To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This article examines the relationship between foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) and the degree of personalism in dictatorships. We contend that aid leads to higher personalism since it is a windfall that accrues to the government and does not require cooperation from elites to obtain it. Contrarily, we posit that FDI is linked to lower levels of personalism because it reshapes elites’ incentives and influence as they may acquire new preferences, connections, and exit options, thus constraining dictators. Using data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and FDI, and a latent index of personalism in autocracies, we find no robust evidence that ODA or FDI are correlated with personalism, but have some effect on some of the index’s components.
We quantify the impacts of a potential Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement under negotiation at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The analysis is based on an innovative multiregion general equilibrium simulation model including bilateral representative firms. Consideration is given to foreign direct investment (FDI) and monopolistic competition. The model shows empirically relevant gains associated with removal of investment barriers in the form of transaction costs faced by foreign investors. The expected global welfare gains range between 0.56% and 1.74% depending on the depth of a potential IFD Agreement. The benefits are concentrated among the participants of the agreement with the highest welfare increase for the low-income and middle-income countries. Notable spillovers accrue to nonparticipants, which can be further increased by joining the agreement. Our results contribute to the relatively scarce research on investment facilitation and provide policymakers with information on the potential effects of the negotiated IFD Agreement.
This chapter examines how the facilitation of foreign direct investment (FDI) through the World Trade Organization (WTO) can contribute to fulfilling the right to development and achieving UN Sustainable Development Goals. It assesses how the WTO facilitates investment related to sustainable development in developing countries through liberalization of trade in services, restrictions on trade-related investment measures, and promotion of intellectual property rights. The study finds that reform efforts to make these WTO disciplines more conducive to sustainable development have been slow and of limited significance. The chapter also looks at how investment is facilitated through investment treaties and domestic investment legislation, highlighting the importance of domestic investment legislation for promoting investment for sustainable development, particularly for least developed countries. Finally, the chapter discusses whether and how the draft WTO Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement can most effectively achieve its objective in relation to countries most in need of development-related investment, considering the relative roles of the home and host states of FDI.
International investments yield returns in the forms of multinational profits, dividends and interest on equity and debt, and the charges on bank loans. These payments are recorded in the current account of the balance of payments and constitute a significant component of many countries' current accounts. Foreign direct investment- (FDI)-generated income is often channeled by firms through countries with low tax rates and regulations. Emerging markets regularly have large FDI income deficits, but a substantial portion of these payments are reinvested. Portfolio securities provide income from diversified securities and lower risk. Global banking offers financing from foreign sources, which may support stability during periods of domestic crises.
This paper examines a causal relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and firms' pollution intensity by exploiting the policy of China's FDI access relaxation in 2002. The result shows that FDI leads to a significant reduction in firms' pollution intensity. The mechanism tests find that FDI reduces pollution intensity by increasing firms' productivity, pollution management abilities, and the output of lightly polluting firms. The effect primarily acts on firms in lightly polluting industries and firms in the eastern region. The findings support the pollution halo hypothesis and provide implications for developing countries like China by evaluating the effectiveness of policies to attract FDI.
Despite the influx of Chinese FDI at the dawn of the 21st century and decades of neo-liberal, market-oriented economic policies in Africa, the pervasive nature of institutional voids (particularly in the labor market) has been constantly flagged as an impediment to socio-economic development in the continent. This has prompted calls for more research into the ability of independent African states to pursue viable labor market policy options, from a business system perspective. While institutional theory (specifically the notion of institutional voids) suggests the use of market-supporting and contract-enforcement structures and processes to enable the efficient functioning of the economy, it does not address the effect of strong external ‘powers’ on weak local institutions in developing countries. This study qualitatively explores how the shifting geopolitical landscape (power) from Western to Chinese sources of FDI shaped the nature and evolution of labor market institutions in Cameroon. The findings show that an entrenched parochial and crony Cameroonian institutional context was at the mercy of transnational forces playing a pivotal role, rather than coherent national socio-economic policy options, in shaping labor market institutions in the country. In an act of political complicity, the dynamics that flowed from Chinese FDI have engendered a regressive turn toward the failed nationalistic labor market policies pursued by Cameroon after independence. This article contributes to revealing the debilitating role of Chinese and Western FDI, and the ensuing dynamics, in the creation and sustenance of labor market institutions in a parochial developing economic context characterized by regulative institutional voids.
Why are politicians selective in granting investment incentives to foreign direct investment (FDI) projects? One understudied reason is that politicians want to minimize backlash from voters. In this article, I present the first study to systematically analyze voter preferences toward investment incentives. I theorize that voters should be more likely to support investment incentives for FDI projects that they perceive as “high quality”—that is, projects that voters perceive to be highly effective in improving the living standards of their communities. As a result, I expect that politicians who support low-quality FDI projects with incentives will lose voter support. A factorial survey experiment in the United States provides evidence in favor of this argument. Voters reward politicians only if they provide investment incentives to high-quality projects. An additional conjoint survey experiment highlights the importance of project characteristics that indicate high quality in increasing the approval of investment incentives. To demonstrate the external validity of these experimental results, I present descriptive evidence that illustrates the consistencies between the determinants of investment incentives for FDI projects and voter preferences.
