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This chapter examines the intended and unintended consequences of American hierarchy on partner states. It analyzes the impact of increased state capacity resulting from American economic hierarchy on civil conflict, human rights, democratization, and inequality. The results suggest that economic hierarchy reduces conflict, human rights abuses, and promotes democracy primarily through direct effects rather than via increased state capacity. However, both economic and security hierarchy exacerbate political inequalities. The chapter highlights the complex implications of American hierarchy.
The year 2021 saw record violent dispossessions of Indigenous Peoples across Paraguay. Once heralded as an early adopter of Indigenous land rights and legal protections, Paraguay is now a site of contentious land politics that have garnered international attention and litigation. In this chapter, we draw from over forty years of collective experience working on and researching Indigenous land rights in Paraguay – from litigation before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to ongoing advocacy with communities – and we trace the major legal achievements and document the ways that land rights have been challenged and threatened. We advance a theory of “pendulum policies” for land rights to trace the shifts in state-Indigenous relations, manifesting today as an implementation gap where de jure land rights are typically undermined in practice by state and private interests. In this chapter, we show how the role of international law and strategic litigations have pushed the pendulum from violations towards justice, yet we remain cognizant of the threats, from land renting to direct violence, which push the pendulum back towards violations. This chapter provides readers with a clear overview of Indigenous land rights in Paraguay, and offers recommendations for pushing the pendulum towards land justice over the next decade.
Following NATO’s military intervention and a very wide-ranging UN peacekeeping mission, Kosovo is today the site of the largest civilian mission of the European Union. In the aftermath of the armed conflict of 1998–9 which was fought along ethnic lines and led to mass atrocities and to the destruction of more than half of the available housing stock, the UN set up a quasi-judicial, administrative mechanism to “resolve” property issues, which was called the Kosovo Property Agency (KPA). Staffed predominantly by Kosovo Albanian national legal professionals and a few international jurists, the KPA was entrusted to deal with war-related property claims submitted overwhelmingly by Kosovo Serbs. Relatively powerless and underfunded, the KPA is a paradigmatic example of a contemporary transitional justice mechanism that is understood as a short-term, bridging, technical-legal project rather than a national process of righting past wrongs. Under the increasing neoliberal managerialism of rule of law as a tool of good governance, the KPA was organized as a mass claims procedure. To “streamline” the process and allow for the “quick” and “efficient” resolution of claims, it used data-processing technologies, and decisions were issued in batches of claims of similar legal scenarios. This chapter conceptualizes the work of the KPA as “law-washing” within the post-cold war juristocratic phase of international intervention and international law more generally. The chapter understands juristocracy in a broad sense, as a diffuse and transhistorical moment in which law is used in often fetishistic, instrumental ways to tackle a range of social and political issues previously not conceived as legal issues. Engaging with law’s “dialectics of reckoning” means analytically making sense of moments (that we may choose to call “juristocratic”) of simultaneous hope in law’s potential to propel the currents of social justice and cynicism and disenchantment about law’s incapacity to “solve” issues beyond law (if at all).
Drawing on research conducted in Iran’s criminal justice system, the chapter explores the linkages between mercy in criminal justice and the increasingly global turn away from social justice movements based on logics of human rights and toward care-based appeals, such as humanitarianism. The latter is just one major arena of increased reliance on and appeals to care or “care work” over claims to inherent rights; others include charity, aid, and philanthropy. In Iran’s “victim-centered” criminal justice system, in homicide and other major crimes, the victims’ families possess a right of “exact” retribution. That is, victims’ immediate family members may exercise their right to have a perpetrator executed. In these cases, however, victims’ family members may also forgo retributive sentencing and forgive the perpetrator. A variety of interests – legal, social, religious, and even economic – shape the concerns of victims’ families as they consider whether to exercise the right of retribution by forgoing rather than executing it. While being merciful or seeking mercy may possess qualities associated with a “seasoning” of justice, the inclination toward mercy and merciful grants, such as granting pardons to persons convicted of crimes, is both a legitimation and entrenchment of an absolute sovereign over the judiciary or the legislative branch, as in Iran. As the chapter argues, this normalization of the resort to mercy has the capacity to reduce everyone in society to a potential supplicant with broader implications for the quest for social justice and legal reckoning.
