This chapter explores the idea of opposition. One may make known one’s opposition to specific measures and one may make known one’s opposition to those who hold the office of government. While opposition to those who rule may flourish only in constitutional arrangements that contemplate changes in government, the freedom to make known opposition to measures may obtain and flourish even absent such arrangements. These two different modalities of opposition – to measures and to governments – draw on a reciprocal understanding that those who oppose and those who rule are both committed to the public good. Depending on the design of its system of government, a constitution may enable or empower opposition, with the parliamentary form of government differing in important respects from the presidential. Some constitutional arrangements and proposals award to opposition members in legislatures and elsewhere some degree of authority in exercising the office of government. Whatever the merits of such coalition or consensus arrangements and proposals, they change the function of opposition, for when those who oppose begin to govern, a version of the question quis custodiet ipsos custodes (who guards the guardians) arises: who stands in opposition to the opposition?

This chapter argues that protecting rights in a constitutional democracy is a collaborative enterprise between all three branches of government, where each branch has a distinct but complementary role to play, whilst working together with the other branches in the constitutional scheme. At the heart of the chapter is a collaborative conception of the separation of powers, where the branches are situated within a heterarchical relationship of reciprocity, recognition, and respect. Grounded in the key values of comity, collaboration, and conflict management, this chapter sketches out the contours of the collaborative constitution. Instead of a conflictual dynamic of ’constitutional showdowns’, the chapter marks out a preference for ’constitutional slowdowns’. Whilst accepting the inevitability and, indeed, the legitimacy of constitutional counterbalancing and tension between the branches of government, the collaborative constitution attends to the collaborative norms which frame and shape the interaction between the branches in a well-functioning constitutional order.