This chapter outlines how the Principle of Multispecies Legality offers solutions to the barriers to legal inclusion facing animals in both criminal and civil law contexts: by enabling animals to take legal action; by ensuring that, in civil suits, harms to animals are taken seriously and benefits are awarded to the animals themselves; and that defences of ‘necessity’ in animal welfare laws only apply when the otherwise harmful action is taken for the ultimate benefit of the animal him- or herself. The chapter then explores four institutional safeguards needed to ensure the PML is effective: that legislation is developed under the principle of anticipatory accommodation; that there is the establishment of independent offices of animal welfare; that there is the establishment of dedicated animal crime units and public prosecutors; and that there is equal access to legal services to ensure that all humans who seek to assist animals in taking legal action can do so, regardless of their financial circumstances. Finally, the chapter considers how we need to learn to recognise more expansive conceptions of (political) communication and learn how to be more receptive to them.

Chapter 3 is a critical genealogy which rests on a history of the global project’s trajectories in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to reevaluate contemporary conceptions of ‘Never Again’. It paints the picture of the material and ideational aspects of the transitional justice project in this country from the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 to the myriad of measures of institutional and legal reform implemented by the international community actors present in BiH in the early 2000s. The chapter opens with a brief description of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the war 1992–1995. It then illustrates the conflict resolution process and explains what kind of BiH was imagined in the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. Next, the chapter outlines a skeleton of transitional justice in this country to show that certain areas, such as criminal justice and institutional reform, have been significantly more developed than others, putting these developments into the context of the promises of neoliberal legalism. Finally, the chapter poses questions about the end of transitional justice in BiH.

Chapter 6 concludes the three-partite discussion about what hampers meaningful assurances of ‘Never Again’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and what transitional justice has to do with conflict recurrence anxieties. The chapter first identifies the widespread glorification of war criminals and denial of atrocity crimes as key sources of anxiety about potential renewed conflict in BiH. Next, the chapter analytically links these practices to the global project and discusses how past practices of legal and institutional reform such as vetting led to a legal structure that did not regulate convicted war criminals’ access to power. The chapter then explains these behaviours as responses to the perceived threats to different political communities’ ontological securities. The chapter shows how the resulting widespread practices of glorification and the culture of denialism are framed by the international community as a ‘civilisational issue’ which serves to prolong the relevance and presence of the external actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina and stigmatise actors in international society.

This chapter focuses on Brazil’s ’Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments’ (ACFIs), which has received significant attention in the context of foreign investment facilitation. It describes the genesis and evolution of Brazil’s ACFI practice since 2015, from modest bilateral initiatives to leadership in plurilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The chapter adopts a three-pillar framework of the ACFI model and details the corresponding governance structure and supporting institutions established domestically within Brazil to implement the commitments and principles laid out in its ACFIs. The study highlights Brazil’s institutional reforms designed to effectively implement its ACFI obligations, emphasizing the concept of ’investment facilitation’ as the key driving force behind Brazil’s investment regulations. The chapter concludes with possible lessons for domestic governance challenges that states participating in a future WTO plurilateral agreement may encounter.

In Chapter 3, I confront views offered by anti-cosmopolitan theorists. According to the first anti-cosmopolitan view, our obligations to guarantee the substance of the right to subsistence is owed primarily to our compatriots. These obligations outweigh our obligations to those beyond our borders. According to the second anti-cosmopolitan view, we don’t have any obligations beyond our own borders. On these views, our obligations to others are delimited by the particularities of our reciprocal relationship with our compatriots. In response, I draw from John Rawls to articulate an institutional conception of rights. On such a conception, our obligations toward others arise in particular contexts where we interact with and coerce one another vis-à-vis our participation in an institutional scheme. Because we are implicated in trans- and supranational economic, political, and social institutions, we interact institutionally with severely poor people. Employing such an argument serves as a defense against anti-cosmopolitan theorists.