This chapter expands on a series of recent interventions about the consequences of the unraveling of juristocracy at a more diffuse transnational level: consequences for critical scholarship (both disciplinary and interdisciplinary), for the state of (mostly Euro-American) progressive politics, and for the urgent project to imagine alternatives to rights-based frameworks for change and justice-seeking that guard against the use of violence, ethnocentrism, and other expressions of an exclusionary juristocratic reckoning. The chapter begins by summarizing the well-known intellectual historical narrative of notable developments in the wake of the “endtimes” (Hopgood 2013) of human rights and other categories of law that were invested with the weight of social, political, and, to a lesser extent, economic transformation. After focusing on and tracing the afterlives of existing human rights up to the present, the chapter then introduces an alternative vision for what is described as the “future lives” of human rights, a proposition that recognizes the force of the different critiques underlining the profound turn away from human rights in the present, but which nevertheless seeks to go beyond these critiques. Although the original argument for “reinventing human rights” (Goodale 2022) was meant to examine fairly comprehensively the ways in which a radically reformulated account of human rights was still possible, an account, moreover, that might yet prove capable of galvanizing new and more sustainable forms of translocal social and political action, the 2022 intervention nevertheless left certain key concepts rather underdeveloped. As a response, the chapter returns to these key concepts in order to thicken the presentation of a reinvented human rights as a framework for multiscalar social mobilization and justice-seeking. Yet as the chapter emphasizes, this framework does not return “human rights” to its grounding in law – national, regional, or international. In this sense, the proposition builds on the transformative potential of the turn away from certain kinds of law. As the chapter concludes, the case for detaching human rights – conceptually and institutionally – from law seems as compelling as ever, perhaps even more so in light of the violent impotence of the international system writ large in the face of recent crises such as the global COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
1. What does the term ‘healing journey’ mean to you? 2. In what ways do you currently feel social work is both a gift and a burden? 3. What lessons does Gloria’s story teach us about who is responsible for what? 4. What is the difference for you (if any) between disability and dis Ability?
1. How can de facto social work be supported in the fight for human rights? 2. As the author writes in this story, working in conflict areas might be dangerous. Think of how social workers can help to secure people in situations where they are threatened because of their engagement or political opinions. How do you think social workers can become a part of changing the everyday life of people in these situations? 3. In what way can de facto social work lead to collaborative support from a community in danger?
In a world grappling with escalating agrochemical pollution, this article explores the potential for shifting from a security-centric approach to a human rights-based approach to safeguard health, the environment, and biodiversity. By engaging with European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence related to environmental protection and climate change, the article critically assesses how to address state (in)action regarding pollutants such as pesticides through human rights litigation. In its analysis, the article highlights climate change litigation as a catalyst for change to assert states’ threefold obligations to respect, protect, and realize human rights. It concludes that the legal approaches developed in climate litigation – with regard to both procedural and substantive aspects – provide a strong basis for addressing the human rights impacts of agrochemical harm.
Land rights for Indigenous Peoples are a global phenomenon and have become an important part of the liberal democratic state. But despite the promise of restoring land rights to Indigenous Peoples, most land justice frameworks have preserved the status quo in what is a slow and arduous process. In this work, William Nikolakis draws from the diverse experiences of Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars and legal practitioners across the world to document both persistent barriers to 'Land Back' as well as opportunities to move forward for land justice. By bringing these voices together, Nikolakis seeks to share lessons from the land justice movement with the goal of advancing land rights for Indigenous Peoples across the world. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
Attitudes of mental health professionals toward coercion are a potential tool in reducing the use of coercive measures in psychiatry.
Aims
This study, part of the nationwide Attitudes toward Coercion (AttCo) project, aimed to assess staff attitudes on a nationwide and multiprofessional scale across adult, child and adolescent, and forensic psychiatric departments.
Method
During 9 weeks in 2023, 1702 psychiatric staff members across Germany filled out a survey including gender, age, profession, work experience and setting, and the validated Staff Attitude to Coercion Scale (SACS). Analyses of variance and multivariate regression analysis for SACS mean overall score were computed to assess group differences.
Results
Participants largely supported that coercion could be reduced with more time and personal contact (mean 4.20, range 1–5), and that coercion can harm the therapeutic relationship (mean 4.08); however, they acknowledged that coercion sometimes needs to be used for security reasons (mean 4.10). Regarding group differences, specialisation (P < 0.001) and professional affiliation (P = 0.008) remained significantly associated with SACS mean score (with a higher score in forensic psychiatric staff compared with staff in adult and child and adolescent psychiatry), when controlling for gender, age and work experience.
Conclusions
Differences in attitudes are predominantly linked to professional training and structural surroundings. Professionals in adult psychiatry and child and adolescent psychiatry are more critical than staff in forensic settings, with an emphasis on patients’ rights and individuals’ integrity. Further studies are needed on how mental health professionals view coercion, and how actual use of coercion is influenced by staff attitudes.
