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Negotiation is important for healthcare managers. In the past, negotiation was largely conducted face-to-face but that changed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many negotiations are now conducted virtually over videoconferencing platforms such as MS Teams. This chapter introduces negotiating that can assist readers to develop their skills for use in personal and professional negotiations.
The rapid development of international law post-World War II also coincided with greater reliance upon treaties as a source of international law. Treaties had always been recognised as a source of international law, and their status was confirmed in art 38 of the ICJ Statute. It was the development of the UN, with its emphasis upon international law and focus upon treaty-making as a means of not only peaceful resolution of disputes but also multilateral agreement between States on matters of common concern, that was the catalyst for a greater reliance upon treaties in the conduct of international relations. This chapter begins by examining the growth of treaty-making, before considering what a treaty is, including the nature of 'instruments of less than treaty status'. It then covers treaty negotiation, creation and entry into force; reservations, objections and declarations to treaties; and legal obligations arising once a treaty has entered into force. The chapter then turns to treaty interpretation, and then examines how treaties are voided or ended through invalidity, suspension or termination. The chapter concludes with a discussion of amendment and modification of treaties.
This chapter considers the various means and methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes as envisaged under the UN Charter and associated mechanisms. The key provisions of the UN Charter are considered, followed by an assessment of various methods of dispute settlement: negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation, arbitration and adjudication. Given its significance to international law, particular attention is given to the ICJ and its jurisdiction in contentious cases and to deliver advisory opinions. The relationship between the ICJ and the Security Council is assessed, as are trends in dispute settlement.
Chapter 14 examines international legitimacy as a system of reference that influences how actors (primarily states and individuals) experience meaning in the international sphere and, to some degree, at the national level. As a way to unpack what to understand in how a sense of legitimacy can function as a reference and framework of meaning in an international system, this chapter focuses on three points: how the start of an international order can impact its legitimacy, which leads me to argue that it can happen in three ways: force, negotiation, and a combination of the two, each of these ways having an impact on how the sense of legitimacy of international order is perceived; how, once in place, the sense of legitimacy in an international system influences actors (their behavior, identity and values); and how the scope and depth of legitimacy internationally can vary with time and circumstances.
Why do states exit international organizations (IOs)? How often does exit from IOs – including voluntary withdrawal and forced suspension – occur? What are the effects of leaving IOs for the exiting state? Despite the importance of membership in IOs, a broader understanding of exit across states, organizations, and time has been limited. Exit from International Organizations addresses these lacunae through a theoretically grounded and empirically systematic study of IO exit. Von Borzyskowski and Vabulas argue that there is a common logic to IO exit which helps explain both its causes and consequences. By examining IO exit across 198 states, 534 IOs, and over a hundred years of history, they show that exit is driven by states' dissatisfaction, preference divergence, and is a strategy to negotiate institutional change. The book also demonstrates that exit is costly because it has reputational consequences for leaving states and significantly affects other forms of international cooperation.
Chapter 9 summarizes our theoretical expectations and empirical findings about IO exits. It outlines the implications of IO exit for international cooperation, future research, and policymaking. It also provides additional insight into IO exits that have occurred as regional conflicts have engulfed the world in recent years, exemplified by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The chapter analyzes how IO exits might affect international cooperation as multilateralism is being contested on several fronts. It also discusses that patterns of democratic decline and polarized domestic politics may lead the future of IO exits to be different than the past. Even while this contestation is happening, however, we show that IO exits (as well as threats and reentry) extend beyond current affairs; they have been a relatively steady occurrence over time. We conclude by arguing that despite – and sometimes because of – occasional exits, international cooperation continues through IOs and a robust set of other international institutions. We outline several exciting areas for future research that may be inspired by the findings from this book.
Why do states exit IOs? How often does IO exit happen? And what are the consequences of IO exit for leaving states? Despite recent attention to individual cases and the importance of membership in IOs, little is known about state exit from IOs across states, organizations, and time. Chapter 1 outlines the common logic of IO exit that links withdrawal and suspension: States often use IO exit as a strategy to negotiate institutional change when mechanisms of voice have failed. We summarize our empirical contributions that rely on a new dataset of IO exit across 198 states and 534 IOs from 1913 to 2022. We show that exit is infrequent, intermittent, and often temporary rather than terminal. Factors related to bargaining help predict IO exit, and exit generates negative reputational and cooperative consequences for leaving states. Nonetheless, IO exit is often an imperfect tool in achieving institutional change. Overall, we correct the view of IO exit as recently increasing. We also show that alternative arguments are not correct: IO exit is not widely occurring because of a backlash against globalization, nationalism/populism, IO authority, or legal rules. Moreover, exit is not inconsequential. We end with a roadmap for each chapter.
