How do ‘communist’ Chinese state companies handle sacredness and religions? What role do religions and sacredness play in infrastructural conflicts? Debates on Chinese investment and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) often highlight the failure of China’s largest-ever hydropower project overseas—the Myitsone Dam, located in war-torn Buddhist Burma (Myanmar) in an ethnic Kachin Christian area. Public outcry against this mega-development led the Burmese regime to halt construction in 2011, shocking Beijing and causing an international scandal. This article explores this infrastructural conflict’s religious, sacred, and more-than-human dimensions. Based on interviews, Chinese media analysis, and ethnographic fieldwork among Kachin people since 2010, the article focuses on the project site—the famous Myitsone confluence, birthplace of the Irrawaddy River. There, local village church leaders helped lead and shelter the very earliest anti-dam resistance, despite military state repression. There also, Chinese state-owned companies encountered Catholicism, Baptism, Theravada Buddhism, and indigenous animist worlds, and described these foreign, rural religious worlds for China’s domestic audiences. Kachin dragon-kin deities, anti-dam activists, and the more-than-human charms of the local natural landscape helped create a sacredness, which the Chinese dam developers could not easily disprove. Throughout, sacred politics shaped this international infrastructure conflict.

In a previous work, I argue that traditional Islamic theism's understanding of the world, when juxtaposed with key facts of our world's religious diversity, is implausible. On this understanding, roughly, the truth of tawḥīd (Islamic monotheism) is universally evident, as is belief in its truth. Faithful Muslims act appropriately on knowledge of tawḥīd and are rewarded with heaven, whereas non-Muslims culpably refuse to do so and are eternally punished in hell. Such a view of the world, I argue, is not borne out by empirical observation and philosophical reflection. In a recent article, Ayşenur Ünügür Tabur criticizes this argument, presenting a number of objections to it. In this rejoinder, I argue that her objections, which primarily consist of misstatements and irrelevancies, fail to refute my argument. Since traditional Islamic theism's understanding of the world includes the view that some people will be eternally punished in hell, Tabur augments her discussion of my argument by attempting to solve the Problem of Hell. In my rejoinder to Tabur, I further argue that her proffered solution to this problem is woefully inadequate.

Establishing the distribution of belief in something, especially something that spans cultures and times, requires close attention to empirical evidence and to certain inadequacies in our concept of belief. Arguments from divine hiddenness have quickly become one of the most important argument types in the philosophy of religion. These arguments and responses to them typically rely on robust but relatively undefended empirical commitments as to the distribution of belief in God. This article synthesizes results from psychology, anthropology, and the cognitive science of religion to show that the distribution of belief in God is much more messy and much more philosophically interesting than is currently appreciated. I then derive some implications for how one might reconceive the hiddenness debate in light of these findings.

À partir d'une expérience s’étant déroulée au Québec auprès de plus de 200 personnes, cet article évalue dans quelle mesure l'humour peut alimenter les stéréotypes culturels et religieux. Si sur le plan des effets directs, les différences s'avèrent moins importantes, on remarque que le degré de participation religieuse joue un rôle significatif dans l'entretien d'une perception négative à l’égard des immigrants et de la communauté arabo-musulmane. Ce constat souligne la nécessité de considérer des facteurs modérateurs pour mesurer les impacts des diverses manifestations de la communication politique, dont l'humour, sur certaines attitudes liées à la diversité.

In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard, writing as Johannes Climacus, famously distinguishes two kinds of religiousness, kind A and kind B. He claims that, even though kind A is basic to kind B, including as represented in Christian religious commitment, kind A both has God ‘in its ground’ and ‘can be present in paganism’ that is atheist or agnostic. This apparent conflict calls for a resolution, if kind A is to be coherent. This article offers a new resolution with a familiar distinction between God de re and God de dicto, even though interpreters have overlooked the importance of this distinction for understanding Kierkegaard. In addition, the article contends that this distinction is supportable from Kierkegaard's own writings, even though he himself did not draw it explicitly. The article also explains the importance of the distinction for understanding Kierkegaard on religious diversity in intellectual content. It proposes that it enables Kierkegaard to offer a compelling position on such diversity, given his understanding of God's perfectly good character and activity.

This paper considers a planning dispute that surrounded the construction of a Jewish religious installation (called an eruv) in the public urban space of an Australian suburb. The aim of this case-study is to examine the role of law in regulating Jewish difference – a topic that has to date received little attention in the socio-legal literature concerned with the governance of religious diversity. In analysing residents’ objections to the eruv, the paper explores long-standing anxieties about Jewish particularity in Australia and beyond as they surfaced in opposition to the eruv. It shows how the law continues to exclude certain forms of Jewish difference that are perceived as transgressing dominant religious and racial norms. Moreover, the paper highlights the particular ways in which planning law assigned value to these anxieties and legitimised the marginalisation of Orthodox Jews, emphasising the significance of local law as a site for exclusion and inequality.

Both Canada and Singapore express support for—and have the reality of being—multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious; and both jurisdictions have an avowed commitment to the freedom of religion. Yet, this commitment expresses itself in different ways in these two contexts. Although both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Singaporean Constitution guarantee the freedom of religion, juridical definitions of what this freedom means may differ quite profoundly.

This Article explores and analyzes these two different environments that nonetheless share important features. We argue that the approaches of Singapore and Canada do not fall simply into the categories of being “liberal” or “illiberal,” but instead invite reflection and reconsideration on the concepts of pluralism, secularism, and liberalism in interesting ways. This Article thus highlights the significance of contextual factors in understanding the ways in which religious diversity is dealt with, particularly in Canada and Singapore, but also more generally.

In Article 7, paragraph 3, the German Constitution provides that religious education shall be a part of the curriculum of public school. This is one of the three approaches of dealing with religious education existing today. Originally, religious education as a regular subject at public schools in Germany was only offered by the two Christian Churches—Catholic and Protestant. As the number of Christians decreased and the number of Muslims increased, the demand for Islamic religious education at public schools grew. Therefore, the question arose whether the constitutional law concerning religion is capable of facing the new challenges of religious diversity. This Article tries to answer this question with regard to the introduction of Islamic religious education as a measure of adaptiveness. In the first step, the requirements of Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Constitution posed to religious education will be outlined in order to be able to examine in the second step whether Islamic religious education may be introduced at public schools as a regular subject. In this regard, the issue of the qualification of an umbrella association as a religious society and the constitutionality of the advisory board model will be discussed.