How did populist governments handle the COVID-19 pandemic? Did they act as erratic, irrational and unsound – in short: ‘populist’ – as observers expected them to do? Through which social policies did they respond to the hardships caused by the pandemic? And, what does populist governance explain about these governments’ social policies? This article explores these questions through a comparative analysis of a diverse set of six populist governments. We first conceptualize, operationalize and measure populist governance by constructing a novel Populist Governance Index. Second, we describe and measure governments’ welfare policies through a novel Social Policy Response Index. Third, we relate social policy responses to variations in populist governance across countries. Our mixed-method study suggests that populism explains the politics rather than the policies of populist governments. We conclude that this is the case because populism fundamentally defines a mode of governance rather than policy content

Judicial transformation may result either from shifts in institutional context (prompting behavioral adjustment among incumbent judges) or changes in the composition of the bench (particularly through court-packing strategies that introduce new appointees). This article examines the case of the Polish Constitutional Court to evaluate which of these mechanisms better accounts for the controversial transformation of the court since late 2015. Drawing on data from constitutional abstract review decisions spanning 2003 to 2023, we analyze the behavior of distinct cohorts of judges. Our findings reveal a marked alignment with government positions following the October 2015 parliamentary elections, especially among judges appointed by the newly elected ruling party. The evidence suggests that the transformation is driven primarily by changes in judicial composition rather than by behavioral adaptation among pre-existing judges.

Past research on populist supporters’ democratic orientations suggests that populist voters believe in democracy but are dissatisfied with how it is being implemented. However, this research has not adequately grappled with variation in the type of democracy citizens support or the left–right orientations of populists. Using the tenth wave of the European Social Survey (2020–2022), I distinguish between respondents’ feelings about how well their country lives up to the liberal aspects of democracy (including minority rights, media freedom, pluralism, etc.) and the aspects of democracy related to popular sovereignty (rule by the people, referenda, etc.). All populist supporters are disappointed in their countries’ performance relative to popular sovereignty, while only left-populist supporters are disappointed in their countries’ liberal performance.

The study of populism has started to permeate international relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA). This literature is still characterised by a frequent focus on individual states’ foreign policies, (therefore) dearth of generalisable findings, and lack of integration with existing IR/FPA theory. This means that it struggles to explain recent findings that, in contrast to earlier assumptions that populist governments consistently disrupt international order, some populist governments are quite willing to compromise internationally and may switch between confrontation and compromise vis-à-vis those trappings of international order they perceive as representing a corrupt liberal elite. I suggest that a neoclassical realist model of populist foreign policy can help address both the larger theoretical as well as the particular empirical challenge. It explains the foreign policy of populist governments primarily by the permissiveness and threat level characterising the respective state’s international environment. However, the effect of these systemic constraints is mediated by the degree to which populist politics capture the state. Such capture is dependent on (1) decision-makers’ depth of commitment to populist ideas and their ability to (2) transform state institutions to remove checks on executive power.

How do populist publics visually represent themselves, and how have shifts in visual technologies altered this process? While research on the visual politics of populism has largely focused on ‘top-down’ uses of imagery by populist leaders and parties, less attention has been paid to how ‘the people’ depict themselves from the ‘bottom up’. This article addresses this gap by theorising the concept of the visual self-mediation of ‘the people’ and tracing its evolution across two emblematic episodes in which contested claims to popular sovereignty were visually enacted: the 2002 Venezuelan coup attempt against Hugo Chávez and the 2021 US Capitol riots. Through a structured, diachronic comparison, the article identifies a broader historical shift – from televisual mediation of ‘the people’, dependent on elite controlled platforms, to digitally enabled self-mediation, wherein publics broadcast themselves as ‘the people’ in real time via smartphones and social media. It analyses how populist publics visually presented themselves, as well as the intended and unintended audiences for these visuals. In foregrounding this transformation, the article contributes to ongoing debates in visual politics, media ecologies, and populism by illustrating how digital infrastructures have reconfigured the visibility, performativity, and legitimacy of populist publics in the twenty-first century.

