We study the resilience of banks to macroeconomic slowdowns in a context of lax microprudential regulations: Colombia during the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. We find that numerous banks underperformed during the crisis, as their shareholders and board members tunnelled resources through related lending, loan concentration and accounting fraud. These practices were enabled by power concentration within banks, lax regulation and the expectation of bailouts. We provide evidence for this tunnelling mechanism by comparing the local banks and business groups that failed during the crisis, the local banks and business groups that survived the crisis and the former foreign banks – all of which survived the crisis. The regulatory changes enacted during the crisis also lend support to our proposed mechanism.

For the very first time, in the Spring of 2023, the European Commission (EC) carried out a survey across all member states to assess their level of financial literacy. This survey complements other national surveys and fills an important gap because it provides a consistent metric that allows comparisons among the European Union (EU) countries. The motivation behind the EC’s survey stems from the need to advance the state of financial literacy to safeguard financial stability and promote important projects, such as the creation of a Capital Markets Union. In this paper, we analyze these new data and confirm findings in the literature about the importance of being financially knowledgeable to achieve good financial outcomes. Unfortunately, the survey also confirms that barely one in two individuals, on average in the EU, is financially literate.

Is the working capital channel big, and does it vary across industries? To answer this question, I estimate a dynamic stochastic macro-finance model using firm-level data. In aggregate, I find a partial channel —about three-fourths of firms’ labor bill are borrowed. However, the strength of this channel varies across industries, reaching as low as one-half for retail firms and as high as one for agriculture and construction. This provides evidence that monetary policy could have varying effects across industries through the working capital channel.

The advent of quantitative easing by the world’s major central banks invites renewed questions about the meaning and role of central bank independence in an age of economic crisis. This article draws together insights from economic sociology, history and democratic theory to engage in further discussion about the proper role of central banks in democratic society. We stress some related themes. Our brief history of central banks aims to show how these banks have always been embedded in economic and political coalitions and conflicts, therefore qualifying the term independence; our study also aims to show that in satisficing between conflicting tasks, central banks need to maintain a balance between cognitive competences and normative expectations. Independence is better understood as a form of dependence on the coalition of interests that supported the financial climate prevailing before the global crisis of 2008, one of low wage-price inflation, high borrowing and debt, and loss of prudential control. We argue that independence amounts to a form of re-privatisation of central banks, and that they are increasingly suborned to the pressures of financial markets. At the same time, asset price inflation has sacrificed growth and employment and therefore prolongs the crisis. The economic measures now demanded by the financial crisis prompt new doubts about the independent central bank experiment, potentially in favour of the ex ante model of governmental oversight of central banks.

The Hayne Royal Commission into Australian financial sector misbehaviour reported in February 2019. It is, however, unlikely to provide a lasting solution to problems of financial sector misbehaviour. It has identified a number of types of misbehaviour, their ‘proximate causes’ and recommended solutions to those. But, reflecting its limited mandate and limited time, it was unable to investigate the complex question of whether there are more deep-seated, fundamental issues driving financial sector misconduct, both in Australia and globally. This article argues that there are, and that consequently the benefits from the Royal Commission will be relatively short-lived, with misconduct likely to resurface, albeit in different guises.

Credit restrictions were used as a monetary policy instrument in the Netherlands from the 1960s to the early 1990s. Since these restrictions were aimed at containing money rather than credit growth, their focus was on net credit creation by the financial sector. We document the rationale of these credit restrictions and how their implementation evolved in line with the evolution of the financial system. We study the impact on the balance sheet structure of banks and other financial institutions. We find that banks mainly responded to credit restrictions by making adjustments to the liability side of their balance sheets, particularly by increasing the proportion of long-term funding. Responses on the asset side were limited, while part of the banking sector even increased lending after the adoption of a restriction. These results suggest that banks and financial institutions responded by switching to long-term funding to meet the restriction and shield their lending business. Arguably, the credit restrictions were therefore still effective in reaching their main goal. Indeed, we do find evidence of a significant effect of credit restrictions on inflation.

