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Building on the problems identified in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 presents a new theory and practice of environmental rights which it argues would better protect the rights of future generations. First, it outlines a theory of intergenerational responsibility for international human rights law, drawing on Edith Brown Weiss’s theory of intergenerational equity. The chapter takes the tripartite duties commonly used in international human rights laws (the duties to respect, protect and fulfil human rights) and gives them new meaning through the application of an intergenerational lens. The result is a typology of duties for states which can be used to articulate expectations and standards with respect to the rights of future generations. The chapter also outlines changes which are needed to the rules of standing and causation to enable the litigation of future generations’ environmental rights. The proposed changes are informed by existing principles of environmental law, including due diligence and the precautionary principle, which help to navigate questions regarding risk and uncertainty and enable a more meaningful application of human rights law to threats of future harm.
In concluding the book, Chapter 9 summarises the lessons that were learned through the three case studies and reiterates the reasons why international human rights law needs to be reformed to better protect the environmental rights of future generations. It highlights the perpetual challenge of balancing the interests of current and future generations, but argues these can be mitigated by articulating new standards and expectations for states which incorporate notions intergenerational responsibility and fairness. Reforms are needed to ensure at least a level playing field, where future generations’ rights can be recognised and given the same weight as those of present generations. Chapter 9 concludes by calling for a multifaceted reorganisation of many areas of law, politics, economics and social policy, and offers hope that reforms of international human rights law might play a leading role in that undertaking.
Chapter 2 presents a detailed rationale for expanding international human rights law to protect the environmental rights of future generations. It draws on various theories of intergenerational responsibility, including the work of Edith Brown Weiss and theories of intergenerational equity, planetary trusts and the capabilities approach. The chapter also considers various Indigenous worldviews, such as the Seventh Generation principle of First Nations peoples in North America and the beliefs of Australia’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, which embody a strong sense of intergenerational responsibility. The deep feeling of connection with ancestors and descendants that is held by many Indigenous peoples translates into notions of custodianship towards the land and obligation to people across time. These worldviews have much to offer as we think about the future direction of human rights law, and provide another justification for making the law more responsive to future environmental threats.
Chapter 8 makes a preliminary assessment of the likely effectiveness of the proposed UN special envoy for future generations by examining this proposal through the lens of three frameworks. These frameworks are, firstly, the rationale or normative basis for such a proposal measured against the principles of intergenerational justice, solidarity and vulnerability set out in Chapter 3 of the book. Next, the special envoy proposal is evaluated in terms of its legitimacy and effectiveness using the criteria elaborated in Chapter 5 (inclusive representation, democratic control in the form of accountability and transparency, deliberation, source-based/input legitimacy in terms of expertise, legal legitimacy, tradition and discourse, substantial/output legitimacy in terms of effectiveness and equity). The possible functions of a special envoy are examined and recommendations are made as to what mandate the special envoy should have, applying the matrix of proxy functions elaborated earlier in this book, which involves breaking proxy representation down into its functions (representative, compliance, reform and norm entrepreneurial). Finally, an overarching framework is proposed for measuring the potential effectiveness of the special envoy which incorporates both frameworks – proxy representation functions and democratic legitimacy.
Chapter 6 contains a case study in which we sketch how the normative framework set out in part A of the book, can be used as a basis for arguments that can be made in relation to the ongoing ICJ advisory opinion on climate change. It argues that the court should interpret international rules in a manner which furthers justice including intergenerational justice. This is essential for maintaining the court’s legitimacy, which must include its future legitimacy. The court should flesh out the principle of intergenerational equity by defining it in terms which require states to take climate action to ensure protection of the human rights of future generations necessary for them to lead a decent life. In addition, the normative framework is used to argue for: (i) an particular interpretation of the no harm rule to incorporate harm towards future generations and (ii) reform of the procedural rules of the ICJ so as to allow NGOs and scientists to make amicus curiae submissions (directly or implicitly) on behalf of future generations in proceedings before the court.
The impact of climate change on young people and future generations has become a key issue globally, and current international law-making processes insufficiently represent the interests of these groups. While ideally the interests of future generations would be mainstreamed, the authors argue that proxy-style mechanisms for representing future generations should urgently be pursued as a parallel strategy. This book analyses existing institutions in the UN which indirectly represent vulnerable groups and uses a novel combination of legal and philosophical methods based in the tradition of John Dewey's pragmatism and International Legal Realism. Chapters include case studies of climate change cases brought before international courts, tribunals and the UN envoy to demonstrate how representation of future generations can be implemented to bring about institutional reforms. Written in accessible language, it will make a useful reference for researchers, graduate students and policymakers in international environmental law, global environmental governance and environmental philosophy.
