Chapter 9 analyzes the global management of fishery resources, deep-seabed resources and marine genetic resources. The ongoing enclosure of fishery resources has been largely exclusionary. Regional fisheries organizations that have been established to manage such resources are not always welcoming of new entrants, which remain discontented with the increasing appropriation of the high seas by coastal states. Deep-seabed resources and marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction have been declared the common heritage of humankind and, thus, cannot be subject to appropriation by any state. The International Seabed Authority is about to issue the first exploitation regulations for the extraction of metals and minerals from the deep seabed. This exploitation is, however, in conflict with the protection and utilization of marine genetic resources and is very likely to drastically alter and pollute the fragile environment of the deep seabed. While environmentalists have called for a moratorium on deep-sea mining, small island states are keen on such mining. They expect that the metals and minerals extracted from the deep seabed, which are used for the green energy transition, will bring them windfalls.

When the conference delegates turned their attention to seabed mining, many proclaimed the great importance of the issue – from either a positive or negative perspective – declaring that it would underwrite a new international economic order, or present a fundamental threat to land-based mining industries, or exemplify the virtues of the free market. The problem was that no state knew how profitable seabed exploitation might be, or the technological challenges involved, or its potential effect on commodities markets. Because of this uncertainty, none of them wanted to put themselves at a potential disadvantage or forego future rewards, so the negotiations were particularly hard fought and protracted. One casualty would be the common heritage concept, replaced with the parallel system by the G5 powers, and with technology transfer by the G77 countries. Another casualty was the cooperation between the industrial powers, with some proposing anti-monopoly clauses and production quotas to protect their own mining concerns and constrain competitors. The outcome managed to displease every state, but most eventually signed the convention with the agreed seabed provisions in 1982.

In 1967, Malta’s UN ambassador Arvid Pardo put forward a proposal to internationalise the deep seabed to preserve it for exclusively peaceful purposes and to exploit it for the benefit of all, especially the most impoverished states. This attempt to inhibit the coastal states’ expanding claims did not win unqualified support, as became apparent during the ensuing UN seabed committee discussions. Some Latin American states feared the roll-back of their existing claims, and some land-based mineral producers feared competition from seabed operations. Meanwhile, the maritime powers, while seeing the commercial and naval advantages of an internationalised seabed regime, were nonetheless determined to sideline peaceful purposes and narrow the range of resources deemed to be of common heritage. This was reflected in the ambiguities and omissions in the General Assembly’s Declaration of Principles resolution, which declined to decide the line between the continental shelf and the international seabed, or define the central concepts of ‘common heritage’ and ‘peaceful purposes’.

As a preliminary issue, this chapter argues that the DSM regime embodies a dual-track regulatory system where national regulation by the sponsoring State plays a subordinate role complementary to international regulation of the ISA. Thereafter, it examines a network of international environmental obligations of the sponsoring State under the overarching principle of sustainable development, in accordance with both lex specialis of DSM and general international environmental law, drawing on the Seabed Disputes Chamber’s Advisory Opinion of 2011. That covers the sponsoring State’s obligation of prevention, obligation to apply the precautionary approach and obligation concerning environmental impact assessment (EIA). Then, it turns to the contractor, investigating its international environmental obligations to conduct EIAs and submit EISs, to prepare for and respond to environmental emergency, on environmental management and monitoring and to apply the highest environmental standards. The latter part refers frequently to the 2019 draft Exploitation Regulations and the still to be adopted Phase 1 Standards and Guidelines of the LTC.