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The “demographic dividend” refers to the boost to GDP per capita growth countries experience during the part of the demographic transition when age dependency ratios plummet. The size and the source of the dividend are debated in the literature. Using newly constructed age-specific population data by country from the beginning of the demographic transition to the present day, this paper estimates the contribution of changing age structure to GDP per capita growth during the demographic transition. A quantitative overlapping-generations model is used to produce country-specific estimates of the dividend and to disentangle its drivers. Model simulations for 101 countries suggest a global average boost of 0.40 percentage points per annum to GDP per capita growth during the dividend period. Changing age structure explains 9.5% of total growth during the period of the demographic dividend on average. Countries with more rapid and more extreme changes in age structure experience larger dividends.
While conventional technologies like Zoom have limitations in interpersonal communication and a risk-free training environment in delivering comprehensive corporate training, the Metaverse provides immersive, face-to-face, interactive, and simulated learning opportunities. However, the literature highlights significant Metaverse adoption barriers and emphasises the need for interdisciplinary research-driven competency integration solutions. Furthermore, the present study investigates essential competencies human resource development professionals need to develop to implement Metaverse-based training, as a literature research gap. Anchored in the Critical Success Factor theory, the study has utilised the Spherical Fuzzy-Bayesian Best Worst Method and Grey Influence Analysis to prioritise and analyse the influential relations of the identified competencies. The findings highlight the significance of technical and gamification competency categories and competencies related to privacy and security, content loss, scripting, playability, and ethical and social responsibility. These findings signify the competencies for implementing the Metaverse for training by the human resource development professionals.
Summarising how economists have historically studied families from the nineteenth century to the present, we recall that economists developed methodologies in response to how they imagined and constituted the problem of family poverty in different periods. In contemporary times, concerns for poverty-alleviation have increasingly featured concerns for justice across gender, race, and ethnicity. We also recall how family economists prioritised some social and political problems over others, leaving significant injustices uncontested. These findings encourage reflection on how we define the social problems of families today. Describing the small body of economics on the relation between family behaviour and a sustainable biosphere, the book closes with a provocation. If each period of family economics has relied on an act of imagination to formulate the family-relevant social problems worthy of consideration, how might we constitute the problem of family poverty today, consistent with justice across gender, race, and ethnicity, while also tackling the very urgent need for a biosphere capable of supporting human life? How might we imagine living well and dying well today, on a damaged planet undergoing ecosystem collapse? And how might economists assist families to tackle this problem, today?
From the 1960s onwards, New Household economists like Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker shifted focus onto the poverty-alleviating impacts of family investment in human capital. This move was informed, first, by increased cultural and political awareness of what Becker referred to as an impoverished ‘underclass’ (1964/1993); second, by the social movements, including civil rights challenges to racial discrimination in schools and labour markets; and third, by government debates during the War on Poverty about the causes of Black family instability. Becker explained family instability as a rational response to price changes in the goods – including children – that families wanted. Given a set of preferences for basic commodities, and facing a defined range of choices, families were conceptualised as maximising utility, subject to constraints of income and time. This permitted hypotheses about how wages and human capital investment affected the cost of children, with effects on family formation and dissolution, fertility, and care-provision by women. As for poverty-alleviation, Becker favoured low-interest education loans. He rejected progressive income taxation and family welfare for incentivising underinvestment in education. Compensatory education programmes would fail by being offset. These policy positions were described by Nancy Folbre and Randy Albelda as a War on the Poor.
I study the effect of educational policy in the host economy on human capital accumulation and growth. The analysis is performed in a two-country growth model with endogenous fertility. I show that providing additional free educational services for immigrant children can increase the attractiveness of migration for less skilled individuals, which can outweigh the positive effect of this policy on the acquisition of human capital. In contrast, imposing taxes on immigrants in the host country reduces low-skilled immigration flows and has the potential to promote human capital accumulation if the resulting revenues are channeled into educational subsidies.
This study examines the heterogeneous effects of economic freedom on human capital accumulation across 83 developing countries between 2000 and 2018. Employing a range of econometric techniques including quantiles via moments regression, the analysis explores both average and distributional impacts of economic freedom on human capital, disaggregated by gender and employment status. The findings reveal that economic freedom positively influences human capital development, with stronger effects in countries with lower human capital levels. Among the five dimensions of economic freedom, freedom to trade internationally, legal systems, and property rights are most strongly associated with human capital accumulation. The results also indicate that women and employed individuals benefit more from economic freedom, highlighting its potential to reduce gender disparities and enhance labour productivity. These findings underscore the importance of institutional reforms promoting economic freedom as a pathway to human capital development in developing economies.
