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In the First Analogy of Experience in his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues, on the ground that it is needed for a united time, that everything in the world is (permanent) substance or a determination thereof. In this paper, I advance what I call a representational reading of this text, and I explain how it addresses two concerns. The first is that Kant’s argument should have no leverage to establish (permanent) substance in experience, since pure intuition already represents a ‘united’ time. The second is that even if Kant can establish the existence of (permanent) substance, he cannot prove that this substance is the substratum for everything else.
Over the past three decades, catatonia research has experienced a remarkable renaissance, driven by the application of diverse methodologies and conceptual frameworks. This renewed interest has significantly reshaped our understanding of catatonia, a complex syndrome with multifactorial origins spanning epidemiology, historical context, phenomenology, genetics, immunology, and neurobiology. These advancements have offered a more comprehensive and nuanced perspective, culminating in the recognition of catatonia as a distinct diagnosis in the ICD-11 – a landmark development that underscores its clinical and scientific relevance. Despite these strides, several unresolved issues remain that require future research. Bridging these gaps is crucial not only to enhance our understanding of catatonia but also to identify the most effective treatments and uncover the mechanisms underlying their efficacy. Such advancements hold the promise of developing improved diagnostic markers and tailored therapeutic strategies, offering significant benefits to patients affected by this challenging condition. In this chapter, we explore the profound implications of catatonia research, spanning its impact on clinical psychiatry and neuroscience, as well as its broader contributions to our understanding of the intricate relationship between the brain and mind.
The analysis of spatio-temporal data is critical for understanding change in ecological systems. Spatio-temporal methods are the natural extensions of spatial statistics incorporating change over time. This chapter covers spatio-temporal approaches such as join counts, scan statistics, cluster and polygon change and the analysis of movement, cyclic phenomena and synchrony. In all these applications, we must consider and account for multi-dimensional autocorrelation in the data.
This chapter begins by outlining Heidegger’s project of identifying the timeliness (Zeitlichkeit) of human existence as what is ontologically distinctive about it. The chapter also recounts how, in the context of establishing that distinctiveness, Heidegger demonstrates that timeliness to be the “original time,” that is, the origin of so-called “world-time” (Weltzeit) (the time of the workworld) and, via use of the clock, the origin of the purely serial time attributed to things on hand in nature. In the wake of this exposition and after flagging criticisms of Heidegger’s undertaking, the chapter examines Ernst Tugendhat’s influential criticism that Heidegger’s putative demonstration is invalid since it has recourse to serial time (“time in the normal sense”) and, hence, is viciously circular. The chapter ends with a sustained rebuttal of Tugendhat’s criticism.
Part of the fascination of Being and Time is that it seeks to weave together so many different strands of thought. But unsurprisingly, its readers also worry that such a work must subject itself to such strain that ultimately it itself must unravel. Key tensions are between the outlooks of three figures: Heidegger the pragmatist, Heidegger the existentialist, and Heidegger the philosopher of being. Seeing how openness to our concerns as a whole is both necessary for authenticity and reveals a unified horizon against which entities with different ways of being show themselves, dissipates these apparent tensions. Recognition of the mediating role played by a conception of the good – that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle and Augustine inspired – helps make clear that authenticity is both compatible with the practical embeddedness of our concerns and reveals a form of understanding necessary for ontology to be possible.
Scholars have identified several temporal challenges in foreign policymaking, such as variable time horizons and maintaining commitment or resolve over time. While the behavioural turn has emphasised leaders and their subjective perceptions, research often relies on rationalist conceptions of objective and linear time and struggles to assess leaders’ subjective perceptions of it. This paper theorises time as an intrinsic aspect of narrative reasoning in foreign policy, introducing a ‘temporal definition of the situation’ (TDoS) framework to capture leaders’ situation-specific subjective time perceptions. I then operationalise the TDoS framework’s key temporal features and show how it can be empirically examined. The value of the TDoS is illustrated by assessing the temporal perceptions of Bush and Obama regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, showing how their distinct definitions of the foreign policy situation shaped their subjective time perceptions and their corresponding responses. I conclude by discussing how this advancement can enhance behavioural research, provide insights into the ‘why now?’ questions surrounding leaders’ actions, and challenge existing understandings of time’s impact on foreign policymaking.
This penultimate chapter turns to MacCormick’s institutional theory of law. This theory sought to answer questions about how law existed and how it was knowable. This chapter reads over four decades of this theory with character, doing so in two parts. In the first part, it explores the sense in which the very substance of the theory can be understood relationally, i.e., as underpinned by sensitivity to the dangers of domination, and a commitment to respect, decency, considerateness, and civility. The second part reads the institutional theory of law as a relational act in another sense, i.e., as mediating across what are otherwise often divisions or separations, such as between philosophy and sociology, or scholarship about law and the practice of law. The chapter tracks various changes in how MacCormick theorised law institutionally, from his early interest in law as institutional fact, to his later law as institutional normative order.
