The introduction provides an overview of the book, presents the core arguments, highlights the contribution to current literature, explains the book’s methods and sources, and outlines the structure of the book. The overarching argument of the book is that intelligence cooperation was so beneficial for all parties that European authorities therefore let Mossad carry out its operation and tolerated the use of its intelligence to kill Palestinians. Hence, the book demonstrates that the extensive advantages that European agencies gained through Club de Berne intelligence-sharing led them to turn a blind eye towards, or even tacitly support, Israeli covert actions on their respective territories.

Chapter 9 summarizes our theoretical expectations and empirical findings about IO exits. It outlines the implications of IO exit for international cooperation, future research, and policymaking. It also provides additional insight into IO exits that have occurred as regional conflicts have engulfed the world in recent years, exemplified by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The chapter analyzes how IO exits might affect international cooperation as multilateralism is being contested on several fronts. It also discusses that patterns of democratic decline and polarized domestic politics may lead the future of IO exits to be different than the past. Even while this contestation is happening, however, we show that IO exits (as well as threats and reentry) extend beyond current affairs; they have been a relatively steady occurrence over time. We conclude by arguing that despite – and sometimes because of – occasional exits, international cooperation continues through IOs and a robust set of other international institutions. We outline several exciting areas for future research that may be inspired by the findings from this book.

Chapter 2 theorizes the causes and consequences of state exit from IOs. We explain that IOs start as being beneficial to member states but may become dissatisfying to some states as preferences diverge, power shifts, or IOs themselves evolve. Leaning on the “exit, voice, and loyalty” framework by Hirschman (1970), we argue that dissatisfied states can voice their discontent but when this does not generate desired results, states sometimes use the process of IO exit to invoke change. Threatening and enacting exit can accelerate a tipping point by presenting states with a potential future without the exiting state, which could reduce institutional benefits. The ability to use exit as a negotiation strategy shifts with a state’s bargaining power as well as institutional constraints. As part of the negotiating process, many exit threats are not implemented and many exiting states return to IOs. But exit is costly: Given that exiting states may be perceived as reneging on an international commitment, they can incur negative reputational and cooperative consequences from other actors in the international community. Exiting states may therefore engage in stigma management. And while institutional change is often the goal, exit is usually an imperfect tool for achieving it.

When reflecting on this book’s insights, a key question is highlighted: What is the prospect for effectively preventing and resolving armed intrastate conflicts globally? The threat of such conflict erupting remains a constant risk for policy-makers and researchers to investigate, and to prepare for constructive intervention. As discussed throughout this text, the challenges inherent to establishing effective peacekeeping policies and resolving intrastate conflict remain. Furthermore, this chapter addresses how areas of non-violent conflict, but high tension, threaten to escalate in the future. Is it possible to successfully intervene and to deescalate future intrastate violence? From the timing of intervention to international cooperation, the debates and critical lessons that we conclude with here will encourage thought-provoking discussions on formulating effective policies to prevent and end intrastate violence.

Not one of the numerous global risks we confront can be averted without better governance through global cooperation. All these risks – the ones we face now and the ones we may soon face next – transcend national borders, cross the globe, and therefore require global solutions. Moreover, many of these risks are interconnected; thus, they require interconnected solutions. Within the biological and chemical container of the Earth’s biosphere, human civilization is not a collection of individual structures of living that are entirely separate and distinct. It is a complex system of interconnected – and interdependent – networks of all kinds, many of which extend across our imagined political borders. Moreover, the ecologies of the world that human cities and states inhabit are all connected through natural systems. The atmosphere, hydrosphere, and cryosphere of the Earth, the biosphere that comprises the Earth’s ecosystems, are all connected. The many parts make a whole. To find planetary solutions, we must employ systems thinking to create institutions and other political arrangements to achieve effective Earth system governance, which must see and treat the world as a whole. To do this, we need human cooperation in problem-solving at every level of human endeavor. Foremost among our tools in this task must be democracy, and democracy must be devoted to sustainable development. Although democracy is in retreat throughout the world, we must fulfill our duty of optimism by establishing democracy everywhere and at every level, including democratic global governance.