Strong constitutionalism usually conceives rights as instruments for protecting people. The problem with this conception is that it generates legal alienation, since it views people as passive recipients of protection, which is an exclusive matter for the state and, ultimately, for judicial review. In contrast, deliberative constitutionalism gives people an active role in deliberating about rights, among themselves as well as between them and the state. However, despite the development of deliberative constitutionalism, it is not yet clear what this view of rights requires of judicial review. Accordingly, this contribution to the Federal Law Review’s symposium issue on deliberative rights theory argues for deliberative judicial review, which is a form of judicial review that, by respecting and promoting democratic deliberation, offers better protection of rights, as well as greater impartiality and legitimacy. In support of this argument, the article first makes explicit that the guide that should orient judicial review is not deference or activism but rather democratic deliberation. Next it states that, from this guide, a form of judicial review should be inferred that is not merely substantial or merely procedural, but rather semiprocedural. It then argues that, notwithstanding contextual turns, weak constitutionalism combined with channels of social dialogue offers a better institutional basis for deliberative judicial review than strong constitutionalism. Lastly, it concludes that deliberative judicial review respects and contributes to articulating rights without legal alienation, i.e. through dialogue among all potentially affected persons.
This article explores how the new generation of legalistic autocrats consolidates power—not by committing mass human rights violations as a way of consolidating power as authoritarians of the twentieth century did, but instead by attacking checks and balances so that democratic institutions are weakened. Judges at transnational courts, faced with evidence of these attacks, are developing a jurisprudence through which they transform the vindication of individual rights into requirements that states maintain democratic structures. While it is not clear if this jurisprudence prevents backsliding, it may become useful as new democrats attempt to restore constitutional institutions using these decisions as guidelines for democratic reform. In doing so, new democrats would be giving meaning to the rule of law writ large.
It is a truism that legitimacy is relational inasmuch as an international institution’s legitimacy hinges on how it is perceived by relevant audiences. What is less discussed is that legitimation practices may have another strong relational dimension as well, in which institutions portray themselves as being related to respected others. While the idea that international institutions associate themselves with others to borrow their legitimacy is not new, it has not as yet been thoroughly theorised. This article therefore brings together insights from research on the legitimation of international institutions and relational sociology, as well as from related fields, to theorise the notion of ‘relational legitimation’. It also presents a case study on the Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council. Based on qualitative content analysis of annual thematic reports, the paper suggests that relational legitimation is a common practice among the Special Procedures, and possibly also among other international institutions. It shows that relational legitimation relies on a number of different frames – alignment being the most important one – and that association is sought primarily with epistemic authorities, especially those from the West, and other ‘family members’.
The international solidarity principle is a crucial legal norm of international society. It helps guide state conduct and facilitate cooperation among international actors to respond to global challenges and uphold human rights. The European Union (EU) and its Member States have argued that their bilateral agreements with non-EU countries to prevent irregular migration to Europe is a demonstration of international solidarity that fulfils their obligations to asylum seekers and refugees. However, the EU’s interpretation of international solidarity in these arrangements has been contested. This article argues that the EU has strategically interpreted the international solidarity principle to fit in with, and complement, its migration deterrence policy framework. It posits that the EU’s interpretation abuses the international solidarity principle as it aims to separate the solidarity principle from the realisation of human rights, thereby hurting, instead of benefitting, asylum seekers and refugees. This article makes an important contribution to understanding how the solidarity principle is interpreted between EU and non-EU partners, and the intimate connection between solidarity and the realisation of human rights. More importantly, it demonstrates how the interpretation and evasion of the international solidarity principle has been shaped by, and shaped to fit, the EU’s migration externalisation policy framework.
This essay reveals the institutional dynamics of hard times in the issue area of human rights. I show that the human rights regime has developed innovative-yet-informal institutions like individuals-based coalitions for the international protection and progressive development of human rights. Yet, as these informal institutions function very much based on, first, the interpersonal relations among their members, and, second, legal instruments that require no further consent by states, the advocacy success of liberal human rights defenders has, in turn, provided a playbook for advocates and governments from the illiberal end of the ideology spectrum. In addition, new human rights advocates in the form of certain private law firms have entered the UN through their pro bono work. They promise valuable resources for a crisis-ridden system but often represent corporate clients with conflicts of interest. Given the imminent risk of ideological capture and illiberal interests in human rights paralyzing the system, I reemphasize the need for regulating access to the human rights global governance institutions.
There is an urgent need to address the poor quality of mental healthcare and human rights violations within mental health systems and communities. To achieve this, efforts must focus on changing the attitudes that perpetuate stigma and discrimination against individuals with mental health conditions, as well as psychosocial, intellectual and cognitive disabilities. The World Health Organization (WHO) QualityRights e-training on mental health, recovery and community inclusion is tackling these issues in several countries; however, its global impact has yet to be evaluated.
Aims
This study aims to assess the changes in attitudes following the completion of the WHO QualityRights e-training in countries worldwide.
