Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) model with households’, firms’, and banks’ default calibrated for Portugal, we assess the impact of some prudential policy measures adopted to mitigate COVID-19 economic effects: the flexibility measure and the dividends pay-out restriction. The joint use of the measures reinforces the support for credit achieved using the flexibility measure only and reduces the effort of banks to rebuild capital buffers once the pandemic crisis is over. Given the recovery and the measures’ withdrawal, we also consider distinct paths for replenishing capital buffers. Shorter transitions strengthen banks’ resilience, but longer transitions may be more suitable to ensure a smooth flow of lending to the economy.

Conditional risk measures and their associated risk contribution measures are commonly employed in finance and actuarial science for evaluating systemic risk and quantifying the effects of risk interactions. This paper introduces various types of contribution ratio measures based on the multivariate conditional value-at-risk (MCoVaR), multivariate conditional expected shortfall (MCoES), and multivariate marginal mean excess (MMME) studied in [34] (Ortega-Jiménez, P., Sordo, M., & Suárez-Llorens, A. (2021). Stochastic orders and multivariate measures of risk contagion. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, vol. 96, 199–207) and [11] (Das, B., & Fasen-Hartmann, V. (2018). Risk contagion under regular variation and asymptotic tail independence. Journal of Multivariate Analysis 165(1), 194–215) to assess the relative effects of a single risk when other risks in a group are in distress. The properties of these contribution risk measures are examined, and sufficient conditions for comparing these measures between two sets of random vectors are established using univariate and multivariate stochastic orders and statistically dependent notions. Numerical examples are presented to validate these conditions. Finally, a real dataset from the cryptocurrency market is used to analyze the spillover effects through our proposed contribution measures.

In a Diamond–Dybvig type model of financial intermediation, we allow depositors to announce at a positive cost to subsequent depositors that they keep their funds deposited in the bank. Theoretically, the mere availability of public announcements (and not its use) ensures that no bank run is the unique equilibrium outcome. Multiple equilibria—including bank run—exist without such public announcements. We test the theoretical results in the lab and find a widespread use of announcements, which we interpret as an attempt to coordinate on the no bank run outcome. Withdrawal rates in general are lower in information sets that contain announcements.

We examine the incentive effects of funding contracts on entrepreneurial effort and on allocative efficiency. We experiment with funding contracts that differ in the structure of investor repayment and, thus, in their incentives for the provision of entrepreneurial effort. Theoretically the replacement of a standard debt contract by a repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contract reduces effort distortions and increases efficiency. Likewise, distortions can be mitigated by replacing outside equity by a repayment-equivalent standard-debt contract. We test both hypotheses in the laboratory. Our results reveal that the incentive effects of funding contracts must be experienced before they are reflected in observed behavior. With sufficient experience, observed behavior is either consistent with or close to theoretical predictions and supports both hypotheses. If we allow for entrepreneur-sided manipulations of project outcomes, we find that non-monotonic contracts lose much of their appeal.

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have been used in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problems of equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment, each subject receives a noisy signal about the true payoffs. This game (inspired by the “global” games of Carlsson and van Damme, Econometrica, 61, 989-1018, 1993) has a unique strategy profile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcome coincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome of the underlying coordination game. In the baseline game, the behavior of the subjects converges to the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that this behavior can be explained by learning. To test this hypothesis, we use a different game with incomplete information, related to a complete information game where learning and prior experiments suggest a different behavior. Indeed, in the second treatment, the behavior did not converge to equilibrium within 50 periods in some of the sessions. We also run both games under complete information. The results are sufficiently similar between complete and incomplete information to suggest that risk-dominance is also an important part of the explanation.

We use experimental methods to evaluate a simplified interbank market. The design is a laboratory adaptation of the analysis of interbank market fragility by Allen and Gale (J Eur Econ Assoc 2:1015–1048), and features symmetric banks who allocate deposit endowments between cash and illiquid assets prior to the incidence of a shock. Following the shock liquidity-deficient banks trade assets for cash. Treatments include variations in the shock type, as well as alterations in the range of permissible asset prices. Consistent with Allen and Gale, we find that while interbank trading substantially increases investment activity, the markets are frequently characterized by price variability and a stochastic distribution of investment outcomes.

