In 1932, Khana Ratsadon (the People’s Party) overthrew the absolute monarchy in a military coup, introducing constitutional rule in Siam (Thailand after 1939). The dominant historical narrative in Thailand centres on the monarchy as the instigator of historical change, celebrating the roles of Thai monarchs in the development and protection of democracy. According to this narrative, democracy is portrayed as the monarchy’s gift to the people, while the significance of the 1932 revolution and Khana Ratsadon has been marginalized in the history of the origins of democracy in Thailand. Since the military coups in Thailand in 2006 and 2014, both original and newly created objects related to Khana Ratsadon have emerged in political protests against coups and post-coup governments. Simultaneously, a revisionist historiography has gained momentum. This article explores how the discursive and material (re)emergence of Khana Ratsadon contributes to the formation of a counter-memory, creating a space for political commentary to enact and reimagine the possibilities of community anew. In doing so, the article will examine the intricate relationship between a historiography of oblivion, counter-memory, and what we term ‘banal and revolutionary objects’.

Phlebotomine sand flies are found across multiple regions of Thailand, with growing recognition of their role in transmitting zoonotic pathogens. Environmental factors, including climate variability and vector ecology, may influence their distribution and activity, contributing to the potential spread of zoonotic pathogens in Southeast Asia. However, comprehensive data on sand fly distribution in Thailand remain limited. To address this gap, a systematic review was conducted following PRISMA guidelines. Out of 112 records retrieved, 33 met the inclusion criteria and quality assessment for further analysis. As per results, sand flies are widespread in Thailand, with a high level of species diversity comprising 42 species of 6 different genera. However, several provinces lack data on the presence and distribution of sand flies. Eleven species were identified as the overall abundant species throughout the studies from January 2007 to June 2025 and grouped by abundance: low-abundance species (Sergentomyia barguesae, Sergentomyia phadangensis, Sergentomyia barraudi and Sergentomyia indica), abundant but understudied species (Sergentomyia sylvatica, Sergentomyia anodontis and Neopulpus vietnamensis) and most abundant species (Sergentomyia hodgsoni, Sergentomyia gemmea, Sergentomyia iyengari and Sergentomyia khawi). From the most abundant species, S. khawi tested positive for several pathogens, such as Leishmania spp., Trypanosoma spp., Bartonella spp. and orbivirus. Besides, S. khawi has been shown to exhibit human-biting behaviour through the analysis of blood meal. These findings raise concerns about its potential role in pathogen transmission, especially concerning zoonotic pathogens. However, vector competence remains unproven for some of these pathogens, suggesting the need for further research.

The crime of rape has been postulated as an unlawful violation of an individual’s rights or interests. However, this article argues that sexual violence against women in Thailand was traditionally viewed as a breach of an interpersonal hierarchy. It was not until the modern criminalization of rape that lawyers attempted to identify the victim’s individual rights as the essence of the crime. By examining the legal techniques employed by these lawyers in drafting, implementing, and adjudicating the crime, the article contends that the voices and demands of female subjects of rape have been silenced or misplaced. The article will offer studies of legal techniques used by lawyers from various institutions in articulating rape and constructing its subjects from the 19th century to the present. This jurisprudence provides context for the current debate on sexual violence in Thailand and makes it possible to critically reassess the right-based conceptualization of rape law.

Modernity has been the idée fixe of law and society scholarship from the very beginning. It is impossible to imagine our field without its roots in the rather different theories of Weber, Marx, and Durkheim about the defining characteristics of a modern legal system; and their theories still resonate in the work of 21st-century researchers. Moreover, pre-modern law and post-modern law, as their names suggest, are also defined and analysed by law and society scholars in relation to the central concept of modernity. Modernity and its pre- and post-incarnations are the very bedrock of the law and society field.

This paper argues that security cooperation among neighbouring countries in the Global South is often hampered by domestic instability and fragmented territorial control resulting from state failures. Geographical proximity, characterised by porous borders and high levels of cross-border human mobility, directly impacts the security of neighbouring states. This creates a dilemma for security cooperation when one state lacks the capacity for effective governance. Empirically, the paper examines the evolution of Thailand’s security relations with Myanmar over recent decades, highlighting the profound impact of Myanmar’s political instability on Thailand. It analyses how the 2021 military coup and the subsequent collapse of Myanmar’s domestic political order have shaped Thailand’s securitisation of non-traditional security threats. By focusing on issues such as irregular migration, public health issues, drug trafficking, and transboundary pollution, the paper explores how these challenges have been securitised in Thailand and how they have complicated security cooperation between the two countries. The paper contends that the limited territorial control and legitimacy of Myanmar’s military government have significantly hindered Thailand’s ability to address its security concerns effectively. It further calls for security cooperation in the Global South beyond the conventional state-to-state level.