Chapter 5 traces the dynamics of our argument about the causes and consequences of IO withdrawal with three qualitative case studies: the US’ withdrawal from the ILO from 1977–1980, Japan’s withdrawal from the IWC in 2019, and the UK’s withdrawal from the EU in 2020. The cases show how states often think of withdrawal as a negotiation tool and highlight states’ long-term striving for “better” institutional arrangements through other mechanisms of “voice” before exit. In each case, we use archival research and media sources to document that the desire for IO change prompted exit, that states used withdrawal threats for negotiation, and that negotiation prior to withdrawal happened but fell short of the state’s goals, leading to withdrawal. In the cases of the ILO and IWC, negotiation continued while the state was a non-member and led to its return in the case of the ILO. The case studies also underscore the effects of withdrawal: Each of the withdrawing states suffered negative reputational and cooperative consequences and sometimes material consequences from withdrawal. International actors chastised withdrawing states, and the withdrawers then engaged in rhetorical stigma management to try to lessen the impact.
Chapter 2 theorizes the causes and consequences of state exit from IOs. We explain that IOs start as being beneficial to member states but may become dissatisfying to some states as preferences diverge, power shifts, or IOs themselves evolve. Leaning on the “exit, voice, and loyalty” framework by Hirschman (1970), we argue that dissatisfied states can voice their discontent but when this does not generate desired results, states sometimes use the process of IO exit to invoke change. Threatening and enacting exit can accelerate a tipping point by presenting states with a potential future without the exiting state, which could reduce institutional benefits. The ability to use exit as a negotiation strategy shifts with a state’s bargaining power as well as institutional constraints. As part of the negotiating process, many exit threats are not implemented and many exiting states return to IOs. But exit is costly: Given that exiting states may be perceived as reneging on an international commitment, they can incur negative reputational and cooperative consequences from other actors in the international community. Exiting states may therefore engage in stigma management. And while institutional change is often the goal, exit is usually an imperfect tool for achieving it.
Chapter 8 traces the dynamics of our argument about the causes and consequences of IO suspensions with three qualitative case studies: Honduras’ suspension from and return to the OAS (2009–2011), Syria’s suspension from and return to the Arab League (2011–2023), and Guinea’s suspension from ECOWAS (2021). Honduras’ and Guinea’s suspensions both occurred after coups d’état violated IO commitments. Syria’s suspension was in response to gross human rights violations that stemmed from government-sponsored violence. Each case shows how IO members used suspension as a multilateral diplomatic sanction, signaling peer disapproval, to push states to halt/change behavior. The suspensions catalyzed other international actors to also punish the countries’ political backsliding as seen through follow-on economic sanctions and the withholding of ambassadors. Each of the suspended countries engaged in stigma management after their forced exits. But the cases also show a range of different outcomes: Honduras returned to the OAS after meeting all of the IO’s stipulations for reinstatement; Syria was readmitted to the Arab League even without behavior changes (largely because of shifts in other members’ domestic politics and an intractable stalemate); and Guinea remains suspended from ECOWAS at the time of writing.
This chapter focuses on digital collaboration when learning an additional language (L2), a specific type of learner–learner interaction. In CALL contexts, collaboration has almost exclusively been researched in connection with writing, which will be the focus of this chapter. The chapter first provides a definition of collaboration versus cooperation and then a literature review of digital collaboration, mainly in writing contexts. We conclude with a list of strategies for promoting collaboration and suggestions for future collaboration contexts and research.
A realistic utopia is a utopia that respects basic constraints imposed by the Human Condition. This chapter explains why some kinds of political manipulation are not bad or wrong at all, and would accordingly remain operative in a realistic political utopia. The legitimacy of manipulation is first demonstrated with respect to five categories of the non-deliberative dimensions of political life: mobilizing, participation, negotiation, ruling, and ensuring stability. It is then demonstrated with respect to political deliberation itself. All of this applies to manipulation’s function in the two faces of democratic politics: cooperation and competition. The need for the “social lubrication” functions of manipulation is especially acute in politics, given the intractability of the coordination challenges on a society-wide scale. Specifically, manipulation is, at certain junctions, a necessary tool for overcoming motivational obstacles to the flow of political information in a way conducive to rational persuasion. In such ways manipulation is integral to the very idea of a functioning democracy.
We analyze a bargaining protocol recently proposed in the literature vis-à-vis unconstrained negotiation. This new mechanism extracts “gains from trade” inherent in the differing valuation of two parties towards various issues where conflict exists. We assess the role of incomplete vs. complete information in the efficiency achieved by this new mechanism and by unconstrained negotiation. We find that unconstrained negotiation does best under a situation of complete information where the valuations of both bargaining parties are common knowledge. Instead, the newly proposed mechanism does best in a situation with incomplete information. The sources of inefficiencies in each of the two cases arise from the different strategic use of the available information.
