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The dominant assumptions positing a linear relationship among individualism, capitalism, competition, and inequality are often rooted in the perspectives of social scientists, whose focus is frequently confined to the West in modern times. I argue that these dominant assumptions have been formulated without sufficient opportunities or willingness to consider societies with cultures and systems different from those of the West. In this regard, this book challenges these dominant assumptions by presenting compelling counter-evidence that (1) competition occurs in every society throughout history whenever humans seek to survive and thrive; and (2) competition does not necessarily lead to inequality, but often serves as a tool to mitigate it, as competitions prevent absolute hegemony and allow individuals to challenge incumbent powers or privileged groups across cultures, systems, and eras. This closing chapter encourages readers to reassess their existing beliefs about the sources and consequences of competition and to strive for a deep understanding of competition arenas that they may choose to enter or inadvertently launch.
Little attention has been paid to competitive dynamics from a political perspective, despite numerous instances of political competition across cultures and systems. In liberal democratic societies, political competition is legalized, allowing citizens to elect leaders who represent their ideas. Conversely, in totalitarian societies, citizens lack voting rights, and political authority is not challenged through democratic means. However, political competitions still occur among ruling elites, often through purges to seize power. This chapter explores political competition, particularly in totalitarian regimes, where purges eliminate rivals among ruling elites. The collapse of such regimes has marked an evolution toward freedom and equal opportunities for all individuals, regardless of background, which aligns with Darwin’s theory of evolution. Highlighting the lack of research on political competitions from an evolutionary psychology perspective, this chapter underscores the need for future research on human emotions and competitive behaviors in the political arena.
The establishment of the Bolshevik communist totalitarian regime in Russia in 1917 was facilitated by the existing institutional genes necessary for totalitarian rule, including the autocratic Tsarist system, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the secretive political organizations. Chapter 7 studies the origins and evolution of these institutional genes and it also examines their role in the failure of the Russian constitutional reforms and the genesis of communist totalitarian ideology and organization in Russia.
Constitutionalism and communist totalitarianism are both foreign ideologies and institutions that were imported into China. The failure of China’s attempts at constitutionalism cleared the path for the rise of communist totalitarianism. This chapter examines the shortcomings of the constitutional reforms and the Republican Revolution, as dictated by China’s institutional genes of the time. It reviews the ineffective Hundred Days’ Reform and the impact of Social Darwinism, which found deep roots in China’s institutional genes and profoundly influenced the later Chinese reception of communist totalitarianism. The text also discusses the unsuccessful constitutional reforms that lacked popular support and chronicles the collapse of the Qing Empire following the Xinhai Revolution. Additionally, the chapter analyzes the failures of the Republican Revolution, attributing them to the absence of those institutional genes necessary for establishing constitutionalism as well as to the enduring institutional gene of “secret societies,” which deeply influenced the revolutionary parties.
Chapter 10 investigates the establishment and growth of China’s Bolshevik Party, the core element in the communist totalitarian revolution and regime, that was orchestrated by the Comintern. The chapter commences with an examination of the inception and operational dynamics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a Comintern offshoot. It also addresses the reorganization of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the formation of the CCP-KMT alliance as key strategies implemented by the Comintern to bolster the fledgling CCP.
The narrative underscores the essential role the Chinese secret societies played in the development of the CCP’s organizational and military forces, following the directives of the Comintern and their implementation in practice. Additionally, the chapter examines the introduction of totalitarian rules within the CCP and its military branches, which fostered a reign of terror and enabled the rise of a totalitarian leader. It traces the initial establishment of a totalitarian institutional structure within the CCP and assesses the Comintern’s decisive role in fortifying the CCP’s ultimate leadership, suggesting its profound and lasting impacts on the Chinese political landscape.
Totalitarian systems, marked by extreme violence, are fundamentally bound to an ideology, such as Marxism-Leninism, which is instrumental to their creation and persistence, from the Bolshevik revolution in Russia to modern China. The chapter examines the genesis of communist totalitarian ideology in early Christian communal equality, connecting it to Rousseau’s and Babeuf’s anti-property ideals, which ultimately influenced Marxism and its vision of a dictatorial society in the name of absolute equality. The enduring pull towards egalitarianism, when pushed to extremes, can encroach on private property rights, ironically culminating in totalitarian rule and unprecedented inequality.
