Scholars increasingly conceptualize populism by whether politicians use people-centric and anti-elite appeals that pit a homogeneous people against a corrupt elite. These appeals reflect “thin” ideology because they offer no programmatic content and thus politicians must pair these appeals with more substantive positions, termed their “host” (or thick) ideology, which often consists of nativism on the right (e.g., espousing anti-immigrant positions) and socialism on the left (e.g., prioritizing redistribution). An emerging literature has thus sought to estimate whether populists garner support due to their thin ideology or their substantive host ideology. To date, no research has validated whether populism treatments (1) truly operationalize populist thin ideology, and (2) do so without manipulating host ideology. Results from three conjoint validation experiments fielded in both the United States and the United Kingdom show that thin ideology treatments successfully manipulate the underlying concepts but caution that some operationalizations also affect perceptions of host ideology.

How can populist authoritarian incumbents justify remaining in power when the golden age they promised remains unrealized? We argue that audiovisual products such as videos are particularly suited to enlivening the histories that so many populists evoke in seeking to legitimize their rule. Political science’s traditional focus on speech-based legitimation, however, leaves audiovisual tools largely overlooked. The few studies that do engage these tools test for audience effects, but the content itself and the political strategies behind its curation and dissemination remain undertheorized. By adding an audiovisual lens to studies of authoritarian legitimation, we identify a regime durability strategy we term selective revivification. We specify the cognitive and affective characteristics of videos that quickly communicate information-dense, emotionally evocative messages, arguing that they engagingly distill specific historical elements to portray incumbent rule as not just legitimate but also necessary. In advancing our argument, we construct an original dataset of all existing narration-based YouTube videos shared by six regime institutions in Turkey from the establishment of YouTube in 2005 to 2022 (n = 134). We use quantitative analysis to identify when video usage emerges as a strategy, as well as patterns of dissemination and content elements. We then use intertextual analysis to extract common historical themes and production techniques. The audiovisual tools we specify and the selective revivification strategy they enable fill gaps in studies of authoritarian legitimation while adding to political scientists’ toolkits for wider inquiry.

The relationship between populist attitudes and ideological orientations remains an area of considerable academic interest, yet much is still unknown about the ideological inclinations associated with populist attitudes. While many scholars acknowledge the link between populist attitudes and political ideology, existing studies often treat this relationship as either a given or a peripheral concern. This paper represents an initial exploration into the association between populist attitudes and political ideology. Utilizing data from the fifth wave (2016–2021) of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, which encompasses 43 countries and 52 elections, this study aims to uncover how this relationship manifests cross-nationally. By employing a variety of rigorous methodological models, including the Generalized Additive Model, our results reveal a nonlinear relationship between populist attitudes and political ideology. Specifically, we find that political ideology and populist attitudes exhibit a U-shaped nonlinear relationship and that ideological extremism and populist attitudes demonstrate an exponential nonlinear relationship. These findings emphasize the nuanced interplay between ideological positions and populist attitudes, providing a deeper understanding of how they intersect.

Critical International Relations Theory (CIRT) is in ‘crisis’. Some argue for a recovery of ‘the inspirational quality’ of Horkheimer and Adorno’s first-generation negative critique. Certainly the challenge of right-wing populism begs questions of CIRT’s ‘consolatory’ cosmopolitanism. I have two concerns however. First, these proposals underplay the reasons why first-generation theorising failed; secondly, CIRT risks throwing the second-generation Habermas–Linklater ‘baby’ out with the ‘bathwater’ at the moment it has particular value. I do two things. I look back to pre-Habermasian Critical Theory, but I set a future agenda based on the Pragmatism of John Dewey. This helps CIRT realise the emancipatory potential in IR’s recent ‘practice turn’, addressing concerns that CIRT is disengaged. It also brings balance to negative and positive critiques, offering a novel challenge to critical/problem-solving binaries in ways that speak to real-world challenges like climate change. Second, I look forward from Habermasian-inspired theory to the third-generation (and Pragmatist-inspired) ‘recognition theory’ of Honneth. This brings a critical edge to IR ontological security studies, further develops the praxeological branch of CIRT, and better informs the political left’s response to the alienating effects of the liberal international order and the rise of right-wing populism.

This Article is based on the author’s farewell speech at the Federal Constitutional Court on May 26, 2023.1

Why are populist radical-right party activists intensely motivated to become involved in their party? These activists combine disaffection with politics, anxiety and the emotion dynamic known as ressentiment on the one hand, with high-intensity, low-reward political activism and a sense of long-term political efficacy on the other hand. This article contributes to a better understanding of the expressive, emotional and identity-based incentives behind party activism. It proposes a Spiral of Ressentiment model. In this model, individuals’ complex emotions of ressentiment are transformed into collective ressentiment through relationships within the party. The party relieves this ressentiment by providing a sense of belonging and hope for the future, but party messages and stigmatization then reignite ressentimentful feelings. This study uncovers the feedback loop through which populist radical-right parties both alleviate and encourage ressentiment emotions by analysing 50 in-depth interviews with Vlaams Belang local activists and party representatives.

This article examines populist challenges to democracy and liberalism in contemporary Europe through the eyes of populist opponents. It does not assume that populist parties necessarily threaten liberal democracy but shows that, for many, fear of this threat is a mobilizing force. Content analysis of data on justifications of initiatives opposing populist parties in Hungary, Poland, Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden and Denmark examines the prevalence of opposition frames defining populism as ‘democratic illiberalism’ or as a ‘threat to liberal democracy’, and demonizing, delegitimizing ‘anti-populist’ frames. Analysis shows the Populism as Democratic Illiberalism and Anti-Populist opposition frames were more prevalent than the Populism as Threat to Liberal Democracy frame. It further shows that populist success in hybrid democracies could be an explanation for the higher prevalence of the Democratic Illiberalism frame in some cases, and that ideological illiberalism and the polarizing practice of cooperation with populist parties in government could explain the higher prevalence of the Anti-Populist frame.