Governments are increasingly targeting academic institutions such as the Central European University in Hungary, Boğaziçi University in Turkey, or CIDE in Mexico. These attacks represent the most visible symptoms of the deterioration of academic freedom. What is the cause of this trend? We argue that populism, being a thin ideology that polarizes the public sphere into virtuous citizens and a corrupt elite while emphasizing the will of the people, has made universities and academics natural targets for leaders who seek to impose a narrative in which only they possess the truth and represent the will of the people. Universities are characterized not only by a pluralism of ideas but also possess an elitist character: these attributes are in direct conflict with the values and vision of populist leaders. To support this argument, we present a global statistical analysis correlating the degree of populism exhibited by executive leaders with the extent of academic freedoms between 2000 and 2021, based on data from the Global Populism Database and V-Dem, and we illustrate our arguments with an in-depth analysis of the case of CIDE in Mexico.

This paper explores diversifying legislatures within a context of ethnonationalism, populism, and democratic erosion. Although diversity and inclusion are often viewed as symbols of democratization, research increasingly challenges this. In fact, diversity and inclusion can occur in tandem with democratic erosion—how so? How do minorities navigate hostile environments? To answer this question, I analyze how women politicians with intersecting identities strategically use their gendered and racialized identities. I conduct a qualitative study of four different women politicians in the Israeli Knesset—Miri Regev of Jewish Mizrahi [Moroccan] descent, Pnina Tamano-Shata of Jewish Ethiopian descent, Merav Michaeli of Jewish Ashkenazi [European] descent, and Aida Touma-Suleiman, a Palestinian-Israeli. I find that women will highlight the aspects of their identities that they believe will benefit them the most, resulting in their promotion of ethnonational divisions and reducing opportunities for solidarity among minority populations.

Under what conditions citizens accept public institutions as legitimate authorities is a key question in political science. Recent accounts suggest that populist citizens reject international organisations (IOs) as distant, elitist, and undemocratic. Conversely, technocratic citizens should favour IOs as they represent the pinnacle of depoliticised, expertise-driven decision-making. In this article, we provide the first joint analysis of technocratic and populist attitudes as drivers of attitudes towards IOs. We analyse a unique survey conducted in five European countries that covers four IOs and ask how individual populist and technocratic attitudes influence attitudes towards IOs. We find only conditional evidence for a structural association between technocratic and populist and IO attitudes, and credible evidence that country-specific experiences with populism in power moderate these associations. Our contribution has important implications for our understanding of citizen attitudes towards various forms of political representation and the legitimacy of IOs.

Scholars increasingly conceptualize populism by whether politicians use people-centric and anti-elite appeals that pit a homogeneous people against a corrupt elite. These appeals reflect “thin” ideology because they offer no programmatic content and thus politicians must pair these appeals with more substantive positions, termed their “host” (or thick) ideology, which often consists of nativism on the right (e.g., espousing anti-immigrant positions) and socialism on the left (e.g., prioritizing redistribution). An emerging literature has thus sought to estimate whether populists garner support due to their thin ideology or their substantive host ideology. To date, no research has validated whether populism treatments (1) truly operationalize populist thin ideology, and (2) do so without manipulating host ideology. Results from three conjoint validation experiments fielded in both the United States and the United Kingdom show that thin ideology treatments successfully manipulate the underlying concepts but caution that some operationalizations also affect perceptions of host ideology.

How can populist authoritarian incumbents justify remaining in power when the golden age they promised remains unrealized? We argue that audiovisual products such as videos are particularly suited to enlivening the histories that so many populists evoke in seeking to legitimize their rule. Political science’s traditional focus on speech-based legitimation, however, leaves audiovisual tools largely overlooked. The few studies that do engage these tools test for audience effects, but the content itself and the political strategies behind its curation and dissemination remain undertheorized. By adding an audiovisual lens to studies of authoritarian legitimation, we identify a regime durability strategy we term selective revivification. We specify the cognitive and affective characteristics of videos that quickly communicate information-dense, emotionally evocative messages, arguing that they engagingly distill specific historical elements to portray incumbent rule as not just legitimate but also necessary. In advancing our argument, we construct an original dataset of all existing narration-based YouTube videos shared by six regime institutions in Turkey from the establishment of YouTube in 2005 to 2022 (n = 134). We use quantitative analysis to identify when video usage emerges as a strategy, as well as patterns of dissemination and content elements. We then use intertextual analysis to extract common historical themes and production techniques. The audiovisual tools we specify and the selective revivification strategy they enable fill gaps in studies of authoritarian legitimation while adding to political scientists’ toolkits for wider inquiry.