We assess how an economy’s wealth distribution shapes its labor market dynamics. We do so in a quantitative job-ladder model featuring directed search, incomplete markets, aggregate shocks, and endogenous on-the-job human capital accumulation. Poorer workers apply for lower-wage jobs when unemployed and under-accumulate human capital when employed to self-insure against unemployment risk. In response to an aggregate downturn, poorer workers reduce their human capital accumulation, all else equal, while richer workers increase it. The wealth distribution therefore matters for the response of aggregate human capital. In the calibrated model, we show that a negative aggregate productivity shock leads to a persistent decline in aggregate human capital, and a more dispersed wealth distribution would amplify this decline.
Most economists think family economics began in the 1960s when price theory was applied to family behaviour. Instead, this book focuses on enduring concerns with family poverty across the last two centuries. In nineteenth-century Britain and Europe, economists debated the effects of poverty relief and sought to improve family productivity. In the US, interwar household consumer economists studied how to rationalise family consumption, because factories were producing goods for low-income families. From the 1960s onwards, 'New' household economists attributed family poverty to inadequate human capital investment in predominantly non-white families. Even when feminist, development, and queer economists problematised gendered injustices, they recentred family poverty, targeting the 'pauperisation' of motherhood and the marginalisation of 'families we choose.' Economics and the Family does not simply reconstruct this alternate history, it also shows how economists in all these periods overlooked injustices which must be shouldered today.
This chapter reviews information about the demographic and democratic imperatives prompting K-16 educators to reconsider what they do not know about their students’ cultural backgrounds in urban schools and minority serving institutions (MSIs). It highlights the connection between the student–teacher racial mismatch characterizing K-16 contexts in the United States and a coexistent cultural mismatch. It makes an argument that these demographic characteristics present a human capital challenge that ultimately diminishes teacher effectiveness at learning across cultural differences between themselves and their students in urban schools and MSIs. It concludes by modeling this human capital challenge as a knowing–doing gap using a framework from the organizational literature.
This research examines whether high temperatures and exposure to childhood rainfall and heat shocks are a cognitive drag on children in Uganda. First, it asks whether students perform worse on a test on hotter days. Second, it examines whether previous longer-term exposure to high temperatures and unusual rainfall influences current test scores and educational outcomes. The analysis shows that high temperatures on test dates harm test performance, especially for girls and children younger than ten, implying additional temperature control considerations for particular demographics. The analysis of childhood climate shocks, which employs within-parish distributions of rainfall and heat, shows that children who experience rain or heat above the $80^{th}$ percentile of the parish distribution from birth until age 4 have worse learning outcomes in math, English, or local language literacy.
The formation of human capital is important for a society's welfare and economic success. Recent literature shows that child health can provide an important explanation for disparities in children's human capital development across different socio-economic groups. While this literature focuses on cognitive skills as determinants of human capital, it neglects non-cognitive skills. We analyze data from economic experiments with preschoolers and their mothers to investigate whether child health can explain developmental gaps in children's non-cognitive skills. Our measure for children's non-cognitive skills is their willingness to compete with others. Our findings suggest that health problems are negatively related to children's willingness to compete and that the effect of health on competitiveness differs with socioeconomic background. Health has a strongly negative effect in our sub-sample with low socio-economic background, whereas there is no effect in our sub-sample with high socio-economic background.
Chapter 6 discusses the policies of colonization in India in a comparative perspective with Korea and Taiwan under Japanese rule. In this chapter, I consider the differences in policies of colonization. At the time of independence, the share of industry in total GDP was not very different in the three countries. Modern industries had developed in India, Korea and Taiwan during the colonial period. The two big differences in colonial policies were with respect to agriculture and education. Japan imported essential food grains from the colonies. This prompted investment in improvements in agriculture to raise productivity. A large proportion of land came under irrigation in both colonies enabling introduction of new varieties of seeds. The British government in India did little to raise agricultural productivity. Second, the Japan as a colonizer expanded primary education, helping to create a literate workforce. A large proportion of industrial workers became literate. In India as a result of the emphasis on higher education, mainly the service sector occupations benefitted in terms of human capital.
