Theories of liberal justice depend upon ideas of how much we can expect ordinary people to be motivated by the moral interests of others; there are limits to the motivational power of such notions as altruism and sympathy. This means, however, that the theories of justice we have may have difficulty in understanding how to rightly respond to the moral claims that might emerge in the face of widespread migration in response to climate change. This essay argues that liberal states may face a dilemma in response to this migration—one in which a state must do what cannot be justified toward either the migratory or the sedentary. This claim, further, might represent a new site of intergenerational injustice, in which future generations are given political problems to which our best theories of political justice can provide little assistance.

Catalyzed by the surge in climate litigation worldwide, this article examines the tension between the moral imperatives of intergenerational justice and the operational constraints of positivist legal frameworks. It hypothesizes that while positivist doctrine prima facie challenges judicial application of intergenerational justice principles, reconciliation is possible through contextually attuned adjudication and evolved conceptions of legal principles for the Anthropocene. The article explores three key litigation strategies: dynamic interpretation of existing rights, application of constitutional future generations clauses, and procedural mechanisms for representing future interests. Building on European climate judgments, it analyzes how these approaches strain positivist tenets and animate separation-of-powers objections. The article argues that addressing interpretive and foundational challenges posed by climate change requires both doctrinal innovation and theoretical reconstruction. It shows how contextual constitutionalism can help courts to acknowledge intergenerational duties while preserving legal determinacy, and explores how positivism might evolve to accommodate multigenerational climate governance. Situating leading cases within debates between positivism and non-positivist theories, the article offers a roadmap for developing a framework of legal validity suited to the era-defining challenge of climate change.

Fausto Corvino has recently argued in this journal that, given present people’s reasonable expectation of future people’s economic activity, present and future people stand in the relation required by both of the two main camps of justice as reciprocity: justice as self-interested reciprocity and justice as fair reciprocity. In reply, I argue that on neither view is the relation Corvino identifies the relation the view requires and that neither view endorses his principle of intergenerational distributive justice, Transgenerational Sufficiency, in a contract between generations. I show that these concerns generalize to any view of synchronic direct intergenerational reciprocity.

This article explores some ethical implications of nuclear energy from a theological perspective. The key point argued for is that the few texts in the literature that address nuclear energy from a theological perspective do not give adequate weight to the importance of the potential benefits of nuclear energy as part of climate change mitigation strategies. The same also applies to the possible role of nuclear energy in providing compensation for future generations in terms of energy resource durability. The texts thus fail to address matters of importance for intergenerational justice. I examine first an article by Jame Schaefer that discusses Aquinas’ conception of prudence in relation to nuclear energy. I then discuss the relevant sections of the papal encyclical, Laudato Si’ and the Japanese Bishops Conference’s document, Abolition of Nuclear Power. All these texts fail to articulate the potential benefits of nuclear energy pertaining to some perspectives on intergenerational justice, because they do not take sufficient note of advances in nuclear technology that would allay some of the concerns expressed within the texts with which I take issue.

In this article, I develop a neglected aspect of the value of hope in Kant’s philosophy. I do so by homing in on Section III of the 1793 essay “On the Common Saying.” In my interpretation, Kant argues that if one recognizes obligations to help future generations while also encountering people who violate these obligations, one is more likely to isolate oneself from society—what Kant calls the hatred of humanity or misanthropy. Thus, the article argues that hope is valuable for combating misanthropy, especially in the pursuit of intergenerational moral goals.

Egalitarian theories assess when and why distributive inequalities are objectionable. How should egalitarians assess inequalities between generations? One egalitarian theory is (telic) distributive egalitarianism: other things being equal, equal distributions of some good are intrinsically better than unequal distributions. I first argue that distributive egalitarianism produces counterintuitive judgements when applied across generations and that attempts to discount or exclude intergenerational inequalities do not work. This being so, intergenerational comparisons also undercut the intragenerational judgements that made distributive egalitarianism intuitive in the first place. I then argue that egalitarians should shed distributive egalitarianism: relational and instrumental arguments against inequality likely suffice to capture egalitarian concerns – including across generations – without encountering the problems produced by distributive egalitarianism.

Recent years have seen a sharp increase in the number of cases being brought before national courts addressing the constitutional rights of children and future generations (FG) in the context of environmental protection. These cases have required courts to devote increasing attention to a wide-ranging and complicated array of constitutional rights claims involving the short- and longer-term impacts of environmental harm on children and FG. This article argues that both litigation and judicial efforts in this area have been hampered by the lack of precision of definitions of ‘future generations’ under comparative constitutional and international human rights law, in particular vis-à-vis children. This lack of precision poses a major challenge to both the delineation and enforcement of rights claims in the context of such litigation. After outlining how these cases are being brought and how courts are addressing (or not) the complexities involved in defining children and FG respectively, the article highlights the lack of authoritative definitions of FG in comparative constitutional law – a lacuna that, the author argues, is exacerbated by the ongoing lack of a clear definition of FG in the international human rights law context. The article concludes by identifying key challenges faced by litigators and courts seeking to engage with the rights of children and FG that result from this definitional gap.

Much of today’s academic scholarship of international cultural heritage law circles around cultural heritage’s protection for the benefit of future generations. Despite this, the efforts to systematically examine the concept in more detail are scarcer. This paper seeks to fill this gap by taking a closer look at the ways in which the notion of future generations features in the body of international cultural heritage law. This contribution firstly illustrates how central the idea of protecting cultural heritage for the benefit of future generations is in international cultural heritage law. Despite this centrality, evidenced by an extensive analysis of international and regional hard and soft law, national law, case law, and policy options, its precisely contours the second argument of this paper, is that they remain elusive. Finally, skepticism is voiced over the concept’s potential ambivalent use with respect to the protection of cultural heritage.

Almost everyone believes that freedom from deprivation should have significant weight in specifying what justice between generations requires. Some theorists hold that it should always trump other distributive concerns. Other theorists hold that it should have some but not lexical priority. I argue instead that freedom from deprivation should have lexical priority in some cases, yet weighted priority in others. More specifically, I defend semi-strong sufficientarianism. This view posits a deprivation threshold at which people are free from deprivation, and an affluence threshold at which people can live an affluent life, even though their lives may be even further improved beyond that point. I argue that freedom from deprivation in one generation lexically outweighs providing affluence in another generation; in all other cases, freedom from deprivation does not have lexical priority.

This paper defends strong emissions sufficientarianism as an approach to assigning moral rights to generate greenhouse gas emissions. Strong emissions sufficientarianism holds that only subsistence emitting is morally permissible. This paper argues that, since it is uncertain how many subsistence emissions there will be, the present generation owes it to future generations to refrain from generating non-subsistence emissions, not to risk imposing on them a tragic choice between sacrificing themselves and contributing to very dangerous climate change. The paper also addresses the charge that emissions sufficientarianism, in general, is too permissive since it entails a right to contribute to very dangerous climate change. The overall message is that, given the moral urgency posed by climate change, there is little room for distributive principles besides emissions sufficientarianism. This casts doubt on the appropriateness of relying on carbon budgets in assigning rights to emit.