Chapter 4 examines legal configurations of political power dynamics during the Legal Modernization Era (ca. 1992–2010) – a golden age for legal reformers in China. The chapter reviews the development of significant national-level economic laws and regulations that gradually replaced many of the fragmented and probationary rules used earlier. The analysis of legal and policy documents suggests that the use of law in this period was consciously directed in two main directions: the use of law to structure and support the creation of markets (i.e., the economic function) and the use of law to reconfigure governance capacities and boost more centralized market regularity within the Party-state system (i.e., the political function). These two functions of law also set the foundation for what is known today as China’s state capitalism and its dominance in the domestic and international markets.

Chapter 9 chronicles the postwar trajectory of extrajudicial killings within the Guatemalan police. It first examines state violence during the transition period and subsequent postwar police reforms, which included the creation of the new National Civilian Police (PNC) in 1997. The chapter then analyzes how the dominant wartime distributional coalition managed to survive peacebuilding reforms and uphold the undermining rules governing extrajudicial executions to eliminate “undesirables.” In an important contrast from the case of Guatemala’s customs administration, the PNC saw the direct reentry of these groups into the upper echelons of the security cabinet, highlighting a different pathway of institutional persistence.

Chapter 8 examines the survival of the undermining rules within Guatemala’s customs apparatus from the discovery of the Moreno Network in 1996 to the uncovering of La Línea in 2015. Specifically, it discusses the series of reforms implemented by the Arzú government in the aftermath of the Moreno Network revelations to curb customs fraud and contraband, including (1) the expulsions of high-ranking security officials implicated in the scheme, (2) the restructuring of Guatemala’s port system, and (3) the creation of a new fiscal apparatus in the form of the Superintendent of Tax Administration (SAT). The chapter then evaluates how the undermining rules in customs outlasted these sweeping reforms, illustrating how the wartime distributional coalition, while largely displaced from the state sphere, penetrated new semi- and extra-state spaces like political party channels and private port concessions.

This chapter outlines potential failures of privatization and presents a sequence of steps to successfully design, implement, and monitor privatization processes. Regarding cases where proposals for offering privatized services face strong opposition and become unfeasible, the chapter also examines how various reform initiatives can lead to better and more effective public organizations, which may also interact with and complement the services of private firms. The chapter concludes by observing that, over time, societies have learned to propose and build on diverse experiences, often exploring multiple paths of improvement where public and private organizations coexist and experiment with plural solutions.

The model of how republican government should work that was most often invoked in council debates or by commissions framing legislation was an abstract one, the “well-ordered republic”. A well-ordered republic was not seen as necessarily unchanging. Reforms could be presented as needed not just to correct abuses, but to restore and reinvigorate institutions, or as essential routine maintenance of the workings of government. In practice, what were presented as reforms of institutions were often changes introduced to consolidate or strengthen particular regimes. Reform of laws was less liable to be a political partisan measure, but the administration of justice was always open to political influence. The fair and effective administration of justice was a cornerstone of any concept of a well-ordered republic, but for those involved in partisan regimes, whether good justice was impartial justice was open to question, and their idea of a well-ordered republic was one ordered to suit them.

In Chapter 9, the concluding chapter, I discuss the prospects of RMB internationalization. There are plenty of reasons to be pessimistic. First, the population is ageing, and the labor force has already begun to shrink in 2012. This hurts the economic size effect. Second, China is too wary of the risks of free capital mobility to relinquish capital controls in the onshore market any time soon. Third, the development of a deep, broad, and liquid financial market in the onshore market will probably take a long time. Fourth, in order to be a “safe-haven currency,” China must have an independent judiciary, an independent central bank, democracy, and freedom, which China still lacks. There are, however, reasons for cautious optimism as well. First, despite possible slowdown in the growth rate, China’s economy is likely going to become the largest economy before long. Second, China has a strong desire to internationalize its currency. Third, as the US share of the world’s GDP is set to fall continuously, the United States would eventually not be able to supply the assets for reserves and payments needed by the world. Some other currency(ies) is needed to fill the gap, and the RMB is a strong candidate.