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This chapter addresses the interplay of invisibility, status, and power in UX writing. My aim in the chapter is twofold. First, I am interested in how UX writers understand and negotiate the (in)visibility of language in their own work. Tracing the semiotic ideologies of these professional language workers, I discuss how UX writers operationalize a discursive ideal of invisible writing in order to establish the value of their linguistic work vis-à-vis their colleagues, who typically privilege other modes of meaning making. Second, I examine how UX writers make sense of the linguistic and cultural-political consequences of this invisibility. In this regard, I suggest that the ideal of an invisible interface is a central media ideology that not only structures the work of UX writers but ultimately determines how ordinary users can(not) communicate with and through digital media. I conclude by linking my case study to broader discussions of invisibility in cultural studies of technology, arguing that communication with and through digital media is shaped not only by users’ perspectives but also by the semiotic and media ideologies of its producers.
Hume’s and Bentham’s criticisms of natural law theory are direct and even mocking. By contrast, Kant’s approach in the Feyerabend lectures is far more restrained. Having adopted for his course an author explicitly committed to natural law premises, Kant largely avoids open conflict with those premises, choosing instead to develop his claims about right without making any direct critique (or defense) of the appeal to natural law. What accounts for this difference? After briefly reviewing the history of natural law theory in the modern period, I turn to a close reading of Kant’s brief but pointed criticisms of Achenwall in the opening sections of the Feyerabend lectures. I argue that Kant understands a theory of natural law not as opposed to but as irrelevant to a theory of right. Once we appreciate this claim, we can better understand Kant’s equally important contribution to the decline of natural law theory in the tradition of liberal political theory.
A traditional view holds that ignorance is simply the absence of knowledge. This view has recently been challenged by the Normative Account, which sees ignorance as involving a normative failure. In this paper, we argue that both perspectives capture important insights. Drawing on three empirical studies, we propose a two-senses account of ignorance, according to which there exist two notions of ignorance: one normative, the other non-normative. We also offer a new explanation of the normative aspect. Our findings suggest that what is negative in being ignorant lies in the expectation that one ought to know the relevant fact.
Alternative paralinguistic features (APF; e.g., capitalization, emoticons) are used in online hotel reviews to maximize positive or negative feedback. So far, little attention has been paid to a description of the use of APF in hotel reviews, and to the influence of APF on the reply strategies used and the way rapport is managed in review responses.
This paper presents a study on the use of APF and their rapport-related effects, using a Dutch-language Booking.com corpus of 1,465 interactions. We coded types and frequencies of APF in reviews as well as reply strategies (rapport-enhancing and defensive moves, intensifiers) in responses to reviews. These data were subjected to statistical analysis.
Results indicate that APF are not uncommon in online reviews, and that they are more often used to intensify positive instead of negative feedback. Moreover, the results revealed a subtle influence of APF on how review-related interactions unfold in terms of rapport, in that a higher frequency of APF strengthening positive feedback is associated with a more enthusiast and persuasive stance in responses to these reviews, and that a higher frequency of APF strengthening negative feedback is associated with a more defensive, less rapport-enhancing stance in responses to these reviews.
Normative conflict is at the centre of many current discussions about order and change in world politics. In this article, we argue that studying normativity in practice is necessary when analysing processes of global ordering, such as negotiating, cooperating, or protesting. Practices are imbued with normativity. This key aspect, however, remains often overlooked in current International Relations (IR) practice research due to a conservative bias that treats practices mainly as patterned. Focusing on normativity reveals the inherent contestation of practices, providing a conceptual avenue for understanding how international practices oscillate between social order and change. Normativity can be defined as evaluating criteria experienced in practice and used for the contextualised moral judgement of public performances. This perspective is relevant for IR scholars interested in how relational, contested, and learning processes relate to order and ordering in world politics. We propose taking a comprehensive approach hereto based on three key dimensions: how normativity is enacted and disputed in practice; how it must be learnt as practical knowledge in communities; and, how ambiguity remains due to the multiplicity of rules applied in everyday situations. We illustrate our approach by examining global protests in different fields (sports, the environment, and peace).
