The present study examines the influence of non-economic factors on women’s labour market participation in low-income neighbourhoods of urban areas in India. For this purpose, we conducted a survey in two slum areas of Kolkata city in West Bengal – one, located in a residential neighbourhood, and another, situated in the dock area of the city and surrounded by factories. Our survey of 384 ever-married working-age women makes three noteworthy observations. First, the location of slums crucially affects the type of paid work that is available and accessible to women. Secondly, although women’s entry into the labour market maybe crisis-driven, the women workers develop an intrinsic valuation of paid work as their right, and as a means of livelihood in the process. Finally, social and community norms explain both the non-participation and the temporary withdrawal of women from the labour force. Thus, the inability and/or the unwillingness of slum women to participate in the labour market primarily stem from the strict adherence to patriarchal norms in general, and community norms in particular, either imposed on them directly by their spouses or indirectly by the community they reside in. Therefore, our analysis highlights the need for tailor-made policies that meet locality-specific needs.

The decision to work is an important yet understudied facet of women’s economic empowerment. This study explores the relationship between married women’s agency over the decision to work, workforce participation, and control over financial resources, using cross-sectional survey data collected in 2022 in India’s three most populous states: Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Maharashtra. Employing logistic regression, inverse probability weighting, and partial identification approaches, we demonstrate that married women in all three states are significantly more likely to engage in paid work when they alone have the final say over the decision to work, compared to when their spouse is the primary decision-maker. We also find that sole decision-making about paid work is positively related to married women’s control over money in Bihar and Maharashtra, and with savings and remittances in Maharashtra. In Maharashtra, women who jointly decide about employment with their spouse are also more likely to work than women whose husbands are the sole decision-makers. Joint decision-making is positively associated with women’s control over money in all three states. Our study highlights work-related agency as an important pathway to married women’s economic opportunities and inclusion in India, and is among the first to empirically examine the relationship between women’s work-related decision-making and economic outcomes. These results align with existing evidence on the positive relationship between women’s household bargaining power and health and human capital outcomes, and offer support for designing programmes to promote women’s participation in the workforce.

Our study contributes to the literature on choice shifts in group decision-making by analyzing how the level of risk-taking within a group is influenced by its gender composition. In particular, we investigate experimentally whether group composition affects how preferences ‘shift’ when comparing individual and group choices. Consistent with hypotheses derived from previous literature, we show that male-dominated groups shift toward riskier decisions in a way that is not explained by any simple preference aggregation mechanism. We discuss potential channels for the observed pattern of choice shifts.

Although evidence suggests men are more generous to women than to men, it may stem from paternalism and could reverse when women excel in important skills for one’s career success, such as cognitive skills. Using a dictator game, this paper studies whether male dictators allocate less to female receivers than to male receivers when these receivers have higher intelligence quotients (IQs) than dictators. By exogenously varying the receivers’ IQ relative to the dictators’, I do not find evidence consistent with this hypothesis; if anything, male dictators allocate slightly more to female receivers with higher IQs than to male receivers with equivalent IQs. The results hold both in mean and distribution and are robust to the so-called “beauty premium.” Also, female dictators’ allocations are qualitatively similar to male dictators. These findings suggest that women who excel in cognitive skills may not receive less favorable treatment than equally intelligent men in the labor market.

This study examines the heterogeneous effects of economic freedom on human capital accumulation across 83 developing countries between 2000 and 2018. Employing a range of econometric techniques including quantiles via moments regression, the analysis explores both average and distributional impacts of economic freedom on human capital, disaggregated by gender and employment status. The findings reveal that economic freedom positively influences human capital development, with stronger effects in countries with lower human capital levels. Among the five dimensions of economic freedom, freedom to trade internationally, legal systems, and property rights are most strongly associated with human capital accumulation. The results also indicate that women and employed individuals benefit more from economic freedom, highlighting its potential to reduce gender disparities and enhance labour productivity. These findings underscore the importance of institutional reforms promoting economic freedom as a pathway to human capital development in developing economies.

The social organisation of productive and reproductive labour leaves women disproportionately vulnerable to climatic changes and extreme weather events. In the Indian context, this could further reduce women’s labour force participation rates from levels that are already relatively low. Employment opportunities for women in the clean energy sector have been noted to create transformative changes in their lives only with policies such as government intervention to provide accessible public services. Towards this end, I propose a gendered and green job guarantee programme directed towards education, health, public transport (or universal basic services), climate mitigation, and climate adaptation activities.

