There is a long-cherished hope, which has its origins in the work of Boltzmann, that all that we are going to need to do in order to account for all the of the differences there are between the past and the future is to add to the fundamental time-reversal-symmetric dynamical laws, and to the standard statistical-mechanical probability-measure over the space of possible fundamental physical states, a simple postulate – a so-called “past hypothesis” – about the initial microstate of the universe as a whole. And there are various widespread and perennial sorts of puzzlement about how a hope like that can even seriously be entertained – puzzlements (that is) about how it is that the macrocondition of the universe 15 billion years ago, all by itself, can even imaginably be up to the job of explaining so much about the feel, today and on Earth, of the passing of time. I want to try to alleviate those puzzlements here. I will begin with a number of very general observations – and then, by way of illustration, I will present a new and detailed analysis of how it is that a simple pendulum clock invariably arranges to turn its hands clockwise in the temporal direction that points away from the Big Bang.

After a brief introduction to issues that plague the realization of a theory of quantum gravity, I suggest that the main one concerns a quantization of the principle of relative simultaneity. This leads me to a distinction between time and space, to a further degree than that present in the canonical approach to general relativity. With this distinction, one can make sense of superpositions as interference between alternative paths in the relational configuration space of the entire universe. But the full use of relationalism brings us to a timeless picture of nature, as it does in the canonical approach (which culminates in the Wheeler–DeWitt equation). After a discussion of Parmenides and the Eleatics's rejection of time, I show that there is middle ground between their view of absolute timelessness and a view of physics taking place in timeless configuration space. In this middle ground, even though change does not fundamentally exist, the illusion of change can be recovered in a way not permitted by Parmenides. It is recovered through a particular density distribution over configuration space that gives rise to records. Incidentally, this distribution seems to have the potential to dissolve further aspects of the measurement problem that can still be argued to haunt the application of decoherence to many-worlds quantum mechanics. I end with a discussion indicating that the conflict between the conclusions of this paper and our view of the continuity of the self may still intuitively bother us. Nonetheless, those conclusions should be no more challenging to our intuition than Derek Parfit's thought experiments on the subject.