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Chapter 1 introduces the instrument doctrine in Aquinas’s thought and explores its foundations in Scripture, focusing on Aquinas’s biblical commentaries. In his commentaries on Romans and 1 Corinthians, among others, Aquinas argues that the logic of scriptural teaching suggests that Christs’ humanity causes divine effects as instrument of the divinity, including our resurrection. The chapter shows how Aquinas interpreted the Scriptures as coherent with the Catholic tradition, especially the conciliar teaching on Christ in the early ecumenical councils. Aquinas thinks that the doctrine should be understood within the conceptual matrix of these early councils’ teaching on Christ.
The introduction states the biblical premise of the book’s argument. In Scripture, God saves human beings through the actions and sufferings of Christ in the flesh. St. Thomas Aquinas developed a theological account of the Incarnation that attempts to account for the way Scripture speaks, namely, that Christ’s humanity is the instrumental cause of salvation, or as the book calls it, "the instrument doctrine." The introduction then gives an overview of the book’s argument: this doctrine best accounts for how Jesus Christ saves Christians in virtue of his humanity. It outlines the argument of the seven following chapters.
This chapter is the heart of the book’s analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on Christ’s humanity as the instrument of the divinity. It explores the various details of Aquinas’s account, outlining it in five synthetic propositions. These propositions, taken together, form the instrument doctrine as St. Thomas conceives of it. Various ambiguities in Aquinas’s account are presented for consideration, and the chapter makes some judgments about how best to understand Aquinas in his mature works. The chapter concludes with a section on the relationship of language to reality in Christology and why reduplicative propositions, used in a standard mode of theological analysis in the thirteenth century, can clarify how to understand the instrument doctrine.
Chapter 3 is a close reading of several documents and transcripts of the Case of Duch of the Cambodia Tribunal. Interestingly, notions of humanity and inhumanity were used by several parties: prosecutors, attorneys for civil parties but also the defendant’s lawyer and Duch himself declared that the latter was dehumanised. In a second move, these findings will be put in a philosophical context by bringing them in conversation with the work of Hannah Arendt, thus showing the structure of dehumanisation and rehumanisation.
The introduction serves a threefold purpose. First, it aims to sensitise the reader to the all-pervasiveness of humanity in international criminal justice, more in particular in the discourse on the atrocity crimes. This part of the introduction argues that the concept of humanity provokes more questions than it is meant to solve. Second, it outlines the book’s methodology to the reader. Third, the introduction sketches the main argument of the book through an overview of the chapters.
World heritage has become UNESCO’s flagship programme, and it is a site of active state engagement. At the crux of that engagement is the prestigious World Heritage List. This engagement is regularly analysed as pursuits of national prestige. In this article, I advance a Bourdieusian analysis of world heritage as a field that generates international cultural prestige. I identify humanity as the field’s doxa that allows for a vertical separation and the generation of more-than-national cultural value. I show how states’ desire for this prestige jeopardised the field’s autonomy at a critical juncture in 2010 and analyse the field’s aftermath as involving fraught attempts by states to discursively reconstruct the field’s vertical and functional separations in the quest for international cultural prestige. This reconstruction involves nothing less than reinterpreting humanity as the community-of-states, pointing at once to humanity’s indispensability for more-than-national value and undermining its ability to generate that value.
In Law and Inhumanity, Luigi Corrias explores fundamental philosophical issues underlying the law and politics of atrocity crimes within international criminal justice. Focusing on understanding the experiences of victims and perpetrators, Corrias draws on numerous disciplines to construct his conceptual framework while also using several case studies to examine important issues including references to 'humanity' in the discourse on atrocity crimes; the need for a first-person plural perspective of a 'We' within international criminal justice; the experiences of dehumanization of both victims and perpetrators; the temporalities of suffering and justice; and the tension between individual criminal responsibility and structural violence.
In conclusion, Mike acknowledges the enormity of the challenges ahead and the potential struggles the future holds. He also shares what gives him hope and that effective action on climate and other key issues could be just around the corner. The chapter finishes with a checklist of what the reader can do on an individual level, in many areas of their lives, to be part of the change that is so urgently needed.