Method
Data from 3026 participants were analysed in this pre-post intervention study. Changes in scores on the WHO QualityRights Attitudes questionnaire were evaluated with the paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Results
The mean differences from baseline to post-training on the WHO QualityRights Attitudes questionnaire were 9.91 (95% CI 9.58–10.24, d = 1.07) for the total sample, 8.95 (95% CI 8.59–9.31, d = 0.99) for the high-income countries sample; and 12.75 (95% CI 12.03–13.47, d = 1.33) for the low- and middle-income countries sample. These findings indicate that participants, after completing the e-training, showed a decrease in negative attitudes toward individuals with mental health conditions and psychosocial, intellectual and cognitive disabilities.
Conclusions
This study suggests that the WHO QualityRights e-training has a positive, large effect in reducing negative attitudes toward individuals with mental health conditions and psychosocial, intellectual and cognitive disabilities, and can contribute to reduced stigma and greater alignment with rights-based approaches. These findings support the scale-up of the WHO QualityRights e-training programme.
This chapter considers the role courts play in protecting fundamental rights. It addresses three questions. What role do domestic courts play in the protection of rights in different constitutional settings? In examining key elements of constitutional design, the chapter show how there are significant variations in how courts protect rights across the world. Secondly, what role should courts play in the adjudication of rights? Here it is argued that courts in their ordinary work, applying legislation and the common law, do and must protect rights. With regard to the more contested question whether courts should protect rights under a constitutional bill of rights, the chapter argues that the case for such a role for courts is at its strongest in certain circumstances but that it cannot be claimed that in all circumstances courts should be conferred with this power. Finally, the chapter considers the current debates in the United Kingdom concerning a possible repeal of the Human Rights Act, and withdrawal from the European Convention of Human Rights, and expresses dismay at the prospect of the repeal of the Human Rights Act, given how elegantly that Act combines protection for rights by UK courts with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
Through the paradigmatic case of post-revolutionary Iran, this article argues critiques of power-laden human rights politics epitomised by Makau Mutua’s 2001 ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors Metaphor of Human Rights’ when combined with states’ anti-imperialist victim branding, and uncritical anti-imperialist solidarities give rise to a reactionary politics I call the ‘Reverse Savages, Victims, Saviours metaphor of human rights’. Here, anti-imperialist-branding states and their constructions of culture are recast as victims, and the state is treated as synonymous with the population it rules. Western imperialism, the human rights corpus, and those deploying human rights conceived of as extensions of Western imperialism are recast as the savages. Finally, leftist thinkers, anti-imperialist thought, and the resisting victim state and its constructions of Indigenous culture become the saviors. This politics eclipses local populations’ agency and lived experiences by (1) diminishing the moral weight of both the state’s transgressions and the human rights paradigm, (2) interrupting a sustained focus on the anti-imperialist-branding state’s acts of subjugation, (3) defining non-Western populations through essentialist notions of their culture as traditional saviourism does (but valorising rather than vilifying it), and (4) adhering to notions of moral complexity which deny or obscure the elements of moral clarity encompassed.
This article examines recent developments relating to the use of third-party findings of fact at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). A proliferation of fact-finding mechanisms creates more opportunities for litigants to ask the ICJ to rely on third-party facts. This demands renewed attention to how the ICJ responds to this type of evidence, especially given the rise of public interest litigation that may depend especially heavily on such materials. The analysis focuses on the ICJ’s approach in recent requests for the indication of provisional measures and asks whether the Court’s approach to third-party evidence differs depending on the phase of litigation, using the 2024 judgment in Ukraine v. Russia as a case study. Ultimately, recent decisions suggest that the ICJ’s efforts to distinguish evidence generated through an adversarial, court-like process from findings of fact based on investigation and fieldwork are often blurred in practice. Moreover, while the Court’s liberal approach to third-party evidence at the provisional measures phase may be justifiable, the quest for coherence in how the Court approaches third-party evidence, especially on the merits, remains a work in progress. To that end, the article suggests ways in which the Court could engage more closely with third-party fact-finding reports in the fulfillment of its adjudicatory function.
The aim of this book is to investigate the history and rationale for the paradoxical extension of human rights to companies in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and to analyse the Court's jurisprudence on protection of companies' intellectual property in this light. The study shows how, before the adoption of the ECHR, the concepts of legal personality and possessions functioned as legal fictions in European civil and common law to facilitate ownership and sale of tangible and intangible property, shares, debts, securities and intellectual property. The Court's construction of the ambiguous text of Article 1 of the First Protocol and its application to corporate intellectual property rights is reviewed in this light and shown to have been initially anchored in the legal fictions of national laws and later expanded and reinforced by European Union law.