In this chapter, I introduce the reader to the life and thought of Antoine Arnauld through an overview of his key philosophical texts. I divide Arnauld’s life into four broad periods based on key events in his life. The first set of texts is from the 1640s and surrounds his time at the Sorbonne and his early interactions with René Descartes. The second set of texts is mostly from the 1660s and concerns the time between his expulsion from the Sorbonne and his going into exile. The third set of texts is from 1679 to 1689 and was written while in exile. And finally, the fourth set of texts - also written while in exile - occurs from 1689 to his death in 1694. This fourth set of texts is distinct from the others because in these texts Arnauld’s thought seems to shift towards Thomism.

Chapter 5 focuses on Arnauld’s account of ideas and perception. Scholars are divided on whether Arnauld is an indirect or direct realist. I begin by distinguishing between these two views as well as a related taxonomy: act theories of idea, act-object theories of ideas, and object theories of ideas. Arnauld’s most detailed treatment of these issues occurs in his debate with Malebranche and in Section 5.2, I offer a brief overview of Malebranche’s indirect realism and object theory of ideas. In Section 5.3, I distinguish between two debates between Arnauld and Malebranche: One is methodological, and one concerns the nature of perception itself. In Section 5.4, I argue that Arnauld’s account of sensory perception is best described as a direct realism, though with several caveats. I also consider some objections to a direct realist reading of Arnauld, especially his account of objective reality and certain passages which seem to reject direct realism. I conclude with some taxonomical considerations and suggest that, while Arnauld’s account of sensory perception is best thought of as a direct realist account, his overall account of perception eludes straightforward categorization.

In Chapter 4, I consider Arnauld’s account of the mind-body union while also discussing some issues in causation. I begin by introducing efficient causation, occasional causation, and the theory of occasionalism, all of which are central to the main threads in the chapter. I then consider Arnauld’s early objections to (or at least concerns about) Descartes’s account of the mind-body union from the Fourth Objections and the New Objections as well as Descartes’s replies. I continue to engage the account of sensation from the Port-Royal Logic and argue that the best reading of this text is one in which Arnauld, and his co-author Pierre Nicole, defend an occasional cause account of body-to-mind causal relations. Finally, I consider Arnauld’s account in later texts, especially the Examen, and argue he ultimately endorses a mitigated version of occasionalism, according to which only God is a true cause with respect to body-to-mind and mind-to-body causal relations.

In this chapter I continue my treatment of Arnauld’s account of the creation doctrine. Building on the distinction in Chapter 10 between the metaphysical and the epistemic versions of the doctrine, I argue that Arnauld holds the epistemic creation doctrine in these later texts. I begin by offering my prima facie case for this interpretation based on his method and epistemic commitments outlined in Chapters 2 and 8. I then consider several arguments that Arnauld is committed to the metaphysical version of the creation doctrine on account of his treatments of divine freedom and divine simplicity. I show that Arnauld has the means to block any commitment to the metaphysical version of the doctrine from either of these other positions. I also consider why Arnauld remains silent on the matter of the creation doctrine and offer an account that explains his silence and shows it to be an intentional choice. All told, I conclude that Arnauld holds the epistemic creation doctrine.

The Scientific Revolution completely transfigured the European intellectual landscape. Old divisions disappeared, while new fault lines emerged. Ancient philosophical sects had been replaced by new schools, featuring novel masters, disciples, and methodological commitments. However, the new schools still engaged in antagonistic discourse, attacking one another along new fronts—e.g., Cartesians against Gassendists, Newtonians against Leibnizians. This chapter presents the diverse philosophical camps that arose in the later stages of the Scientific Revolution by noting a shift in the use of the term ‘sect’. While it still signified something like an Ancient philosophical school for some, it could also take on a more negative polemical meaning, intended to disparage one’s opponents. Moreover, the individuals associated with the “sects” did not all faithfully subscribe to explicit, coherent, and systematic programs. On the contrary, declaring membership of a sect was as often a signal of opposition as of allegiance to a methodology or theory. Despite calls for conciliatory research programs, sectarian attitudes did not disappear by 1750, but delineated new battle lines between the Cartesians, the Leibnizians, and the Newtonians.