We study factors influencing individuals’ decisions to purchase Citibank stock during the 1920s. Familiarity was an important positive influence (measured outside New York by branch presence, and within New York, by network connections to existing owners). Within New York, wealth, knowledge, and one's influence within the New York City Business network also increased the probability of becoming a Citibank shareholder. The role of some network influences, like other identifiable influences, became less important during the price boom of the late 1920s, perhaps reflecting the rising importance of other means of increasing familiarity during the price boom (i.e. media coverage).

We study the resilience of banks to macroeconomic slowdowns in a context of lax microprudential regulations: Colombia during the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. We find that numerous banks underperformed during the crisis, as their shareholders and board members tunnelled resources through related lending, loan concentration and accounting fraud. These practices were enabled by power concentration within banks, lax regulation and the expectation of bailouts. We provide evidence for this tunnelling mechanism by comparing the local banks and business groups that failed during the crisis, the local banks and business groups that survived the crisis and the former foreign banks – all of which survived the crisis. The regulatory changes enacted during the crisis also lend support to our proposed mechanism.

We propose a simple indicator for the climate-related transition risks of bank lending based on transaction-level loan data. The underlying idea is that the higher the greenhouse gas intensity of an economic activity, and thus that of the debtor involved, the higher its transition risk. The relationship is mapped through two min-max-normalised functions, each of which represents a scenario for the future characteristics of the green transition. The concept is versatile and applicable to different dimensions at different levels of aggregation (banking system or individual banks, whole economy or specific sectors). As a practical example, we discuss the proposed indicator using Hungarian data for the period 2012–2020.

In 1962, Spain implemented significant banking law changes to boost competition. This study investigates their impact on provincial banking concentration from 1964 to 1975, utilising novel provincial-level private bank balance sheet data and including savings banks. Results show a substantial decline in concentration across most provinces. Panel data models identify the determinants of banking concentration: larger populations and higher gross domestic product per capita correlate with lower concentration, while agrarian-focused provinces exhibit higher concentration. The provincial financial sector’s structure also matters, with a higher number of branches and headquarters per capita associated with reduced banking concentration. These findings refine existing literature and provide new insights into the intricate relationship between banking concentration and regional economies in Spain.

This article studies how sudden changes in bank credit supply impact economic activity. I identify shocks to bank credit supply based on firms’ aggregate debt composition. I use a model where firms fund production with bonds and loans. In the model, bank shocks are the only type of shock that imply opposite movements in the two types of debt as firms adjust their debt composition to new credit conditions. Bank shocks account for a third of output fluctuations and are predictive of the bond spread.

The paper analyses the potential impact on monetary policy transmission stemming from the adoption of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). Bank funding conditions and potential profitability effects are the main channels through which CBDC could have a bearing on monetary policy transmission via banks. As is the case for banknotes, the central bank balance sheet identity operates in effect as an aggregate consistency restriction that prevents CBDC from creating funding scarcity for the banking system as a whole. However, without policy neutralising actions, the new resulting bank funding mix might be less favourable for banks, thus potentially leading to suboptimal outcomes from a monetary policy perspective, such as restrictions in credit supply. Analysing the transmission channels through which banks obtain the necessary reserves suggests that a CBDC could have a material impact on bank lending conditions only if some relevant frictions, such as collateral constraints or liquidity shortages, materialise. Adverse funding conditions, such as those arising from lower bank liquidity or difficulty to access central bank funding or to tap the bond market, further paired with a large demand for CBDC, could affect bank lending conditions and the transmission of monetary policy. Importantly, even in this case, careful design, and implementation, as well as attentive communication can limit an unwarranted tightening coming from funding and liquidity tensions due to the rollout of CBDC. In addition, the central bank could take specific action to prevent or neutralise unwarranted impacts in order to maintain its desired monetary policy stance. In the longer term, a digital euro could support the digitalisation of the euro area banking sector, levelling the playing field for banks more exposed to competition from new players like big tech firms.

Is the working capital channel big, and does it vary across industries? To answer this question, I estimate a dynamic stochastic macro-finance model using firm-level data. In aggregate, I find a partial channel —about three-fourths of firms’ labor bill are borrowed. However, the strength of this channel varies across industries, reaching as low as one-half for retail firms and as high as one for agriculture and construction. This provides evidence that monetary policy could have varying effects across industries through the working capital channel.