If elections are fair and free, citizens should accept their results regardless of the party or candidate they voted for. The evaluation of democracy should not be tainted by ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ an election. However, research on ‘losers’ consent’ has demonstrated that winners evaluate the functioning of democracy more positively than losers. We argue that the effect of losing is even more pronounced for populist voters. For them, winning and losing is indicative of the functioning of the democratic system itself. To demonstrate this, we use cross-sectional data from the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems as well as panel data from Germany and the Netherlands for longitudinal analysis. We show that the more populist a citizen is, the stronger the effect losing is on the level of satisfaction with democracy.

Comparative legal literature increasingly stresses the fundamental importance of informal norms that underpin democratic and constitutional governance. A particular species of these informal norms is the constitutional convention. Although there is wide recognition of the fact that populism constitutes a key issue of constitutional resilience in our time, the issue of constitutional resilience with regard to the relationship between populist political style and constitutional conventions has been largely overlooked. This article maps the extent to which populism threatens constitutional resilience in democratic systems which rely substantively on constitutional conventions. Bringing together political science and legal theory, we engage in a conceptual analysis of conventions and of populism as a political style. In doing so we seek to explain the perceived tension between the two phenomena. We argue that populism should be conceived as a transgressive political style, which is fundamentally hostile to the notion of unwritten constitutional law or practice. In view of the crucial connection between constitutional conventions and the resilience of the constitutional system, and the vulnerability of conventions as norms of self-restraint (lacking independent enforcement mechanisms), we conclude that the populist political style indeed constitutes a problem of constitutional resilience.

We investigate whether election results are associated with emotional reactions among voters across democracies and under what conditions these responses are more intense. Building on recent work in comparative politics, we theorize that emotional intensity is stronger after elections involving populist candidates and highly polarized parties. We test these expectations with a big-data analysis of emotional reactions on parties’ Facebook posts during 29 presidential elections in 26 democracies. The results show that ideological polarization of political parties might intensify emotional reactions, but there is no clear relationship with the presence of populist candidates.

This study assesses the validity and reliability of empirical strategies derived from the study of European populisms by applying them to the case of Canada. Using a dataset of 5,845 original tweets by Canadian federal party leaders in 2022, we compare the prevalence and intensity of three characteristic populist discourses: “people-centrism,” “anti-elitism” and “exclusion of others.” Our results raise questions about the role of party ideology in shaping populist communication styles, by revealing a convergence among opposition leaders around primarily economic representations of the “people” and political portrayals of the “elite.” We also confirm the hunch that Canada is “exceptional” with respect to the prevalence of “exclusion of others,” demonstrating that this discourse is rare and has not been embraced by mainstream politics. Finally, the study adds to the skepticism about the value of “people-centrism” to operationalizing populism, given the widespread nature of this discourse.

This study examines the evolution of populism in South Korea by analyzing the rhetoric of its two mainstream political parties, the People Power Party (PPP) and the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), from 2012 to 2022. Utilizing a longitudinal content analysis of party statements and employing advanced large language models (LLMs) for classification, the findings reveal three key trends. First, populist rhetoric has increased over time across both parties. Second, its usage intensifies during election periods and when parties are in opposition. Third, among different forms of populism, sectarian populism, marked by moral polarization and hostility toward political opponents, emerges as the most prominent. These findings contribute to the broader understanding of populism’s role in third-wave democracies, illustrating its implications for democratic stability and the entrenchment of political sectarianism.

Overt political retribution, typically considered outside the bounds of American democracy, has recently risen to the surface of American political discourse. How do voters respond to elected officials wielding their powers of office for retributive purposes? In the current partisan political climate, do voters’ views of retribution depend on whether the official is a member of their party? Politicians in both parties have demonstrated willingness to threaten or pursue retaliation against corporations for using their political voice to publicly express opposition. Due to the American public’s ambivalence about the role of business in politics and the rights of corporations to political speech, the scenario of corporate political speech provides a useful case in which to test for partisan acceptance of the use of political retaliation. In an original and replication experiment, we find strong bipartisan rebuke of an elected official’s employment of “abusive legalism” in response to corporate political criticism. Strikingly, the negative consequences are greatest for an in-party official. The drop in support suffered by the official is equivalent to the effect of partisanship, such that an in-party official using their powers of office to “keep business out of politics” is viewed as unfavorably as a non-responsive out-party official.

It is widely agreed that politicians are prone to hyperbole, proposing platforms that no one expects them to fully accomplish. We develop a theory of electoral competition focusing on politicians who differ in terms of both ideological preferences and in their capability to “get things done.” An imperfect ability to implement platforms introduces a novel role for status quo policies. We first show that the traditional left-right orientation of political competition arises only when the status quo is relatively moderate. Otherwise, an extreme status quo becomes the dominant dimension of electoral competition, providing a novel rationale for “populist” campaigns. Our second set of results address when campaign platforms can serve as effective empirical proxies for policies. We show that when there is a shock to voter preferences, the effect on platforms and policies is qualitatively the same, hence platforms are good qualitative proxies for policy implications. But when shocks are to the platform-policy linkage, platforms and policies respond in qualitatively different ways.