Federal policy began to drift from tribal termination during the late 1950s. Navajo Nation citizens Paul and Lorena Williams argued they could not be sued in state court for events arising in Indian country, and the United States Supreme Court agreed in 1959, ruling state jurisdiction would infringe upon tribes’ ability to self-govern. The Supreme Court’s decision reinvigorated tribal sovereignty, and the Miccosukee leader Mostaki, better known as “Buffalo Tiger,” pushed the limits of tribal sovereignty. When the United States refused to recognize the Miccosukee as an Indian tribe, Buffalo Tiger led a Miccosukee delegation to Fidel Castro’s Cuba in 1959. Castro acknowledged the Miccosukee as an Indian tribe, and the United States was forced to do the same upon Miccosukee’s return. President Lyndon Johnson took an interest in Indian affairs and passed the controversial Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. However, President Richard Nixon became tribes’ greatest advocate. In 1970, he formally ended the termination era and set in motion policies that would lead to the present tribal self-determination era.

President Lyndon Johnson reluctantly began the sustained bombing of North Vietnam with Operation Rolling Thunder on March 2, 1965. Johnson initially thought that gradually increasing attacks against the North Vietnamese heartland might break the North’s morale and end its support of the insurgency, but the significant restrictions that the president placed on bombing limited its effectiveness. More importantly, the character of the war fought by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese – an infrequently waged guerrilla conflict that required minimal supplies to wage – negated the utility of bombing the North’s supply lines, oil, and its meager amount of industry. Meanwhile, in South Vietnam, air force, navy, and marine fighters and helicopters supported American and South Vietnamese ground operations, as did US Air Force B-52s, which began bombing Southern targets in a massive campaign known as Arc Light in June 1965. Compared to bombing the North, air attacks on South Vietnamese territory had few limitations and often inflicted significant civilian casualties. Though air power often tilted the scales toward American forces in rare conventional engagements like Khe Sanh and the Tet Offensive, it could not guarantee survival of a Southern government that was fundamentally corrupt and out of touch with its populace.

The politics of Vietnam was born in the early Cold War when Republicans made a concerted effort to undercut the national security advantage that Democrats enjoyed after a decisive victory in World War II. The years after the war are often remembered as a period when politics stopped at the water’s edge. Nothing could be further from the truth. Although there were a number of factors that moved the US military deep into the jungles of Vietnam, including a “domino theory” positing that if one country fell to communism everything around it would follow, partisan politics was a driving force behind this disastrous strategy. The same political logic and prowess that led President Lyndon Johnson to strengthen the legislative coalition behind his Great Society simultaneously pushed him into a hawkish posture in Southeast Asia.

Chapter 4 relates the impact of the Americanization of the Fourth Civil War for Vietnam. Despite public claims to the contrary, Hanoi at that time had no desire to negotiate an end to the conflict; it was committed to “complete victory.” Nothing short of the surrender of its enemies was going to satisfy it. To meet that end, Le Duan’s regime relied heavily on political and material support from the Soviet Union and China, which was not always easy to obtain in light of the growing ideological dispute between the two. Mounting frustration with the course of the war eventually prompted Le Duan to order a major, months-long military campaign to break the stalemate and expedite victory: the Tet Offensive of 1968. Although it dealt the United States a major psychological blow, the three-staged offensive fell far short of meeting Le Duan’s own expectations. In fact, it energized the regime in Saigon and rallied the Southern population behind it to an unprecedented degree.

Chapter 4 relates the impact of the Americanization of the Fourth Civil War for Vietnam. Despite public claims to the contrary, Hanoi at that time had no desire to negotiate an end to the conflict; it was committed to “complete victory.” Nothing short of the surrender of its enemies was going to satisfy it. To meet that end, Le Duan’s regime relied heavily on political and material support from the Soviet Union and China, which was not always easy to obtain in light of the growing ideological dispute between the two. Mounting frustration with the course of the war eventually prompted Le Duan to order a major, months-long military campaign to break the stalemate and expedite victory: the Tet Offensive of 1968. Although it dealt the United States a major psychological blow, the three-staged offensive fell far short of meeting Le Duan’s own expectations. In fact, it energized the regime in Saigon and rallied the Southern population behind it to an unprecedented degree.