Chapter 14 on Intergenerational Equity sheds light on how this principle, which posits a responsibility to ensure that future generations inherit a habitable planet, has been invoked in climate cases to date. The authors examine how this principle has been interpreted and applied across different jurisdictions, highlighting the notable contributions of jurisprudence from the Global South in shaping the development and understanding of the principle. Through an examination of leading cases from around the world, they illuminate how courts in these jurisdictions have infused their decisions with a consideration for future generations, thereby advancing a more inclusive and long-term perspective on climate justice. The authors distil instances of emerging best practice where the principle of intergenerational equity has been invoked to guide legal reasoning and judicial decisions in climate cases. They underscore the potential of this principle to shape future climate litigation, particularly as the impacts of climate change increasingly span across generations.
Theories of liberal justice depend upon ideas of how much we can expect ordinary people to be motivated by the moral interests of others; there are limits to the motivational power of such notions as altruism and sympathy. This means, however, that the theories of justice we have may have difficulty in understanding how to rightly respond to the moral claims that might emerge in the face of widespread migration in response to climate change. This essay argues that liberal states may face a dilemma in response to this migration—one in which a state must do what cannot be justified toward either the migratory or the sedentary. This claim, further, might represent a new site of intergenerational injustice, in which future generations are given political problems to which our best theories of political justice can provide little assistance.
Catalyzed by the surge in climate litigation worldwide, this article examines the tension between the moral imperatives of intergenerational justice and the operational constraints of positivist legal frameworks. It hypothesizes that while positivist doctrine prima facie challenges judicial application of intergenerational justice principles, reconciliation is possible through contextually attuned adjudication and evolved conceptions of legal principles for the Anthropocene. The article explores three key litigation strategies: dynamic interpretation of existing rights, application of constitutional future generations clauses, and procedural mechanisms for representing future interests. Building on European climate judgments, it analyzes how these approaches strain positivist tenets and animate separation-of-powers objections. The article argues that addressing interpretive and foundational challenges posed by climate change requires both doctrinal innovation and theoretical reconstruction. It shows how contextual constitutionalism can help courts to acknowledge intergenerational duties while preserving legal determinacy, and explores how positivism might evolve to accommodate multigenerational climate governance. Situating leading cases within debates between positivism and non-positivist theories, the article offers a roadmap for developing a framework of legal validity suited to the era-defining challenge of climate change.
Fausto Corvino has recently argued in this journal that, given present people’s reasonable expectation of future people’s economic activity, present and future people stand in the relation required by both of the two main camps of justice as reciprocity: justice as self-interested reciprocity and justice as fair reciprocity. In reply, I argue that on neither view is the relation Corvino identifies the relation the view requires and that neither view endorses his principle of intergenerational distributive justice, Transgenerational Sufficiency, in a contract between generations. I show that these concerns generalize to any view of synchronic direct intergenerational reciprocity.
This article explores some ethical implications of nuclear energy from a theological perspective. The key point argued for is that the few texts in the literature that address nuclear energy from a theological perspective do not give adequate weight to the importance of the potential benefits of nuclear energy as part of climate change mitigation strategies. The same also applies to the possible role of nuclear energy in providing compensation for future generations in terms of energy resource durability. The texts thus fail to address matters of importance for intergenerational justice. I examine first an article by Jame Schaefer that discusses Aquinas’ conception of prudence in relation to nuclear energy. I then discuss the relevant sections of the papal encyclical, Laudato Si’ and the Japanese Bishops Conference’s document, Abolition of Nuclear Power. All these texts fail to articulate the potential benefits of nuclear energy pertaining to some perspectives on intergenerational justice, because they do not take sufficient note of advances in nuclear technology that would allay some of the concerns expressed within the texts with which I take issue.
In this article, I develop a neglected aspect of the value of hope in Kant’s philosophy. I do so by homing in on Section III of the 1793 essay “On the Common Saying.” In my interpretation, Kant argues that if one recognizes obligations to help future generations while also encountering people who violate these obligations, one is more likely to isolate oneself from society—what Kant calls the hatred of humanity or misanthropy. Thus, the article argues that hope is valuable for combating misanthropy, especially in the pursuit of intergenerational moral goals.
A new way of thinking about environmental problems has emerged since the 1980s. Environmental problems are increasingly seen as systematically entwined, with human action as their primary cause. We are in a new epoch in Earth’s history, the Anthropocene, and climate change is its most immediate and dramatic manifestation. The drivers of the Anthropocene can be seen through the lens of a simple equation: Environmental impact is the product of population, affluence, and technology. Nations and individuals vary greatly in their impacts, so questions of justice are unavoidable. Questions of justice extend across generations as well as among nations and individuals. Ultimately, we must ask what kind of world we want for ourselves and our children.
Egalitarian theories assess when and why distributive inequalities are objectionable. How should egalitarians assess inequalities between generations? One egalitarian theory is (telic) distributive egalitarianism: other things being equal, equal distributions of some good are intrinsically better than unequal distributions. I first argue that distributive egalitarianism produces counterintuitive judgements when applied across generations and that attempts to discount or exclude intergenerational inequalities do not work. This being so, intergenerational comparisons also undercut the intragenerational judgements that made distributive egalitarianism intuitive in the first place. I then argue that egalitarians should shed distributive egalitarianism: relational and instrumental arguments against inequality likely suffice to capture egalitarian concerns – including across generations – without encountering the problems produced by distributive egalitarianism.