In the traditional multidimensional credibility models developed by Jewell ((1973) Operations Research Center, pp. 73–77.), the estimation of the hypothetical mean vector involves complex matrix manipulations, which can be challenging to implement in practice. Additionally, the estimation of hyperparameters becomes even more difficult in high-dimensional risk variable scenarios. To address these issues, this paper proposes a new multidimensional credibility model based on the conditional joint distribution function for predicting future premiums. First, we develop an estimator of the joint distribution function of a vector of claims using linear combinations of indicator functions based on past observations. By minimizing the integral of the expected quadratic distance function between the proposed estimator and the true joint distribution function, we obtain the optimal linear Bayesian estimator of the joint distribution function. Using the plug-in method, we obtain an explicit formula for the multidimensional credibility estimator of the hypothetical mean vector. In contrast to the traditional multidimensional credibility approach, our newly proposed estimator does not involve a matrix as the credibility factor, but rather a scalar. This scalar is composed of both population information and sample information, and it still maintains the essential property of increasingness with respect to the sample size. Furthermore, the new estimator based on the joint distribution function can be naturally extended and applied to estimate the process covariance matrix and risk premiums under various premium principles. We further illustrate the performance of the new estimator by comparing it with the traditional multidimensional credibility model using bivariate exponential-gamma and multivariate normal distributions. Finally, we present two real examples to demonstrate the findings of our study.

Modern financial crises are difficult to explain because they do not always involve bank runs, or the bank runs occur late. For this reason, the first year of the Great Depression, 1930, has remained a puzzle. Industrial production dropped by 20.8 percent despite no nationwide bank run. Using cross-sectional variation in external finance dependence, we demonstrate that banks’ decision to not use the discount window and instead cut back lending and invest in safe assets can account for the majority of this decline. In effect, the banks ran on themselves before the crisis became evident.

In the follow-up to the 1926 political and monetary crisis in France, a new government led by Raymond Poincaré attempted to restore monetary stability by restructuring public debt. A sinking fund was missioned to withdraw short-term public bills from money markets. This policy disorganized the largest Parisian banks of the time, as they relied on these bills to manage their liquidity. Without developed domestic money markets, no other asset could absorb the excess liquidity freed by the withdrawal of these bills, and these leading banks faced a low-rate environment. In search of yield, they expanded their activities abroad a few months before the 1929 crash. These findings renew our understanding of the expansion of France's banking sector in the 1920s. In addition, they shed new light on the role of public debt in financial stability in an open economy.

Adam Smith promoted free banking—private, competitive, convertible banknotes. He also supported restrictions on banks. We study Smith’s views and the era in which they developed, suggesting his ‘regulations’ were a backstop against banks’ risks to depositors but primarily monetary stability. In modern parlance, Smith supported macroprudential regulations to underpin monetary stability, as did Friedman and Schwartz the US FDIC. We discuss why Smith’s vision for banking went unrealised. Bank regulation became microprudential and ran aground in 2008/2009. The prominence of macroprudential regulation now provides a chance to reorientate regulation to support monetary stability. Early signs are not promising.

This paper examines global data on unbanked and underbanked consumers to highlight the role improved financial literacy and capability could play in motivating and enabling the safe and beneficial use of financial services. The paper uses Global Findex data, a demand-side survey on ownership and use of accounts at formal financial institutions, such as a bank or similar financial institution, or a mobile money service provider. The paper reviews the self-reported barriers to account ownership and use cited by unbanked adults and identifies the challenges faced by account owners who could not use an account without help. Together, these issues point to the importance of financial education to improve digital and financial literacy skills, in addition to product design that considers customer abilities, and strong consumer safeguards to ensure that customers benefit from financial access.

Few retirees use reverse mortgages. In this paper, we investigate how financial literacy and prior knowledge of the product influence take-up by conducting a stated-preference experiment. We exogenously manipulate characteristics of reverse mortgages to tease out how consumers value them and investigate differences by financial literacy and prior knowledge of reverse mortgages. We find that those with higher financial knowledge are more likely to know about reverse mortgages, not more likely to purchase them at any cost but are more sensitive to the interest rate and the insurance value of these products in terms of the non-negative equity guarantee.

Efficiencies of Agricultural Credit Associations of the US Farm Credit System are measured quarterly from 2005 through 2020. A slacks-based measure based on the directional distance function is used with non-performing loans included as an undesirable output. This permitted efficiency scores to be measured by type of defined input or output. Generally, most Associations were highly efficient, but there was deterioration in mean efficiency over the years 2008–2018, a period of financial difficulties in the US agriculture. Efficiencies of Associations that merged or consolidated were tracked before and after these activities. Mergers and consolidations often led to increased efficiencies.