The chapter recounts the history of the concept of risk and of early modern insurance practices as they evolved from communal attempts, mainly in Europe between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, to discipline and commodify earlier forms of speculation. The processes eventually involved in risk assessment, pooling, and diversification were neither inevitable nor entirely capricious. They were complicated and indeterminate, and accommodating structures of government developed in tandem. The chapter also provides an orientation to increasingly complicated scholarship focused on the governance of risk and uncertainty as considerations of their consequences migrate over time and geographic space. It notes how leading business firms around the world, not just in the insurance industry, came to base their strategies on sophisticated models that take for granted commonplace, and even simplistic, notions of risk. Those models are dynamic and they now shape larger structures within which firms and people interact. As collective impressions of risk become more complex, shared sources of uncertainty also rise, often because economic and political systems are misaligned.

History for German idealism is the expression of practical reason, the process of gradually bringing about the accord of subject and object. In Hegel’s conception of the history of freedom, different configurations of ethical life embody changing assessments of the self and the world, and contain essential contradictions whose resolution is the key to progress towards new and more complex forms. The dialectic of the will in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is an exposition of the idea of spontaneity, endowing itself with concrete content as it moves through its dimensions of universality, particularity, and singularity. Hegel demonstrates that modern institutions are not mere limitations, but legitimate conditions for the exercise of freedom. The rationality of the real, however, does not preclude a critical engagement. Close examination of current relations and institutions as exemplifying ideas of freedom reveals nodal points where practical interventions are likely to be fruitful in effecting change. An implicit, historicised ‘ought’ in Hegel, arising from his reworking of the logical categories, marks his place within post-Kantian perfectionism.

The term “school adjustment” refers not only to the state or phenomenological description of a student at a given point in time; it also refers to the process that newcomers experience once they start to make the transition from home to early childhood care or kindergarten; from kindergarten to elementary school; from elementary school to secondary or junior high-school; from secondary school to high school; from any one school to another (e.g., due to parental divorce or immigration); and from high school to institutions of higher education. The state of school adjustment refers to students’ exhibition of expected academic outcomes, expected interpersonal outcomes, a general motivation to learn, and personal outcomes (e.g., positive self-esteem, lack of depressive symptoms). The process of school adjustment is the advancing process by which the students’ readiness and even eagerness to meet the aforementioned criteria of a state of school adjustment gradually emerge. As one of the life-course transitional events, adjustment too school can be articulated by the Stress and Adjustment Model (STA; Israelashvili, 2023).

The textbook Immanuel Kant assigned for his course on Naturrecht was Gottfried Achenwall’s Natural Law. In the Feyerabend transcript of his course (1784), Kant not only explains Achenwall’s text but also criticizes him and expounds his own alternative theory. Since it is not always obvious from the lecture notes whether Kant is explaining Achenwall, criticizing him, or presenting his own theory, one must know the basics about Achenwall’s positions when reading Kant’s Feyerabend lectures. In this essay, we introduce Achenwall and his handbook to readers of Kant’s Feyerabend lectures. We start with some background information and then discuss Achenwall’s position on freedom and obligation, natural law and right, and his theory of property and the state. We end by pointing out a few of the main points of disagreement between Kant and Achenwall that emerge from the Feyerabend lectures.

This chapter traces Qiu Jun’s use of Classical ritual texts, legal debates, and historical cases to discuss the political, emotional, and ritual dilemma of filial revenge, the ancient obligation of a child to avenge a parent’s murder. Legal and ritual precedents are given in order to find a balance between the Confucian tenets embodied in the central virtue of filial piety and ensuing ritual obligations, personal feeling, and popular sympathy, with legal sanctions and imperial power, while also elevating filial revenge to a cosmic principle. His chosen texts and commentaries urge leniency and sympathy and for individual filial revenge cases to be considered at the highest level. I argue that there is a palpable unease at the heart of Qiu’s discourses, in that his lifelong attachment to ritual studies and his filial piety complicate his responses as a loyal minister in handling the perennial problem of filial revenge.

Chapter 23 stresses that four sets of ideas need to be added to the principles and the topics of focus mentioned in Chapter 22. First, neither international order nor national order can be sustainable if the contradiction that exists today between, on the one hand, the celebration of human rights and, on the other hand, the tendency to treat individuals as disposable, deepens or simply persists. Second, the global justice agenda cannot credibly claim to be feasible if it does not factor in the views of the rest of the world. It is imperative to integrate what the non-West thinks. The ownership of a global agenda cannot be lopsided. Third, a cosmopolitan approach does not have to call for the removal or elimination of the state and sovereignty; rather, it is their reconceptualization and the application of this reconceptualization that are recommended. Fourth, institutional innovation will help implement this agenda.