The aim of this paper is to analyze gender differences in the determinants of the gap between actual and desired fertility in Spain. To this aim, we exploit the 2018 Fertility Survey (EF2018) from the Spanish Statistical Institute (INE). A binary probit model shows that gender differences in the risk (and its pattern) of not reaching the desired family size are generally more pronounced amongst parents than amongst childless adults. For women, a high level of education, a potentially unstable employment situation (as an employee in the private sector) and not living with a partner increases the risk of not having the desired number of children. For men, variables related to income instability or low monthly income cause a more pronounced differential between desired and actual parenthood than amongst women, while neither educational level nor partner status – amongst those who are already fathers – significantly influences their probability of not reaching the desired number of children.
We conduct the first modern econometric analysis of the historical deaf population in the United States by incorporating deafness into a model of human capital. We find that the deaf population invested less in observable educational and physical human capital. Lower literacy, employment, and occupational scores also suggest that unobserved human capital investments were not substantial enough to improve productivity to the level of the hearing population. States that subsidized schools for the deaf provided deaf people with improved social capital and access to intangible goods that they pursued at the cost of higher economic achievement. Finally, we argue that substantial lifecycle differences between the hearing and deaf populations have implications for unbiased school attendance and employment rate estimation.
This chapter proposes a framework for estimating the investment in human capital from health improvement or activities that improve life expectancy and reduce morbidity rates. The measurement framework builds on and extends the Jorgenson-Fraumeni income-based approach for estimating human capital to account for the effect of health on human capital. This economic approach to measuring health human capital differs from the welfare-based approach that estimates the economic effect of health improvements on the quality of life and well-being of individuals. The framework is then implemented for Canada, and the investment in health human capital for the period from 1970 to 2020 is estimated. The estimated investment in health human capital based on the income approach was found to be lower than health expenditures in Canada. This suggests that much of the health expenditures should be classified as consumption rather than as an investment that increases earnings.
The chapter examines the relationship between the size and diversity of the expellee population and entrepreneurship and occupational change in West Germany. Using statistical data at the municipal and county levels, it documents a reversal of fortune: although expellee presence presented economic challenges in the immediate postwar period, in the long run, it increased entrepreneurship rates, education, and household incomes. The more regionally diverse the expellee population, the better the long-run economic performance in receiving communities.
The chapter examines how the size and diversity of the migrant population shaped economic outcomes in western Poland using statistical analysis. It shows that when state institutions were extractive, the composition of the migrant population played no role in shaping economic performance. Once institutions became more inclusive, however, municipalities settled by more regionally diverse populations registered higher incomes and entrepreneurship rates. The chapter then rules out a series of alternative explanations for these findings.
We quantify the importance of endogenous human capital and of selection effects for counterfactual analysis of social security (SS) reforms. The literature typically performs these analyses by using structural models featuring exogenous productivity profiles. However, this approach faces two issues: (i) the estimation of productivity is subject to selection bias, and (ii) productivity is endogenous to the SS reforms. In this paper, we estimate a quantitative overlapping generations model featuring endogenous human capital accumulation using US data. First, we eliminate the SS and find a large positive effect on aggregate effective labor supply (${+}10.31\%$). Next, we build variants of this model to quantify the two issues (i) and (ii). We find that the endogeneity issue (ii) is quantitatively more important than the selection bias issue (i).
Over the last 40 years, the massive increase in average years of schooling in developing countries was not accompanied by a similar increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. We investigate this apparent disconnect between education and growth by focusing on the role of education quality. We propose an overlapping generations model which features an endogenous tradeoff between quantity and quality of education. A policy that increases average years of schooling then has an ambiguous effect on long-run human capital and GDP per capita. We also consider a quantitative version of the model to understand the Latin American experience between 1970 and 2010.
Companies and business lobby groups bemoan a lack of qualified workers, even for entry-level or low-skill jobs. At issue is a stated inability to find workers with the right ‘fit’ for the role or business. But what does fit really mean? We draw on human capital theory and labour segmentation theory to examine how perceptions of fit are shaped. We conducted ninety-three interviews with food service workers, managers, and other industry stakeholders and found that employment decisions are shaped by stereotypes, with a particular focus on ‘pretty privilege’ or aesthetic labour, as well as Indigeneity, citizenship, race, and gender. We present implications for research and practice in the food services industry.