The chapter examines the application of intersectionality theory to feminist judgment writing at the International Criminal Court (ICC), questioning whose feminism is centered and which intersections matter. Drawing on Black feminist scholarship, Dawuni evaluates both the merits and limitations of intersectionality as a framework for judicial decision-making in international criminal law. The chapter argues that while intersectionality can illuminate how multiple identities shape experiences of victimisation and access to justice, careful attention must be paid to avoid reproducing marginalisation through oversimplified applications. It critiques the continued impact of coloniality on the ICC’s operations and questions the homogenisation of African experiences in international law. The analysis concludes with recommendations for judges, registry staff, and researchers, emphasising the need for continuous education on intersectionality, greater institutional diversity, and constant self-reflection about positionality and privilege. Dawuni argues that true intersectional justice requires transforming both the composition and operational culture of international criminal institutions.

The chapter interrogates the value of applying the feminist judgment methodology (FJM) to the International Criminal Court (ICC), addressing skepticism about whether such projects are merely wishful thinking. Through the metaphor of fairy tales, McLoughlin examines tensions between feminist legal theory and judicial practice, arguing that feminist judgments are not simply acts of imagination but demonstrate real possibilities within existing legal frameworks. McLoughlin makes two key arguments for extending the FJM to the ICC. First, the ICC’s poor record on gender justice, including limited convictions for sexual and gender-based crimes, makes it an important site for feminist intervention. Second, the Rome Statute’s unrealised promise of gender justice - including provisions for gender expertise and representation - provides a firm foundation for feminist judicial approaches. The chapter concludes that feminist judgment writing serves to legitimise gender-sensitive approaches to international criminal law while acknowledging law’s limitations and demonstrates how the ICC’s commitment to gender justice could be meaningfully realised through feminist judicial practice.

The chapter reproduces Gopalan’s speech delivered at the International Criminal Court’s 20th anniversary conference at The Hague in 2022, examining intersectional approaches to investigating and prosecuting sexual and gender-based crimes in international criminal law. Gopalan explains intersectionality as an analytical framework that reveals how multiple identities and systems of oppression shape international crimes. Through case studies including Korean "comfort women," Srebrenica’s Muslim women, and Tamil male survivors in Sri Lanka, she demonstrates how factors like gender, colonialism, class, ethnicity, and religion intersect to create distinct patterns of harm and victimisation. Gopalan argues that while gender analysis has advanced understanding of sexual violence, examining gender alone is insufficient. Her analysis reveals how intersectional approaches can uncover overlooked structural inequalities and make visible what might otherwise remain unseen, enabling more comprehensive and survivor-responsive justice processes. The speech argues for expanding investigative and prosecutorial frameworks beyond single-axis analysis to better serve the complex realities of survivors.

The chapter presents a dialogue between Mudukuti and Chappell, examining critical challenges facing the International Criminal Court (ICC) through the lens of Mudukuti’s experience as practitioner, advocate, and trainer. Drawing on her work at the ICC, domestic courts, and civil society organizations, Mudukuti highlights the urgent need for greater intersectionality in international criminal justice. The conversation focuses on institutional reform at the ICC, addressing the Court’s problematic staff composition where over half of professional positions are held by individuals from Western European and Other Groups. Mudukuti argues a lack of geographic, racial, and gender diversity in leadership affects how cases are approached, evidence is interpreted, and justice is delivered. The dialogue examines the role of civil society in advancing reform and the importance of amicus curiae briefs in bringing diverse perspectives to ICC cases, particularly regarding sexual violence. Mudukuti emphasizes that intersectionality requires transforming both institutional composition and judicial understanding through continuous learning and openness to different disciplinary perspectives.