The intersections between gendered livelihoods and the climate crisis, as well as the gendered and environmental implications of the existing rural employment guarantee in India, are reviewed. Gender-disaggregated employment creation through the proposed job guarantee programme and the budgetary implications are estimated, along with suggestions for potential sources of financing. The programme is estimated to result in the creation of 36 million guaranteed jobs, which accounts for 6% of the workforce as of 2023. Of these jobs, women’s employment opportunities constitute 11.6 million. The number of guaranteed jobs created for women accounts for 4% of the rural female workforce and 11.6% of the urban female workforce. Thus, a gendered and green job guarantee programme in India could be an effective form of government intervention to address the interlinked issues of women’s work and climate action in India.

Over the past half-century, there have been significant advances towards workplace gender equality. However, Australia’s working women continue to earn less than men. A key reason is that occupational segregation has maintained very high levels of feminisation in frontline care and other occupations, including in many ‘ancillary’ or supportive roles, which employ large numbers of women and where skills may not be readily recognised and valued. This article explores the way one set of highly segregated ancillary occupations, receptionists, are vulnerable to gender-based undervaluation and argues that this group warrants further attention in strategies to promote workplace gender equality. First, the article outlines the legislative changes, which have recast regulatory attention to low pay and undervaluation in highly feminised occupations and industries, then draws on Australian Bureau of Statistics data to show the presence of several ancillary occupations among Australia’s most feminised. The article then narrows to examine health care reception and reviews the small body of literature that explores the complex, invisible skills this work involves. The example of health care reception underlines the need for gender equality strategies that challenge constructions of women’s jobs as peripheral and subordinate to male-dominated roles, and which recognise and make visible the skills and contributions that women make in a fuller range of feminised occupations.

In a field experiment where revelation of co-worker earnings and the shape of the earnings distribution are exogenously controlled, I test whether relative earnings information itself influences effective labor supply and labor supply elasticity. Piece-rate workers shown their peer earnings standing provide significantly more labor effort. However, the productivity boost from earnings disclosure disappears when inequalities in the underlying piece rate exist. By cross-randomizing net of tax piece rates, labor supply elasticity with respect to the net of tax wage is also estimated. Unlike labor level, I find this labor elasticity is unchanged by the relative standing information. Taken together, these findings have direct implications for how to best model relative status concerns in utility functions, supporting some and precluding other common ways. More speculatively, they also suggest social comparisons could be strategically used to grow firm output or the tax base, and, that underlying inequalities in compensation schemes inhibit the ability of social comparisons to incentivize work.

I experimentally investigate whether there is a gender difference in advice giving in a gender-neutral task with varying difficulty in which the incentives of the sender and the receiver are perfectly aligned. I find that women are more reluctant to give advice compared to men for difficult questions. The gender difference in advice giving cannot be explained by gender differences in performance. Self-confidence explains some of the gender gap, but not all. The gender gap disappears if advice becomes enforceable. Introducing a model of guilt and responsibility, I discuss possible underlying mechanisms that are consistent with the findings.

In this study, we report experimental results on the dictator decision collected in two neighboring ethnic minority groups, the matrilineal Mosuo and the patriarchal Yi, in southwestern China. We follow the double-blind protocol as in Eckel and Grossman (in Handbook of experimental economics results, 1998), who find that women in the U.S. donate more than men. We find this pattern reversed in the Mosuo society and find no gender difference in the Yi society. This is highly suggestive that societal factors play an important role in shaping the gender differences in pro-social behavior such as dictator giving.

Female specialization on household work and male specialization on labor-market work is a widely observed phenomenon across time and countries. This absence of gender neutrality with respect to work-division is known as the “work-division puzzle”. Gender differences regarding characteristics (preferences, productivity) and context (wage rates, social norms) are generally recognized as competing explanations for this fact. We experimentally control for context and productivity to investigate preferences for work-division by true co-habiting couples, in a newly developed specialization task. Efficiency in this task comes at the cost of inequality, giving higher earnings to the “advantaged” player. We compare behavior when men (or women) are in the advantaged position, which corresponds to the traditional (or power) couple case where he (or she) earns more. Women and men contribute equally to the household public good in all conditions. This result allows us to rule out some of the standard explanations of the work-division puzzle.

We present evidence of a direct social context effect on decision-making under uncertainty: the gender composition of those in the room when making individual risky decisions significantly alters choices even when the actions or presence of others are not payoff relevant. In our environment, decision makers do not know the choices made by others, nor can they be inferred from the experiment. We find that women become more risk taking as the proportion of men in the room increases, but the behavior of men is unaffected by who is present. We discuss some potential mechanisms for this result and conjecture it is driven by women being aware of the social context and imitating the expected behavior of others. Our results imply that the environment in which individual decisions are made can change expressed preferences and that aggregate behavior may be context dependent.