This chapter introduces a fundamental aspect of attention that is beginning to be understood at a deeper level because of neuroscience research. In addition to how attention is allocated at one instant in time, new research is showing that there are temporal limits to attention and that a complete understanding of attention requires understanding the timing of attention. The “attentional blink” phenomenon is discussed, along with neuroscience evidence linking attention and consciousness. The brain mechanisms of attending to time are compared to those involved in attending to space and to static properties of objects. This chapter also explores the relation between attention and memory, highlighting the holding of attention. The factors that determine attentional dwell time, and the brain regions affecting this type of control are introduced. Classic and modern theories of the role of rhythms in the brain are discussed, and evidence from fMRI, ERPs, and single-unit recordings are presented that provide evidence for internally generated versus externally triggered rhythms in the alpha, beta, theta, and gamma frequency bands. The importance of neural entrainment and the synchrony of neural activity within and across brain regions is discussed, in relation to its role in attentional control and conscious processing.
Before COVID-19, breast cancer patients in the UK typically received 15 radiotherapy (RT) fractions over three weeks. During the pandemic, adoption of a 5-fraction treatment prescription and more advanced treatment techniques like surface-guided RT, meant a change in the duration and number of hospital visits for patients accessing treatment. This work sought to understand how breast cancer patients’ time in the RT department has changed, between 2018 and 2023.
Methods:
Appointments for CT simulation, mould room, and RT, from January 2018 to December 2023, were extracted from the Mosaiq® Oncology Management System. Appointments lasting between 5 minutes and 5 hours were analysed. Total visit time was calculated from check-in to completion on the quality checklist.
Results:
In total, 29,523 attendances were analysed over 6 years. Average time spent in the department decreased during the pandemic but has since increased 12·4% above pre-COVID-19 levels. Early morning and late afternoon appointments resulted in the shortest visits, with early afternoon appointments leading to the longest visits. On average, patients spend the longest in the department on a Monday, and the least amount of time on a Friday. Friday was the least common day to start a 15-fraction treatment, whereas Tuesday and Friday were equally uncommon for the 5-fraction regime.
Conclusions:
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of visits a patient makes for breast cancer RT and related services dropped, and remained lower post-COVID-19, due to fewer treatment fractions being prescribed. Average time spent in the department initially decreased but has since increased beyond pre-COVID-19 levels.
Time is frequently structured in terms of motion as moving-time (e.g., “summer is coming”), moving-ego (e.g., “we approach winter”), or sequence-as-position (e.g., “winter follows autumn”) across the world’s languages, including Chinese – a language that shows greater variability in its expression of such metaphors. Using a metaphor explanation and a metaphor comprehension task, we tested 60 children learning Chinese, equally divided into ages 3–4, 5–6, 7–8. Children’s performance improved with age, marking ages 7–8 as the period with significant gains in both comprehension and explanation of metaphors – a later mastery compared to children learning English shown in earlier work. Metaphor type also affected children’s performance, but only for the explanation and not the comprehension of metaphors. Overall, our findings highlight that the structure of spatial metaphors for time in Chinese influences the timing but not the trajectory of children’s development in learning spatial metaphors for time.
This chapter introduces the book, laying out its central questions, including what it means to be postdigital, what diverse kinds of life and humanity can be found in screens, and what new technologies such as automation and AI might mean for screen lives. Chapter 1 also describes both the background and aspirations of the book, as well as its structure and a guide on how to approach reading it. Beyond discussing the defining research questions, this chapter also details the ideas underpinning the book, including the notion that there has been a tangible shift between how we related to screens a decade ago and how we do now. In addition, the book is guided by an awareness of the often conflicting and intricate relationships people have with screens, as well as the concept of the ‘smallness of screen lives’, inspired by Deborah Hicks’ notion. The Comfort of Screens is a tapestry which unfolds a story of postdigital life, sewn from the fabric of 17 people’s screen lives, interviews with whom form the backbone of the book. These ‘crescent voices’ are also introduced in this chapter.
Opening with an analysis of Instagram, Chapter 2 is concerned with how to think about postdigitality. Touching on multimodality, time-space-place, and responsive loops, this chapter highlights the contrast between digital life and postdigital life, unravelling the many dimensions of postdigitality. It concludes that postdigitality represents a world of symbiosis, whether that be of body and mind, physical life and screen life, representation and non-representation, immersion and connectivity, or interaction and convergence. These combinations are what lends digital media its unique power to move across time, space, and place. To explore these ideas, Chapter 2 analyses data which has been processed through ATLAS.ti to produce a list of postdigital keywords used by crescent voices.
This chapter, which opens by employing Forest as an example of an app which aims to help people avoid procrastinating on screens, is concerned with screen time. In particular, it discusses postdigital temporal rhythms, or the ways in which people experience time on, at, with, and against screens. Drawing on Henri Bergson’s theory of time, Chapter 6 situates durational time within a new, postdigital context, where free-flowing subjective time on screens is mediated by what Bergson terms qualitative multiplicity. These ideas are discussed against a backdrop of reflections from crescent voices, including data processed by ATLAS.ti, which tabulates what interviewees had to say about time and memory on screens. The chapter observes a trend in interviewee responses that experiences of time on screens were very often described as being strongly intuitive. Crescent voices frequently lost track of time in habitual movements on screens, a slip which interviewees found could give comfort by offering a break from clock time. Expanding on this, the chapter elaborates how screens disrupt notions of time as a predictable, measurable entity.