This chapter investigates how ‘society at large’ interacts with the world of international arbitration, now and for the foreseeable future. This broad topic can be made more manageable by breaking down the interaction through four focus groups within society: the media, academia, arbitration ‘clubs’, and civil society NGOs. These groups provide services to the world of international arbitration but are mostly instead what Emmanuel Gaillard terms ‘value providers’ – seeking to influence its normative structure. This chapter also touches on international and professional organisations, which are also significant value providers.
One key question is whether and how international arbitration may be expanding or at least becoming more visible through the four focus groups. A second is whether it may be becoming more diverse and indeed polarised. The chapter presents empirical evidence of ongoing ‘lawyerisation’, hence renewed concern about costs and delays. It also considers the impact of burgeoning investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases and coverage, especially in the general media. Analysis of newspapers in Australia and the United Kingdom as well as social media reports confirms that views about ISDS remain overwhelmingly negative – a new development that could increasingly shape the overall perceptions of international arbitration held within society at large.
After establishing why people migrate, in this chapter we turn to an investigation of how migrants economically re-engage with their homeland. Specifically, we explore how migrants facilitate flows of international financial capital. We argue that migrants, because they possess critical knowledge about investment opportunities in their homelands, help international investors overcome information asymmetries which drives both portfolio and foreign direct investment into their homelands. Our empirical analyses leverage a wide range of data on migrant stocks and portfolio and foreign direct investment to test our argument. We find that migrants are key to explaining international capital flows, especially in environments where formal political institutions that protect property rights are absent or weak.
Migration is among the central domestic and global political issues of today. Yet the causes and consequences - and the relationship between migration and global markets – are poorly understood. Migration is both costly and risky, so why do people decide to migrate? What are the political, social, economic, and environmental factors that cause people to leave their homes and seek a better life elsewhere? Leblang and Helms argue that political factors - the ability to participate in the political life of a destination - are as important as economic and social factors. Most migrants don't cut ties with their homeland but continue to be engaged, both economically and politically. Migrants continue to serve as a conduit for information, helping drive investment to their homelands. The authors combine theory with a wealth of micro and macro evidence to demonstrate that migration isn't static, after all, but continuously fluid.
We provide selective account of how and why the share of Asia in the world economy has more than quadrupled in the past half-century. In 1970, Asia (excluding Japan) accounted for around 9 per cent of the world economy. At the turn of the twenty-first century, this had climbed to 18 per cent and today exceeds 40 per cent. Asian growth has occurred rapidly regardless of political system, institutional arrangements or policy cocktails. We illustrate how far the Asian economies have come and how far they have left to go to attain the living standards of Europe or North America. For example, in India and China income per capita went from just under 5 per cent of the US level each to around 11 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively from 1970 to 2020. The main drivers of growth have been the accumulation of capital and labour along with improvements in the quality of the labour force. We also concentrate on the features that are both a cause and a consequence of the connections world. These include export-led growth, the role of the state, political systems and economic institutions, but also inequality. In so doing, we set the scene for the chapters that follow.
We find that most Asian economies are not very innovative by international standards, though in line with their level of development. Asian economies mostly obtain their technologies from abroad through FDI or via technological diffusion. However, FDI to Asia has been modest and entrepreneurship limited, largely as a consequence of the connections world. Politicians and business groups have been mutually supportive in erecting barriers to entry. As a result, most innovation has been within business groups or by new firms entering new sectors where existing business groups were absent or had not managed to erect unscalable entry barriers. However, three countries have developed some base for innovation: China, India and South Korea. In each, efforts to construct a supportive ecosystem, including policies for education, science and technology, as well as encouraging returning migrants with knowledge, are reaping dividends. Each has adopted a rather different model which we discuss in detail. Despite these achievements, the power and influence of the connections world in these three countries also remains a serious brake on their ability to innovate in the future.
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law in May 2000 to encourage increased trade and investment between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It provides eligible countries with duty free access to the US market for over 1800 products in addition to those available under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The benefits extend through 2025. This study explores the link between US trade preferences under AGOA and beneficiary country exports. Using a large US import database, the study examines the extent to which AGOA influences export performance. It also examines the moderating roles of rule of law and foreign direct investment. The results largely indicate that AGOA has a positive and significant effect on beneficiary country exports. It also shows that rule of law moderates the relationship between AGOA and export performance. We believe that AGOA will target foreign direct investment (FDI) to SSA from other advanced regions such as the EU to take advantage of the US market. However, the role of FDI appears to be weak in moderating the relationship between trade preferences (tariff concessions) and exports from beneficiary countries to the US market.
