Chapter 7 focuses on the assassination of Mohamed Boudia, who died in a car explosion in a fancy Parisian neighbourhood on 28 June 1973. The chapter discusses the cables sent by French intelligence updating Club de Berne members and Mossad about the police investigation (despite widespread rumours that Mossad was likely behind these killings). Boudia, a top Black September terrorist, was in charge of various terrorist attacks and this chapter details what intelligence agencies knew about these attacks and Boudia’s involvement. At the time, he was preparing an attack against the Schönau transit camp near Vienna, where Jewish migrants stayed on their way to Israel from the Soviet Union. The chapter highlights how Mossad used Club de Berne intelligence for Operation Wrath of God. In particular, the Schönau investigation was used by Mossad as a pretext to gather information on Boudia. In particular, intelligence provided by the Swiss intelligence agency was very useful for Mossad to organise the killing mission against Boudia.

Chapter 2 looks at intelligence exchanges right after the Munich Olympics attack. This was when the Israeli government decided to go ahead with preparing the killing mission against any Palestinian involved in the planning and execution of the Munich massacre. This chapter shows how European intelligence helped Mossad identify the perpetrators of the attack, including those who planned and managed the terrorist operation as well as those who helped with the implementation or provided logistical support. European intelligence also helped Mossad to get a better sense of Black September’s operational methods in Europe, an area where Mossad lacked intelligence at the time. During this period, Black September carried out an explosive letters campaign, and this chapter shows how intelligence-sharing helped agencies detect the letters before they were opened. Lastly, through Club de Berne intelligence reports, numerous tactical details come to light about how Black September had organised the Munich Olympics attack.

Chapter 4 looks at Mossad’s assassination of Mahmoud al-Hamshari, who was killed in an explosion in his home in Paris on 8 December 1972. The chapter analyses the cables sent by French intelligence that updated Club de Berne members (including Mossad) about the ongoing police investigation. The chapter also looks at Black September attacks that happened in December 1972, one of which was a major attack in Bangkok. Palestinian terrorists planned a simultaneous attack in Scandinavia, which is revealed here for the first time. Another attack targeted Israel’s prime minister via a surface-to-air missile at Rome Fiumicino Airport. If this attack had succeeded, it would probably have counted among the most spectacular terrorist events of the decade. Club de Berne reports about Black September’s preparations for its terrorist activities show that agencies were trying to be one step ahead of the group. A few warnings issued by Mossad at the time are interesting from a contemporary perspective: the agency warned that Palestinians could hijack a plane and crash it into an Israeli city. Mossad thought that a plane could serve as a weapon, as was the case forty years later during 9/11.

The book’s first chapter provides background information about Operation Wrath of God, the Black September organisation, and the Club de Berne. This sets the scene and provides an understanding of the historical and political context in which the events described in the book take place. For instance, understanding how Operation Wrath of God was organised will later help explain ways in which European intelligence was useful to Mossad to carry out its assassinations.

On 21 July 1973, in a small, quiet Norwegian vacation town called Lillehammer, Mossad committed two unforgivable mistakes: first, it killed the wrong man and, second, it got caught doing it. On the official diplomatic level, the Lillehammer affair and public trial of the six Mossad officers caused a mass outpouring of international outrage and hostile press towards Israel. On the secret intelligence level, as this chapter demonstrates, it was as if the Lillehammer affair never happened. Chapter 8 focuses on three cases where cooperation started before the killing in Lillehammer and lasted for several months after. The chapter also discusses Club de Berne reports from early 1973 about terrorist activities in Scandinavia, which explains why Mossad readily believed claims that Salameh, a top terrorist, would be in Norway.

The concluding chapter discusses how Mossad relied heavily on foreign intelligence agencies to organise its covert actions. This invites the reader to rethink the oft-presented image of Mossad as a near omnipotent and omniscient agency. Instead, it is clear that Mossad did not act alone, and that European intelligence was vital for the successful implementation of Operation Wrath of God. The book thus offers a more nuanced and realistic view of Mossad’s strengths and weaknesses. The conclusion also discusses the major themes of the book, including questions relating to the international relations of intelligence agencies and the effectiveness of covert actions. Lastly, it discusses the core dilemma that European intelligence agencies faced when Operation Wrath of God was exposed: should they criticise Mossad and risk losing it as a vital partner in the fight against terrorism, or keep quiet and continue cooperating with Israeli security? Obviously, they chose the latter because the intelligence exchanges were deemed very valuable and because it could be kept entirely secret – at least until this book, which has revealed the secret for the first time.

Chapter 3 starts with Operation Wrath of God’s first targeted assassination: the shooting of Wael Zwaiter in Rome on 16 October 1972. After the killing, Italian intelligence asked for help from its Club de Berne partners to find Zwaiter’s assassins. The absurdity of this, of course, is that one of the partners who was supposed to help identify the murderer, was the murderer. This chapter analyses intelligence cooperation around four attempted or perpetrated Black September terrorist attacks, some of which will be revealed for the first time in this book. The chapter further highlights that several cables also served a second purpose for intelligence agencies. For example, agencies wanted to appear as powerful, relevant, well networked, and knowledgeable as possible about Palestinian conspiratorial activities as a way to cultivate their image in the eyes of their partners. The chapter outlines a few cases of such covert diplomacy where, through intelligence-sharing, agencies tried to change how they and their governments were perceived by other governments.