Critically engaging with the works of Roger Brownsword, Mireille Hildebrandt and William Lucy, the article addresses the increasing reliance on computer codes and intelligent physical infrastructure as behavioural control tools and its implications for modern state law. It is argued that, if we look at the new developments in the context of broader social and institutional trends (like the rise of Internet platforms), instead of the prospect of code superseding the law, we face complex practical challenges related to the dynamic balance between different modes of guiding and controlling behaviour in legal regulation.
The chapter outlines key principles in Cognitive CDA, which inherits its social theory from CDA and from cognitive linguistics inherits a particular view of language and a framework for analysing language (as well as other semiotic modes). In connection with CDA, the chapter describes the dialectical relationship conceived between discourse and society. Key concepts relating to the dialogicality of discourse are also introduced, namely intertextuality and interdiscursivity. The central role of discourse in maintaining power and inequality is described with a focus on the ideological and legitimating functions of language and conceptualisation. In connection with cognitive linguistics, the chapter describes the non-autonomous nature of language, the continuity between grammar and the lexicon and the experiential grounding of language. The key concept of construal and its implications for ideology in language and conceptualisation are discussed. A framework in which construal operations are related to discursive strategies and domain-general cognitive systems and processes is set out. The chapter closes by briefly introducing the main models and methods of Cognitive CDA.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the concept of informality as a crucial legal concept for the understanding of trilogues. It begins from a twofold observation. First, the informal nature of trilogues is stated in black and white in a significant variety of legal instruments. Secondly, the role of legal scholarship is to make sense of that unequivocal characterization. Drawing on institutional theory, this chapter argues that informality is a full-blown concept of EU law, and it sets about defining its characteristics. To that end, it compares trilogues with two other informal bodies, namely the Euro Group and the Informal Council meetings. The core idea of this chapter is that the codification of informality translates into legal terms the intention of the institutions to protect certain spaces from an excessive penetration of legal normativity. This intention, in turn, is indicative of the desire to preserve those spaces for the emergence of powerful social frameworks where genuine exchanges among actors may occur; exchanges that should be conducive to compromise.
It has been argued that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. Recent defenses of the normativity of rationality assume that this implies that we always ought to be rational. However, this follows only if the reasons rationality requires us to correctly respond to are normative reasons. Recent meta-epistemological contributions have questioned whether epistemic reasons are normative. If they were right, then epistemic rationality wouldn’t provide us with normative reasons independently of wrong-kind reasons to be epistemically rational. This paper spells out this neglected challenge for the normativity of epistemic rationality by connecting the two bodies of literature. Moreover, it generalizes this challenge to the rationality of desire, intention, and emotion. The upshot is that we can only answer the normative question about rationality if we debate about blame and accountability for holding different kinds of irrational attitudes, as well as about the sources of mental normativity.
This article argues that our attention is pervasively biased by embodied affects and that we are normatively assessable in light of this. From a contemporary perspective, normative theorizing about attention is a relatively new trend (Siegel 2017: Ch. 9, Irving 2019, Bommarito 2018: Ch. 5). However, Buddhist philosophy has provided us with a well-spring of normatively rich theorizing about attention from its inception. This article will address how norms of attention are dealt with in Buddhaghosa’s (5th-6th CE) claims about how wholesome forms of empathy can go wrong. Through this analysis, I will show that Buddhist philosophers like Buddhaghosa think there is an existential norm of attention, one that commands us not just to pay attention to ourselves and the world properly, but one whereby we are exhorted to attend to ourselves in a way that gradually transforms our cognitive-emotional constitution so that we become liberated from suffering.