The final chapter reiterates the challenges posed by totalitarianism. By conducting coherent theoretical and empirical research into the origins and expansion of totalitarianism, this work strives to address these significant challenges that Mises warned about decades ago. This chapter summarizes the key insights drawn from both the empirical evidence and the theoretical framework of institutional genes that constitute a comprehensive methodological approach. The literature review distinguishes this book from other works in the fields of China studies, institutional analysis, and social science methodology. The two most extensive sections of the chapter examine the institutional genes and their evolution in Taiwan and in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (FSU-EE). The former section sheds light on the pivotal role the institutional genes played in Taiwan’s transition from authoritarian rule to constitutional democracy, while the latter section explains the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in the FSU-EE countries and their divergent institutional transformations. The chapter also highlights the implications of the transitions in Taiwan and the FSU-EE countries for China’s future transformations.
Building on the institutional genes of the Tsarist autocracy, the Russian Orthodox Church and the secret political societies analyzed in the previous chapter, this chapter explores the origins of the Bolshevik Party, which was the first communist totalitarian party. It analyzes the Bolsheviks’ transformation from a secretive organization to a ruling totalitarian party characterized by a personality cult and Red Terror. The chapter then outlines the institutional prerequisites for the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power, noting the absence of constitutional backing for the Provisional Government and the appropriation of power under the guise of Soviet authority. Furthermore, the chapter details the consolidation of a comprehensive totalitarian system, including the suppression of opposition through dictatorship of the proletariat, the application of Red Terror tactics, the establishment of total state ownership, and the role of the Comintern in initiating communist totalitarian revolutions internationally, all of which were prerequisites for the creation of the Chinese communist totalitarian regime.
This chapter examines the way in which the Holocaust has been brought into conversation with understandings of the modern world, with a strong focus on historical and sociological accounts (though recognizing the place of the Holocaust in postmodern literary and critical theory.) It shows the multiple ways in which concepts of modernization, modernity, and the modern have been deployed, be it to establish the Holocaust’s paradigmatic or normative character, or the reverse. It illustrates the paradoxical character of efforts to highlight the Holocaust’s distinctiveness while harnessing it to a pervasive and generic “modernity.”
In past decades, the relationship between fascism and communism was of major interest. The theory of totalitarianism viewed them as different versions of the same phenomenon. Communists saw fascism as a function of capitalism, and communism as its only legitimate opponent. Both views marginalized the Holocaust. As the Holocaust came to the fore in Western scholarship, entanglements with communism slipped out of view. This chapter argues that they deserve closer attention. Though its roots were older, after 1917 anticommunism gave the right a new focus, giving radical fringe groups respectability. Communism exerted a “negative fascination” on the right, encouraging mutually escalating extremes. Anti-Marxism legitimated Nazi violence after 1933, drawing support even from the Churches. For their part, even after the adoption of the popular front strategy in 1935, the KPD continued to believe that the SPD was the main enemy, and long remained silent on the persecution of Jews. Since the end of the Cold War, the question of the relationship between communism, Nazism, and the Holocaust has been expressed above all in the culture of remembrance.
This book explores the origins and evolution of China's institutions and communist totalitarianism in general. Contemporary China's fundamental institution is communist totalitarianism. Introducing the concept of “institutional genes” (IGs), the book examines how the IGs institutional genes of Soviet Russia merged with those of the Chinese imperial system, creating a durable totalitarian regime with Chinese characteristics – Regionally Administered Totalitarianism. Institutional Genes are fundamental institutional elements that self-replicate and guide institutional changes and are empirically identifiable. By analyzing the origins and evolution of IGs institutional genes in communist totalitarianism from Europe and Russia, as well as those from the Chinese Empire, the Chinese Communist Revolution, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and post-Mao reforms, the book elucidates the rise and progression of communist totalitarianism in China. The ascent of communist China echoes Mises' warning that efforts to halt totalitarianism have failed. Reversing this trend necessitates a thorough understanding of totalitarianism.
Xi Jinping's frequent references to Mao Zedong, along with Xi's own claims to ideological originality, have fueled debate over the significance of Maoism in the PRC today. The discussion recalls an earlier debate, at the height of the Cold War, over the meaning of Maoism itself. This paper revisits that earlier controversy, reflected in arguments between Benjamin Schwartz and Karl Wittfogel, with an eye toward their contemporary relevance.