President Lyndon B. Johnson and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. stand out as remarkable co-architects of the movement for racial progress and just democracy that marked the decade of the 1960s. Individually, each put an indelible stamp of the civil rights and Great Society eras. Together, for a time, they formed perhaps the most formidable political tandem between a president and social justice movement leader in American history. Yet their relationship was also a fraught one,  filled with creative tension, political conflicts, and personal disappointments. This chapter delves into the arc of Lyndon Johnson and Martin Luther King Jr.’s relationship to tease out the extraordinary ways they were able to galvanize America toward some of the most remarkable achievements of the nation’s Second Reconstruction; yet, by the end of the public political careers, they grew increasingly distant, combative, and disappointed in the other. Ultimately, the chapter argues that, despite their political differences, their evolving relationship helped to fundamentally transform postwar American democracy even as it framed the limits of the political liberalism within which such change could occur.

If West Germany had one unique asset, it was the bedrock stability of its currency, the Deutsche Mark. Chapter 4 introduces the principal defenders of German stability – the economy and finance ministries, the Bundesbank, and the Council of Economic Experts. In fall 1965, Chancellor Erhard identified the maintenance of price stability as the foundation of German policy – with enormous repercussions for foreign relations. In 1965-66, development aid programs, restitution to Israel, and offset purchases from the United States would all be scaled back in order to keep Bonn’s budget balanced and avoid stimulating inflation. German monetary experts worked closely with U.S. officials to uphold the Bretton Woods monetary system; but Lyndon Johnson was furious that Erhard had broken his offset pledges, particularly since West Germany remained reluctant to send personnel to Vietnam. In spring 1966, Erhard’s cabinet tried to unthaw relations with the USSR by issuing a “peace note” calling for mutual renunciation-of-force declarations; but the Soviet bloc rejected the approach as inadequate. When West Germany slipped into recession, Erhard’s coalition collapsed in failure.

For Mailer, the 1960s were not only notable for the volume of his published writing, but for the extent of his political engagement and participation. Though Mailer wrote and spoke about American politics until the end of his life, he was arguably most directly involved in political protest during the Vietnam War era. During this time, he spoke out frequently against the war, and in 1967 published the stylistically innovative Why Are We In Vietnam?, often read as an allegorical criticism of the national mindset that led to America’s involvement in the unwinnable war. Most notably, Mailer participated in the March on the Pentagon in October of 1967, which provided the foundation for his Pulitzer Prize winning work Armies of the Night (1968), a seminal work of New Journalism that to this day is considered one of the best pieces covering the event.

In the summer of 1968, Mailer covered the Republican and Democratic conventions in Miami and Chicago, respectively. In this work, as in Armies of the Night, Mailer employs the literary tactics of New Journalism, and includes himself as a character in the narrative. Yet the Mailer of Miami and the Siege of Chicago is different from the Mailer of The Armies of the Night. In addition to providing the historical and political context for the publication of this work, this chapter will discuss the shift in Mailer’s level of involvement, enthusiasm, and support for the protests that erupted in Chicago.

Chapter 6 assesses the ambassadorship of Henry Cabot Lodge II, chosen by President John F. Kennedy to lead Embassy Saigon at the height of the 1963 "Buddhist crisis." South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem's crackdown on Buddhist demonstrators had alarmed American public opinion, and Lodge decided shortly after taking up his duties that Diem had to go. This view ran counter to that of every senior administration figure - Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, CIA Director John McCone, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy - all of whom believed that Diem, despite his flaws, was preferable to any alternative and ought to be supported. General Paul Harkins, Lodge's military counterpart in Saigon, likewise felt that Washington should stand by Diem. Lodge prevailed over this opposition through a campaign of secrecy, misinformation, and repeated disobedience. He formed ties with rebel generals and promised them U.S. backing if they overthrew Diem, a policy no one in the White House or State Department had approved. He withheld information about coup plots from his superiors. He refused to follow orders from Rusk to meet with Diem and resolve the situation diplomatically. Diem's deposal and murder were in great part Lodge's doing. However distasteful, that outcome gave America a fresh start in Vietnam.