Geoffrey Pullum has produced countless contributions to linguistic theory over his 50-year career in the field. Given this exceptional scientific achievement, his philosophical work often goes underappreciated. In this article, I discuss and critique three themes from Pullum’s philosophy of linguistics, namely, cardinality neutrality, model-theoretic syntax and normativity in language. I conclude by showing how these seemingly disparate elements might indeed be connected in terms of a normative constructivist approach to linguistics.
In the philosophical discussion of the last decades, the position has gained a foothold according to which there is a more or less well-identifiable, partly detached domain of values, which is not necessarily hypostatized, but which supposedly belongs to the furniture of the world. This discussion is commonly conducted using the vocabulary of “moral realism,” and it has in the meantime generated subtly nuanced formulations and argumentations. After an initial phase, the discussion has subsequently centred on the nature of normativity. The subtlety of positions and the ingenuity of argumentations is impressive – expressed in a philosophical style that ceased to be baroque, intended for outdoor use, and has taken up features of rococo, which is at home mainly indoors. This chapter suggests that empirical findings should be taken seriously and develops a novel naturalistic account of normativity informed by the deliverances of the sciences.
In the philosophy of law there has been a proliferation of advanced work in the last thirty years on the normativity of law. Recent theories explore law's character as a special kind of convention, shared cooperative activity, and social artifact, among other perspectives, to explain the precise way in which law provides subjects with reasons for action. Yet, for all their sophistication, such accounts fail to deliver on their promise, which is to establish how law creates more than just legal reasons for action. This Element aims to survey these views and others, situate them in a broader context of theories about the nature of law, and subsequently suggest a path forward based on the methodological continuity between analytical, evaluative, and empirical approaches to law's normativity.
This paper argues that an AI judge is conceptually undesirable and not just something that lies beyond the state of the art in computer science. In a nutshell, even if an AI system could accurately predict how a good human judge would decide a particular case, its prediction would be the product of correlations between such factors as patterns of syntax in bodies of legal texts. This approach of AI systems is insufficient for basing their output on the sort of rationales that are expected of valid judicial decisions in any desirable legal system. Thus, by their very nature, AI systems are incapable of providing valid legal decisions in any such system.
This paper explores the way in which childhood is socially constructed in the context of child marriage regulation. Despite extreme social and cultural diversity, there is a core ideology in UN human rights instruments, around which official versions of childhood pivot. International law recommends setting the minimum age of marriage at 18years. This article problematizes the progressively depoliticizing effects of a seemingly neutral regulatory drive at the heart of the UN’s promotion of a standardized construction of childhood. The immediate purpose of this article is not to offer solutions to child marriage, but to bring together some elements that may form a basis for understanding the way in which conceptions of childhood are contextually constructed. My hope is that a familiarity with these social perceptions will help to explain the present struggle and resistance to apply universal rights constructions of childhood to non-western societies.
My aim in this chapter is to contribute to what the volume calls the ‘third move’ in International Relations norm studies, which explicitly addresses the legitimacy of the norm being studied as well as its influence on practice. I build on the work of those who point to the relevance of classical American Pragmatism, which considers how we know that what we are doing is appropriate once we realise that norms are the product of social and historical practices rather than abstract moral foundations. I trace the Pragmatist’s commitment to deliberative inquiry through the ideas of Charles Peirce and John Dewey and relate it to Antje Wiener’s arguments that normativity is sustained through proactive contestation. While there are overlaps between the two approaches, I argue that Deweyan Pragmatism can help us understand when it is appropriate to defend a norm against contestation. It does this by drawing on what Dewey called a ‘stock of learning’, understood as the background knowledge that has epistemic authority because it is the product of a deliberative and inclusive process of inquiry. I develop this with reference to debates within Pragmatist philosophy before applying it to offer a preliminary assessment of global health norms.