We examine the role of cognitive ability and personality traits in a gift exchange experiment. Controlling for cognitive ability and personality characteristics, men offer higher wages than women, and men and women with greater cognitive ability and greater agreeableness on the Big Five personality scale offer higher wages as well. Men provide greater effort than women do, and respond to higher wage rates with greater increases in effort. For both genders, one standard deviation increases in agreeableness and in wages generate similar increases in effort. Serious biases arise from omitting cognitive ability and pooling men and women.

There is substantial evidence that women tend to support different policies and political candidates than men. Many studies also document gender differences in a variety of important preference dimensions, such as risk-taking, competition and pro-sociality. However, the degree to which differential voting by men and women is related to these gaps in more basic preferences requires an improved understanding. We conduct an experiment in which individuals in small laboratory “societies” repeatedly vote for redistribution policies and engage in production. We find that women vote for more egalitarian redistribution and that this difference persists with experience and in environments with varying degrees of risk. This gender voting gap is accounted for partly by both gender gaps in preferences and by expectations regarding economic circumstances. However, including both these controls in a regression analysis indicates that the latter is the primary driving force. We also observe policy differences between male- and female-controlled groups, though these are substantially smaller than the mean individual differences—a natural consequence of the aggregation of individual preferences into collective outcomes.

We study how culture and social structure influence bargaining behavior across gender, by exploring the negotiation culture in matrilineal and patriarchal societies using data from a laboratory experiment and a natural field experiment. One interesting result is that in both the actual marketplace and in the laboratory bargaining game, women in the matrilineal society earn more than men, at odds with years of evidence observed in the western world. We find that this result is critically driven by which side of the market the person is occupying: female (male) sellers in the matrilineal (patriarchal) society extract more of the bargaining surplus than male (female) sellers. In the buyer role, however, we observe no significant differences across societies.

We look at gender differences among adolescents in Sweden in preferences for competition, altruism and risk. For competitiveness, we explore two different tasks that differ in associated stereotypes. We find no gender difference in competitiveness when comparing performance under competition to that without competition. We further find that boys and girls are equally likely to self-select into competition in a verbal task, but that boys are significantly more likely to choose to compete in a mathematical task. This gender gap diminishes and becomes non-significant when we control for actual performance, beliefs about relative performance, and risk preferences, or for beliefs only. Girls are also more altruistic and less risk taking than boys.

Experiments have demonstrated that men are more willing to compete than women. We develop a new instrument to “price” willingness to compete. We find that men value a $2.00 winner-take-all payment significantly more (about $0.28 more) than women; and that women require a premium (about 40 %) to compete. Our new instrument is more sensitive than the traditional binary-choice instrument, and thus, enables us to identify relationships that are not identifiable using the traditional binary-choice instrument. We find that subjects who are the most willing to compete have high ability, higher GPA’s (men), and take more STEM courses (women).

This paper reports findings of a laboratory experiment, which explores how reported self-assessment regarding the own relative performance is perceived by others. In particular, I investigate whether overconfident or underconfident subjects are considered as more likeable, and who of the two is expected to win in a tournament, thereby controlling for performance. Underconfidence beats overconfidence in both respects. Underconfident subjects are rewarded significantly more often than overconfident subjects, and are significantly more often expected to win. Subjects being less convinced of their performance are taken as more congenial and are expected to be more ambitious to improve, whereas overconfident subjects are rather expected to rest on their high beliefs. While subjects do not anticipate the stronger performance signal of underconfidence, they anticipate its higher sympathy value. The comparison to a non-strategic setting shows that men strategically deflate their self-assessment to be rewarded by others. Women, in contrast, either do not deflate their self-assessment or do so even in non-strategic situations, a behavior that might be driven by non-monetary image concerns of women.

Competition involves two main dimensions, a rivalry for resources and the ranking of relative performance. If socially recognized, the latter yields a ranking in terms of social status. The rivalry for resources resulting from competitive incentives has been found to negatively affect women’s performance relative to that of men. However, little is known about gender differences in the performance consequences of social-status ranking. In our experiments we introduce a novel design that allows us to isolate the effects of status ranking from those caused by a rivalry for resources. Subjects do a time-limited task where they need to search for numbers and add them up. Performance is straightforwardly measured by the number of correct summations. When there is no status ranking we find no gender differences in the number of attempted summations or in performance. By contrast, when there is status ranking men significantly increase the number of attempted summations as well as the number of correct summations. Remarkably, when women are subjected to status ranking, they significantly decrease the number of attempted summations. The net result is striking. With status ranking men attempt more summations and correctly solve many more than women. These differences are markedly large and statistically highly significant. Our results suggest that increased participation in competitive environments could harm women’s labor market success along a hidden channel.