Unrighteousness in the Steward of Unrighteousness parable adheres to a business tycoon whose steward is forced to act cannily on his own behalf, a stratagem that in an ideal future world will no longer be necessary. Underlying are deceptive actions involving money that Joseph had his steward take against the brothers, which nonetheless resulted in reconciliation among Israel’s first family.
The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) creates a new process to cap Medicare Part D branded drug prices. It prohibits Medicare from paying more than a specified discount from average private market prices and requires that CMS negotiate with manufacturers to agree on a maximum fair price that Medicare will pay that is lower than the specified discount. This article analyzes the cause of high drug prices and how negotiations to set the maximum fair price might unfold. It compares Medicare’s new pricing process to the way drug prices are set in Medicaid, the Veterans Administration, U.S. private insurers, and European nations. It analyzes how negotiations to set the maximum fair price might unfold in light of negotiation theory and the practices to negotiate prices employed in Europe. It draws inferences from the initial published data on the first round of negotiated prices.
This chapter analyses limitations to parties’ freedom of contract as to the negotiation and formation stage of the contracts under review, that are aimed at remedying situations where musicians grant excessive rights to corporate partners. These limitations seek to ensure that such contracts have a ‘fair scope’. As yet, awaiting potential EU harmonisation of authorship and initial ownership, there are no relevant harmonising rules at the EU level. Instead, focus lies with restrictions under national law. First, objectionable precontractual behaviour may be sanctioned by precontractual liability, giving right to damages. Subsequently, the requirement of consent is subject to certain requirements. Third, the law limits parties’ freedom as to the scope of rights that may be transferred or licensed and provides tools to determine this scope in practice. Finally, the chapter turns to the negotiation and formation stage of secondary contractual relationships that may arise once the initial contract has been entered into. It concludes with an overview of the main findings.
Promoting and adopting change is often a source of conflict in organisations. These conflicts are a result of perceptions held by the employees and managers. Employees may fear the uncertainties ahead, while managers may hesitate to take decisive action, or feel ill-equipped to implement the proposed changes. Additional factors, including the availability of resources (such as financial or staffing), may contribute to the conflict experienced during a period of transformation.
Such conflicts need to be managed professionally to ensure a positive outcome. This management process usually takes the form of negotiation, so both parties perceive there to be something to ‘win’ from the process. Recognition of the organisation’s culture – that is, awareness of understanding shared values, meanings and assumptions – can help managers communicate and enact changes.
This chapter explores navigating change, designing a change communication plan, acknowledging resistance to change, and recognising and managing conflict. It then looks at negotiation strategies to ensure conflict is managed appropriately.
Alan Strudler’s “Lying about Reservation Prices in Business Negotiation: A Qualified Defense” challenges a number of claims I make in a prior essay, “A Lie Is a Lie: The Ethics of Lying in Business Negotiations.” Here, I examine Strudler’s critique and seek to refute his various arguments—in particular, those based on assumption of risk and the signalling value of reservation price lies.
The conclusion turns to the implications of this study today, both in terms of our own view of liberal democratic society and the place of women in it. Grouchy shows us, firstly, how significant ideas can persist through an era of upheaval like the French Revolution: through constant negotiation, continual re-interrogation, and a determination to hold on to core concepts while adapting and discarding others. It argues, furthermore, that Grouchy’s politics and philosophy provide further evidence that women in history have thought and acted politically, but not always in the ways we commonly understand as ‘thinking’ or ‘acting’. It expresses the hope that the example of Grouchy will provide inspiration for other historians who wish to reconstruct the ideas of those in the past – in particular women and other marginalised groups – who did not do all, or any, of their thinking over the course of long texts. The reconstruction of this rich history will, in turn, help combat the problem of authority still encountered by women today in political and intellectual spheres. Finally, it ends with the suggestion that Grouchy’s thought may be of use for those twenty-first century theorists who argue that emotions are essential to successful liberal democracies.
As well as providing a brief biography of Sophie de Grouchy, the introduction sets out the aims of the book. It describes how A Republic of Sympathy is the tale of how thought could be produced by an eighteenth-century woman in a time of Revolution: with all the possibilities, limitations, and opportunities that this period offered. It outlines how over this period, Grouchy developed her own, unique form of republicanism, by appealing to sympathy as the glue between the individual and the republic. It emphasises that Grouchy’s thought consisted of a series of shifting, adapting ideas, which nevertheless consistently relied on this sentiment. It describes how Grouchy not only experiment with variations of her theory over this period, but with different mediums of expressing her ideas: including pedagogical treatise, journal articles, translated texts, commentaries, collaborative projects, or embodied in her lived relationships. It also highlights Grouchy’s key interlocutors: from Adam Smith, to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, from her husband, the marquis de Condorcet to Benjamin Constant, from Thomas Paine to Jacques Pierre Brissot.