The challenges for governance in ancient Athens are dwarfed by the challenges for governance in our own time. Humanity seems incapable of cooperation for collective action. We are failing in problem-solving. This failure is evidenced at every level of governance. It is especially obvious in global governance, where an escalating avalanche of ecological and other crises has already begun and hurtles toward us. The failure of democracies is particularly distressing in that it is the democracies that, in the eyes of those who support and believe in them, are supposed to do the most to meet the common needs of humanity. The human species has survived and thrived because we have cooperated. We must do so now if we are to meet the challenges before us and secure the fullness of human flourishing through sustainable development. We have, however, not yet found the common will that is indispensable to taking the collective action that is necessary to achieve our goals for humanity. Like the ancient Athenians in their triremes, we must learn to row together to serve the public good. We must, like them, form participatory knowledge networks for the public good. This requires vastly more public participation in self-rule at every level of human governance. New cooperative networks for sustainable development are examples of the kind and extent of popular participation we need to continue to survive and succeed as a species.

This chapter discusses the political and diplomatic control of the implementation of international decisions by quasi-judicial bodies. It covers the follow-up procedures of the Human Rights Committee, the African Commission, and the Inter-American Commission, highlighting the challenges and effectiveness of these mechanisms. The chapter examines the role of states, international organizations, and civil society in ensuring compliance with international human rights decisions, the strategies for overcoming obstacles to implementation, and the impact of political and diplomatic efforts on the protection of human rights. It also discusses the need for enhanced cooperation and coordination among various actors to improve the effectiveness of these follow-up procedures.

This chapter examines the universal system for the protection of human rights, focusing on the permanent organs of the United Nations (UN) and specialized human rights bodies. It explores the roles and functions of these organs, including the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, and the Secretary-General, as well as various human rights treaty bodies and special procedures. The chapter discusses the challenges and opportunities in the universal human rights system, highlighting the importance of international cooperation and the role of UN mechanisms in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide.

This paper considers the goals of regulators in different countries working on regulating online platforms and how those varied motivations influence the potential for international coordination and cooperation on platform governance. different policy debates and goals surrounding online platform responsibility. The analysis identifies different policy goals related to three different types of obligations that regulators may impose on online platforms: responsibilities to target particular categories of unwanted content, responsibilities for platforms that wield particularly significant influence, and responsibilities to be transparent about platform decision-making. Reviewing the proposals that have emerged in each of these categories across different countries, the paper examines which of these three policy goals present the greatest opportunities for international coordination and agreement and which of them actually require such coordination in order to be effectively implemented. Finally, it considers what lessons can be drawn from existing policy efforts for how to foster greater coordination around areas of common interest related to online platforms.

The world has muddled through with limited and ambiguous understandings of the scope of national jurisdiction in a number of private and public law areas. In order to reduce the barriers of legal difference in the field of platform responsibility, states may begin by reducing areas of overlapping application of law, by agreeing on rules of exclusive jurisdiction. They may also agree on rules of national treatment, most favored nation treatment, and proportionality, or they may agree to harmonize rules. These incursions on national regulatory autonomy will require detailed, sector-specific negotiations, recognizing both the importance of global communications, and the importance of national regulatory autonomy.

Chapter 13 focuses on Luxembourg, which sits near the top of several regional and international indexes for ICT development, digital economy and society, and technological readiness, and hosts an impressive and growing number of data centres along with the regional or global headquarters of major internet and e-commerce players. The country’s small size, highly connected nature and financial strength translate into the active cooperation of service providers in criminal investigations in both domestic and cross-border situations. Drawing on interview-based research, this chapter provides an international audience with a targeted overview of the Luxembourg legal framework, the ways in which it has adapted to developments at the international and EU levels (Budapest Convention, European Investigation Order, Law Enforcement Directive) and the practical as well as legal challenges relating to the various forms of cooperation between service providers and law enforcement authorities. It offers a comprehensive, up-to-date picture of national data retention rules and discusses the potential impact of the new European Production Order on service providers in Luxembourg.