Are screens the modern mirrors of the soul? The postdigital condition blurs the line between screens, humans, physical contexts, virtual worlds, analogue texts, and time as linear and lockstep. This book presents a unique study into people and their screen lives, giving readers an original perspective on digital literacies and communication in an ever-changing and capaciously connected world. Seventeen individuals who all live on the same crescent, aged from 23 to 84, share their thoughts, habits, and ruminations on screen lives, illuminating eclectic, complex, and dynamic insights about life in a postdigital age. Their stories are brought to life through theory, interview excerpts, song lyrics, and woodcut illustrations. Breaking free from digital literacy as a separate, discrete skill to one that should be taught as it is lived – especially as automation, AI, and algorithms encroach into our everyday lives – this fascinating book pulls readers into the future of digital education.
We use time, rather than money, as the salient component of subjects’ incentives in three workhorse experimental paradigms. The use of waiting time can be interpreted as a special type of real effort condition, in which it is particularly straightforward to achieve experimental control over incentives. The three experiments, commonly employed to study social preferences, are the dictator game, the ultimatum game and the trust game. All subjects in a session earn the same participation fee, but their choices affect the time at which they are permitted to leave the laboratory. Decisions that are associated with greater own payoff translate into the right to depart earlier. The modal proposal in both the dictator and ultimatum games is an equal split of the waiting time. In the trust game, there is substantial trust and reciprocity. Overall, social preferences are evident in time allocation decisions. We compare subjects’ decisions over time and money and find no significant differences in average decisions. The pattern of results suggests that results obtained in the laboratory with money as the medium of reward generalize to other reward media.
This article begins by critiquing Kathryn Tanner’s Christianity and the New Spirit of Capitalism on two fronts. It suggests that her presentation of ‘Financially Dominated Capitalism’ (FDC) is problematically one-dimensional, and it takes issue with her theological construal of time. The article then argues for an alternative temporal vision which both makes better sense of Christian experience and finds resonance with economic policy proposals that undercut FDC.
Heidegger calls the thought that 'being is presence' the 'thunderbolt' that led him to link being and time and inspired his deconstruction of Western metaphysics. However, the scope of the concept of presence varies in his texts; the narrower it is, the more dramatic yet less plausible is his 'thunderbolt.' What is presence? Does Heidegger ultimately reject presence as the meaning of being, or does he accept it if conceived broadly enough? This study surveys the meaning and status of 'presence' in Heidegger. It argues that Heidegger maintains a critical perspective, and that his critique can be applied not only to the tradition as interpreted in his 'history of being,' but also to contemporary phenomena such as information technology.
System avoidance refers to the tendency of individuals who are concerned about formal social control (e.g., incarceration, immigration enforcement, or the removal of children from their families) to avoid surveilling institutions that engage in recordkeeping. While this research locates concerns about formal social control in an individual’s sanctionable status, the laws, policies, and practices that generate the threat of formal social control vary across space and time. Drawing on theories of legal consciousness, this article posits that spatial and temporal variation in the threat of formal social control has differential associations with whether and to what degree individuals with a sanctionable status report involvement in surveilling institutions. Our empirical case is U.S. immigration policing, which burdens Latinos across citizenship statuses. We link individual-level data on institutional involvement from the American Time Use Survey with administrative data on immigration policing across state-years. Results from double-hurdle models show that Latinos in state-years with higher rates of immigration policing (1) are less likely to report involvement in surveilling institutions but, (2) conditional on any involvement, do not vary in the time reported involved. We evaluate variations by nativity, citizenship status, institution, and the presence of sanctuary policies that circumscribe immigration policing. We conclude that the threat of formal social control across space and time implicates the situational meanings of institutional involvement for subordinated populations.
This Element discusses Heidegger's early (1924–1931) reading and critique of Hegel, which revolve around the topic of time. The standard view is that Heidegger distances himself from Hegel by arguing that whereas he takes time to be 'originarily' Dasein's 'temporality,' Hegel has a 'vulgar' conception of time as 'now-time' (the succession of formal nows). The Element defends the thesis that while this difference concerning the nature of time is certainly a part of Heidegger's 'confrontation' with Hegel, it is not its kernel. What Heidegger aspired to convey with his Hegel-critique is that they have a divergent conception of man's understanding of being (ontology). Whereas Heidegger takes ontology to be grounded in temporality, Hegel thinks it is grounded in 'the concept,' which has a dimension ('logos') manifesting eternity or timelessness. It is argued, contra Kojève, that Heidegger's reading (but not necessarily his critique) of Hegel is, in an important respect, correct.
This chapter introduces the key metaphysical concepts that are integral to understanding the nature of time. It also critically assesses the leading arguments in this intellectual landscape, arguing that there are compelling metaphysical reasons to endorse a B-theory or C-theory and reject all A-theories (particularly presentism, the growing block, and the moving spotlight).