Isotopes of strontium, oxygen, and carbon were analyzed in human tooth enamel from two Postclassic sites in the central Peten lakes region, Guatemala, to examine patterns of mobility and diet during a time of social unrest. Excavations at both sites, Ixlu and Zacpeten, have revealed evidence for purposeful dismemberment and interment of individuals. This study examines a possible shrine surrounded by rows of skulls at Ixlu, and a mass grave of comingled individuals interred at Zacpeten. The interments coincide with a period of conflict and warfare between two dominant polities, Itza and Kowoj. The 14 sampled individuals at Ixlu were young males, six of whom isotopically match the Maya Mountains of central Belize/southeastern Peten. At Zacpeten, isotopic signatures of adults and children (n = 68) suggested that many were either local or came from other parts of the Maya lowlands, but not the Maya Mountains. In the Late Postclassic, the Zacpeten individuals were exhumed, defiled, and deposited in a mass grave, probably by Kowojs. Although temporally and geographically related, the Ixlu and Zacpeten burials represent two distinct cases of ritual violence that reflect the tumultuous political landscape of the Postclassic period.

Most of what we know about organized criminal violence comes from research on illicit narcotics markets. Yet criminal groups also fight to capture markets for licit commodities, as evidenced by Sicilian lemons and Mexican avocados. When do organized criminal groups violently expand into markets for licit goods? We argue that rapid increases in the share of a good’s export value create opportunities for immediate profit and future market manipulation. These opportunities lead to violence as groups expand their territorial holdings and economic portfolio. We provide subnational evidence of our mechanism using data on avocado exports from Mexico, and address reverse causality with Google Trends data on the popularity of web searches for “avocado toast.” We also provide cross-national evidence by combining data from the Atlas of Economic Complexity, V-Dem, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). We find that increases in a country’s share of global export value for agricultural goods are associated with more homicides—but only where organized criminal groups are present.

This article reviews the evolution of the representation of Italy’s ‘Catholic partisan’. In essence, this involved adaptation of the model of the Catholic soldier, who was able to kill out of love and ‘without hatred’, to the context of a civil war. With particular reference to the case of the central Veneto, this examination looks back to earlier Italian experiences during wartime to help explain how Catholic activists and the partisan groups linked to the Catholic world addressed the key issues of the legitimation of Resistance violence and the control of its use. It emphasises the disparity between the rhetoric directed at containing the violence and the realities of guerrilla warfare. The article goes on to analyse the different models of the ‘Catholic partisan’ put forward in the immediate postwar period (1945–1950): the ‘Catholic soldier’, with his military bearing; the ‘pure martyr’, who never initiated violence; and the ‘devout partisan’, who managed to restrict his use of violence, assessing its costs and benefits, and was characterised by his inclination to forgive and, especially, to kill as little as possible. The conclusions consider how a particular rhetoric helped to shape the narrative of the active involvement of Catholics in the Italian Resistance.

Prior research shows that the pro-Trump, anti-democratic January 6th insurrection (J6) led to a short-term reduction in Republican support for President Trump. However, it remains unclear why the anti-Trump backlash occurred among his electoral base. We theorize that white Republicans concerned about the declining status of Anglo whites in the American ethno-racial hierarchy were the least likely to backlash against Trump after J6. Leveraging an unexpected-event-during-survey design (UESD) and a large survey fielded shortly before and after J6, we find no difference in support for Trump due to J6 among white Republicans who strongly perceived anti-white discrimination (Study 1). We replicate this result with another UESD with a separate survey fielded during J6 (Study 2) and a difference-in-differences approach with additional panel surveys fielded around J6 (Study 3). Moreover, across four cross-sectional surveys, we find the negative relationship between J6 disapproval and Trump support post-J6 between 2021 and 2024 is attenuated among status-threatened white Republicans (Studies 4–7). Our evidence suggests racial status threat undercuts the ability of the white Republican mass public to hold co-partisan anti-democratic elites accountable for norm violations.

Nonviolent resistance against rebels has received increasing scholarly attention over the past decade. Research has explained why and when civilians engage in resistance or place different types of demands on rebels. However, the question of whether nonviolent resistance succeeds or fails to achieve its objectives remains understudied. This article addresses this gap by theorising and testing three key factors that shape rebel responses to civilian resistance: the nature of civilian demands, the power of civilian resisters, and the rebels’ own power. Fieldwork in Colombia’s Caquetá region reveals that FARC rebels accommodated civilian demands only when these did not threaten their strategic goals. The group responded with repression whenever resisters clashed with its politico-military objectives. While unarmed resistance campaigns have successfully overthrown repressive states, there is no evidence for civilians in Colombia or elsewhere managing to push armed groups to make far-reaching concessions, let alone defeat rebels via nonviolent action only.