An international authority is necessary for the features of international legitimacy—that is, international membership, rights holding, fundamental principles of international law and hierarchy of rights holding, and rightful conduct—to be identified and operationalized, to become the expression of legitimacy and legitimacy in action internationally. Since the end of World War II, the United Nations (UN) has embodied this international authority. Having been established by the will of states and the UN Charter, the UN serves as the international authority of the time, the framework in which most of the construction and evolution of international law—be it through lawmaking treaties, the resolutions of the UN Security Council, or the work of the UN General Assembly and other UN organs—has taken place since the end of World War II. In the process, it has played a central role in determining what is and is not legitimate in international life.

The issue of international rightful conduct, as an expression of international legitimacy advanced by international law, concerns not only the state and the individual but also international organizations. However, this chapter focuses on the state and the individual because they are particularly significant international rights holders. Due to the hierarchy among international rights holders, with the state at the top, the determination of the rightful conduct of states is a crucial aspect of rightful conduct. This introduces the question: What are the right or legitimate ways for states to behave? The answer to this question is based on the actors with which states interact and toward which they project their power—that is, other states and individuals. Thus, this chapter analyzes the issue of rightful conduct (1) in the setting of interstate relations and (2) in the setting of the attitude of the state toward individuals.

This chapter investigates one-person decision problems under uncertainty. The main building block is that of a conditional preference relation: a mapping that assigns to every belief about the states a preference relation over the decision maker’s choices. Under certain conditions, such a conditional preference relation admits an expected utility representation, which allows us to summarize the conditional preference relation by a finite utility matrix. Throughout the book it is assumed that the conditional preference relation indeed has an expected utility representation.

This chapter wraps up the arguments and delineates possible avenues ahead for central banks. Central banks may become Banks of the State, financing government deficits as they have done recently. This may imply a retreat from central bank independence. With large holdings of public securities in central bank balance sheets, the pressure to finance governments would increase. Another option is for central banks to change their job profile, becoming Banks for Everybody. This would happen if they decided to issue all-purpose retail central bank digital currencies. This would risk weakening private initiative in the payment industry, a sector where private markets have worked well recently. The third avenue is for central banks to remain Banks of the Banks, the dominant model that prevailed until the Great Financial Crisis of 2008–09. Central banks would continue to exert rigorous surveillance and use their regulatory powers to encourage further progress and foster efficiency and stability in the underlying settlement infrastructures. We express support for this line but also highlight some challenges, first and foremost the regulation of crypto assets and the extension of safety nets and central bank competence on “shadow banking,” the growing unregulated segment of financial markets.

The final chapter concludes with broader implications. After recapping how the previous chapters fit together to form a larger window on social control beyond coercion, it scrutinizes the limits of political atomization with a focus on perverse outcomes that result from the accumulated effects of individualization. Next are implications for China for inequality, the economy, migrant welfare and citizenship, and the authoritarian state’s social control toolbox. China is not alone in using political atomization, and a comparative perspective can spur future research on how the phenomenon already exists in not only other developing and authoritarian countries but also in democracies and developed countries. It ends with an examination of inequality and the state, noting that individual-level schemes are no match for systemic deflection and demobilization to address the entrenchment of inequality in social policy.

The chapter resituates the ideas of empire and nation in relation to the category of space. It delineates the centrality of the concept of space for understanding the imperial and contemporary world-system and the development of colonial capitalist modernity. Drawing on theorists that include but are not limited to Karl Marx, Frantz Fanon, Henri Lefebvre, Nikos Poulantzas, Raymond Williams, and Edward Said, the chapter seeks to understand how their works engage with space as a critical concept, and how their theorizations deploy the category of space to illuminate the production of new kinds – and conceptions – of space in colonial capitalist modernity: the metropole and the colony; notions of the core, periphery, and the semiperiphery; and the modern world-system as a concatenation of spaces – that is, a set of contiguous and nominally equal nation-states separated out from each other through the novel spatial form of the border. The chapter also examines theorizations of the nation to underline it as an ideology of space.

This chapter examines Marx’s important but understudied text Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. It is shown that Marx, beginning from an enthusiasm he shares with Hegel for developing an organic theory of the state, shows Hegel’s execution of his project to be deeply flawed. Hegel’s defence of constitutional monarchy has the strange result of producing, when properly thought through, a defence of radical popular power. His attempt to use the ‘estates’ as an element in the state performing multiple many-way mediations further serves to reveal that something is amiss in the role that Hegel’s logic is being called upon to play.