Alexander of Aphrodisias included Aristotle’s first principles of rational thinking, in particular the principle of non-contradiction, in the domain of metaphysics, as would Syrianus. In this chapter I discuss this principle as it was understood by Syrianus, in particular with regard to its roots in divine Intellect, where the unity of intellection and its objects grounds the principles of reasoning in human intellection and the truth of its objects.

The Afterword recalls the importance of “emphatic experiences” throughout Emerson’s thought, especially in Nature, “The Over-Soul,” “Circles,” and “Spiritual Laws.” It also registers the many oppositions discussed in Emerson, the Philosopher of Oppositions: Reality and Illusion in “Experience,” “Unity” and “Variety,” “rest” and “motion,” in “Plato”; dead language and living poetry in “The Poet,” nominalism and realism in “Nominalist and Realist,” fate and freedom in “Fate.” Emerson “accepts” his “contrary tendencies” by building them into his essays, one after the other: “‘Your turn now, my turn next,’ is the rule of the game.” Skepticism pervades Emerson’s thought, as he registers doubts about knowledge, other minds, freedom, or meaning. But skepticism can also be understood as a way of life, as in ancient Greek philosophy and in Montaigne’s Essays, and Goodman argues for the attractions of Emerson’s own version of the skeptical life, what he calls a “wise skepticism.”

This chapter provides brief conclusions drawing together the threads of the story and its wider analysis, the political and religious context, its transnational significance and the insights a single document and event have provided. Returning to some of the themes raised in the introduction, reflects on the role of truth and secrecy amid the practicalities for ministers of upholding an ideological cause.

Chapter 4 explores the central role of Huguenot ministers in maintaining and nurturing this confessional network as part of an international collaboration with the Calvinist church, noble leaders, scholars and other agents. Considers the refugee experience and establishment of stranger churches abroad, the navigation of theological differences and the part played by cooperation and conflict, especially in the French church in London. Focuses on connections to cardinal Châtillon and Regnard/Changy as well as other ministers involved in, and identified through, the correspondence, such as Pierre Loiseleur de Villiers. In particular, establishes the pragmatic day-to-day challenges that Huguenot ministers faced in serving their communities at home and abroad alongside bonds of faith and amity and the handling of disagreements. The varied experience and careers of the ministers are also compared and contrasted, as are the roles of other agents, particularly scholars and diplomats. Diplomacy and the negotiation of alliances were vital to the upholding of the Protestant and Catholic causes as was the identification of plotting by the other side.

Chapter 6 focuses on fears of espionage and treachery, but also the extensive use of information and intelligence-gathering by all sides, and the fine distinctions between these. The close connection with ambassadors and their contacts is discussed, alongside how spies and spying were viewed by contemporaries, through correspondence and judicial records. Explores extensive fears of plots and foreign intervention and how this affected diplomatic and confessional relations; the execution of experienced courier, Jean Abraham, secretary to the prince of Condé, exemplifies this. Looks in detail at contemporary English concerns about a Franco-Scottish alliance in support of Mary Queen of Scots, making links from these concerns to the activities of Norris, cardinal Châtillon and to the network exposed by the letters carried by Tivinat. Attention is given to the role of female agents and especially to double agents, such as Edmund Mather, whose career and connections to Norris, Regnard/Changy and the wider network are explored in detail.

The aim of the translation is to provide an English text that is both scholarly and accessible. The referencing system resembles the familiar biblical chapters and verses; sections are provided with titles that identify their key theme and bring to light the structure of a work often regarded as diffuse and repetitive.

This book explores Herodotus’ creative interaction with the Greek poetic tradition from early hexameter verse through fifth-century Attic tragedy. The poetic tradition informs the Histories in both positive and negative ways, since Herodotus adopts or adapts some poetic features while rejecting others as a means of defining the nature of his own project. The range of such features includes subject matter; diction and phraseology; narrative motifs, themes, patterns, and structure; speech types and speech complexes; the role of the narrator – his presence, functions, source(s), authority, and limitations; the manipulation of time (narrative order, rhythm, and frequency); conceptions of truth and falsehood; the construction of the human past and its relation to the present; the relationship between humanity and deity, and the role each plays in the causation of events. In these and other regards Herodotus may use poetic precedent as a model, a foil, or some combination of the two.