What drives public discontent about Chinese investment on the ground? This study probes the “ground truth” of public reaction in Zambia by documenting both the public perception and the actual impacts of Chinese investments. We find a “reputation deficit” for Chinese investment: Zambians are significantly less likely to support Chinese investment than investment from other countries. Combining results from an original household survey, interview records, and official statistics, we examine the drivers of this reputation deficit. Chinese firms are no worse at generating employment or adhering to labor and environmental standards than Western corporations operating in Zambia, according to official statistics as well as public opinion. However, Chinese firms possess a lower degree of localization, specifically in managers’ knowledge of local languages and the provision of culturally relevant benefits, and they are less likely to engage with the media. Our study highlights these previously overlooked causes of the reputation deficit.
China has become a leading source of outward foreign direct investment (FDI), and the Chinese state exercises a unique degree of influence over its firms. We explore the patterns of political influence over FDI using a comprehensive firm-level data set on Chinese outward FDI from 2000 to 2013. Using six country-level measures of affinity for China, we find that state-owned and globally diversified firms appear to conform most closely to official guidance. Official investment directives and state visits link investments to state policies; Taiwan recognition and Dalai Lama meetings anchor our political interpretations; and UN General Assembly voting and temporary UN Security Council membership suggest that this intervention may be systematic. The results are robust to country, year, and sector fixed effects, and most do not hold for private or small firms. The results suggest that China uses FDI by prominent state-owned enterprises as an instrument to promote its foreign policy.
In this article I develop a new theory of how globalization in the form of increasing potential foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows affects democratization. As the level of potential FDI inflows increases, workers become more willing to support democratization because of the large wage benefits from liberalizing FDI under democracy, while capitalists become less willing to support democratization because of their increasing need for protection from the dictator in the form of FDI restrictions. Increased demand for protection allows dictators to extract larger share of rents from capitalists. The effect of increasing potential FDI on democratization is ambiguous because it increases both workers’ incentive to revolt and dictators’ resistance to democratization.
Both the knowledge and technology diffusion literature largely focus on adoption and adaptation at country and firm levels. The literature on how knowledge and technology are transferred, adopted and adapted at the level of the individual remains under-researched. Based on a unique employees and managers MNE in Ghana in 2015 and using social network analysis, this chapter examines the transfer of knowledge at the individual level and presents new evidence on the role of managerial knowledge diffusion from MNEs to host countries. Our results indicate that knowledge flows occurs from MNEs to local people. We, however, found that foreign knowledge transfer, particularly from Chinese MNEs and EU MNEs, is similar. The results also suggest that firm network structures influence knowledge transfer within firms, with the more decentralized MNEs and local workers in Chinese MNEs tending to perform better. In terms of policy recommendation, the chapter suggests that trade policies must focus on the stimulation of FDI inflows through MNEs that have decentralized subsidiary structure as they tend to serve as a better conduit for knowledge transfer to local employees
Foreign knowledge and technology enhance the technological capability of local firms. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are key channels through which foreign knowledge flows and is transferred. This chapter reviews different types of foreign knowledge sources and the factors that ensure success in the adaption of foreign know-how to the local context. The results show that formal firms tend to have higher local technological capability are more likely to adopt and adapt foreign knowledge and technologies. Interaction with foreign firms through imports and collaboration are important sources of knowledge. The managerial localisation strategies in Chinese firms is also identified in our case study to offer an essential learning potential for local firms.
Based on the concept of limited and open access orders (LAO/OAO), this paper explains what appears to be a paradox: how was it possible that a former civil war country, Mozambique, which had been extremely successful in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and which the International Monetary Fund praised as a great Sub-Sahara African success story in 2007, only a few years later found itself on the brink of a new civil war? We argue that the destabilization of the country was the result of a toxic mix of domestic politics and a massive inflow of FDI. FDI provided rents to an increasingly dominant state party, FRELIMO, which could be appropriated one-sidedly. It then used these rents to oppress RENAMO, its previous civil war enemy and currently its main opposition party, to monopolize power. This strategy seemed to be successful until RENAMO, faced with the risk of being politically marginalized (and of losing its rents accordingly), returned to armed conflict in 2013. By analyzing the links between the macro-level of national politics and the micro-level of an enterprise and by embedding the interplay between polity and economy into an international context, the paper also makes a theoretical contribution to the LAO/OAO concept.
In Chapter 7, we focus on the domain of foreign direct investment (FDI). We claim that states often refrain from sharing sensitive economic information, even though it can be important to adjudicating investment disputes. We demonstrate that properly designed IOs, such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), can ameliorate this problem by receiving and protecting sensitive information. We assess our hypotheses using new data on specific pieces of information shared – along with information withheld – from this institution. Specifically, we pair a measure of redactions in publicly released panel reports with qualitative case evidence. We show that key reforms designed to safeguard sensitive information increased the provision of this information and boosted FDI, especially in areas where sensitive information is particularly common. We conclude the chapter by discussing how solving this pervasive issue puts international investment institutions in tension with the normative goals of transparency and accountability.