The chapter synthesises key findings from the collection of feminist reimaginings of International Criminal Court (ICC) judgments. The editors Louise Chappell, Suzanne Varrall, Kcasey McLoughlin and Rosemary Grey first examine methodological lessons from feminist judgment writing, highlighting three key themes: the critical role of contextualisation in understanding gendered dimensions of atrocity crimes; the necessity of intersectional analysis in capturing how multiple forms of discrimination intersect; and the significance of temporality in judicial decision-making.

The chapter analyses opportunities and barriers for advancing gender justice at the ICC, examining both internal factors (like judicial diversity and training) and external pressures (including geopolitics and evolving conflict dynamics). While some contributors to the book argue the ICC’s structural limitations make it incapable of delivering gender justice, others contend meaningful progress is possible through better implementation of existing provisions rather than statutory reform. The chapter concludes that despite significant challenges, the ICC remains an important, if imperfect, vehicle for advancing gender justice in international criminal law.

The chapter presents a dialogue between Sellers and Grey, exploring how "absent jurisprudence" from past international tribunals shapes contemporary international criminal law. Through a discussion of cases from Tokyo and Nuremberg to the ICC, Sellers demonstrates how opportunities for gendered analysis of crimes like enslavement were missed, creating enduring gaps in legal understanding. The conversation focuses on the overlooked cases of "comfort women" at the Tokyo Tribunal, women’s detention at the Ravensbrück camp during World War II, and the evolution of enslavement jurisprudence from the ICTY’s Kunarac case to recent ICC proceedings. Sellers argues that had early tribunals conducted deeper intersectional analyses of gender, race, and class in enslavement cases, contemporary courts would be better equipped to address similar crimes. The chapter suggests the Rome Statute’s bifurcation of "sexual slavery" from "enslavement" obscures how enslavement inherently involves control over victims’ sexuality and reproduction. The conversation reveals how jurisprudential gaps continue to constrain judges’ ability to fully recognize and address gendered dimensions of international crimes.

The chapter introduces the first collection of feminist judgments analysing decisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The editors outline how the book draws on the established feminist judgment methodology and extends it to international criminal law to present a range of re-written decisions from nine ICC situations. The chapter outlines the book’s three-part structure: conceptual foundations, re-written judgments with accompanying reflections, and concluding analysis. It details the editorial decisions regarding situation selection, contributor diversity, and methodological adaptations for the international context. It also describes how the book goes beyond traditional legal analysis by incorporating poetry and photography to transcend the limitations of judicial discourse. The chapter concludes that the feminist judgment method reveals significant opportunities for enhancing gender justice at the ICC, while acknowledging the Court’s political constraints. It argues that judges could deliver more gender-sensitive decisions within the existing Rome Statute framework, thereby contributing to both international criminal law scholarship and feminist legal methodology.

This chapter explores the interaction between international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL), as well as international criminal law. It examines how IHRL influences the application and development of IHL and how human rights principles are integrated into international criminal procedures and substantive law. The chapter discusses the mutual reinforcement and potential conflicts between these branches of international law, highlighting the need for a coherent and integrated approach. It also explores the role of international courts and tribunals in applying and interpreting IHRL, IHL, and international criminal law, and the challenges in ensuring compliance and accountability.

The Deal New regulated banks, transportation, and energy among other industries, in the 1930s. In the 1970s, there was a mostly bipartisan effort to reduce regulation in those industries. Although Ronald Reagan is known as the deregulation president, it was Jimmy Carter that started deregulation in each of those industries. Alfred Kahn, whom Carter appointed to lead the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), together with recently retired Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, advised Senator Ted Kennedy on how to deregulate airlines. The deregulation of truck, railroad, bus, and transportation, along with natural gas deregulation, followed. Deregulation was based on policy evidence that changes in those industries made it possible to lessen regulation and depend on markets to achieve greater efficiencies. By comparison, Congress decision to reduce regulation of savings and loan banks, based on industry lobbying, ended in disaster as S&Ls failed because of risky behavior and Congress had to bail them out. On balance, the regulation that occurred rebalanced the mix of government and markets in order to achieve a more robust economy.