The relationship between populist attitudes and ideological orientations remains an area of considerable academic interest, yet much is still unknown about the ideological inclinations associated with populist attitudes. While many scholars acknowledge the link between populist attitudes and political ideology, existing studies often treat this relationship as either a given or a peripheral concern. This paper represents an initial exploration into the association between populist attitudes and political ideology. Utilizing data from the fifth wave (2016–2021) of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, which encompasses 43 countries and 52 elections, this study aims to uncover how this relationship manifests cross-nationally. By employing a variety of rigorous methodological models, including the Generalized Additive Model, our results reveal a nonlinear relationship between populist attitudes and political ideology. Specifically, we find that political ideology and populist attitudes exhibit a U-shaped nonlinear relationship and that ideological extremism and populist attitudes demonstrate an exponential nonlinear relationship. These findings emphasize the nuanced interplay between ideological positions and populist attitudes, providing a deeper understanding of how they intersect.

Critical International Relations Theory (CIRT) is in ‘crisis’. Some argue for a recovery of ‘the inspirational quality’ of Horkheimer and Adorno’s first-generation negative critique. Certainly the challenge of right-wing populism begs questions of CIRT’s ‘consolatory’ cosmopolitanism. I have two concerns however. First, these proposals underplay the reasons why first-generation theorising failed; secondly, CIRT risks throwing the second-generation Habermas–Linklater ‘baby’ out with the ‘bathwater’ at the moment it has particular value. I do two things. I look back to pre-Habermasian Critical Theory, but I set a future agenda based on the Pragmatism of John Dewey. This helps CIRT realise the emancipatory potential in IR’s recent ‘practice turn’, addressing concerns that CIRT is disengaged. It also brings balance to negative and positive critiques, offering a novel challenge to critical/problem-solving binaries in ways that speak to real-world challenges like climate change. Second, I look forward from Habermasian-inspired theory to the third-generation (and Pragmatist-inspired) ‘recognition theory’ of Honneth. This brings a critical edge to IR ontological security studies, further develops the praxeological branch of CIRT, and better informs the political left’s response to the alienating effects of the liberal international order and the rise of right-wing populism.

This Article is based on the author’s farewell speech at the Federal Constitutional Court on May 26, 2023.1

Why are populist radical-right party activists intensely motivated to become involved in their party? These activists combine disaffection with politics, anxiety and the emotion dynamic known as ressentiment on the one hand, with high-intensity, low-reward political activism and a sense of long-term political efficacy on the other hand. This article contributes to a better understanding of the expressive, emotional and identity-based incentives behind party activism. It proposes a Spiral of Ressentiment model. In this model, individuals’ complex emotions of ressentiment are transformed into collective ressentiment through relationships within the party. The party relieves this ressentiment by providing a sense of belonging and hope for the future, but party messages and stigmatization then reignite ressentimentful feelings. This study uncovers the feedback loop through which populist radical-right parties both alleviate and encourage ressentiment emotions by analysing 50 in-depth interviews with Vlaams Belang local activists and party representatives.

This article examines populist challenges to democracy and liberalism in contemporary Europe through the eyes of populist opponents. It does not assume that populist parties necessarily threaten liberal democracy but shows that, for many, fear of this threat is a mobilizing force. Content analysis of data on justifications of initiatives opposing populist parties in Hungary, Poland, Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden and Denmark examines the prevalence of opposition frames defining populism as ‘democratic illiberalism’ or as a ‘threat to liberal democracy’, and demonizing, delegitimizing ‘anti-populist’ frames. Analysis shows the Populism as Democratic Illiberalism and Anti-Populist opposition frames were more prevalent than the Populism as Threat to Liberal Democracy frame. It further shows that populist success in hybrid democracies could be an explanation for the higher prevalence of the Democratic Illiberalism frame in some cases, and that ideological illiberalism and the polarizing practice of cooperation with populist parties in government could explain the higher prevalence of the Anti-Populist frame.

If elections are fair and free, citizens should accept their results regardless of the party or candidate they voted for. The evaluation of democracy should not be tainted by ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ an election. However, research on ‘losers’ consent’ has demonstrated that winners evaluate the functioning of democracy more positively than losers. We argue that the effect of losing is even more pronounced for populist voters. For them, winning and losing is indicative of the functioning of the democratic system itself. To demonstrate this, we use cross-sectional data from the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems as well as panel data from Germany and the Netherlands for longitudinal analysis. We show that the more populist a citizen is, the stronger the effect losing is on the level of satisfaction with democracy.