We examine the impact of asset allocation and contribution rates on the risk of defined benefit (DB) pension schemes, using both a run-off and a shorter 3-year time horizon. Using the 3-year horizon, which is typically preferred by regulators, a high bond allocation reduces the spread of the distribution of surplus. However, this result is reversed when examined on a run-off basis. Furthermore, under both the 3-year horizon and the run-off, the higher bond allocation reduces the median level of surplus. Pressure on the affordability of DB schemes has led to widespread implementation of the so-called de-risking strategies, such as moving away from predominantly equity investments to greater bond investments. If the incentives produced by shorter term risk assessments are contributing to this shift, they might be harming the long-term financial health of the schemes. Contribution rates have relatively lower impact on the risk.

After Southern Italy became part of a new, national state in 1860, its financial sector was radically transformed under Piedmontese influence. This article challenges the conventional wisdom that the aggressive penetration of a Northern credit institution, the future Bank of Italy, into the South following unification harmed the local banking system and highlights instead its transformative role in modernising and deepening regional credit markets. On the basis of new statistics, banking and political records, this contribution shows that the introduction of ‘foreign’ banking from Northern Italy under the auspices of a national, constitutional government resulted in a financial revolution and a democratisation of credit supply to the advantage of the whole South. Public banking under the Bourbons had privileged the needs of an absolute government over those of the private economy and of the capital city over those of the rest of the country, retarding financial development. Credit undersupply and regional fragmentation could only be overcome through the integration of the South within a larger Italian market, in which, however, the lion's share went to a predominantly Northern institution.

This special issue celebrates the career of Youssef Cassis. The introduction will outline his major contributions from his initial work on social characteristics of the financiers of the City of London, and their relationship with landed aristocrats and industry, through his analysis of a succession of financial centres, the comparative study of big business, the relationship between finance and politics, to his new project on the memory of financial crises. Then, we will draw on Youssef's mode of analysis to consider some of the more pressing issues in the era since the global financial crisis and the impact of Covid-19. We will consider the role of central banks, the challenge of fintech, the impact of low interest rates on inequality, savings and debt, and the potential shift in financial centres and reserve currencies with the rise of China. We will conclude by arguing that the mode of analysis developed by Cassis over his long and productive career has never been more pertinent.

From the 1970s to the 1990s there was a revolution in international financial markets, which combined the processes of financialisation and globalisation. Deregulation and financial innovation were the two underlying forces that facilitated this transformation. At the same time, distinctive national characteristics of banking structures and cultures influenced the way that financial globalisation affected the geographic distribution of financial activity. This article addresses these seismic shifts through three perspectives: changes in regulation and the geographic pattern of international banking activity, reform of the main stock markets in New York and London and the rise of financial conglomerates. It identifies complementarity as well as competition among international financial centres.

A century ago the US commercial banking system was exceptional in two ways. It was by good measure the largest commercial banking system of any country. And it was different from the commercial banking systems of other leading countries in having tens of thousands of independent banks with very few branches rather than the more typical pattern of a far smaller number of banks with many branches. Today, a century later, the US system is more normal than exceptional, dominated by a small number of very large banks with extensive branch systems. This article describes the US banking-structure transition from exceptional to normal. It closes with an interesting contrast of US and European banking developments.

From 1716 to 1718, Sweden experienced a shock of liquidity when the absolutist regime of Charles XII issued large amounts of fiat coins (mynttecken) in order to finance the Great Northern War. After the death of the king in November 1718, the new parliamentary regime decided to partially default on the coins. In international literature, this episode is largely unknown, and in Swedish historiography, scholars have often claimed that the country's currency collapsed in hyperinflation. We assess the performance of the new coins by studying how prices of commodities in various geographic locations developed. We also study bookkeeping practices in order to see how accountants treated the new coins. Our results show that there was a complex relationship between prices and liquidity. Prices of products in high demand by the military increased more than other prices. Accountants did not treat mynttecken and other currencies differently in 1718. It was only after the death of the king that accountants started to differentiate between different types of coins. The value of the fiat coins was linked to the actions and the legitimacy of the royal regime, which is in line with the State theory of money.