The Conclusions reflect on the law outlined in Chapters 1−10. They recall that IHL is essentially an attempt to balance two fundamentally contradictory drivers – the need to wage war effectively, and the need to protect people and property from the excessive effects of warfare. It concludes that IHL largely succeeds in this endeavour, and that without IHL life for those caught up in armed conflict would be immeasurably worse. It notes, however, that while the fundamental principles of IHL are enduring, States can and should do more to develop new or more comprehensive laws where there is a need, such as the under-developed law of non-international armed conflict and the lack of regulation of certain weapons.

This chapter introduces a conception of rule that takes resistance rather than obedience as the constitutive element of rule. Based on an eclectic reading of different theories of rule, we argue that there is no rule without resistance. Even though rule might aim at suppressing resistance or might take such a subtle shape that it hardly encounters resistance, conceptually, rule is bound to resistance. Without a minimum of opposition, a recourse to rule would not be necessary. Even legitimate rule, which Weber calls authority, is legitimate only to a certain degree. As a consequence, not only obedience and the will to comply, but also dissent and the will to resist are part of rule. This chapter therefore sheds light on the relational dimension of rule, by analyzing the dynamic relationship between (forms of) rule and (forms of) resistance at the global level. To this end, we distinguish between two forms of resistance – opposition and dissidence – in order to show how resistance and rule implicate and influence each other. To demonstrate this relationship, we discuss four illustrative case studies on state and non-state forms of resistance and how they indicate and influence different forms of rule.

The chapter examines the nature and the main characteristics of arbitral institutions and describes the main features of institutional arbitration. It then illustrates several categories of institutions, distinguishing them on the basis of various criteria. The chapter further describes the functions performed by arbitral institutions with respect to the specific cases submitted to them, their contribution to the making of arbitration law and their role in promoting the knowledge and culture of arbitration. The chapter further examines the notion of "mandatory institutional rules", i.e. rules that institutions do not accept derogations from, and illustrates the conditions for institutions' liability vis à vis the parties and the scope of their immunity in relation to acts and omissions in the performance of their functions under the rules The author concludes that, despite the importance of the functions carried out by institutions, their role does not entail any involvement in adjudicating disputes. The impact of institutions’ decisions on the outcome of cases is indirect, limited to procedural issues or limited to recommendations to arbitrators.

Drawing on the examples of the ICC and ICSID, this chapter shows how international arbitration has successively embraced a ‘relation-based’ and then a ‘rule-based’ model of governance. Initially, the systems of dispute resolution promoted by the ICC and ICSID displayed the features of the relation-based model. The ICC and ICSID sought to promote self-governance by pooling information concerning traders. A related goal was to encourage repeat business by creating an equitable method of dispute settlement that relied, to a large extent, on the participation of its users. The second step came, however, when self-governance failed to sustain cooperation, leading both the ICC and ICSID to promote a rule-based model of governance where third party-arbitrators and arbitral institutions gained increasing powers over the disputing parties. As a final step, arbitral tribunals evolved towards a fully judicialised system of dispute resolution, causing them to increasingly resemble national courts.

Eventually, the first cases before the ICC and the ECCC reached the adjudication stage. Based on a review of the court’s voluminous legal records and in-depth interviews with those involved, this chapter identifies the ICC’s main adjudicative practices regarding reparations. The goal is to understand how reparations were conceived through these practices, and how these practices shaped the reparations outcomes decided by the judges. Chapter 6 examines the first two reparations cases before the ICC, namely the cases concerning Thomas Lubanga and Germain Katanga. In 2012, the ICC delivered its first reparations decision in Lubanga. This decision was amended by the ICC Appeals Chamber in 2015. The account ends with a second reparations decision by the Appeal Chamber in 2019. The second ICC case to reach the reparations phase was Katanga, where a reparations order at first instance was rendered in 2017 and an appeals judgment in 2018.