Readers should be aware that content about Kant’s racism may be difficult and distressing to read. In various texts, Kant makes statements alleging that Indigenous Americans have ‘no culture’ and Black people possess only the ‘culture of slaves’. These are straightforwardly repugnant commitments. In order to address the role of Kant’s account of ‘culture’ in his racism and provide additional support to Charles Mills’ ‘Untermensch (subhuman) interpretation’ of Kant’s views on race, this article situates Kant’s comments on ‘racialized cultures’ within his teleological account of human history. In his system, ‘culture’ refers to the possession of developed capacities to achieve the ends that one sets for oneself. He sees achievement of culture as part of the development of human beings into members of a socialized, moral kingdom. Given his understanding of culture, I argue that Kant’s remarks on the cultural limitations of persons of color commit him to the further claims that Indigenous Americans and Black people are incapable of setting their own ends and that these deficiencies are hereditary and permanent. For Kant, this has the consequence that these individuals do not possess genuine moral worth in his system, thus supporting Mills’ Untermensch interpretation of Kant’s views on race.
This chapter develops a critique of the “safe third country” concept, its legality, and its implications for understanding the nature and purpose of international refugee law. It does so, in part, on a different plane of analysis than has predominated the literature thus far. While most scholars have criticized the safe third country concept as undermining individual rights protection, this author argues that it is implicated in a preceding and more foundational harm: It deforms the possibility of democratic responsibility. We would do well to see the violations of refugee rights in question as more than privatized harms inflicted on an individual. They are relational and structural wrongs that concern the objective relationships guaranteed by domestic constitutional and administrative law. Perceiving this harm illuminates not only how the safe third country concept has corrupted international refugee law, but also why international human rights should be understood, more broadly, to protect the political agency of democratic citizens. This conclusion yields an important analytic shift, in which we see commitments to international human rights and humanitarian ideals to align, constructively and in new form, with the public integrity of democratic states.
This chapter critically evaluates, from the standpoint of the capability approach and the human development paradigm, the reliance on market-driven forces and mechanisms in the vaccine development and distribution pillar of ACT-A (COVAX), and the significance of complementary (or supplementary) developments such as the establishment of mRNA technology transfer hubs and the waiver of certain provisions of the international intellectual property (IP) regime. In hope of regaining some ground lost in global health equity, this chapter highlights the need to appropriately situate IP rights, not by maintaining the status quo but to advance deeper relationality in terms of the technological capability of health systems, particularly those of the "Global South."
Kant defined 'Right' (Recht) as the condition that obtains among a population of physically embodied persons capable of setting their own ends who live on a finite surface and therefore cannot avoid interaction with each other if each is as free to set their own ends as is consistent with the freedom of all to do the same. He regarded this rational idea, heir to the traditional idea of 'natural Right, as the test of the legitimacy of the laws of any actual state, or 'positive Right.' He clearly considered Right to be part of morality as a whole, namely the coercively enforceable part, as contrasted to Ethics, which is the non-coercively enforceable part of morality. Some have questioned whether Right is part of morality, but this Element shows how Kant's "Universal Principle of Right" follows straightforwardly from the foundational idea of Kant's moral philosophy as a whole.
As an African American deeply impacted by the personal and communal trauma from the police murder of George Floyd in May 2020 and alleged “racial reckoning” that took place globally immediately thereafter, I have personally wrestled with the responses of many non-Black persons to these events. Though the responses came from well-intentioned friends and colleagues trying to be helpful and conciliatory, they resonated as an empty refrain: “I don’t know what it means to be Black, but….” Each time I heard this refrain, I found myself pondering more deeply what and how these folks, and all folks, understand and practice empathy. My experiences and research revealed a similar concern that I witness across many situations in which people think they are being helpful when in fact they are not doing what real empathy requires – being with the person rather than trying to imagine what the person is going through. This article challenges the faulty ways that people have been taught to think about and practice empathy in hopes of offering a model that might facilitate in more meaningful ways ties that bind human hearts and minds.
The Dark Forest Theory of the universe applies a pessimistic view of humanity to alien civilizations. While many look to space with hope and optimism, the Dark Forest Theory suggests that humanity should be fearful and cautious when expanding beyond Earth and that interaction with aliens could spell humanity's doom. This article will briefly examine the theory and present some arguments against the pessimistic view offered by the Dark Forest Theory.