In contradistinction to totalitarianism, Claude Lefort theorised a democratic form of society as one primarily characterised by indeterminacy, absence of ground, and by extension openness to the event. In maintaining this form of society, Lefort reserved a key role for human rights. The aims of this paper are twofold: first, I argue that, despite the fact that Lefort never developed a theory of constitutions, an important role can nonetheless be ascribed to them. I hypothesise constitutions to be key in democratic society’s symbolic representation of itself to itself. Second, I then examine what the repercussions are for this idea when Martin Loughlin’s account of constitutionalism is taken into account. Loughlin’s argument suggests that, while constitutions may have been important safeguards against totalitarianism, constitutions today threaten to become total themselves. I conclude by indicating the populist response as a point of convergence between Lefort’s and Loughlin’s analyses.
Once the totalitarian regime is established, various disasters are bound to recur. A totalitarian state is diagonally opposite to liberal democracy, which is characterized by prevalence of horizontal connections, the sum total of which constitute a social contract. An ideal totalitarian structure, to the contrary, is like a zero-impedance conductor: orders flow from the top to the lowest level all without any obstacle. It was this totalitarian system that enabled Mao, the charismatic leader, to use his overwhelming social support to overthrow his political rivals within the system when his authority was weakened. Like a courtly struggle, the Cultural Revolution was for the sake of Mao’s personal power, but the cost of social destruction was incomparably greater.
This book offers the reformist perspective of one of the most persistent and outspoken constitutional reformers in China. Through the analysis of landmark constitutional events in China since the late nineteenth century, it reveals the fatal dilemma faced by constitutional reform and the deadly dangers of any violent revolution that arises out of the frustration with the repeated failures of reform. Although there is no easy way out of such a predicament, the book analyzes available resources in the existing system and suggests possible strategies that might bring success to future constitutional reforms.
Chapter 10 explores democracy versus autocracy. It offers a frequency-based fitness analysis of the political regimes in the world, demonstrating the superior fitness of democracy, represented by the United States in time and place, but also revealing the resilience of non-democratic forms of government, represented by China. Countering the larger historical trend, democracy has retreated and autocracy has gained in recent years. It is difficult to tell whether this is a temporary setback for democracy or the start of a longer trend. Evolution does not assume constant progress, so the chapter dives deeper into the performance criterion for competing political regimes by peeling off the labels and examining different components of a political regime. In addition, the chapter offers a discussion of how East Asians have lived with the liberal international order, which most current American and Western leaders view as central to their fight against autocracy.
This essay identifies and explores three dominant intellectual traditions that critique and theorize about ideology: Marxist, prudentialist, and social scientific. For these traditions, the word ‘ideology’ names interest-serving rationalizations, pseudoscientific totalitarian zealotry, or political outlooks. The blending of these three specialized meanings has generated a colloquial sense of ideology that is philosophically untenable and damaging to political discourse. According to this colloquial sense, all thinking is ideological and we are all ideologues. In response, I instead offer in this essay an adverbial account of ideology. In this account, “ideology” names a kind of epistemic vice. Admitting that this is something we all may do sometimes, I describe how we think when we think ideologically. Finally, I conclude with some suggestions about how education might help us avoid the epistemic vice of ideological thinking.
Utopia is nominally a ‘nowhere’ that is also, as Thomas More tells us, a ‘good’ place. Although there are competing cognate notions, the Greek description looms large in most accounts of utopia. The details of this ideal are so specified that utopic literature consists in a catalogue (and critique) of specifications. This essay draws attention to the fragrance attributed to Lucian’s ‘Isles of the Blest’ together with Ivan Illich’s attention to ‘atmosphere’ and to the aura and the nose along with Nietzsche’s emphasis on the sense of smell. Utopic suspicion is discussed as parallels are drawn with pragmatic critiques of utopia as inherently totalitarian along with the ‘good life’ in political theory and the programmatic default of techno-utopic fantasy. In the historical context of ‘conspiracy’ and the politics of living and breathing together in community, I conclude with Illich on pax and breath.
This chapter offers an investigation of what Socrates may have meant when, in his infamous appearance before a jury at Athens in 399 BCE, he referred to himself as a myōps – typically translated as a gadfly. The chapter illustrates that the natural world does not just serve to naturalize (and thus normalize) collective political systems that are already firmly in place. As in the case of Socrates, it can also serve as a potent strategy to seek to naturalize (and thus normalize) the individual political stance outside of the collective. The chapter shows that, by carving out a space for dissent, Socrates defined a form of citizenship that resonates far beyond the ancient world. It, for example, helps to explain the ambivalence surrounding modern dissenting voices (such as those of Julian Assange, Michael Moore, and Edward Snowden). The chapter ultimately traces the buzzing of the Socratic gadfly into Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy and illustrates the important tole that this peculiar ancient creature plays in her critique of the perils of modernity.