compatibility of relativist positions with monotheism, emphasising the need to differentiate among the diverse forms, types, and domains of relativism. It presents a nuanced stance on the relationship between relativism and monotheism.
This is a reply to Komárek’s criticism of our article “Europe’s political constitution”. We address the issues raised by our critic one by one. The topics range from the definition of the public sphere to the role that law blogs and social media play in it. The reply concludes by examining what it means to pursue truth in legal scholarship based on contrasting the views of Hans Kelsen und Stanley Fish.
State responses to the recent ‘crisis’ caused by misinformation in social media have mainly aimed to impose liability on those who facilitate its dissemination. Internet companies, especially large platforms, have deployed numerous techniques, measures and instruments to address the phenomenon. However, little has been done to assess the importance of who originates disinformation and, in particular, whether some originators of misinformation are acting contrary to their preexisting obligations to the public. My view is that it would be wrong to attribute only to social media a central or exclusive role in the new disinformation crisis that impacts the information ecosystem.
Today is a time of retrogression in sustaining rights-protecting democracies, and of high levels of distrust in institutions. Of particular concern are threats to the institutions, including universities and the press, that help provide the information base for successful democracies. Attacks on universities, and university faculties, are rising. In Poland over the last four years, a world-renowned constitutional law theorist, Wojciech Sadurski, has been subject to civil and criminal prosecutions for defamation of the governing party. In Hungary, the Central European University (CEU) was ejected by the government, and had to partly relocate to Vienna, and other attacks on academic freedom followed. Faculty members in a number of countries have needed to relocate to other countries for their own safety.
In April 2023, the Government of India amended a set of regulations called the Information Technology Rules, which primarily dealt with issues around online intermediary liability and safe harbour. Until 2023, these rules required online intermediaries to take all reasonable efforts to ensure that ‘fake, false or misleading’ information was not published on their platforms. Previous iterations of these rules had already been challenged before the Indian courts for imposing a disproportionate burden on intermediaries, and having the effect of chilling online speech. Now, the 2023 Amendment went even further: it introduced an entity called a ‘Fact Check Unit’, to be created by the government. This government-created unit would flag information that – in its view – was ‘fake, false or misleading’ with respect to ‘the business of the central government’.
In United States v. Alvarez, the US Supreme Court ruled that an official of a water district who introduced himself to his constituents by falsely stating in a public meeting that he had earned the Congressional Medal of Honor had a First Amendment right to make that demonstrably untrue claim. Audience members misled by the statement might well be considered to have a First Amendment interest in not being directly and knowingly lied to in that way. Other members of the community might be thought to have a First Amendment interest in public officials such as Xavier Alvarez telling the truth about their credentials and experiences. Nevertheless, as both the plurality and the concurring justices who together formed the majority in Alvarez viewed the case, it was the liar’s interest in saying what he wished that carried the day. Why is that? Crucial to answering this question is whether ‘the freedom of speech’ that the First Amendment tolerates ‘no law abridging’ is understood to be primarily speaker-centered, audience-centered, or society-centered.