Amongst the ways in which American democracy is distinct, the Weberian anomaly stands out: the United States equates to a classical Weberian state with the routine trappings of bureaucratic power, national organization, stable territorial parameters, a legal code and military power. But it is at best a quasi-Weberian state in respect of state monopolization of legitimate violence. The scope of the Second Amendment means the federal government has control in many instances over the use of physical force but historically this authority coexists with the (explicit or implicit) delegation of political violence to societal actors. In this article I argue that the legitimation of political violence outside the state is endogenous to the American constitutional settlement, a feature which arises from the country's origins and the institutional arrangements adopted in key constitutional clauses and judicial decisions.

Research on civil war termination typically classifies conflict outcomes into homogeneous categories. Civil wars are conventionally described as ending in ‘victory’ for one side, ‘negotiated settlement’, or ‘stalemate’. However, each of these common categories conceals a significant degree of unexplored variation. Not all peace processes are the same, nor should we assume equivalence between all ‘victory’ outcomes. Ignoring the variability in outcomes obscures our understanding of how civil wars actually end and can undermine efforts to examine how this may influence the sustainability of the ensuing peace. This article focuses on the concept of rebel victory and argues that it has been used to describe a wide range of civil war outcomes that share some features but that also differ along three dimensions: (i) the residual threat posed by the defeated regime; (ii) the role of external actors in enabling victory; and (iii) rebel fragmentation. The article describes these dimensions and the influence that they can exert on the likelihood of continued political instability in the aftermath of rebel victories. The examples of rebel victories in the Central African Republic (2003 and 2012) are used to demonstrate the analytical utility of this novel conceptualisation of rebel victory.

The end of the civil war, the fall of the Italian Social Republic, the allied occupation and the gradual transition to the new Italian Republic not only set Italy on the path to democracy, but also gradually gave Italians access to a new public space. This article proposes to revisit the classic question of the legacy of Fascism by looking at the question of space and the difficult construction of a genuine democratic space. During the ventennio, opponents were largely denied access to common spaces, both symbolically and physically. The article raises the question of violence and the exclusive appropriation of space, showing that the representations and practices inherited from Fascism did not disappear overnight. But these practices of space were not always violent: by looking at aspects that are often neglected (graffiti, manifestos, noises and singing), the aim is to show that the transition took time and was sometimes complicated, despite the political leaders of the Italian Republic claiming to have opened up a completely new era.

Previous research has found that individuals harboring hostile sexist attitudes are more likely to support the use of political violence. In this study, we examine this relationship further. We theorize that the impact of hostile sexism on support for political violence is mediated through two mutually reinforcing factors: social dominance orientation and political illiberalism. We test this argument using an original survey we administered to over 1,400 subjects in the United States. We employ two operationalizations of individuals’ support for political violence: support in the abstract and support for specific acts of political violence. We find that individuals who exhibit hostile sexism are substantially more likely to support political violence, both abstract and specific. Moreover, we find that both social dominance orientation and political illiberalism together mediate 64.9% of the effect of hostile sexism on support for political violence in the abstract and 80.5% of the effect on support for specific acts of political violence. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings.

Among all the situations scrutinised by the International Criminal Court (ICC), Guinea has received the least scholarly attention. This article fills that gap by analysing the ICC's preliminary examination of Guinea (2009–2022) and testing claims that it represents a success for the Court. Based on 25 interviews in Conakry, it examines the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and its diplomatic engagement with state authorities, showing that Guinea is a partial success story. However, this success extends beyond the textbook application of complementarity rules – it reflects lessons learned by the OTP following previous diplomatic missteps in Guinea and other contexts. The analysis underscores that ICC scrutiny is deeply shaped by political dynamics, with favourable domestic and international conditions playing a crucial role. This case study not only sheds light on ICC-state relations but also offers insights into how the Court can navigate political challenges to fulfil its mandate.

This article compares and connects two episodes of political violence in the late nineteenth century: the Haymarket Affair in Chicago in 1886 and the bombing of the offices of the De Beers Company, chaired by Cecil Rhodes, at Kimberley on the South African diamond fields in 1891. These episodes were connected by the existence in both countries of an American and then global movement, the Knights of Labor/Labour. The Knights’ American history was shaped by Haymarket. Their South African history was radically altered by the De Beers explosion, which both the Knights and their enemies interpreted through the prism of Haymarket. They drew lessons from it that determined their own conduct and may have contributed to the demise of the South African Knights less than two years later. This article charts those connections and the context to the De Beers explosion, the trial that followed, and the lessons that South African Knights drew from the experiences of their American brothers and sisters.

On 3 August 1970, a student activist belonging to the Kakumaru-ha (Revolutionary Marxist Faction) was beaten to death by members of the rival Chūkaku-ha (Central Core Faction) at Hosei University, Tokyo. This incident sparked an intense war between Japanese New Left factions that stretched into the 1980s and resulted in dozens of deaths, making Japan a unique case among industrialized nations for its extremely high level of left-wing interfactional violence. Of particular importance in understanding the ideological factors surrounding such an escalation of violence was the debate triggered between Umemoto Katsumi, one of the intellectual founders of the Japanese New Left, and members of the Kakumaru-ha led by Kuroda Kan’ichi around the limits of political violence. This article explores the theoretical confrontation between these two opposing sides that was of such critical importance to the logic of war between Japanese New Left factions in the 1970s and 1980s.