Building on the concepts of evidence-based medicine, evidence-based management (EBMgmt) suggests that leaders and managers find, evaluate and use the best available scientific evidence to inform their practice. This chapter discusses when and how to look for evidence and outlines how to apply it.

Chapter 6 highlights a few implications for political legitimacy and the theory of legitimacy that can be derived from some of the key points that I have touched upon in Chapters 4 and 5. The implications include the following: (1) the character of a theory of political legitimacy is at the same time conservative and progressive, albeit more progressive than conservative; (2) the scope of evaluation and judgment that a theory of political legitimacy entails must avoid two dangerous paths: the first one is thinking that it is not possible to produce valid evaluations and judgments of legitimacy, and the second one is evaluating and judging all political situations from one’s own perspective; (3) evidence—that is, what people think and feel—can be called upon and mobilized for the evaluation and judgment of legitimacy; and (4) contemporary politics is especially relevant to the discussion of legitimacy.

This chapter depicts the creation, use, and proliferation of imagery by regime propaganda and individuals (despite censorship and prohibitions); discusses problems of the “Nazi gaze” (vis-à-vis victim-generated imagery) and relevance of perpetrator imagery for scholarly analysis (beyond historiography); elimination of corpses (SK 1005) and sites in their interrelation with Nazi attempts to destroy incriminating evidence, and to control messaging and the spatial/physical dimensions of mass violence.

Psychology and law, by their nature, are deeply entwined. Both are about human behavior – understanding it, modifying it, regulating it. Psychology’s research engagement with legal topics enjoys a long history, but until recently has been largely limited to clinical assessment (e.g., capacity, insanity) and police and trial evidence and procedures (e.g., eyewitnesses, jury instructions). The traditional canon of “Psychology & Law” research gained prominence when DNA evidence revealed that many wrongful convictions involved problems foreseen by psychologists. Also, the emergence of “Behavioral Law & Economics” likely provided more legitimacy to law’s engagement with empirical psychology topics and methods, spurring “Law & Psychology” teaching and research in law schools. The expanded range of research can be found across the US law curriculum as illustrated in four main first-year courses – Criminal Law, Torts, Contracts, and Property – and two commonly taken or required courses – Evidence and Professional Responsibility. The current experimental jurisprudence boom has added to the topics and methods used in this research and amplifies the existing trend in which psychology engages more closely with the content and values of law.

This chapter discusses the promise and the pitfalls of conducting social psychological research on mock jurors. The tremendous potential of this methodology to shed light on the psychology of jury decision-making is only beginning to be tapped. We use two recent experiments on the psychology of character assessments as case studies to explore some of the necessary tradeoffs in this methodological design, and to showcase the importance of understanding the psychological underpinnings of our legal doctrines. However, future research must present more diverse stimuli that better reflect the racial and gender composition of parties in real trials. Recognizing how hard it can be to replicate complex psychological processes experimentally, we argue that in some cases we should switch the burden of proof – that is, near-universal psychological processes should be presumed to also occur in the courtroom.

Drawing upon ethnographic research and an analysis of judgments at the Special Anti-Prostitution Court in Mumbai, Chapter 4 shows how rescued women’s testimony is only one (albeit significant) factor shaping the outcomes of trials against the accused. The chapter illustrates how these trials are primarily shaped by the priorities of Indian law, its interpretation by the police and prosecutors, and the possibilities that requirements for “respectable” witnesses both in the ITPA and in Indian procedural law open up for NGOs. It reveals that anti-trafficking NGOs’ participation in the Special Court is neither entirely dependent on victim-witness testimony, nor on proving sex trafficking. Overall, the chapter shows how evidence and testimony at this Special Court is presented to prove prostitution rather than sex trafficking, and how NGOs, police, and other witnesses participate in what the author refers to as the choreography of these trials. Beyond victim-witness testimony, it examines how the testimony of other prosecution witnesses (police officers, NGO workers, and decoy customers), forms of material evidence (cash, packets of condoms and tissues), and medical reports shape ITPA cases and their outcomes at the Mumbai Special Court.

So, here we are at the final chapter, and at this point you might be minded to ask ‘So what?’ Although some of you may have found this book to be so compelling that you have decided to become an epidemiologist, it is likely that most of you will looking for other ways for this epidemiology stuff to value add to your health science learning and ongoing professional or academic lives. In modern life, we are deluged with health information that is provided in multiple formats, including social media, news websites, online videos, televised news bulletins and chat shows, and even academic texts and other published literature. How are we to find something approaching the truth in this plethora of often contradictory information? In its focus on epidemiology, this book has aimed to provide you with the tools for evaluating scientific information using critical thinking – a way of identifying and evaluating evidence that has wide applicability to just about every area of human endeavour.

This chapter clarifies the theoretical arguments through discussion of issues and questions that may arise in conceptualizing, testing, and evaluating not only comprehensive deterrence theory (CDT) but also, more generally, that can arise in deterrence research. For example, it discusses the nature of punishment. Deterrence scholarship understandably has examined the idea that punishments may deter. What has not been systematically theorized or empirically studied is punishment itself. Historical accounts exist, of course. And numerous scholars certainly have detailed many aspects of certain types of punishment, such as the death penalty. However, deterrence scholarship lacks a coherent foundation for predicting the effects of a wide variety of legal punishments, or how to distinguish when one type of punishment meaningfully differs from another. Similarly, there is a great deal of confusion about legal vs. extralegal punishment as well as specific vs. general deterrence. The chapter examines these and other issues with an eye towards clarifying CDT and charting directions for improving deterrence scholarship.

Dispute settlement is at the heart of trade agreements in the twenty-first century. As rules have proliferated, the importance of enforcement has likewise grown. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the focus in trade agreements was state-to-state dispute settlement where one state would bring an action against another for the latter’s breach of the agreement. In recent years, however, the role and design of dispute settlement mechanisms have begun to evolve. This chapter examines that evolution and its future direction. It begins by reviewing recent innovations and the disputes that have arisen under those mechanisms. Next, it studies how these trends have highlighted additional areas for study in the areas of procedures, institutions, and remedies. Finally, the chapter turns to the purpose of dispute settlement mechanisms in trade agreements and argues that the future of dispute settlement is multipurpose and multi-optional.

This chapter of the handbook examines the sanctioning doctrines within Anglo-American criminal law and explores similarities and differences between criminal blame and ordinary social blame. The chapter explores the legal notion of actus reus in the context of intended but incomplete transgressive conduct, the distinction between intended and unintended outcomes, as well as questions of recklessness and the role of a transgressor’s character in ordinary and legal blame. It also explores the possibility that a fundamental human motivation to punish those with bad character can influence perceptions of legal questions such as consciousness of risk. Intuitions about the role of moral character in legal blame have produced legal rules restricting the consideration of prior misdeeds. At the same time, these rules and their interpretation ultimately rest on political and moral judgments, rather than psychological insights. The chapter concludes by briefly exploring some remaining questions of criminal law and intuitive blame, such as the role of cultural commitments on motivations to impose legal blame.