Artificial Intelligence (AI) can collect, while unperceived, Big Data on the user. It has the ability to identify their cognitive profile and manipulate the users into predetermined choices by exploiting their cognitive biases and decision-making processes. A Large Generative Artificial Intelligence Model (LGAIM) can enhance the possibility of computational manipulation. It can make a user see and hear what is more likely to affect their decision-making processes, creating the perfect text accompanied by perfect images and sounds on the perfect website. Multiple international, regional and national bodies recognised the existence of computational manipulation and the possible threat to fundamental rights resulting from its use. The EU even moved the first steps towards protecting individuals against computational manipulation. This paper argues that while manipulative AIs which rely on deception are addressed by existing EU legislation, some forms of computational manipulation, specifically if LGAIM is used in the manipulative process, still do not fall under the shield of the EU. Therefore, there is a need for a redraft of existing EU legislation to cover every aspect of computational manipulation.

Conventional medical ethics, medical law and human rights protect us against the technological manipulation of our bodies, in part through recognising and enforcing a right to bodily integrity. In this chapter, we will explore the possibility of that we might also protect ourselves against the technological manipulation of our minds through recognising an analogous right to mental integrity. In the first part of the chapter, we describe some of the recent developments in the areas of persuasive and monitoring technologies, and how they are currently being used, e.g., in criminal justice and on the internet. In the second part we survey existing and proposed novel human rights law relevant to mental integrity. In the third part we argue that, though the right to mental integrity has thus far particularly been debated regarding neurointerventions, it would also apply to at least some persuasive and monitoring technologies. Finally, fourth, we consider how existing (i) law and (ii) philosophical scholarship might help to resolve the thony question of which persuasive and monitoring technologies would infringe the right to mental integrity.