This chapter adopts techniques from historical poetics to understand the queerness of American poetry before 1850. It suggests a set of techniques and methods as descriptive of queer historical poetics. It places poetry in its historical context to determine how queerness has changed across early American history. By examining poetry from Puritan New England, eighteenth-century American satires, verse of the American Revolution, and poetic collaborations from the early Republic, this chapter shows how poetry was understood to be queer in colonial American and the early republic. It suggests a relationship between queerness and formalism that looks for the ways queer sociabilities and ordinary queerness appeared in traditions of American poetry, and how these forms might challenge our idea of queer poetry as always intent on being radical, deviant, or innovative. Queer historical poetics restores sexuality to discussions of the formalist and poetic traditions of American poetry before 1850 while borrowing from queer studies the demand for relevancy.
The chapter defends a particular philosophical engagement with medicine (i.e., normative philosophy of medicine) that is directly connected to the problem of determining the nature of philosophical inquiry. It starts with the discontinuity view, notably advocated by Pellegrino (1986; 2001), suggesting philosophy and science are discrete. Two primary arguments support the discontinuity view: science is empirical while philosophy is conceptual (Dummett 2010), and science is descriptive while philosophy is normative (Thomasson 2015; 2017). The chapter critically examines and ultimately rejects these claims, introducing the continuity view as an alternative, positing a close relationship between philosophical inquiry and science. Building on the works of Sober (2008), Kaiser (2019), and Kitcher (2011), a normative philosophy of science approach is proposed, distinguishing three levels of analysis (aims, nature, and key concepts), which mirror the types of questions posed by modern medical challenges. The chapter concludes by endorsing philosophy of medicine as a legitimate subdiscipline of philosophy of science, and arguing for the comprehensive value of this approach over conventional perspectives.
As seemingly cognate sub-genres of history, the history of sexuality and women’s history have a complicated relationship. Both tell 1970s origins stories from global north liberation movements, despite the scholarly scrutiny of sexuality and women in earlier historical periods. Core journals and publications reveal these sub-fields’ distinctive, sometimes incommensurate development trajectories. Perhaps due to their recent advent, presentism is clear in both, with the corollary of a marked post-1800 skew of most research and publications. Women’s history tracks women, in all their subdivisions, of necessity with focus upon sexualities in many registers, while seeking address of race, indigeneity, ethnicity, and international and global foci. Alternatively, the history of sexuality prioritizes sexual minorities and erotic alterities, welcoming studies of identities, expression, and representation. Key themes are transgressive resistance against repression and heteronormativity, entailing special concentration on same-sex history. Women figure within these themes, while innovative feminists are influential historians of sexuality. Nonetheless, women’s history and feminist analysis of sexualities have no default standing for the history of sexuality. In short, intellectual, methodological, and political properties prove less reciprocal than might be presumed. These exciting areas of history should evolve, to illuminate crucial topics for both, for instance reproduction. As both pursue aims to incorporate all historical periods and regions, their interconnections may become stronger.
Our objective was to explore procedures and methods used at health technology assessment (HTA) agencies for assessing medical devices and the underlying views of HTA practitioners about appropriate methodology to identify challenges in adopting new methodologies for assessing devices. We focused on the role of normative commitments of HTA practitioners in the adoption of new methods.
Methods
An online survey, including questions on procedures, scoping, and assessments of medical devices, was sent to members of the International Network of Agencies for Health Technology Assessment. Interviews were conducted with survey respondents and HTA practitioners involved in assessments of transcatheter aortic valve implantation to gain an in-depth understanding of choices made and views about assessing medical devices. Survey and interview questions were inspired by the “values in doing assessments of health technologies” approach towards HTA, which states that HTA addresses value-laden questions and information.
Results
The current practice of assessing medical devices at HTA agencies is predominantly based on procedures, methods, and epistemological principles developed for assessments of drugs. Both practical factors (available time, demands of decision-makers, existing legal frameworks, and HTA guidelines), as well as commitments of HTA practitioners to principles of evidence-based medicine, make the adoption of a new methodology difficult.
Conclusions
There is a broad recognition that assessments of medical devices may need changes in HTA methodology. In order to realize this, the HTA community may require both a discussion on the role, responsibility, and goals of HTA, and resulting changes in institutional context to adopt new methodologies.