The Cold War is often depicted in binary terms: communists against anti-communists, the left against the right, or the free world versus the communist world. However, during the latter part of the Cold War, particularly following the 1979 war between China and Vietnam, earlier Cold War binaries no longer applied, and new alliances were established. These alliances often brought people with the same enemies together, despite having little in common ideologically. This article examines the historical circumstances and Cold War geographies of ethnic Khmu anti-Lao PDR and anti-Vietnamese insurgents, including their alliances with right-wing governments in Thailand and the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC). As neutralists, these Khmu occupied a political space rarely discussed in relation to the Cold War. Although the PRC provided training, weapons, and supplies to the neutralist Khmu between 1979 and 1983, later their political leader, General Kong Le, had a falling out with the Chinese, and the PRC stopped supporting his largely ethnic minority soldiers. However, up until 1989, the Thai government continued to allow the Khmu to maintain bases in Thailand for launching military operations inside Laos, until the Thai government adopted the “Battlefield to Marketplace” policy. Some Khmu continued resisting inside northwestern Laos during the early 1990s, but with declining numbers of soldiers and decreased outside support, armed resistance ended in 2003. It is critical that the geographies and alliances of the later Cold War be differentiated from those of the earlier years of the Cold War. This transnational insurgency deserves attention.

This analysis explores the impact of the Myanmar earthquake on March 28, 2025 and its subsequent effects on Thailand and Myanmar by collecting and synthesizing data on immediate casualties, infrastructural damage, humanitarian needs, disaster preparedness in both countries, and relevant theoretical concepts. The earthquake in Myanmar has created a major humanitarian crisis, compounded by existing weaknesses, while the effects in Thailand have highlighted significant gaps in urban safety protocols. Differences in preparedness and societal awareness have influenced the outcomes in each country, emphasizing the urgent need to strengthen resilience capacities across the affected region.

This paper explores the politics of Asia-Pacific War memory and memorialization in Southeast Asia, evident in the production context and visual semiotic resources of Thailand's Victory Monument, a generic memorial to Thai war heroes, and the Philippines' Shrine of Valor, a historical shrine complex dedicated to Filipino and US soldiers of the Asia-Pacific War. These heritage structures represent two divergent memorialization practices that demonstrate how the commemoration or suppression of war memory is influenced by politics, agendas, and the benefits it brings to the state. In Thailand, the inward justification and outward restraint stem from the difficult choices the state had to make during the war. In the Philippines, while war memorialization was pronounced and served state aims, it was initially undermined by President Ferdinand Marcos, who wanted to bolster his fraudulent war heroism claims. The cases illustrate how diverging national memorial practices surrounding the war's contested past achieved similar aims and how memorial sites become repositories of meaning potentials through which we could make sense of the nation and its international entanglements.

In 2021, the 44th session of the World Heritage Committee Meeting voted to list the Kaeng Krachan Forest Complex as a Natural World Heritage Site, seven years after it was first nominated for consideration by Thailand. A central point to the debate was concerns raised over human rights abuses relating to the Indigenous Karen people living inside the park boundaries. This paper undertakes an analysis of the World Heritage Committee discussion, unpacking key themes of Outstanding Universal Value, human rights, and the role of local communities to illustrate the impact that World Heritage – and the subsequent Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD) it creates – can have on Indigenous communities.

Transnational marriage is a controversial topic in Hmong communities in the United States, Laos, and Thailand, and has sometimes led to intra-ethnic disputes and conflicts. Initially, many of the Hmong American men who travelled overseas to marry Hmong Lao or Thai women were already married. Furthermore, the Hmong American community has frequently come to believe that economic gain is the primary motivation for Hmong Lao/Thai women to marry Hmong American men. On the other hand, some activists have referred to these marriages generally as “abusive transnational marriages.” The association of economic resources with transnational marriage, including remittances, increased bride prices, and opportunities for migration to the United States, has perpetuated negative stereotypes that frequently overshadow the personal stories of many Hmong Lao/Thai women who do not fit with the stereotypes. For these women, marrying a Hmong American man signifies not only personal gain but also economic advancement for their families. This paper reviews the intricacies related to the topic of Hmong transnational marriage between Hmong American men and their Hmong Lao and Hmong Thai brides. In doing so, we argue that it is important to consider the complexity and nuances associated with Hmong transnational marriages, as they take on various forms that go beyond standard stereotypes.

How do different regime types execute a security response during a pandemic? We interrogate the politics of monopolistic securitization which we argue to have significantly directed and influenced the COVID-19 policy strategies adopted in the ‘democratic’ United Kingdom (UK) and ‘authoritarian’ Thailand. Despite their stark political differences, we contend that the British and Thai states’ parallel resort to monopolistic securitization as an overarching pandemic approach effectively made them ‘functionally similar’ by producing security responses that differed only in magnitude and scale but not in kind. Integrating securitization and democratic standards violations frameworks, we find out that the British and Thai authorities’ monopolistic securitization of COVID-19 initially constrained the intersubjective process required to socially construct the pandemic as a primary existential threat endangering both countries. This significantly diminished their public audiences’ individual/agential and collective/institutional capacity to deliberate the immediate emergency measures they unilaterally deployed, particularly during the pandemic’s early stages. Consequently, whether it was in the UK with a supposedly robust democracy or in Thailand with at best a hybrid regime if not outright authoritarian, the security responses that emerged constituted varying types and degrees of violations within the illiberal-authoritarian spectrum. Nevertheless, as the pandemic progressed, the fundamental deliberative-iterative mechanism underpinning securitization enabled the British and Thai public audiences to gradually reclaim their role and space, allowing them to challenge the appropriateness and legitimacy of the existing emergency measures, thereby weakening the states’ monopolistic control over the process.