The Conclusions reflect on the law outlined in Chapters 1−10. They recall that IHL is essentially an attempt to balance two fundamentally contradictory drivers – the need to wage war effectively, and the need to protect people and property from the excessive effects of warfare. It concludes that IHL largely succeeds in this endeavour, and that without IHL life for those caught up in armed conflict would be immeasurably worse. It notes, however, that while the fundamental principles of IHL are enduring, States can and should do more to develop new or more comprehensive laws where there is a need, such as the under-developed law of non-international armed conflict and the lack of regulation of certain weapons.
Chapter 2 outlines the contemporary legal framework of IHL, examining the treaty and customary laws that govern conduct in armed conflict, and exploring the fundamental principles of the law. The distinction between the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum is explained, as well as some of the different terms used in IHL (Hague Law, Geneva Law, war vs armed conflict, etc). The main sources of IHL are explained – treaties and customary international humanitarian law. The chapter then explains the main principles governing IHL – distinction, discrimination, military necessity, proportionality, prohibition on unnecessary suffering, neutrality and humanity.
2024 will mark seventy-five years since the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Despite the drafters’ efforts to mitigate the worst horrors of armed conflict, contemporary conflicts continue to witness the death and suffering of millions. This raises fundamental concerns over the ability of international law to alleviate the harm caused to those caught up in armed conflict, to redress violations and to prevent their recurrence. In international policy, international humanitarian law (IHL) is increasingly intertwined with transitional justice and in particular its emphasis on the centrality of human rights. This article focuses on the intersection between IHL and transitional justice in protracted conflicts, interrogating their increasing overlaps, complementary intersections and even tensions. In particular, the article examines the importance of the temporal dimensions of humanity and justice in prevention of violations. In doing so, the article concentrates on the impact of time on those harmed by armed conflict and the repercussions this has on the law and justice efforts. The article argues that time can be weaponized to frustrate accountability and prevent interference with belligerents’ behaviour. Victims in war cannot wait until the end of fighting to seek the recovery of the remains of their loved ones, for those responsible to be brought to justice, and for redress of their continuing suffering. Indeed, such delays amount to violations of victims’ right to an effective remedy and fail to stop the continuation of violations or the re-victimization of civilians and their communities. The article suggests the need for “provisional justice”, whereby, in the increasing number of situations of protracted conflict, efforts to redress conflict-related violations should be, at least in part, dealt with at the time, rather than waiting until the end of hostilities, so as to mitigate harm to victims and to correct belligerents’ behaviour in order to prevent recurrence.
In this iteration of the Review's “Beyond the Literature” series, we have invited Joël Glasman to introduce his recent book Humanitarianism and the Quantification of Human Needs, before then posing a series of questions to Bertrand Taithe, Léa Macias, Dennis Dijkzeul, Andrea Behrends and William Anderson. Bertrand Taithe is Professor of Cultural History at the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom. Léa Macias is an anthropologist focusing on digital humanitarianism in the Middle East, currently working as an Evaluation Officer for the French Development Agency. Dennis Dijkzeul is Professor of Organization and Conflict Studies at Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. Andrea Behrends is Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology at Leipzig University, Germany. William Anderson is the Executive Director for Sphere based in Geneva.
The Review team is grateful to all five discussants, and to Joël, for taking part in this engaging conversation.
The concept of humanity has been much discussed with respect to humanitarian work and international humanitarian law. There is today an idea of a single humanity, with each member equally valued beyond superficial differences in belief, nationality, ethnicity etc., and a global legal framework exists to prevent needless human suffering, including in war.
Dehumanization arises linguistically as the negation of a common, positive and mutually supportive humanity, though there is no single definition, and it certainly predates its opposite. Research indicates that dehumanization increases the risk of conflict/violence, increases the risk of abuses therein, and makes it harder to resolve conflict.
This paper gives an overview of how humanity is currently defined and used, notably by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as one Fundamental Principle of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and what dehumanization means especially in relation to conflict and violence. The paper then explores why and how dehumanization happens and the real-world harm that can result when it is espoused or tacitly condoned by those in positions of power. Finally, the paper examines how global legal frameworks and the principle of humanity, bolstered by impartiality, independence and neutrality, in particular as enacted by the ICRC, work to curb and push back against some of the worst harms that dehumanization can cause.