Chapter 6 describes a true war of the spooks. Within days, Mossad assassinated members of the Palestinian armed struggle in Paris, Beirut, and Athens. On 5 April 1973, it gunned down Basil Paoud al-Kubaisi in full daylight in the streets of the French capital. In Beirut on 9 April 1973, Mossad organised a raid and killed a top Fatah leader, Abu Yussuf, a PLO spokesperson, Dr Kamal Butros Nasser, and the Fatah operative in charge of operations in the West Bank, Kemal Adwan. In Athens on 11 April 1973, it assassinated Zaid Muchassi, the Fatah representative in Cyprus who had replaced Hussein Abu-Khair after he was killed by Mossad on 22 January 1973. In retaliation, in Rome on 27 April 1973, Black September assassinated Vittorio Olivares, an El Al employee (falsely) accused of being a Mossad agent. Lastly, chapter 6 describes Mossad’s spectacular seventh killing mission. Abdel Nakaa and Abdel Shibli were killed when their car exploded as they were on their way to perpetrate an attack against an El Al office in Rome. What sounds like a James-Bond-esque operation can indeed be confirmed with Club de Berne records, together with new and hitherto unknown elements.

This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the War of Attrition, a conflict between Israel and Egypt that lasted from 1967 to 1970. The chapter explores the political and social processes triggered by the war, as well as the significant involvement of the Soviet Union and increased US aid to Israel. It also delves into the limited scope of the war, with both sides aiming for a strategy of exhaustion The chapter highlights the role of Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan in shaping the country’s military strategy during the war. Dayan’s advocated for Israeli concessions and partial settlement with Egypt, arguing that the opening and reconstruction of the Suez Canal could generate positive dynamics for promoting peace. Another aspect is the social impact of the war on Israeli society, revealing the emergence of cracks in the national consensus. The war was long-lasting and resulted in heavy losses, leading to discontent and criticism from various levels of society. Despite this, the war ultimately demonstrated Israel’s military strength and ability to withstand pressure from a much larger opponent.

The chapter provides a detailed account of the decision-making processes that led to strategic surprise in the Yom Kippur War 6 of October 1973 and the battles during the first days of the war. The chapter highlights the differences in opinion among Israeli military leaders regarding the best approach to defending against an Egyptian attack, with some advocating for a flexible defense and others favoring a rigid defense with strongpoints. Ultimately, political considerations led to the adoption of a rigid defense strategy integrated with some mobile units. The chapter also explores the misunderstandings and communication issues that occurred during the first hours of the war that led to Israel’s military failures, particularly with regards to the delayed call-up of reserve units but also the air force. Israel’s counter offensive on the 8 of October failure in its southern front is also analyzed.

Chapter 5 focuses on the rise of populist nationalism in Israel. The collapse of what was once called the “peace camp” at the start of the century opened up the political space for nationalist politicians to link the security establishment with “the failed left” given its close association with the Oslo peace process. The continuous attacks by populist-nationalist politicians on the top echelon of the army and intelligence services must be seen as part of the broader pattern of assaults on state institutions including the courts and the media – all targeted as part of the maligned “leftist” elite. The security officials who have challenged the right’s policies – particularly, its approach toward the Palestinians – have found themselves ostracized and, in some cases, their careers cut short for their so-called “leftist” agenda. Senior veterans of the security establishment, who are more free to speak their minds, have likewise found themselves targeted by populist politicians on the right in an effort to neutralize the criticisms and dire warnings often issued by ex-generals and retired heads of the Mossad and Shin Bet security services.

Chapter 1 focuses on the Israeli security community’s desire to preserve Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, a sentiment that serves as the basis for the security veterans’ disproportionate support for the two-state solution. This chapter explores the assessments of the security establishment from the 1967 War to the Oslo peace process of the 1990s to the breakdown of the peace process in the 2000s. It shows that proposals for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were submitted by the IDF and intelligence services to the Eshkol government even before the conclusion of the 1967 “Six Day” War. Two decades later, the IDF top brass played an important role during the first Intifada in prodding the Rabin-led government to pursue peace talks with the PLO. During the second Intifada in the early 2000s, retired senior security establishment officials urged Prime Minister Sharon to resume peace diplomacy with the Palestinians. As this chapter shows, Israeli governments have varied in their commitment to pursuing a deal with the Palestinians based on the two-state solution, often putting them at odds with the national security community.

Chapter 3 focuses on the policy disagreements with the security community in the period following Netanyahu’s return to power in 2009, a decade after he lost his reelection to Barak. His dismissal of the two-state solution and aggressive settlement policy in the West Bank; his approach toward Hamas-led Gaza; and key aspects of his policy aimed at thwarting Iran’s nuclear program have encountered serious opposition by the security establishment and retired senior security officials. This chapter describes how civil-military tensions spiked following the formation of Netanyahu’s sixth government in December 2022 and its pursuit of its highly controversial legal overhaul.

Netanyahu’s worldview, his modus operandi, and the significant steps he has taken to keep the generals at bay are explored in Chapter 2. It is argued that he is a pragmatic hardliner – a lifelong right-wing ideologue and opponent of Palestinian statehood who nevertheless has displayed flexibility, enabling him to remain coy about his territorial vision for Israel. A master manipulator of the media, he has cultivated an image of himself as “Mr. Security” and sought, early on, to exclude the IDF generals from the decision-making process, associating them with the political left and seeing them as potential rivals. The security community, for its part, sees Netanyahu not as “Mr. Security” but, rather, as a politician who routinely places his personal and political interests ahead of national security concerns.

This chapter examines the Jewish Agency’s Mossad’s Brichah, Hebrew for “escape,” for Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in Europe who wanted to go to Palestine, as well as efforts of the British foreign minister Ernest Bevin to enlist the assistance of the US State Department to discourage Americans from assisting that Jewish immigration. British and American diplomats and intelligence officials feared that Brichah would enhance Soviet efforts to infiltrate communist agents into Palestine. American liberals denounced efforts the “red scare” of associating Zionism with communism.