This concluding chapter reflects on the relationship between transitional justice, power, and law at the current global conjuncture of the alleged end or “eclipse” of liberal democracy and human rights and the rise of rightwing authoritarian populism and fascism. It recapitulates the major interventions of the book that critically interrogate the binary of liberalism and authoritarianism and the abstract idealization of the virtues of transparency and the right to know in dominant transitional justice and human rights politics. The chapter organizes the concluding reflections under five headings that draw attention to the making of rightwing authoritarian populist legalism and transitional justice; the problem of Eurocentrism; capitalist and nation-state-centric politics of transitional justice; and reflections on the alternative notions of truth and political responsibility that the book has developed as part of its attempt to envision socially transformative justice beyond moral autopsy and heated political struggles.

The chapter on insolubles in Ockham’s Summa Logicae is a short appendix inserted toward the end of Part III-3 in chapter 46, alongside a section on obligations, after the treatment of the Topics and before the transition to the material on the Sophistical Refutations. By Ockham’s own admission, the purpose of the section is not to leave “so great a part of logic completely untouched.” Despite the concise character of the exposition, however, Ockham’s analysis of insoluble propositions is notable for his usual clarity of style and purpose, and by the adoption of a standard medieval solution to semantic paradoxes based on a principle of restriction on self-referential expressions containing the predicates ‘true’ or ‘false.’ The present chapter discusses Ockham’s solution and examples in detail, presenting them in the broader context of coeval discussions of semantic paradoxes from the first quarter of the fourteenth century and against the backdrop of Ockham’s own semantic theory.

This chapter scrutinises the framework within which Kant decides to conduct his argument against Constant. Constant argues that the would-be murderer has forfeited his right to be told the truth. Kant argues that the duty to be truthful does not depend on that kind of right; that Constant fails to distinguish between truth and truthfulness with sufficient care; and that one should distinguish the question of whether lying is permissible (licence to lie) in emergencies from the question of whether lying is ever morally required (obligation to lie). In the 1797 essay, Kant addresses the second question through the first. If there is never a licence to lie, there can be no obligation to do so.

‘Truth’ refers to reality – what is, was, will be, and should be – and its aspects, in the context of representations thereof. A true something is the real thing, and a true proposition, belief, hypothesis, exemplar, and so forth is a successful representation of truth in the first sense. The virtue of truthfulness is the judicious love of truth in both senses. From love of reality and correct representations of it, the truthful person tends to tell others the truth as she sees it, but is not fanatical about telling it, because virtues like justice, compassion, and gentleness, which themselves are a kind of truth, can enjoin the withholding or even distortion of truths. Truths can be horrible, and it can take courage and humility to admit them.

This chapter explores the connection between Heidegger’s existentialism and fundamental ontology. Specifically, and contra John Haugeland who argues that existentialism is a key feature of fundamental ontology insofar as taking responsibility for our existence entails getting the being of entities right, this chapter argues that taking responsibility for our existence explicitly exhibits the temporal horizon that is fundamental for all our purpose activities and our understanding of entities, generally.

Chapter 7 examines the Fourth Way, which argues from the gradations of being, truth, goodness, and other perfections found in things, to a first cause utmost in being and perfection. After a translation and the premises are given, the chapter explains what assigning a gradation of these terms involves for Aquinas. There is discussion of a key implication of the Five Ways that God is “subsistent being itself,” that God’s essence is God’s existence. Next, there is a discussion of the premise that there is a maximum in every genus which is the cause of all other things in that genus. Thus, there is a maximum in being, truth, and goodness which causes these in all other things. This is God. A closing section discusses the doctrine of continuous creation in Aquinas, that God sustains all else in existence at every moment. There is a look at the contemporary debate over the need for a God to do this, which is termed divine conservation versus existential inertia.

This chapter looks at the history of climate change, the failure to act, systemic thinking and truth.