This article traces the origin of too-big-to-fail policy in modern US banking to the bailout of the $1.2b Bank of the Commonwealth in 1972. It describes this bailout and those of subsequent banks through that of Continental Illinois in 1984. During this period, market concentration due to interstate banking restrictions is a factor in most of the bailouts and systemic risk concerns were raised to justify the bailouts of surprisingly small banks. Finally, most of the bailouts in this period relied on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's use of the Essentiality Doctrine and Federal Reserve lending. A discussion of this doctrine is used to illustrate how legal constraints on regulators may become less constraining over time.

This paper summarizes recent developments in Dutch occupational pensions of both the defined contribution and defined benefit (DB) types. A reform of DB schemes is discussed that introduces financial assets as individual entitlements. At the same time, the reformed schemes derive (dis)saving, financial risk management and insurance decisions from the explicit objective of adequate and stable lifelong retirement income. The proposed system also involves an insurance contract pooling longevity risks and possibly collective buffers that share systematic risks with future pension savers. The paper identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the Dutch contract design and draws lessons for other countries.

Before the founding of the Federal Reserve, bank clearinghouse associations served as an emergency lending facility during the National Bank Era (1863–1913). This article clarifies the operation of clearinghouse loan certificates during panic periods. If clearinghouse loan certificates do not circulate among the general public, then they bear similarities to interbank loans among clearinghouse member banks. In general, the central clearinghouse organization does not act alone as a lender of last resort to make loans from the central clearinghouse to individual member banks.

Using recovery plan data of 213 underfunded Dutch pension funds for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, discrete choice models are estimated describing pension funds' choices between three recovery measures: higher contributions, no indexation and pension cuts. The estimation results suggest, first, that pension cuts are more likely when the funding ratio is very low, there is little time left for recovery, the pension fund is not a corporate pension fund, and its participants are still relatively young. Second, the results suggest that Dutch pension funds consider contribution increase first, no indexation second and pension cuts only as a last resort.

To improve the design of the pay-out phase of DC plans, this paper proposes a new approach to structure pension products: the Personal Pension with Risk sharing (PPR). By unbundling and valuing the investment, (dis)saving, insurance and risk-sharing functions of pensions, PPRs allow risk management and (dis)saving to be customized to the specific features of heterogeneous individuals. Unlike variable annuities, PPRs allow investment risks to be combined with longevity insurance without giving rise to high year-on-year volatility in consumption streams or opaque and rigid valuation and smoothing rules. The synthesis of a PPR structure provides new opportunities for product innovation and for the comparison of retirement products.

Responding to the challenges of demographic ageing, the German system of old-age provision has undergone substantial changes during the past two decades and is in fact still under reconstruction. Benefit levels deriving from the public pay-as-you-go scheme will decline until 2060, while contribution rates may still go up substantially. Additional cover from private or occupational pension schemes is urgently needed. Thus far, steps in this direction have been half-hearted. The continuing crisis in financial markets and a more profound distrust in financial institutions and market-based instruments of old-age provision currently create obstacles to progress with this overhaul. Nevertheless, despite the differing traditions, Germany could learn important lessons now from other developed countries that have longer experience of funded pensions.

This paper reviews the market failures that may justify the need for liquidity regulation, assesses whether liquidity regulation is a necessary complement to Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) policies, capital regulation and prompt corrective action, surveys the available evidence on the net benefits of liquidity regulation, and concludes by outlining research directions useful to improve bank regulation design.

Capital regulation is critical to address distortions and externalities from intense conflicts of interest in banking and from the failure of markets to counter incentives for recklessness. The approaches to capital regulation in Basel III and related proposals are based on flawed analyses of the relevant tradeoffs. The flaws in the regulations include dangerously low equity levels, a complex and problematic system of risk weights that exacerbates systemic risk and adds distortions, and unnecessary reliance on poor equity substitutes. The underlying problem is a breakdown of governance and lack of accountability to the public throughout the system, including policymakers and economists.