Recent years have seen a sharp increase in the number of cases being brought before national courts addressing the constitutional rights of children and future generations (FG) in the context of environmental protection. These cases have required courts to devote increasing attention to a wide-ranging and complicated array of constitutional rights claims involving the short- and longer-term impacts of environmental harm on children and FG. This article argues that both litigation and judicial efforts in this area have been hampered by the lack of precision of definitions of ‘future generations’ under comparative constitutional and international human rights law, in particular vis-à-vis children. This lack of precision poses a major challenge to both the delineation and enforcement of rights claims in the context of such litigation. After outlining how these cases are being brought and how courts are addressing (or not) the complexities involved in defining children and FG respectively, the article highlights the lack of authoritative definitions of FG in comparative constitutional law – a lacuna that, the author argues, is exacerbated by the ongoing lack of a clear definition of FG in the international human rights law context. The article concludes by identifying key challenges faced by litigators and courts seeking to engage with the rights of children and FG that result from this definitional gap.
Much of today’s academic scholarship of international cultural heritage law circles around cultural heritage’s protection for the benefit of future generations. Despite this, the efforts to systematically examine the concept in more detail are scarcer. This paper seeks to fill this gap by taking a closer look at the ways in which the notion of future generations features in the body of international cultural heritage law. This contribution firstly illustrates how central the idea of protecting cultural heritage for the benefit of future generations is in international cultural heritage law. Despite this centrality, evidenced by an extensive analysis of international and regional hard and soft law, national law, case law, and policy options, its precisely contours the second argument of this paper, is that they remain elusive. Finally, skepticism is voiced over the concept’s potential ambivalent use with respect to the protection of cultural heritage.
DOHaD research on preconception, prenatal, and early-life periods of human development can provide a critical resource for legal thinkers interrogating the lines of responsibility for environmental harms (both physical and psychosocial) that affect a child’s growth and development. DOHaD scholars who engage with epigenetic research offer an evidentiary narrative that traces the causal origin of early-life health harms to events that have occurred during pregnancy and prior to conception. Scientific research is increasingly providing evidence that those who suffer disadvantage throughout their lifecourse (in conditions of systemic oppression such as from racism, sexism, or poverty) may be disproportionately subject to molecular changes, creating harmed subgroups that are then intergenerationally reproduced as socially disadvantaged communities. Drawing examples from Australia, the United States, and Canada, this chapter asks what legal obligations, if any, should or can be imposed on contemporary society to ensure not just the future ’health’ of existing children (as they grow into adults) but also the generations of people yet to be born. It is argued that traditional common law legal responses that place responsibility on the individual rather than the community do not ensure intergenerational justice.
Almost everyone believes that freedom from deprivation should have significant weight in specifying what justice between generations requires. Some theorists hold that it should always trump other distributive concerns. Other theorists hold that it should have some but not lexical priority. I argue instead that freedom from deprivation should have lexical priority in some cases, yet weighted priority in others. More specifically, I defend semi-strong sufficientarianism. This view posits a deprivation threshold at which people are free from deprivation, and an affluence threshold at which people can live an affluent life, even though their lives may be even further improved beyond that point. I argue that freedom from deprivation in one generation lexically outweighs providing affluence in another generation; in all other cases, freedom from deprivation does not have lexical priority.
Indigenous philosophies bring to life the idea that we are all part of an intergenerational journey. Each of us are born in the imaginations of generations past, with the responsibility to set the course for the journeys that follow. To embed this intergenerational thinking, Indigenous philosophies emphasize the importance of nourishing and regenerative relationships. This chapter explores some of these ideas and describes how they enhance relationships through regenerative practices, invest in relational repair, and enable the ongoing transformation of concepts and ideas toward new imaginaries. In so doing, the paper notes some of the ways that policies and processes can they function to realize intergenerational justice and ground an enduring sense of responsibility to its pursuit and realization.
The chapter proposes a concept of justice for future people that is mindful of Indigenous critiques of the Anthropocene and associated climate horror scenarios. I first review these critiques, which suggest that motivating pro-futural care by dreading an impending climate crisis tends to betray a privileged, often settler-colonial perspective. On this basis, I then review various Indigenous accounts of intergenerational relations, in which I find one common idea in the claim that present generations owe to descendants in part because they received a gift from ancestors. I seek to model and defend this view and its social ontology (I call it “asymmetrical reciprocity”). I then seek to show how asymmetrical reciprocity can help to decolonize the future by disallowing a linear view of time according to which a focus on the future permits the neglect of the past. Hence, climate ethics and intergenerational justice must face the history of colonialism.